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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the sometimes fantastic nature of spy fiction, the relation between espionage practice and 
its cultural reproductions is not as distinct as intelligence agencies might wish. My dissertation 
breaks from traditional literary analyses of the genre by interrogating how authors, policy 
makers, and the general public talk about spycraft has influenced what that spycraft actually 
entails. Spy fiction and intelligence work are connected in a web of incentivization, influence, 
and reference, and this connection is not merely uni-directional. This dissertation examines 
critical moments of this cross-connection, beginning in the early 20th century with the formation 
of MI6 in relation to William Le Queux’s invasion literature and continuing through today’s 
issues and imaginings of the intelligence community: specifically, torture, drone warfare, and 
domestic surveillance. Throughout, I draw attention to how shifts in masculinity facilitated by 
cultural representations, especially James Bond, have affected intelligence work. I also 
contextualize the role of the “Other” within spy fiction. As a part of this analysis of the Other, I 
trace the lingering Orientalism that has adhered within spy fiction and spy agencies since the late 
19th Century. The alternating give-and-take of intelligence work and its fictionalized 
representations, or, as I term it, the cultural discourse of espionage, is ripe for exploration and 
analysis at the present moment. This combined literary, cultural, and historical approach reveals 
spy fiction as a site to explore broader conceptions of the critic’s role in public discourse. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Espionage as the Loss of Agency 
 
Here are two spy stories. One: In order to assassinate one of the world’s most wanted 
“terrorists”—Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, aka “Carlos the Jackal”—the CIA created a false identity 
for an operative, brainwashed him into becoming a killer, and asked him to engage in violent 
political action of his own. After drawing Carlos’ attention and being recruited into the Jackal’s 
organization, the CIA hoped the operative’s training and mental conditioning would take over, 
ostensibly preparing him to kill the Jackal. In actual practice, his mission ended in failure when 
the agent’s conscience got the better of him. Two: In order to assassinate one of the world’s most 
wanted “terrorists”—PLO leader Yassar Arafat—the Israeli Mossad created a false identity for 
an operative, brainwashed him into becoming a killer, and asked him to engage in violent 
political action of his own. After drawing Arafat’s attention and being recruited into his 
organization, the Mossad hoped their operative’s training and mental conditioning would take 
over, ostensibly preparing him to kill Arafat. In actual practice, his mission ended in failure when 
the agent’s conscience got the better of him. These stories are almost parallel in their structures, 
but the first story is the plot of 1980’s The Bourne Identity, while the second story is of an actual 
operation carried out twelve-years earlier, in 1968, by the Mossad. The Mossad did not base their 
plan on the yet-to-be-written Bourne novel; how preposterous to think that one of the world’s 
leading intelligence agencies would design an operation based on a book. They based it on a 
film. According to historian Ronen Bergman, Mossad commander Binyamin Shalit had seen the 
1962 film The Manchurian Candidate and felt that it made a good model for turning unwitting 
civilians into trained assassins (Bergman 118). The Bourne novel calls to mind the Arafat 
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attempted assassination, which was an idea that stemmed from The Manchurian Candidate. 
What the imbricated nature of these examples points to is the entanglement of the reality and the 
fictions of espionage.  
Here are a few more examples: The story of a high-level Communist traitor in MI6 revealed 
by his former best friend is the true story of Kim Philby and Nicholas Elliot, but also the fictional 
story of Bill Haydon and George Smiley in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. Also, two secret agents 
have actually peeled off a wetsuit to reveal a tuxedo—James Bond in Goldfinger, Dutch agent 
Pete Tazelaar during WWII. When an MI6 source makes up a doomsday weapon to improve the 
life of his family, does one think of Wormold in Our Man in Havana or Source Curveball in the 
run-up to the Iraq War? Was the CIA plan to assassinate Fidel Castro via poisoned wet suit and 
exploding cigars a real CIA plan, or did it happen in a spy spoof from the 60s? (It was real.) 
Despite the revelations that all our digital communications are being scanned by NSA 
algorithms, the general public still has very little direct experience with espionage as a real 
profession. We primarily experience it as a cultural representation of itself, through the pages 
and screens of spy fiction. Evidence like Binyamin Shalit’s Manchurian Candidate-inspired 
assassination plan indicates that this out-sized reliance on cultural representation can extend to 
members of the intelligence world itself. Combined with the secrecy and lack of public 
accountability within spy work, the temptation to enact fantasies into reality has manifested itself 
in some incredibly outlandish plans.  
But what if these fantasies began to shift from the absurd and cartoonish, towards fantasies 
that devalue the human components of intelligence work—both the human agents that make up 
the intelligence agency and the common humanity those agents share with the spied-upon? 
Fantasies in which incentives for efficiency in intelligence work stack one on top of the other, 
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until they form an obscure bureaucracy? Or fantasies for big, splashy, quick results that can end 
up incentivizing more and more spectacular violence? Fantasy enters into the world of action as 
ideology. Examining how these fantasies form, who holds them, and how they become codified 
into policy can give us insight into how the institution of intelligence relates to the cultural idea 
of intelligence. In fact, the two are not separate nor are they separately analyzable. Espionage is a 
discursive entity, one that operates across multiple realms of influence simultaneously. This 
dissertation tracks that influence in fiction, in policy, in public conversation, and in the personal 
histories of quite a few individuals—intelligence agents, spy fiction authors, and intelligence 
agents who became spy fiction authors—who have shaped how the public thinks of spy work. 
My aim is to present, if not exactly a cultural history of espionage, then a history of espionage as 
a cultural force.  
Methodology; or, Why Study Spy Fiction? 
Spies are, in intelligence historian Phillip Knightley’s words, the “second oldest profession,” 
so it’s no surprise that they have been a feature of Western literature since the Old Testament, 
when Joshua sends two spies into Jericho in the Book of Deuteronomy. Even then, it is not 
immediately intuitive how analyzing fictional representation of intelligence work could help us 
understand intelligence work in the real world. In fact, studying spy fiction at all has not always 
been widely accepted among critics. Spy fiction, as a genre that can be classified, analyzed, and 
compared to other novelistic genres, does not emerge until the late nineteenth century. While 
certainly rooted in the “thriller,” spy fiction has branched out from the invasion-paranoia schlock 
put out around the turn of the twentieth century by authors like William Le Queux, whose anti-
German propaganda novels I examine more closely in Chapter Two. As fans of the genre know, 
however, this branching happened almost immediately—with Kipling and Conrad—and yet the 
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mass-market thriller is still a fairly sizable portion of the genre’s continuing presence, 
exemplified by the Tom Clancy/Robert Ludlum/James Patterson airport bestseller. The hyper-
visibility of this kind of spy fiction calls into question its cohesiveness as a genre; in other words, 
is there a difference between spy-fiction—which is mass-market, lowbrow or midbrow at best—
and literature that features spies and/or espionage as central to the plot, works like Conrad’s the 
Secret Agent, Henry James’s Princess Cassamassima, or John Banville’s The Untouchable? 
Critics—and authors—are divided on this question. The result of this generic indeterminacy is 
that spy fiction, like other forms of “genre fiction” like fantasy and sci-fi, has not always been 
considered a rich vein for criticism. Spy novels have been dismissed as mindless entertainment, 
middlebrow fantasies, or as off-brand “divertissements.1” 
Bringing the analysis of spy fiction into a more mainstream critical discourse has largely 
been the purview of the cultural studies movement, as a part of its concern with genre fiction as a 
whole as a meaningful site for ideological coding. Their justifications for doing so largely arise 
from a Jamesonian insistence on the connection between the tropes and conventions of genre and 
the ideological (that is to say, the social) conditions that produce them. Michael Denning, who 
wrote the first generic study of spy fiction and its connection to the social formations that 
conditioned its birth and ascendency, quotes just such a justification from Jameson’s Political 
Unconscious:  
The strategic value of generic concepts for Marxism clearly lies in the mandatory 
function of the notion of a genre, which allows the coordination of immanent formal 
analysis of the individual text with the twin diachronic perspective of the history of forms 
                                                 
1 The “divertissements” self-critique is Graham Greene’s evaluation of his own spy stories, 
indicating that even spy authors themselves are ambivalent about classification of their work. 
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and the evolution of social life…So generic affiliations, and the systematic deviation 
from them, provide clues which lead us back to the concrete historical situation of the 
individual text itself, and allow us to read its structure as ideology, as a socially symbolic 
act, as a protopolitical response to a historical dilemma. (qtd. in Denning 8) 
Taking the idea that individual texts can be, as Jameson says here, a “socially symbolic act,” and, 
elsewhere in the Political Unconscious, representative structures of “particular political 
fantasies,” grants Denning and those such as myself who follow in his footsteps as genre critics 
the license to look at cultural texts as more than simply material ephemera that arise from the 
economic base of reality and then evaporate away like sea foam once their time is spent. While 
always maintaining the importance of thinking of novels as products, the critic can also consider 
them as collections of themes, stock characters, tropes, and perhaps even a few key individual 
artistic touches that are—like the banking system, the auto industry, the two-party US political 
system, and the CIA—part of the mode of production2 itself. The task of the critic becomes, as 
Denning puts it, to account for the “social history of the thriller in terms of its relations of 
production and consumption, and in terms of the ideologemes3 articulated in its characteristic 
formulas” (15). Denning, to whom I am greatly indebted, finds in the spy novel a working-out of 
                                                 
2 Jameson uses and explicates Althusser’s concept of mode of production as “the synchronic 
system of social relations as a whole” and the “only structure that exists” which has branches like 
the economic and cultural instead of privileging one or the other as a determinate “base” 
(Jameson 36). 
3 Denning quotes Jameson to define the term thusly: “The term signifies the basic unit of the 
‘essentially antagonistic collective discourses of social classes…The ideologeme is an 
amphibious formation, whose essential structural characteristic may be described as its 
possibility to manifest itself either as a pseudo-idea—a conceptual or belief system, an abstract 
value, an opinion or prejudice, or as a protonarrative, a kind of ultimate class fantasy about the 
“collective characters” which are the classes in opposition’” (qtd. in Denning 155). For Denning, 
in spy fiction, the class fantasies emerge out of the tension between the agency and the lack of 
agency experienced by the bourgeoisie under late-stage capitalism (Denning 15).  
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the difficulty to “narrate the totality of social relations in the terms of individual experience” in a 
world of late-stage capitalism, a world of imperialism and later neo-imperialism and monopoly. 
The world of late capitalism, in Denning’s analysis, de-agentifies the individual to such an extent 
that the most popular fantasies are ones in which the individual matters—he or she can do 
something on the world-stage, can make a difference. Or, in words that I repeat throughout this 
dissertation: “The secret agent returns human agency to a world which seems less and less the 
product of human action” (14). Denning works out precisely what that means for different 
cultural iterations of a reading public throughout his work. In other words, analyzing spy fiction 
can help us elucidate how ideologies of agency are reproduced and transmitted within a wider 
reading (and watching) public. But what Denning leaves unexamined is why and how espionage 
itself internalizes these ideologies of agency and how it propagates that lack within its own 
bureaucratic and cultural mechanisms. Denning takes it for granted—for reasons I will discuss 
shortly—that spy fiction is reflecting the general malaise of the twentieth century but fails to see 
that reflection as connected to actual practices and developments within espionage. Other critics 
in the Denning vein, such as Alan Hepburn in his monograph Intrigue, have similarly divorced 
the history of intelligence from its fictional representation. My project departs from this tradition 
by reading these histories together, as mutually constitutive discursive formations with very real 
and entwined histories, impacts, and futures. Two questions remain however: what can be gained 
when we examine the reality of espionage with its cultural images, and how can we go about 
describing the relationship in a way that doesn’t overstate fictional determinism nor erects a wall 
between the “real” and the “fake” aspects of espionage? I address these questions below. 
As discussed above, Michael Denning’s focus on the social history of the spy thriller 
largely, and deliberately, ignores the actual history of the intelligence apparatus that the spy 
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thriller claims to represent. Denning dismisses this history because of the nature of that “claim.” 
In short, he determines that it is not a very believable claim in the first place. Realism is, in 
Denning’s view, mystification, or part of the fantasy re-working of social conditions inherent in 
the genre.4 Denning ducks the question of whether or not Le Carré “accurately” depicts spy 
work—he’s skeptical that anyone really does, true, but he’s more content to lay the entire 
relationship between spy fiction and espionage itself aside in order to interrogate the genre’s 
connections with other aspects of the social order. “Realism” in spy fiction is itself, according to 
Denning, a telling ideologeme, one that emerges as the thriller as a genre grapples with the end 
of the age of imperialism and the game-filled, boy-adventure novel ethos that defined popular 
culture during it—think Rudyard Kipling’s Kim (33). The turn in spy fiction to intricate 
description of tradecraft (of espionage as “work” instead of play or adventure), more complex 
characters, and moral shades of grey respond to audience demand in a world in which the fantasy 
of exotic5 adventure in “defence of the realm” is replaced by the fantasy of understanding the 
intricate bureaucratic and technocratic machinery of modernity. What is depicted in spy fiction, 
in Denning’s analysis, whether it is the martini-flavored adventures of Bond-like super spies or 
the stale-beer tinged musings of George Smiley, does not correspond to reality or need to 
correspond to reality. And there is a point to be made here; while some strange things have 
happened in the history of intelligence departments,6 I doubt any spy has had to actually run 
                                                 
4 He terms it a “feigned realism, a sleight-of-hand totality” (29). In other words, realism exists to 
draw the reader into the novel—as a literary device. 
5 Whether exotic in the sense of “over there” (the Orient, or Africa, etc.) as in Kim or in the sense 
of “out of the ordinary” as in the jolting arrival of the spy Scudder into Richard Hannay’s 
drawing room in The Thirty-Nine Steps.  
6 For example, the CIA once tried to spy on the Soviet embassy by implanting microphones in 
stray cats (Macrakis 382). 
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down the outside of the Burj Khalifa, as Tom Cruise’s Ethan Hunt has to do in the fourth 
Mission: Impossible film.   
However, I argue that it is a mistake to reduce the relevance of spy fiction to espionage as 
a political, governmental and social institution to either 1) a debate over representational 
accuracy or 2) a generic convention that masks an ideological shift in working- and middle-class 
escapism. In other words, what spy fiction says about espionage and the ideologies of espionage 
is no less worthy of critical attention than what the genre might say about other aspects of the 
mode of production, and that while both Denning and I take it for granted that the details of 
espionage practice in spy fiction might be better understood as thematic or ideological points of 
interest instead of historical accuracies, we disagree about the size of the social map that those 
points of interest are plotted on. I argue that the social institution of intelligence—a central 
institution connected directly to state power—should also be included in good faith in the study 
and analysis of spy fiction. The following passage, once again from Jameson’s The Political 
Unconscious, has particular relevance for this claim: 
We may suggest that from this perspective, ideology is not something which informs or 
invests symbolic production; rather the aesthetic act is itself ideological, and the 
production of aesthetic or narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own 
right, with the function of inventing imaginary or formal “solutions” to unresolvable 
social contradictions. (79)    
Clearly, Denning and other critics have very helpfully brought to light how the genre and 
individual works within it engage with, express (both overtly and covertly) and resolve a wide 
variety of these social contradictions. But in ignoring the history of real intelligence, critics like 
Denning and Hepburn miss how these works function as imaginary (in some cases wish-
 9 
fulfilling) solutions for the fractures and disagreements in the ideological fabric of the 
intelligence community. Though spy novels, stories and films are aesthetic products, their 
production includes the translating of political and social ideology, including ideologies of 
intelligence work itself, into a consumable and culturally-available narrative.7 At times, these 
narratives have been taken up by figures within the intelligence community itself, becoming 
something more than illustrative, but actually impactful in the policy decisions that guide 
intelligence work.  
Take, as a quick example I elaborate on in detail in Chapter Four from which the former 
title of this dissertation is taken, “Bond with Burgess.” What does it mean to place the most 
famous fictional spy in a critical conversation with some of the most infamous real ones? Guy 
Burgess was one of the Cambridge Spies, a group of upper-class government servants and 
intelligence professionals who converted to communism at Cambridge and then worked as 
Soviet agents through World War Two and the beginning years of the Cold War. The uncovering 
of the Cambridge spies was public spectacle of the highest order, and much of the initial 
conversation around Burgess concerned his homosexuality and its relation to his betrayal of the 
U.K. I believe that a crucial factor in Bond’s invention and immediate popularity was Ian 
Fleming’s revision and reworking of the cultural image of the secret agent as aggressively 
heterosexual, and thus, to a homophobic public and intelligence community, “trustworthy.” Bond 
is one of those “imaginary or formal ‘solutions’” of which Jameson speaks in the quote above. In 
                                                 
7 The separateness of the aesthetic, social, economic, and political realms being that which is 
explicitly rejected in Jameson’s explanation of Althusser’s “mode of production.” As Jameson 
argues, “social life is in its fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single 
inconceivable and transindividual process, in which there is no need to invent ways of linking 
language events and social upheavals or economic contradictions because on that level they were 
never separate from each other” (40). 
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this case, the contradiction that Bond resolves was the relationship between the gentlemanly, 
Oxbridge-educated, aristocratic concept of the ideal spy held by MI6 and that same image’s 
linkage to homosexuality and Communism—a link which becomes an extremely public 
embarrassment for the intelligence community in the exposure and defection of the Cambridge 
Spy Ring. As I show, this linkage has, in fact, a longer history in spy fiction than the mid-century 
defections of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean (and later, Kim Philby)—as well as the 
emergence of Bond as the cultural image of the spy—might lead one to believe. Bond is 
indicative of a change in attitude about and around masculinity within espionage and in popular 
culture. I examine the social, historical, ideological and literary developments that led to his rise 
and continuing popularity. Intelligence workers and policy-makers, journalists who work on 
intelligence matters, and spy-fiction writers themselves are a particular subset of the producers 
and consumers of spy fiction, and whether they intend it or not, spy fiction serves to mediate 
between their actual professional lives and the public’s understanding of what they do. And so I 
see it as a rich battleground of competing ideas and ideologies, like those surrounding the 
Cambridge Spies and Bond. These contradictions and their resolutions in and out of spy fiction 
have molded the ideology of institutionalized intelligence agencies, and thus, are a rich vein of 
inquiry for critics to explore instead of ignore.  
In doing this exploration, one is inevitably confronted by the idea that espionage in its 
broadest form—its practices, leading figures, policies, narratives—is best described as a kind of 
cultural discourse. Tracing the development of espionage as a discourse entails tracing its 
historic forms and representations. Espionage’s first few thousand years—whether they began 
when Joshua sent two spies into Jericho or even earlier—were quite irregular. Private individuals 
and small networks working directly for a head of state composed the less-than official spy rings 
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of pre-modernity. Not until Britain formed an Office of Military Intelligence in order to better 
play the “Great Game” of imperialism in South and Central Asia in the 1870s did espionage 
enter into the bureaucracy of the modern state. With that change came more people involved, 
which meant more exposure, and the secret world began to be talked about, reported on, 
imagined, and dreamed on an unprecedented scale. When espionage became the function of 
dedicated spy agencies, employing dozens, then hundreds, then thousands, tens of thousands, 
hundreds of thousands of people, it became a balancing act, one that teetered between secrecy 
and exposure. The amount and type of cultural texts about espionage proliferated, and, indeed, 
are continuing to proliferate. But the nature of spy work means that not all of these texts will be 
accurate, not all of them will be confirmed, not all of them will be released, not all of them will 
be official, not all of them will be fiction—in other words, the desire to know is great, in many 
cases (especially in matters of political rivalry and war) the urgent need to know is great, but the 
knowledge itself…well, it can’t be confirmed or denied. One of the early texts of post-colonial 
theory—a theory that itself formed in the cultural context of the Cold War and its anxieties of 
secrecy and exposure—is Edward Said’s Orientalism, which situates intelligence gathering 
within a long tradition og imperial knowledge production and cultural discourse. As Edward Said 
explains in his discussions of the textual origins of Orientalism:  
A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual [and arising out of 
an amorphous, hard to understand, obscure-to-the-public context] is not easily 
dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, 
and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its 
practical successes warrant. Most important, such texts can create not only 
knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such 
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knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a 
discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given 
author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. (94) 
In an extremely similar vein, which is not at all a coincidence given the considerable overlap 
between Orientalism and the creation of spy agencies, the discourse of espionage arrives and 
shapes knowledge of spy craft both for the general public and, as I argue throughout this 
dissertation, within the political institutions of espionage as well. This process is exacerbated as 
intelligence workers themselves become producers of spy fiction, as the veneer of reality 
conferred by, say, John le Carré’s former profession induces audiences to take his fiction at face 
value, and as they become consumers of spy fiction who then go on to produce intelligence 
policy.  
The emphasis in my work is on how the cultural products of spy fiction depict resolutions 
to ideological contradictions in the intelligence community and also how they, by virtue of being 
products consumed in the public sphere, help to map the contours of how 1) the intelligence 
community thinks about itself and acts on that knowledge and 2) how the public thinks about the 
intelligence community and acts on that knowledge. This approach owes a debt to the ideas of 
cultural historians like Mary Renda, whose book Taking Haiti identifies the role the cultural 
discourse of paternalism—as expressed in popular culture, newspapers, political rhetoric, the 
diaries, journals and letters of soldiers, and literary texts—played in the American occupation of 
Haiti in the first half of the twentieth century. Renda’s argument, like my own, is premised upon 
historian Joan Scott’s conception of discourse as “a historically specific ‘structure of statements, 
terms, categories, and beliefs’ generated within a particular social and institutional context”; 
Renda is drawn to this definition because it “emphasizes the institutional relations of power that 
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undergird processes of signification” (23). The emphasis on mapping those institutional relations 
of power—doing the historical work of uncovering the “particular social and institutional 
context”—is essential for Renda’s argument that culture acts through its products, that a cultural 
discourse can influence and incentivize behavior and policy. Incentivization occurs by forming 
coherent collective identities. Belonging to an institution, and enjoying the privileges therein, 
becomes less and less distinct from holding institutional beliefs. If one wants the privileges as 
outlined in the cultural discourse, one conforms. Though she does not reference Jameson, her 
argument resonates with how he treats the cultural as a part of the material (and not as a trivial 
superstructure) and how Renda emphasizes the specific historical and material origins of certain 
cultural discourses. Cultural processes, Renda reminds us, are “never wholly distinct from 
economics, politics, and military practice,” and the material effects of the cultural discourse of 
paternalism, for example, can be read in how that discourse “gives shape and form to human 
bodies, the physical environment, and the material resources and tools wielded by human actors” 
through processes such as the production of uniforms and guns, the military training that 
conditioned soldiers’ bodies and minds, and the economic incentives that led to exploitation of 
Haitian labor by American companies (23, 24). In order, then, to fully explicate a discourse’s 
effects, Renda teaches us that one needs to do some history, to dig into the material origins of a 
discourse in addition to the cultural and textual. And so I, in order to interrogate how the 
discourse of espionage is influenced by and influences spy fiction, on the one hand, and how it is 
influenced by and influences the more-readily-visible-as-material8 practices and institutions of 
“real” espionage, on the other hand, have had to do some historicizing myself. Thus, I ground 
                                                 
8 Since the aesthetic is just another aspect of the material mode of production itself (in its 
Althusserian form as the totality of social relations), it is no less “material” than institutional 
history, economics, etc., though we sometimes see it as less so.  
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readings of individual texts in historical contexts, and analyze overarching trends in spy fiction 
in relation to the changing profession of intelligence work. James Bond novels and films do not 
cause spy agencies to act a certain way, but the culture that produces Bond incentivizes a certain 
kind of intelligence practice by certain kinds of intelligence agents. Additionally, the fictional 
Bond adventures have proven to be useful for the public and intelligence workers themselves to 
make sense of that incentivizing structure. Thus, it is necessary to include cultural production in 
telling the history of the development of intelligence culture, a development which has shaped 
intelligence practice. They are intertwined.  
Renda writes that—at any given moment—what we experience as culture is the “sum 
total of a collection of overlapping but not coincident discourses and fragments of discourses” 
(26). The cultural discourse of espionage is one of these constitutive cultures but is also itself 
made up of smaller discursive fragments, each arising from a combination of political demand, 
institutional (bureaucratic) logic, and other, pre-existing cultural discourses— such as 
Orientalism or the discourse of military masculinity. It’s an intricate terrain, with cross-cutting 
pieces that, given the size and power of intelligence agencies, has resulted in abrupt policy shifts 
and institutional in-fighting with tremendous stakes in terms of human lives, freedoms, and 
rights (for example, the right to privacy). Currently, this discourse of espionage is both 
influenced by and significantly contributes to a global climate of mistrust and fear of espionage 
agencies, primarily driven by their disregard for legal and normative concepts such as national 
sovereignty, expressed declarations of war, due process of law, and individual civil rights. For 
example, the Senate investigative report on the CIA’s use of torture in the “War on Terror” and 
its revelations about the culture of the world’s largest intelligence service are sobering, but given 
the history of the organization, not surprising. In this work, I will contextualize the post-9/11 
 15 
willingness by intelligence departments to engage in torture, as well as the two other most recent 
controversial intelligence practices: the invention and proliferation of drone surveillance and 
strikes as well as the NSA domestic surveillance program. Far from being separate issues from 
human spy work, the increased use of torture, drone strikes, and computerized domestic 
surveillance arise from an intelligence apparatus that is steeped in a culture of hyper-
masculinization and the tendency to take a reduced view of the subjectivity and general humanity 
of anyone not locatable in an increasingly narrower definition of “us”—by which I mean those 
who can be “safely” invested with political agency. Intelligence agencies, of course, have always 
been inherently nationalistic, imperialist, conservative, and focused on the defense of the nation-
state to the extent that they are willing to engage in unethical behavior. But, I argue that this 
narrowing has excluded possible dissenting voices from the intelligence community and has 
resulted in a culture that treats even its own agents as disposable tools instead of as human 
actors, and its opponents as targets to be eliminated instead of as human assets that can 
themselves be converted to “our” side. This de-agentifying culture is reflected in the discourse of 
espionage, composed of training manuals, press releases, internal memos, and, yes, in spy fiction 
across all forms of media, both those texts created by those with a familiarity with intelligence 
operations and those which exist more generally in the public sphere. The discourse does more, 
though, than passively reflect an already-existent culture; it also and more importantly shapes the 
vocabularies and tenets of espionage within the closed-off world of intelligence work and 
without it, in the public sphere, when those of us without privileged access are forced to grapple 
with the actions of the governmental organizations, contracted corporations, and political and 
juridical systems that make up the “shadowy world” of espionage. Thus, the Predator drone and 
domestic surveillance are not radical breaks from some static and reliable existing tradition of 
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spy thrillers as reassuring fantasies; rather they are the most recent answers to questions that spy 
fiction has wrestled with throughout its history: Who can be a spy? What do spies do? What is 
the relation between intelligence gathering and state discipline? Are individuals reliable and do 
they matter on the global stage? Or, as Renda asks, “How does the state benefit from cultural 
processes that were set in motion by official actions, but that took shape most likely beyond 
official control?” (Renda 21). This work focuses on how those questions have been answered 
historically and culturally, by individual authors, individual intelligence agents, government 
bureaucracies, and the genres of spy fiction and film.  
Studying espionage as a cultural discourse allows us to make claims that representations 
of spy work can influence and incentivize actual behaviors within the intelligence world, but we 
are still missing how that influence and incentivization operates on the institutional and personal 
level. Critics of Renda might point out that her claims that culture “does” are not 
uncontroversial, and so I hope to answer some of this criticism in my project. Espionage 
provides us with a unique model for examining how culture can mold and be molded by 
multifarious discrete phenomena. My thinking along these lines has been in part shaped by 
scholar Erin Carlston, whose work Double Agents examines the nexus of Jewishness, 
Communism, homosexuality, literature, and espionage in the Dreyfuss affair, the Cambridge 
defections, and the Rosenberg trial. In her introduction, Carlston tries to articulate the role of the 
literary in these social events. The following three quotes elucidate her thinking: 
Tracing the imaginative and expressive forms in which ideas about, for example, 
citizenship and difference have been posed enables me to recover the imprints of 
concepts that have otherwise largely disappeared from public discourse (2). 
 
 17 
The Dreyfus Affair and Proust’s response to it provides the imaginative map for my 
analysis of how particular identities become ever more closely identified with espionage 
in the course of the twentieth century (7). 
 
The writers thus helped construct the framework within which the treason of the so-called 
Cambridge spies—Burgess, Maclean, Kim Philby, and Anthony Blunt—would 
eventually be received and understood (7). 
Carlston’s three metaphoric terms here—“imprints of concepts,” “imaginative map,” 
“framework”—indicate a kind of relation between cultural discourse and public action that is not 
merely descriptive. In her first formulation, culture has defined concepts used to judge Dreyfuss, 
Burgess and Maclean, and the Rosenbergs. This judgment is both in public discourse, but also 
legalistic—the discourse around citizenship and treason is a performative speech act when it is in 
the court. In her second formulation, culture (here, specifically Proust’s response to the Dreyfuss 
affair), maps the relationship between identity categories and government bureaucracy, creating 
a vocabulary for individual selves to address their subjecthood in the face of state surveillance. In 
her third formulation, culture (here, the writings of W.H. Auden and Stephen Spender) shapes 
public understanding of a fairly complex and complicated event (the Cambridge spy defections). 
The cultural preparation provided by Auden among others, Carlston argues, provided a readily-
available meaning that could be easily attached to commentary about Burgess, Maclean, Philby, 
etc. Carlston’s three formulations about cultural discourse envision it as a force that “does,” a 
conception that Mary Renda and other cultural critics share. Specifically, Carlston’s conception 
of cultural discourse “does” by shaping and influencing the thinking about discrete historical 
events. In some cases, the discursive speech is behavior itself, as in a court or policy decision. In 
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other cases, the effect is indirect, preparing attitudes and beliefs that then motivate acts. I follow 
from Carlston and Renda in trying to formulate an idea of cultural discourse that is analyzable 
and actionable, so that we can, in the hope of changing both for the better, interrogate the relation 
between how we talk about espionage and its practices.    
Let’s imagine the cultural discourse of espionage as a field composed of all the ways 
people engage with the subject—official ways, unofficial ways, political ways, technological 
ways, aesthetic ways, etc. Various components of that discourse can become over-determined, 
sometimes deliberately—such as when an intelligence chief issues a policy directive, or regime 
change ushers in a new set of ideologies—and sometimes as a result of historical and cultural 
particulars, as in the way the Cambridge defections managed both to re-ignite a long simmering 
cultural belief that homosexuality was correlated with treason and tap into a feeling among 
intelligence professionals that the “old boys club” model of intelligence work was outmoded 
after WWII. As these components become over-determined, they become nodes of reference; 
eventually, these nodes dominate the conversation entirely, and individual entities (individuals, 
but also organizations, or even the public itself) make meaning of the discourse as a whole by 
either gravitating toward a node due to incentivization or away from one to another. The 
structure that emerges is what I call a “cultural lattice”, a connection of these nodes within a 
cultural discourse that so takes over the public conversation about that discourse that it comes to 
be seen as the “real thing,” though it is only a bare-bones representation. While reality is diffuse, 
difficult to append meaning to, a squirming thing, the cultural lattice is the squamous box, a 
structure that allows for explanation and meaning to be made by placing its constituent parts in 
relation to each other. Cultural lattices can emerge in a wide variety of discourses, but in 
espionage, the cultural lattice serves as the primary meaning-making frame of reference because 
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the reality of the profession is almost excessive in its obscurity. For example, take the following, 
recent exchange from NPR’s national radio program, Here and Now. The host, Robin Young, is 
speaking to the White House Correspondent Tamara Keith about the recent ouster of Russian 
diplomats, widely regarded to be intelligence officers (i.e. spies), in response to the (widely-
speculated by the U.K., U.S., and E.U.) Russian poisoning of a former Soviet double-agent on 
British soil. Keith has just mentioned that the Russian diplomats were suspected spies: 
Tamara Keith, White House correspondent: The U.S. has now, as a part of this broader 
coalition, in solidarity with the U.K., expelling sixty of what they describe as undeclared 
Russian intelligence officers. Sixty is a big number! It’s a much bigger number than other 
countries. Of course, we are also a very big country.  
Robin Young, host: Also, I’m not meaning to be flip here, but if you watch The 
Americans, which is based on facts, there seems to be a lot of Russian spies in the 
country. (Here and Now) 
The TV show The Americans is decidedly not based on any particular factual case—it merely 
features some aspects of real intelligence work and some details from various cases the creator of 
the show, Joe Weisberg, an ex-CIA agent, encountered in his espionage career9. But for Robin 
Young, the TV show’s premise that Soviet agents had at one time been in deep cover in the U.S. 
as a married couple with children who just-so-happen to live next door to an FBI agent (yes, 
really, that is the initial set-up) carries descriptive power of the real of espionage work, and in 
fact offers information about a current geopolitical situation within intelligence work. The 
                                                 
9 For some specific examples—like how bad wigs are more faithful to intelligence work than the 
CIA would care to admit, see this 2013 interview with Weisberg in Rolling Stone: 
https://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/the-americans-invade-new-yorks-paley-center-
20131005 
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fictional work shapes Young’s understanding of actual espionage work, and in her capacity as a 
journalist, she reinforces that connection. Note that this kind of referencing is not just the case 
for the lay-public, but for intelligence professionals as well. Thus, we find the head of the CIA, 
Allen Dulles, seeking to hire operatives who will act like James Bond (Kinzer 274). As we will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 5, Dulles knew better than most that Bond’s spy work was not 
perfectly coincident with the “real thing,” but still used Bond to make sense of the agency’s pivot 
toward covert action. Furthermore, because the node of Bond was equally present to the public, 
we let Dulles do it—it made sense to the public that a spy agency would want James Bonds. 
Only by analyzing the cultural lattice of espionage can we see that any history of the profession 
is a cultural history, an intermixing of representation, misrepresentation and fact. The critic’s job 
is to analyze how the nodes of the cultural lattice have crystallized into the frame of easy 
reference, and to unpack the effect of that crystallization on those who make, enact, and allow 
intelligence policy.  
A Brief Overview of the Entwined Histories of Espionage as a Practice and Espionage as a 
Cultural Product 
As discussed above, espionage is simultaneously a set of: practices, for example digital 
surveillance; policies, for example official determinations where the CIA is allowed to operate; 
cultural beliefs, for example, that spy work is primarily in the field; cultural products, for 
example, The Americans; and intelligence workers themselves. Determining how these 
components interact requires parsing their entwined histories. One place to start in doing so is 
thinking about the point of espionage in the first place, the “why of spy”: the finding of unknown 
strategic knowledge. This knowledge is gathered from people, in some fashion—by which I 
mean directly, through conversation or coercion, or indirectly, through many different possible 
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kinds of surveillance. After being gathered from its many disparate sources, this knowledge 
becomes crystalized, passed up the hierarchical rungs of vast bureaucracies so that those properly 
credentialed can make decisions based on it. In other words, knowledge in espionage is presented 
as always and ultimately a balancing act between the individual and the institutional. This 
ambivalence—or rather, this conflict—has not been conclusively resolved in the history of 
intelligence, or, as we will see, in spy fiction. This has meant that the growth and expansion of 
intelligence institutions has been set within the discourse of espionage against the value and 
worth of the individual as a subject of intelligence gathering and as an agent of intelligence 
gathering. Individuals become suspect, critical, or unreliable, and so in order to chase efficiency 
and security the agent has become the network of agents which has more recently become the 
computer network. Formal intelligence departments began in an age of imperial colonialism, and 
as such their task as described by James Scott in Seeing Like a State was “to make society 
legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, 
conscription, and prevention of rebellion” (2). Military intelligence was the collection of the 
statistical, anthropological, and geographic information that would facilitate that “legibility” and 
thus extend the colonial reach and control over these populations. Counter-intelligence was the 
ascertaining of rival imperial powers’ plans and operations in contested zones of influence or 
colonial spaces. The end of the imperial era and the Cold War changed the definition of 
intelligence and counter-intelligence. Outward expansion became a game of strategic denial and 
opening up zones to Western market capitalism, while counter-intelligence took on the fury of a 
witch-hunt. Institutional loyalty became the highest virtue, which meant that the definition of a 
professional intelligence worker narrowed to only those considered to be above suspicion, a 
designation that had as much to do with demographics—gender, race, sexual orientation and 
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class—as past performance. Professionalism and bureaucracy stood (at least, in principle) as 
bulwarks against possible infiltration, ideological or actual. Institutional entrenchment and 
compartmentalization have as a whole led to more secretive operations aimed at an increasingly 
decentered global network of control, discipline, and information. These changes in intelligence 
agency structure have made it more usable in the new globalized capital-E Empire of scholars 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s formulation10. Wide-ranging and heavily bureaucratic 
intelligence agencies, while still backing distinct state interests, are more able to justify 
themselves the more amorphous and ever-present an enemy against whom they set themselves. 
Intelligence agencies feed on the fear of the threat that can spring unexpectedly, and from within. 
Given that Empire is assumed to be global and globally desired by those within it, this makes 
each conflict an ideological betrayal, a rebellion from within against tenets that have been reified 
into an absolute good by hegemonic power, and thus makes the enemy a fundamental evil. As 
Hardt and Negri explain, that this evil can live within Empire and rupture it unexpectedly 
provides tremendous justification for an aggressive intelligence agency: “Today it is increasingly 
difficult for the ideologues of the US to name a single, unified enemy; rather there seem to be 
minor and elusive enemies everywhere. The end of the crisis of modernity has given rise to a 
proliferation of minor and indefinite crises, or, as we prefer, to an omni-crisis,” (189). Omni-
crisis can only be met with omnipotence, which requires omniscience to exercise. Thus, 
                                                 
10 For Hardt and Negri, the Empire is the international, post-modern order formed by neoliberal 
capitalism. This order is no longer nationalistic, but as expansive and inclusive as possible in 
order to satisfy an ever-hungry market demand. As such, enemies of the Empire are criminals or 
terrorists, not rivals on equal but opposite footing (as was the case through the Cold War). As the 
major world powers return to nationalistic bents, we will have to closely monitor what happens 
to both theorizations and manifestations of Empire.  
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intelligence agencies have become increasingly able to justify any means in attempting to 
acquire this omniscience. 
As William Wark writes, “intelligence agencies mirror the soul of the state and reflect its 
structures, passions, and rhetoric” (7). Given this, what one can see in the spy fiction written by 
authors with intelligence experience is their vision of a soul rapidly shedding its individuality. 
Recruiting practices of intelligence agencies reflect this trend, moving from using gentleman 
club or academic networks for recruitment to moving towards more directly from the disciplined 
and regimented ranks of the military. As I mentioned above, the secret agent, which again 
according to Denning, was “the link between the actions of the individual—often an ‘ordinary 
person’—and the world historical fate of nations and empires,” seems on the whole to be losing 
the expectation of being able to make an individual difference. But even as early as Buchan and 
Le Queux prior to the first World War, the early thriller authors who in many ways represent 
Denning’s formula the best, hint at a world rapidly changing, increasingly ignoring and 
trampling everyone’s self-determining agency, even that of its super-heroic spies. Agency 
requires tension to prove itself against, stories need conflict to work through. In spy fiction, this 
conflict has at times been more interesting than the protagonists who overcome it. There are four 
problematic nodes of the cultural lattice embedded into the generic language of spy fiction—
conspiracy, bureaucratization, cruelty and technophilia—which trouble Denning’s formulation, 
and which I examine over the course of my first two chapters. The end result of these four nodes 
is an ambivalent relationship within the genre: they both call into question the ability of any 
single individual to have a complete and unadulterated relationship with knowledge, but they are 
also quite often the source of conflict within the stories of the work that are overcome by the 
singular agent’s heroic will. Fiction mines this conflict for entertainment; the catharsis of the spy 
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novel, in general, is the resolution of this conflict in favor of individuality. However, when these 
tropes break free from the individual plots of novels or films and become floating discursive 
structures within the discourse of espionage itself, their effect is not catharsis. As over-
determined discursive formations—nodes within the cultural lattice of espionage—conspiracy, 
bureaucracy, cruelty and technophilia become generative in and of themselves, acting to warp 
the public conversation around intelligence policy, which warps intelligence policy itself.  
Thus, it is crucial to understand the particulars of the relation between these four nodes, 
and how they have changed over the past century and a half. In the fiction of the early 1900s, 
British secret agents invariably discovered the secret and far-along plot by another nation-state 
(usually Germany, but sometimes France or Russia) to infiltrate and undermine Britain’s war-
making capabilities. In that of the 1920s and 30s, spies stumbled into fascist-capitalist collusion 
and raced to foil the plans of multinational corporations and would-be dictators in order to wrest 
power from governments ostensibly elected by and for the people. The Cold War brought a 
return to the infiltration plot but turned the cat-and-mouse (or cat-and-mole) gamesmanship of 
Childress or Buchan into a deadly serious meditation on the nature of loyalty and the role of the 
individual in a large state bureaucracy. The enemy Other in spy fiction has changed considerably 
from its origins as well. Early spy genre introduced us to the maniacal conspiracy, the acting of 
shadowy organizations or individuals—splinter groups, terrorists, top-secret spy rings—not just 
to seize power (which is an old motivation), but to create a vacuum of power through targeted, 
mass destruction first, and then to establish their new global orders within that empty space. This 
is not the anarchy of Conrad’s Professor, or the revolutionary spirit characteristic of communist 
villains pre-WWII, or even the paternalistic “we know best” fascism of the 30s. Aurich 
Goldfinger has no illusions that he is the bad guy. How refreshing, especially given the contrast 
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with the above-mentioned other strand of Cold War spy fiction, emblematized by George Smiley 
empathizing with Soviet double-agent Bill Haydon’s dissatisfaction with Britain in Tinker Tailor 
Soldier Spy. The terrorist-as-arch-villain is still with us in post-Cold War spy-fiction, though just 
as likely now to have a Middle Eastern connection than an Eastern European one, but 
increasingly we find that the role of the nefarious Big Other in current spy fiction is likely to be 
played by Western spy agencies themselves, especially the CIA or a rogue splinter-group within 
the CIA.  
In the shadows, on the run, and scrambling over the pages of these changing historical 
scenarios are a cast of spies, secret agents, intelligence professionals, superheroes, and a 
disturbing number of men and women who just happened to be in the wrong place at the right 
time. In its beginnings, spy fiction mostly11 concerned itself with the differentiation between the 
good British operative, essentially an older Boy Scout12, and the evil French, German, or Russian 
spy couching in cafes and restaurants around the UK. British intelligence work in the buildup to 
WWI consisted of pretty much the same thing: collecting paperwork on possible foreign 
operatives, using geographic and academic knowledge to assess military capabilities, and 
building rudimentary intelligence networks based primarily on professional cordiality, Oxford- 
or Cambridge-tied social clubs, and aristocratic family relations.13 British secret agents were 
conceived as those who already were assumed to have access to privileged information: 
university men, academics, gentlemen with friends in high places, specialists. These are the men 
who constituted the core of British imperial rule as well, and indeed the modern intelligence 
                                                 
11 With a few exceptions, such as Conrad’s The Secret Agent  
12 Not a coincidence that the founder of the Scouts, Baden-Powell, wrote a defense of geographic 
intelligence gathering called My Life as a Scout 
13 (Hiley 61) 
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agency is inseparable from the colonial police forces that were its immediate forebears. Post-
WWI, the spy genre and the intelligence community in Britain were not immune to Modernist 
soul-searching, facing critiques from both the right and the left. As the post-war period also 
found authors with intelligence work experience such as W. Somerset Maugham writing in the 
spy genre for the first time (a trend which would become a staple of the genre), many of these 
critiques were pointed attacks on the effectiveness of the spy himself, as he was currently 
conceived by MI5 and MI6. Authors’ probing of the question “who should be a spy” kept that 
topic in flux, while the moral wrangling produced in these works also helped the genre flirt with 
higher-brow entertainment. Some more conservative authors, for example H.C. McNeile in his 
Bulldog Drummond stories, felt that the spy needed to be a more active shaper of events, while 
others, like Somerset Maugham in Ashenden or Graham Greene in The Confidential Agent, 
questioned the morality of someone who would willingly become the “glorious amateur” spy. 
One of the aims of my project is to demonstrate the influence of an under-studied, yet crucial, 
turning point in the public conception of spies: the influence of the life and writings of T.E. 
Lawrence. Lawrence’s experience in Arabia and then his later retreat to the Royal Air Force 
(under an assumed name) was read even contemporaneously as a fable of British imperial folly 
and duplicity, of the ill-suitedness of the public-school, academic, upper-class personality type 
(with its homosexual undertones) for spy work, and of a perceived-as-inherent dishonorable 
nature of the profession.   
After WWII, spy fiction continued to split into two separate styles, if not genres: 1) the 
pulp thrillers, spearheaded by Fleming and Bond, and 2) the middle-brow novels of intrigue of 
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which Greene, Le Carré, and Ambler are the most well-known14.  Both strands focused on the 
Cold War, and completed the work of the authors of the 20s and 30s in ending the idea of the 
“glorious amateur” for good, positing instead the action hero in the pulp paperback thriller and 
the “company man” in middle-brow works. This pulp protagonist, descended from Bond, whose 
hyper-masculinity, heterosexuality, middle-class and military origins, and lack of interiority 
prefigures the ideal member of a new type of intelligence operative.15 This soldier-spy was born 
out of the war-era Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and was far more concerned with 
operational intelligence and physical force—what journalist Mark Mazzetti has recently termed 
the “way of the knife”—than the traditional “Great Game,” which focused on asset retrieval, 
strategic alliances, and evaluating geographic and cultural information for strategic advantage 
(Mazzetti 45). Fictional representations of spies—at least, protagonist spies, more often called 
“secret agents”—are cloaked in the characteristics and backgrounds to make these operatives of 
shadowy agencies and organizations, inherently untrustworthy and viewed with skepticism by 
the public, into heroes for the ages that produce them. The palliative fictions themselves have 
changed—from university man to soldier, amateur to professional, aristocrat to bureaucrat—but 
the idea persists that spies in fiction need to conform to a culturally safe standard. 
Palatability for the profession inevitably increases its cultural visibility, which in turn 
bolsters its presence in reality. Spy fiction has served to create easy references for spy behaviors 
since at least the early twentieth century. As Nicholas Hiley states, before WWI, the British 
                                                 
14 The war also managed to send into a prolonged slumber the serious left-leaning espionage 
novel. After Elizabeth Bowen’s The Heat of the Day, most spy novels critical of the world-
systems that spies served were primarily satirical, like Our Man in Havana, or, like much of Le 
Carré’s work, caught up in an unsatisfactory moral equivocating that cast spying as a flawed and 
morally questionable necessity. Only recently have we found a return to the serious spy work 
with a clear left-lean—perhaps Banville’s The Untouchable (1997) restarted this minor trend.   
15 And with the operative, the strategy that fits him. 
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public’s experience with espionage was almost all in the realm of fiction—so much so that “even 
those officers employed on counter-espionage had little opportunity of testing fiction against 
reality’” (Hiley 61). Representations of spies became overlaid on the real thing, with actual 
intelligence agents “‘feel[ing] like…character[s] in a spy novel’” and “‘standing about aimlessly 
or whispering in corners much after the manner of spies in the cinematograph’” (Hiley 60). 
Fiction and reality blur. Men and women are recruited into intelligence work with an already-
ingrained idea of what it is. Their reactions to this idea—their attempts to live up to it, or their 
disillusionment with a false reality—affects their work. What does this mean in an age in which 
Bond and his hyper-competent, morally-simple ilk have become the de facto cultural image of 
the modern secret agent in popular culture? How has the corresponding historical period16 in 
which both intelligence agencies worldwide have increasingly been ordered to (and have ordered 
themselves to) “grade their own work,” a term which signifies creating an intelligence situation 
through covert action and then requesting more funding to evaluate that emerging intelligence 
situation, been shaped by the super spy (81)? As one senior Pentagon official who oversaw the 
expansion of the Pentagon’s own spy program (JSOC) said, “We had all these guys running 
around trying to be James Bond, and it didn’t work very well” (qtd. in Mazzetti 82).  Playing 
James Bond in the intelligence operations of today—as has playing Bill Haydon, or Richard 
Hannay in other times—has influenced how these agencies operate. In the particular case of the 
proliferation of the soldier-spy, agencies now both collect intelligence for military operations 
(including an ever-expanding number of assassinations and kidnappings), and use their own 
personnel to carry out those same operations regardless of official declarations of war or 
                                                 
16 Roughly beginning with Kennedy’s administration and continuing through the present, 
excepting perhaps a brief lull in the mid- to late- 1970s (Mazzetti 43). 
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international law. No longer a support to defense departments, intelligence agencies are actively 
instigating and carrying out armed conflict17. This global war has seen the unprecedented use of 
surveillance technologies and unmanned aerial drones for both intelligence gathering and combat 
operations, including remote assassinations of targets. I see the widespread (though not 
universal) establishment acceptance18 of the mechanization of intelligence work as the inevitable 
outcome of a particular re-characterization of the spy in the post-WWII period. 
Professionalization, hyper-masculinity (defined as heterosexual and consequently “leak-proof”), 
and shifting class-relations in representations of the ideal spy in popular culture have influenced 
the development of an intelligence community seemingly devoted to removing human 
subjectivity from their operatives, and narrowing down the answer to “who can be a spy” to its 
most reductive point: the drone.  
The name I have given to the current governing cultural formation that influences who 
can be a spy is “drone masculinity.” Drone masculinity is itself a discursive formation, born from 
policy decisions and James Bond films, training manuals and larger societal gender relations. It 
emphasizes violence and covert action and cedes individual agency to the bureaucratic machine 
in exchange for sexual and societal reward. It isn’t brain-washing, but a set of incentives—
professional, organizational, sexual, cultural—that weights some behaviors and attitudes as more 
desirable than others: for example, covert action, torture as a means of intelligence-gathering, 
                                                 
17 Mazzetti gives as one illustration of this trend the growth of the Counterterrorism Center of the 
CIA, which, as a small corner of Langley after its founding in the 80s, could not get legal or 
political approval to carry out assassination operations. After 2001, it quickly swelled to 
consume the vast majority of CIA funding, and, as we are painfully aware, conducts regular 
lethal operations all over the world (11, 57).    
18 While the use of drones and widespread domestic surveillance projects are opposed by factions 
on the left and right, elected officials do not seem to be focused on curbing intelligence agencies, 
nor, to my knowledge, has a major political figure campaigned on a platform that includes a 
scaling back of the “way of the knife.”  
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Special Forces soldiers masquerading as CIA agents and vice versa. Drone masculinity also 
helps to set the stage for drone warfare itself. What drone masculinity aspires to be, drone 
warfare can achieve: a small, controllable, mechanized warfighting force that introduces distance 
between killer and killed. Drone warfare is supposed to perfect the efficiency and lethality which 
make drone masculinity a seductive discursive ideologeme in the first place. However, drone 
warfare has been marked by high civilian casualties (especially as collected by non-
governmental watchdog groups and journalists) and by a tendency to radicalize individuals to 
embrace groups like al Qaeda and ISIS in areas under the drone’s surveilling gaze. Both drone 
masculinity and drone warfare substitute spectacular results for lasting ones, and our intelligence 
services’ reliance on them moves them away from the traditional work of espionage, eroding 
their ability to do the human-network building essential to using intelligence in the pursuit of 
peace. 
Drone surveillance and image analysis is a part of a larger structure of SIGINT (SIGnals 
INTelligence), that is electronic surveillance, gathered from intercepted radio and telephone 
calls, emails, social media posts, satellite imagery, spy planes and drones, and any other way 
besides another human being giving intelligence information directly to an intelligence worker or 
contractor. SIGINT has been embraced by spy agencies worldwide, but especially in the U.S. 
and the U.K. As of 2013, the CIA’s total budget was $14.7 billion, of which over half was 
devoted solely to SIGINT, and the NSA entirely focuses on SIGINT (Grey 274). The British 
version of the NSA, the GCHQ, was profiled in a 1982 Times article entitled “Exit Smiley, Enter 
IBM.” The reference here to John le Carré’s arch-spy George Smiley, and his obsolescence, is 
telling. Unlike Smiley’s focus on personal relations, SIGINT furthers the distance between the 
intelligence agency and the people subjected to its surveillance. Drone masculinity, drone 
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warfare, and the turn to SIGINT arise from the cultural history of espionage and can be situated 
within it. The discursive field that produced them and which they help to sustain is a deeply de-
humanized one. Over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first century, the discourse of 
espionage has tried to balance the super-heroic agency attributed to the agent and the de-
personalization of the conspiracies, bureaucracies, and technocracies he or she (mostly he) is 
caught up in or faces down. As my dissertation shows, this balancing act has increasingly 
become less-balanced; intelligence, in both history and fiction, has tilted away from the human to 
embrace the policies, metaphors, and structures of the institution, the network, the bureaucracy, 
the drone.  
Chapter Outline: Chapters 2 and 3 
As mentioned above, my dissertation maps out the relation between the discourse of 
espionage in fiction, in public discourse, and in the history and development of intelligence 
policy. My first two chapters attempt to demonstrate what this analysis looks like—in other 
words, to examine the idea that a spy agency is not merely a political entity, but a discursive 
formation, one that acts in the cultural realm and is affected by that cultural realm as well. The 
political and cultural histories of espionage are linked, and the tropes of spy fiction have had 
influence in the halls of the CIA and MI6. In these chapters, I examine four master-themes in the 
discourse of espionage, themes that show up on the page and on screen in fictional spy media, 
but also in public and political discourse, in how journalists and policy makers, including heads 
of intelligence and other high-ranking spies, speak about intelligence organizations. These 
master-themes—conspiracy, bureaucracy, cruelty, and technophilia—ultimately push 
intelligence towards the dehumanizing, de-agentifying entity it is today. Each arise from one 
another, forming a mutually-constituted “espionage mindset” that drives the development of 
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intelligence practices in the U.S. and the U.K. The espionage mindset devalues humanistic 
principles of individual worth, replacing moral and ethical evaluations with strategic ones. 
Within the internal logic of an intelligence agency, the espionage mindset appears to be “best 
practices.” But when we analyze this internal logic free of the mandates of secrecy and national 
security, we can see how its inherent dehumanization prevents our intelligence agencies from 
being moral, ethical, legal, or even as effective as they could be.  
Conspiracy and its relation to spy fiction may seem an unlikely place to begin this 
dissertation project, but the two have been historically and ideologically linked since the 
formation of the genre. In fact, spy fiction would not have developed at the time and in the way it 
did without the conspiracy-mongering of the author William Le Queux, whose anti-French and 
then anti-German paranoia and aggressive marketing techniques convinced segments of the 
British populace that their everyday world was plagued by secret agents plotting the overthrow 
of the U.K. in the years before World War I. In the face of such a dastardly (fictional) 
conspiracy, the public clamored for a dedicated counter-intelligence agency, leading to the 
creation of MI5. The cultural discourse of espionage is a field in which conspiracy moves from 
fiction into reality. One way this happens is the expected one: part of espionage is secret skull-
duggery, the creation and, less often, the execution of plans designed to overthrow governments, 
cartels, etc. Fidel Castro was assassinated many times in CIA writing, though in reality the 
agency was considerably less successful, though not for lack of trying. But, as evidenced in 
William le Queux’s role in the creation of MI5, there is another means by which that conspiracy 
can manipulate reality, a means unconnected to the actual machinations of CIA agents or 
Goldman Sachs. Analyzing the role of conspiracy as a feature of spy fiction, as a part of its 
beginnings (in Henry James’ Princess Cassamassima and Joseph Conrad’s Secret Agent), its 
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popularity, and its ability to transcend the bounds of the strictly fictional, causes us to reevaluate 
the role conspiracy plays in our cultural imagination. Contrary to the idea that conspiracy 
reduces the feeling of agency in those who believe in it, I posit that conspiracies proliferate in 
fiction and in reality for the exact opposite reason: belief in a secret conspiracy operating behind 
the scenes re-orients the world into those “in the know” and those who are fooled. Being “in the 
know” means recovering a sense of lost agency that has been drained by the non-secret, though 
still sometimes obscure, operations of global capital and politics. In other words, conspiracies are 
generative. They create avenues for agency to be proved—either by creating one, which authors, 
spies, businessmen and bloggers sometimes do, or by believing in one, an act which confers 
special status to the believer. For example, Russian paranoia over the Dulles Doctrine, 
documents purporting to outline the dismantling of the Soviet and then Russian state by CIA 
operatives, appears today as justification for Russian meddling in the 2016 election. However, 
the reality is that the Dulles doctrine was invented in a 1973 Soviet spy novel. There are multiple 
sense of fictional at play here. A fictional (i.e. deliberately created in a novel) conspiracy has 
become a fictional (i.e. not based on an actual policy) motivating force for an actual conspiracy, 
(enacted in reality by secret actors) to undermine American civic institutions. It has become 
difficult to discuss the hybrid real and fictional concept of the conspiracy without acknowledging 
that conspiracies can act even when their purported claims don’t really exist. Though even here, 
spy fiction has anticipated such a turn of events; G.K. Chesterton’s The Man who was Thursday 
(1908) features a police secret agent ordered to join a conspiracy only to find that every other 
member is also a police secret agent who has been ordered to spy on the conspiracy. Eventually, 
the leader of the conspiracy is revealed to be the leader of the police, and he might also be God, 
able to move the planets and stars via a secret conspiratorial power. There is no inside or outside 
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to the conspiracy. The Man who was Thursday was written in 1908. In spy fiction, the conspiracy 
has been meta-fictional, in the sense of drawing attention to its own unreality, since its 
beginning. What this points to is that fiction itself is key to the meta-commentary within the 
discourse of espionage on the notion and structure of conspiracy. Fiction calls out the process of 
discursive world-making that is at the heart of espionage. 
 My first chapter begins by examining the notion of conspiracy as a feature of the 
discourse of espionage and its relation with agency. Conspiracies often provide the “ground” on 
which, or against which, the “figure” of the secret agent protagonist proves their agency. I argue 
that this is not so very different from how believers in conspiracies engage with conspiracies. 
The belief in a conspiracy, far from making people feel like powerless pawns of the system, 
motivates them, often with anger, to feel like a privileged visionary of the true history of the 
world. When conspiracies appear in the discourse of espionage—broadly writ—they are done so 
to examine the individual’s role in the world. In Chapter Two, I discuss the trope of the 
conspiracy as a call to action in Princess Cassamassima, Captain America: The Winter Soldier, 
The Secret Agent and North by Northwest. The conspiracy is a call to action whether heard by a 
novel protagonist or a person on Facebook. But as to what action, this is less clear. Not many of 
us are Richard Hannay (from The 39 Steps), or Jason Bourne, or Captain America—or even Cary 
Grant’s somewhat bored socialite Roger Thornhill in North by Northwest. In response to William 
Le Queux’s German panic, the British government created a bureaucracy, collecting and 
organizing many people who weren’t quite Richard Hannay in the hopes that in the aggregate 
they might be. Once born, the spy bureaucracy grew prodigiously. What began as a means to 
preserve the individual under the threat of the faceless, malevolent conspiratorial unknown 
became a crushing mass in its own right. For this reason ,I discuss both the role conspiracy and 
 35 
bureaucracy have played in shaping how the public conceives of spy agencies, as well as how 
those agencies conceive of themselves. Bureaucracy in spy fiction often functions as the 
“conspiracy of the Same,” as opposed to the antagonistic “conspiracy of the Other.” By this, I 
mean that the bureaucracy and the conspiracy as discursive constructs are not different in the 
assumption of their traffic in secrets, but in who is the target of those secrets. Conspiracies are 
arraigned against us, bureaucracies include us already, whether we like it or not. In spy fiction, 
this manifests as the lone agent vs his own organization, the creative, skilled, adaptive individual 
vs the prosaic, rigid, boring collective. These plots, like conspiracy plots, resonate with a 
readership that itself feels caught up in the machine of the state, global capital, social institutions, 
etc. The tension within spy fiction between individual agency and the spy bureaucracy bleeds 
over into the discourse of espionage as a whole; intelligence leadership and policy-makers 
themselves go back and forth about wanting independent, motivated agents, on the one hand, and 
dependable company men on the other. This debate maps onto changing definitions of 
masculinity and changing notions of spy work, from strict intelligence-gathering to covert action. 
That mapping occurs both in policy and in fiction. In the former, it manifests in who is hired by 
intelligence agencies and what they are asked to do. In the latter, in the split between “lowbrow” 
thriller novels by Ian Fleming or Robert Ludlum and the “more literary” work of John le Carré or 
Len Deighton.  
 I examine spy fiction as a cultural formation for the ways the debate within the 
intelligence community can play out. I analyze the different kinds of fantasy structures that 
support each side of the debate, from the fantasy of James Bond finding freedom within his 
bureaucracy to follow his own instincts, to the fantasy of Jim Wormold in Graham Greene’s Our 
Man in Havana fooling his bureaucracy, to George Smiley in le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, 
 36 
Spy mastering his. Unsurprisingly, one repeated way that authors of spy fiction, especially those 
with intelligence backgrounds themselves, represent defiance and the preservation of individual 
agency is by making their protagonists writers. We find it in the first part of the twentieth century 
in Somerset Maugham’s Ashenden and in the first part of the twenty-first in Ian McEwan’s Sweet 
Tooth. In these works, the craft of espionage and the craft of literary creation are twinned, and 
facility in the latter demonstrates success in the former as a kind of expert liar. However, the 
history of intelligence is plagued by literate liars and loquacious loose-tongues, creating 
misinformation or revealing classified information with the urgency of political action and the 
force of literary talent. Thus, writing itself becomes a double-edged sword in the discourse of 
espionage, a tool for better performance and a marker of the “right kind” of spy, but also a 
potential tool of defiance.19  
But bureaucracy is not always so easily defied or thwarted, and sometimes an author’s 
moral criticism, as in le Carré’s A Most Wanted Man, requires their protagonist to be crushed 
under the weight of red tape. After all, the bureaucratic intelligence agency is not a benevolent 
machine after all; in the best cases it is cold and paternalistic, the worst corrupt and cruel. 
Bureaucracy diffuses blame. On one level, bureaucratic diffusion of blame is self-preservation, 
as structures in which power and responsibility are clearly delineated do not last beyond their 
head’s tenure. There may even be a compelling case to be made that civil society needs an 
organization like the FBI to ultimately be both larger and less than immediately responsive to its 
head20 (despite what J. Edgar Hoover might have one think). But the flip side of bureaucratic 
                                                 
19 The former CIA agent who helped create the TV show The Americans, Joe Weisberg, was 
asked in his CIA-polygraph interview whether he was joining just to get information for a novel 
(Leeds). Oops. Should have asked about a TV show.  
20 We are seeing such a case be made in real time with the Mueller investigation into Russian 
interference in the 2016 election. A more streamlined intelligence apparatus more directly under 
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expansiveness is bureaucratic obscurity, and when obscurity meets the national security mandate 
to know, the potential for cruelty is rife because the potential of getting away with it is extremely 
high. For example, take Gina Haspel. Haspel ran the black site prison in Thailand in which many 
actual, suspected, and misidentified al Qaeda operatives were subject to water-boarding and 
other forms of enhanced interrogation (Kelly). These sessions were videotaped, but despite a 
Congressional request to preserve these tapes, they were destroyed before the Senate Intelligence 
Committee could view them. Haspel ordered their destruction; she is now President Trump’s 
nominee to be director of the CIA. When Senate Democrats protested this appointment, the 
defenses from the intelligence community shared the same tone: someone else ordered Haspell to 
destroy those tapes (Kelly). And who was that? Well, that remains a secret; we can agree cruelty 
occured, but not who to blame for it. Cruelty in espionages is the large-scale embrace of illegal, 
unethical, and immoral strategies for intelligence-gathering and spy work—torture and its 
euphemistic cousin “enhanced interrogation,” black-bag kidnapping covert ops missions, 
assassination (or “targeted killing” in the parlance). It is one of two topics I address in my third 
chapter, along with technophilia. Both cruelty and technophilia result from the bureaucratic drive 
for results and efficiency and the intelligence service mandate for secrecy, making them a 
thematically-resonant pair to examine together. As internal drivers within the logic of 
intelligence work and as discourses which sanction a certain kind of spy work, both cruelty and 
technophilia have shaped the development of the intelligence community over the past 50 years.  
Spy fiction in which the protagonists save the day by means of ethically-compromised 
behavior, like the TV drama 24, attaches a false sense of urgency to acts of moral cruelty. With 
                                                 
the executive branch would not likely have the impartiality and qualified personnel to carry out 
such a sensitive investigation with anything approaching public confidence.  
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this urgency comes a cultural license for actual agencies to mimic their fictional counterparts. 
The outrage is tampered down in advance by the theatricality of cruelty. This cultural license is 
an expectation that the public has about spy work, a willingness to let cruelty go when it matches 
the accepted definition of what intelligence work is. Unafraid to criticize spy work as cruel, 
works such as the aforementioned A Most Wanted Man and the 2015 film Sicario take the 
opposite track to 24. However, I have concerns about whether this depiction of cruelty is an 
effective critique, an ineffective one, or, worse, a choice that reaffirms for audiences the 
necessity of cruelty in spy work and/or a means to derive enjoyment from this cruelty. I find 
suspicious the notion that spy fiction can portray cruelty without endorsing it in some small 
measure, and argue that the reading or viewing pleasure in identifying with the individual 
intelligence agent can blunt the criticism in portraying the collective as cruel. If the universe of 
spy fiction is a universe in which the individual agent is always right, whether that agent is 24’s 
Jack Bauer or A Most Wanted Man’s Gunther Bachmann, then why worry so much about what 
the larger organization is doing? Isn’t it composed of many Gunther Bachmanns and Jack 
Bauers, and if not, if there are occasionally some “bad actors,” then surely the Bachmanns will 
straighten it out? The way policy and structure create cruelty is under-emphasized in spy fiction, 
even though Sicario is a good-faith attempt to depict bureaucracy as the ultimate bad guy. The 
theatricality of cruelty, especially of torture, as it is presented in spy fiction makes the genre 
complicit in the acceptance of torture by the general public and by the intelligence apparatus 
itself; military officials have had to ask the producers of 24 to stop portraying torture as the first 
and best choice for intelligence-gathering because too many soldiers were mimicking Bauer 
(Nelson 64). I analyze the long relationship between torture, spy fiction, and spy work in Chapter 
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Three, and argue that treating the issue of torture in intelligence work as solely a policy issue, 
instead of a cultural one, will not be sufficient to end the practice. 
Technophilia, the fascination with gadgets, computer network intelligence-gathering, and 
radio, satellite and drone surveillance, is similarly situated as cruelty is within the discourse of 
espionage. It is a set of practices and technologies but also attitudes, shaped as much by 
capability—what is possible—as by desirability. The coolness of technological spycraft on 
display in spy media is the product of distortion. While spy agencies do often implement 
bleeding-edge technological design, and have been known to disguise weapons as pens or other 
prosaic devices, the mismatch between how technological spycraft is portrayed and its actual use 
is wide. The fantasy of technophilia is one of frictionless omniscience, of a big brother who 
stands as the ultimate witness of wrong-doing. What this fantasy ignores is the end of privacy as 
we know it, the diminishment of human relationships and human networks of information 
gathering, and the replacement of human agents with field experience with computer analysts. 
The technocratic spy agency has become inseparable from our modern experience, from our 
online behaviors and its monitoring (hi NSA!) to the digital penetration of social media by 
Russian intelligence contractors during political elections. I argue that the willingness of the 
public to, by and large, surrender to the idea that spy agencies can and should become an all-
seeing eye, despite a less-than-stellar track record for technological espionage as a whole, is in 
large part a product of social conditioning. This conditioning arises from consumer spaces, 
certainly; the willful self-surveillance that we allow Facebook, Google and Amazon et al. (and 
there are a lot more) helps to normalize the digital surveillance power of the state. But as 
journalist Robert Draper points out, the countries in which surveillance culture is most 
normalized are also the countries that most heavily romanticize espionage, with the U.K. and its 
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fascination with Bond and Bletchley Park21 and its leading camera-per-capita surveillance 
system leading the way (Draper 48). I analyze Bond’s relation with his gadget-master, Q, and the 
British television program Spooks as two among many examples of how spy fiction makes 
technophilia attractive as an appropriate and effective principle of spycraft, and thereby affects 
what the public expects and allows from its spy agencies. The technophilic pursuit of efficiency 
within the intelligence community is the most visible tenet of the espionage mindset for Western 
observers. Whether through spy films such as Spectre or TV shows such as Spooked or NCIS, or 
through Edward Snowden (who has had two films and counting made about his life), wikileaks, 
Robert Mueller’s Russia investigation, or even seeing a targeted advertisement online, the tools, 
techniques and technologies that make SIGINT have entered into our collective cultural 
consciousness. We know we are being watched, and this changes how we consider those doing 
the watching. Faith in intelligence agencies is at a pronounced low. I conclude these two chapters 
by examining how the impersonalization and dehumanization that surveillance culture enforces 
on its watched subjects makes the espionage mindset counter-productive. Spy agencies mistake 
seeing for understanding, and consequently see far less than they imagine. I return to this theme 
in the final chapter of my dissertation as well, in the context of drone use.  
Chapter Outline: Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
Whereas my first two chapters proper are invested in describing the spy agency as a 
discursive entity, my middle two chapters seek to answer the question of who can be a spy 
within this changing cultural discourse of espionage—in other words, what are the characteristics 
of the secret agent in fiction and in fact, and how do those characteristics change over time. Spies 
                                                 
21 The location of Alan Turing’s code-breaking group during WWII, a group which cracked the 
famed Nazi enigma machine with proto-computers and thereby hastened the end of the war.  
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take various forms in fiction. These forms are influenced by time period, shifting cultural norms, 
whether the character is “with us” or “against us,” genre, author, etc. But at its root, the secret 
agent is an information collector, usually officially licensed by a state or a large, supra-national 
entity such as the UN, a multi-national corporation, or a global organized movement—a 
nebulous classification which includes global communism in the vein of the Third International 
and also fascistic conspiracies, terrorist/anarchist groups, and secret societies. Thus, in 
examining who can be a spy in fiction, we gain insight into what kinds of people are culturally 
seen as believable agents of and enemies of the state (and as a consequence capable of 
examining, analyzing, storing, transporting, and creating state knowledge). We also glimpse as 
the nature of the facts and speculations that are supposed by popular culture to compose that 
knowledge. In this respect, spy fiction is like its close generic cousin, detective fiction, in that it, 
too, concerns the mechanisms of a Foucauldian discipline, the components of which are 
pervasive surveillance, self-policing, internalizing the ideals of state control, and the use of 
statistical knowledge to analyze and control populations. Slavoj Zizek writes that the classic 
detective is akin to the Lacanian analyst, the “subject supposed to know” the “true meaning of 
our act, the meaning visible in the very falseness of the appearance” (Zizek 57). The omniscience 
of Hercule Poirot or Sherlock Holmes would be ill-suited to the spy genre though, which hinges 
not on the near-immediate mental apprehension of a suspect’s innocence or guilt, but rather on 
the belabored, drawn-out discovery of key information that either threatens the disciplinary 
regime of the state or must be protected to preserve it. The spy is less the “subject supposed to 
know” and more the “subject supposed to find out” about the “real” threat facing not just an 
individual, but the very world-system of which the spy is a part.  
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Spies must therefore be deemed trustworthy by their superiors and the populace at large. 
This is easier said than done though, as espionage has been somewhat synonymous with skull-
duggery, lying, manipulation, and other shady-dealings. The discourse of espionage in general 
and spy fiction particularly have helped with this image problem by transforming the spy into the 
secret agent. Secret agents are invested with the authority of the state, a prospect which presumes 
the agent is worthy of that authority. Thus, we find that the cultural shorthands for “worth” are in 
full effect in answering the question “who can be a spy, or, more accurately, a secret agent?” 
These shorthands, unsurprisingly, are coincident with privilege—the secret agent comes from the 
ruling or dominant class, gender, race, etc. In the expected contrast, the “spy,” or the subversive 
enemy agent, diverges from the categories of privilege in some way or ways. They must have 
some whiff of the cultural Other about them; perhaps they are secretly homosexual, or of mixed-
race, or physically disabled, or possess aristocratic airs in a culture of bourgeois middle-
managers. We see these distinctions in spy fiction of all stripes, from the most adrenaline-filled 
thriller to the most cerebral slow-burners. Unfortunately, we also find it in how Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg were treated in the press, and how the U.K. media responded to the Cambridge 
defections. I argue that this is not a coincidence, but an example of how individual choices, 
ideologies of gender, policy decisions about intelligence gathering, and the numerous other 
components of the discourse of espionage become entwined.          
Chapter Four seeks to map out the relation between the spy in popular culture, 
homosexuality, and masculinity. I begin by describing the ideal British secret agent, a type of 
ideal man, at the onset of spy fiction at the turn of the twentieth century. This character—an 
amateur, belonging to the leisure-class, with a colonial background or experience—is best 
represented by John Buchan’s Richard Hannay. Hannay palliates an anxious British public, riled 
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up by William le Queux’s anti-German conspiracy fantasies. Hannay assures his audience that 
“our best people” are on the case. At the same time, Hannay’s popularity pressures fledgling 
intelligence departments to recruit men like him into the service; a natural fit, given the overlap 
between stand-alone intelligence agencies and colonial-military intelligence units at the dawn of 
MI5 and MI6. The Eton man—the British gentleman bred in the public-school system for 
colonial service—was the ideal secret agent because he already met the cultural expectations of 
the ideal spy fiction protagonist. Given the power the patriarchal, patrician system had at the 
time to select itself as its own successor, we should not be surprised that the first few generations 
of secret service men conformed to a very similar type. However, we do not find that this 
Oxbridge gentleman still represents the cultural expectation of a secret agent—even Bond’s level 
of posh has varied significantly over the years. In Chapter Four, I determine when, why and how 
this change took place. The answers respectively emerge mid-century because of a drastic shift 
in the public trustworthiness of the classic spy type, and through cultural pressure as much as 
historical redesigning of intelligence after World War II.  
These cultural pressures—cultural catalysts for a complete overhaul in the public image 
of the spy—focused on an unexpectedly fraught relation between masculinity, class, 
homosexuality, and trustworthiness. This relation was upended by the Cambridge 5 defections at 
the onset of the Cold War; but the anxiety of the closet—that is, the anxiety that the kind of 
homosocial masculinity required culturally for governmental service was too close to 
homosexuality—is an old one in espionage discourse. In fact, it is exacerbated within this 
cultural space, as the secret and at times underhanded nature of espionage seemed always on the 
edge of triggering a cultural panic about “covert perverts” in the secret service. Drawing on the 
work of Eve Sedgwick and Erin Carlston, I explore the metaphorical prevalence of 
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homosexuality in spy fiction and its attempts to stamp out that anxiety before the Cambridge Spy 
Ring and the homophobia of HUAC and McCarthy. Like Carlston in her book Double Agents, I 
recognize that a fear of the Other, specifically the homosexual as a threat to the state, is a 
significant factor in the Cold War redefinition of the spy. Unlike Carlston, however, I offer 
reasons as to why the first part of the twentieth century seemed to have had no problem with 
employing gay men throughout the spy service, as the ideal secret agent was felt to require so 
many of the characteristics--ease in homosocial situations, academic and specialized knowledge, 
upper-class background, ability to keep secrets, etc.—as the early twentieth century conception 
of the gay man as Alan Sinfield defines him in his work The Wilde Century. Also unlike 
Carlston, I argue that dissatisfaction with this model of the ideal secret agent actually began in 
the high Modernist period with attacks on the effectiveness of spy services from both the Right 
and the Left. The onset of Cold War paranoia over state secrets, rather than being the initial 
catalyst for a drastic change in spy fiction, is instead, in my view, the last straw for both the old 
conceptions of the spy and the older ideal of the masculinity they represented. While some 
authors grappled with those implications, others set about inventing new character-types that 
aimed to conform to a rapidly changing definition of what makes a “good” spy. The success of 
these characters in both the marketplace in general and in intelligence circles ensured that they 
would be the first in the line that ultimately yields the figurative and literal killing machines of 
the present. 
Central to this shift, James Bond emerges into a cultural moment ready to make him the 
most popular secret agent, real or fictional, and ready to read his characteristics as a part of spy 
work itself. The second half of Chapter Four examines Bond as a cultural force in depth. The 
accoutrements that make Bond recognizable across decades, novels, short stories, films and 
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actors are not arbitrary. They form the Bond cultural identity, a construct unattached to the 
particulars of any one plot or characterization. As a series of symbols and tropes, Bond has 
become an integral part of how the public conceives spy work, and as I examine here, how the 
intelligence community sees itself. This is not to say that real spy work has embraced the 
absurdity of Moonraker exactly, or to suggest that most intelligence work no longer involves 
analysis. Rather, Bond can be understood as a kind of founding figure in a cultural formation I 
term “drone masculinity.” In the Bond stories and films, we can see how the mindset 
characteristic of drone masculinity—a tendency to violence, a subordination of the masculine id 
to patriarchal bureaucracy, a machine-like focus on accomplishing strategic goals—become 
attached to incentivizing rewards, like sexual pleasure, consumer pleasure and tourist pleasure. 
Bond is a salesman for drone masculinity, intentionally sometimes, especially during the 
immediate aftermath of the Burgess and Maclean defections, but sometimes also purely on the 
basis of his cultural momentum and accrued historical popularity. 
Chapter Five builds on understanding Bond as a cultural force by examining his legacy 
with the cultural discourse of espionage. Here, I describe drone masculinity and its effects within 
intelligence work more fully. I analyze how Bond and his cultural imitators have become 
embedded in the language of intelligence work, serving as recruiting tools, easy analogies, and 
aspirational figures. The “Bond effect,” as I call it, has been to present intelligence as less 
morally complex than it ought to be considered. As a result, we have seen the rise of ethical 
conundrums within the culture of intelligence. For example, in the practice of sheep-dipping, 
Special Forces operators are reclassified as intelligence workers in order to avoid legal 
prohibitions relating to active combat zones. This practice springs both from the desire to have a 
more flexible, efficient covert action force and from the expectation that intelligence work is 
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inherently violent and that the rule of law is not a match for the “license to kill.” This expectation 
to “play James Bond,” exists to a high degree within intelligence agencies (Mazzetti 82). But it 
also exists in the public sphere, where it mediates our ideas about what kinds of action are 
allowed as a part of intelligence work. Sometimes, these allowances about kinds of action extend 
to allowances about the people carrying out those actions; drone masculinity also entails ignoring 
and downplaying issues in the psychological health and well-being of intelligence and Special 
Forces personnel. This means systematic mishandling of spiking PTSD cases, and of the rampant 
sexual harassment and assault that occurs in a culture in which violence, hierarchy, sexuality, 
and violent forms of masculinity are so closely tied together. It also means licensing illegal and 
unethical acts by intelligence agents in the pursuit of their goals. Torture, extraordinary rendition, 
and drone warfare by intelligence agencies fundamentally change the relation between the U.S. 
and its allies, partners, and the other sovereign nations whose territorial sovereignty we routinely 
ignore. However, the evidence that any of these tactics are strategically advantageous ranges 
from non-existent (extraordinary rendition) to mixed (drone warfare) to clearly in the negative 
(torture). In the long term, drone masculinity has not performed to its own standards, making the 
costs it accrues unsustainable. As a discursive feature of the culture of intelligence, it will linger 
on as long as cultural representation reinforces the naturalness of the mindset for intelligence 
workers. Thus, we must seek other kinds of masculine representation in culture broadly but also 
in spy fiction and media itself. 
The second half of Chapter Five takes up this search. I examine works by John le Carré, 
Robert Ludlum, Eric Ambler, and John Banville, in addition to examining actor Daniel Craig’s 
performance of James Bond in more detail, in an effort to find alternate masculinities heroically 
presented within spy fiction. The emphasis on heroism is important for reasons of cultural 
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palatability; no other masculinity can displace drone masculinity until the definition of a hero is 
decoupled from the nexus of tropes, beliefs and attitudes that constitute drone masculinity. 
However, attempts to do this are mixed, as entertainment value in a populist genre like spy 
fiction continues to embrace spectacle, and especially the spectacle of violence. The character 
Jason Bourne may feel intense shame and guilt over his prowess at killing, but his stories are still 
propelled by the deployment and necessity of violence. Le Carré’s George Smiley, Gunther 
Bachmann, and Jonathan Pine as well as Banville’s Victor Maskell shun the covert action turn in 
intelligence entirely, but the fundamental moral ambiguity in these works prevents these 
characters from usurping the Bondian ideal from its perch as the most popular and widely-
imitated secret agent. Reckoning with drone masculinity and how to defeat it still means 
reckoning with Bond. Fortunately, the more recent Bond films seem willing, at least in part, to 
do that kind of reckoning. Bond still sells us the idea of consumer-cool, but actor Daniel Craig’s 
and director Sam Mendes’ take in Skyfall and Spectre on the legacy and relevance of the 
character attempts to remake Bond as a champion of the human agent. This is more than a little 
odd. Bond, after all, helped usher in mechanization to the intelligence world. He did so both 
metaphorically, in the sense of ceding personal agency to hierarchy and bureaucracy, and 
literally, in the sense of increased SIGINT and drone use. Perhaps, though, reform must start 
with those who most need it.  
Such reform is urgent if intelligence can ever be used to hasten the arrival of world peace, 
rather than as a strategic tool for managing internal dissent and external wars. Intelligence since 
its inception as a government bureaucratic entity has chased particularism and national 
chauvinism over universalism and international cooperation. Heads of intelligence work may say 
that this split is inherent in the twin mandates of secrecy and national security. I disagree; I see 
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very little reasoning behind pitting national security and international cooperation against each 
other. In my final chapter, I examine one reason the discourse of espionage has furthered divides 
within the nation and between nations. Specifically, I interrogate the role of the Other as a 
rhetorical construct within that discourse. In other words, if Chapters four and five took as the 
question “who can be a spy?” Chapter 6 asks “who can be the enemy?” Spy fiction, as discussed 
above, provided a tremendous push in the run-up to WWI on the British cultural imagination to 
imagine the Germans—considered ethnically and racially like the British (especially in 
comparison to the French)—as a malevolent force. Throughout the twentieth century, Germany, 
the USSR, and then Arabic terrorism have served as bogeymen in the pages and on the screens of 
spy media at large, and intelligence agencies, recognizing the opportunity to leverage cultural 
Othering into political influence, have been loath to diffuse the public’s paranoia. I begin with a 
general overview of how Othering has shaped the discourse of espionage and the public’s 
experience of it. Drawing on the work of Edward Said and Homi K. Bhaba and other post-
colonial critics, I push beyond simplistic depictions of Others in spy fiction. Transparently evil 
villains are somewhat of a staple in the genre, but spy fiction hardly draws its interest from the 
white hat/black hat moralizing of the stereotypical Western. Instead, I argue that the threat of the 
Other in spy fiction is the threat of the mimic, the threat that enmity and enemy can appear 
indistinguishable from the safe “reality” of social existence to all but the most trained eyes. This 
is the fear that incentivizes the ceding of power to intelligence professionals—
indistinguishability requires omniscience to out. The dangers of treating this fear for 
entertainment value are readily apparent: a world in which neighbor cannot trust neighbor unless 
they are all perfectly observed being presented as entertainment normalizes it. Inter-group and 
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intra-group mistrust and bias become justifications for police action and for the surrender of 
liberal notions of privacy as the training-ground for the public soul.   
After providing this general overview, which primarily engages with John Buchan, Eric 
Ambler, le Carré, and Fleming, I examine how one particular case of Othering has affected the 
intelligence community’s inability to fulfill its national security mandate without also being an 
instrument of discrimination and oppression. In many ways the oldest form of Othering within 
the discourse of intelligence, Orientalism, is inseparable from the historical origins of the state-
licensed intelligence agency. I argue that its latest manifestation is in the practice of drone 
warfare, best understood as a combination of technological capability, policy, and an Orientalist 
decision-making framework. The technological properties of drone warfare are not sufficient for 
the program to achieve its strategic aims--namely, a war of extreme precision. Civilian casualties 
and radicalization of local populations after heavy drone use make drone warfare’s success 
record hopelessly inconclusive. The inability of drone warfare to be as effective as advertised 
arises because the practices of drone warfare remain rooted in Orientalism. My chapter aims to 
trace how elements of that entrenchment within espionage culture have affected the use and 
abuse of drones as a technology of colonial policing, asymmetrical killing, and voyeuristic 
surveillance. Without understanding historical strands of Orientalist thought and value-
judgments, one cannot grasp how drone warfare has failed as the decisive warfare strategy they 
were designed to be. Seeing is not understanding, and the surveillance powers of the drone are 
limited by the very human interpreters of the video and audio feeds provided. The “drone 
Orientalism” that governs drone use in the Persian Gulf states, Central Asia, and North Africa is 
a part of the espionage mindset and a feature of the cultural discourse of espionage. It must be 
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combatted by both policy changes as well as cultural ones, and we face the urgent ethical task to 
do so. 
Drone Orientalism is another example of the intelligence community’s tilt away from 
human-focused intelligence work and towards dehumanization, SIGINT, and violent covert 
action. Intelligence approaches war in the manner that once frightened George Orwell, who in 
the quintessential surveillance novel 1984 predicted a future in which 
[W]arfare [is] of limited aims between combatants who are unable to destroy one another, 
[and] have no material cause for fighting…[It] involves very small numbers of people, 
mostly highly trained specialists, and causes comparatively few casualties. The fighting, 
when there is any, takes place on the vague frontiers whose whereabouts the average man 
can only guess at…In the centres of civilization war means no more than…the occasional 
crash of a rocket bomb which may cause a few scores of deaths. 
War thrives when it is less and less personalized, to the point of becoming eternal. An 
intelligence community that pursues dehumanization as a strategic choice ensures its continued 
existence by betraying any hope of real security. As Mary Renda reminds us, culture is not a 
static product, “it is the doing of something—specifically, the making of meanings and thereby 
the structuring of human relationships” (25). The culture of espionage has moved away from 
those human relationships, and the role spy fiction and media have played in that shift marks the 
genre as culpable for a part of that shift. Even when spy fiction authors have emphasized human 
agency in their works, the trappings and tropes that constitute the bedrock of the genre’s 
entertainment has worked against them. Critics of the genre have also been problematically 
asleep at the wheel, refusing to consider the genre with the attention it deserves. Reworking the 
culture of espionage means fundamentally rethinking the role spy fiction plays in it—the ways it 
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can shape and reinforce who can be a spy, what is proper action for spy agencies to take, who or 
what the “enemy” is. In order to do that reworking, we first have to understand where we are at. 
That is the goal of this dissertation. 
 
 
 52 
Chapter 2 The Spy Agency as a Discursive Formation, Part 1: Conspiracy, Bureaucracy 
and the Espionage Mindset 
 
The generally accepted history of spy fiction, articulated, among other places, in John 
Cawelti and Bruce Rosenberg’s work The Spy Story, is that it grew out of some combination of 
the colonial adventure story, the detective novel, and the gothic romantic fantasy. These generic 
precursors offer much to our understanding of the tropes and structures of espionage fiction; 
from the adventure story spy authors borrowed an imaginary that purported to describe the 
Other, as well as learned how to write chases, and quests for hidden items (material in the 
adventure story, informational in the spy story); from the detective novel the spy story inherits 
master villains, intricate plotting, and brilliant protagonists; gothic romance lends spy fiction its 
sense of dread and paranoia, its dark halls of hidden strongholds filled with conspirators. But the 
innovations spy fiction makes to these pre-existing templates define the genre as a major one for 
the twentieth century, arguably more dynamic and better-selling in the past hundred years than 
any of its forebears. Double agents, fantastic gadgets, and clever individuals navigating 
complicated webs of international intrigue have become part of our pop-culture landscape, as 
have the shadowy organizations that these pop-culture heroes and villains work for—those three 
letter agencies: CIA, FBI, NSA, MI5, MI6, KGB, FSB, BND22, etc. The spy agency is a major 
part of spy fiction, and has, like other features of the genre, come to have symbolic resonances 
                                                 
22 Respectively the American international, domestic, and electronic intelligence agencies, the 
British domestic and international intelligence agencies, the Soviet Union’s international 
intelligence agency, modern Russia’s version of the same, and the German intelligence agency. 
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and memetic tropes attached to it. While each three-letter organization possesses very different 
real-life remits and functions, the fictionalization of espionage work in spy fiction has flattened 
many of these differences in order to tell spy stories that can resonate for a wide audience of spy 
fiction fans. Western spy agencies in particular are recognizable in their bureaucracy, their 
conspiratorial secrecy, their technophilia. Perhaps the most readily available archetype of the 
Western spy agency is James Bond’s MI6: led by a mysterious bureaucrat (M), highly 
compartmentalized, eager to show off Q branch’s toys. The reader or viewer of a Bond narrative 
is never allowed to see the totality of the agency; its presence seems to be endless, with agents 
and at times whole branches appearing when and where they are needed by the plot. The 
resulting duality is key to the spy agency as a cultural structure: the spy agency is both locatable, 
in the offices of M and Moneypenny and Q, and also diffuse—its representatives are around 
every corner, its surveillance always turned on. Sometimes, as in the Bond works, this duality is 
meant to be comforting; sometimes, when the spy agency is the villainous group in the story, it is 
meant to be terrifying and paranoia-inducing; and, sometimes, the absurdity of an infinite Big 
Other staffed by bureaucrats and wannabe action heroes is played for laughs, such as in Graham 
Greene’s Our Man in Havana (1958) or the TV show Archer (2009). But spy agencies are not 
merely assemblages of tropes; they actually exist, are funded by public money and staffed by 
thousands of workers with diverse intelligence roles. They work in secret and function as a key 
support in the modern nation-state’s security apparatus. The actual activities of spy agencies are 
covered in a cloak of clandestinity, at least unless they are leaked to the public or they 
spectacularly succeed or fail to the point that the agency divulges them. Spy fiction offers a 
glimpse into that secret world for a public that finds it fascinating but has little direct experience 
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of spy agencies themselves—a feeling of inclusion aided by the overlap between spy authors and 
former intelligence agents.  
At the same time, mistaking spy fiction directly for reality is a misstep that critics have 
not made at least since Michael Denning’s Cover Stories; as discussed in the Introduction, 
“realism” in depiction of spies and spy agencies is itself a trope, an authorial choice that can 
perform ideological work.23 Cawelti and Rosenberg argue that spy fiction is thus one-half reality 
and one-half melodrama, equal parts real-world detail and fantasy (56). I am not sure on the 
exact proportions, but the blend of both reality and fantasy in spy fiction has had a potent effect 
on the public imagination. The (scant) information to come to the public’s attention from actual 
intelligence organizations has left conceptual gaps in the public understanding of spy agencies 
and spy work, gaps spy fiction has, perhaps inadvertently but inevitably, filled. The result has 
been the transformation of the spy agency into a discursive entity. By this, I mean that spy 
agencies are understood by and to a certain extent understand themselves through the lens of 
fiction, and that they also are talked about and (to a certain extent) talk about themselves through 
the symbolic, metaphoric, metonymic, and memetic vocabulary of fiction. While the 
consequences of spy agency actions are very real, interactions between the public and state 
intelligence are influenced and mediated by fantasy structures, most notably assumptions about 
what spy agencies are and what they are allowed to do. Instead of crafting moral, ethical and 
legal justifications for their actions, or accepting responsibility when these justifications are 
lacking, intelligence agencies have sometimes leaned on fiction to make the case for covert 
action or expanded powers, as in the case, examined below, of the actual founding of MI6 in 
response to the invasion literature of William Le Queux. Additionally, pressure to conform to 
                                                 
23 See page #7 in Introduction for a discussion of this trope.  
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expectations arising from fictional representations of intelligence work that the public, policy 
makers, and intelligence personnel hold has led to changes, some drastic, in how intelligence 
agencies operate.    
The first two chapters of my dissertation examine the role the spy agency has played in 
spy fiction, the role spy fiction has played in shaping our understanding of real-world spy 
agencies, and the way our experiences with real-world espionage have filtered into spy fiction. In 
order to do this, I will dissect the current role the spy agency plays in cultural discourse, and then 
trace the lineages both in fiction and in political history of the key components of that role. Spy 
organizations currently find themselves in an ambiguous position in our cultural landscape, 
owing to ambivalent feelings about them by the public at large. In recent years, as Cawelti and 
Rosenburg point out, “there is an increasing awareness of the way in which organizations like the 
CIA abuse their authority by fomenting problems that threaten the peace more than they work to 
preserve it” (36). We see this in reactions to the revelations by Edward Snowden, Chelsea 
Manning, and other whistleblowers that the NSA, CIA, GCHQ (the UK’s version of the NSA) 
and other global intelligence agencies were engaged in widespread domestic and international 
surveillance, collecting, storing, and in many cases analyzing the digital footprints of every 
person to use electronic devices, regardless of any legal justification that such collection was 
necessary for national security purposes. These revelations are the latest examples of the 
intelligence world’s clandestine bubble being punctured to show unethical, immoral and/or 
illegal activity within. This lineage of “inconvenient” (for the intelligence world) revelations also 
includes, for example, torture in CIA secret prisons, the arming of the Taliban during the Russian 
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invasion of Afghanistan, the Watergate scandal, revelations about programs like MK-ULTRA,24 
the Bay of Pigs invasion, and the Iranian coup of 1953. Such revelations increase the public’s 
sense of conspiracy in the intelligence world, its intuition that intelligence agencies do not have 
to play by the same rules as everyone else, and that they are taking advantage of the secrecy of 
their operations to rig world-events to their own benefit over and above the benefit they are 
tasked with providing to the citizenry of their respective nation-states. Conspiracy is a key 
component of the portrayal of the spy agency in cultural discourse, including (and aided by) 
fictional works as diverse in time, theme, and intended audience as The Man who was Thursday 
(1908), The Human Factor (1978), The Bourne Identity (1980), and Captain America: The 
Winter Soldier (2014).  
The sense of conspiracy surrounding intelligence activities and agencies leads to a desire 
among journalists, watchdog groups, scholars, and concerned citizens for more transparency, a 
desire often frustrated by another characteristic of the modern spy agency: bureaucracy. In the 
modern era, there is nothing secret about the size of intelligence agencies; they are massive, 
multi-headed, well-funded, and so integral to the functioning of the nation-state that to imagine a 
national security apparatus without intelligence services seems impossible. Yet only a little over 
a hundred years ago, dedicated independent intelligence agencies did not exist, and two hundred 
years ago even military intelligence branches were loosely organized and purely informal. 
Espionage is old, but the spy agency as a bureaucratic megastructure is comparatively new. The 
spies in Queen Elizabeth’s spy ring, like Sir Walter Raleigh for example, had no official state 
standing—they were private individuals who were entirely on their own should they be 
                                                 
24 CIA experiments on the mind-control, brain-washing, and interrogation potential of mind-
altering drugs and psychological techniques (Eschner).  
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discovered. Even when, in the 1870s, the British military created in-house intelligence 
departments, these departments were small, loosely organized (i.e. agents had very few points of 
contact with command or other agents), and narrowly focused on the gathering of intelligence, 
especially geographic, cultural, and political information of relevance to the British Empire. 
Intelligence-gathering, counter-espionage, and covert action are now handled not by one entity, 
but by hundreds (when one considers contractors) in the U.S. alone, emerging in the years since 
the end of the Second World War and the dismantling of the covert action wartime agency, the 
Office of Strategic Services. The most notable of these alphabet-soup organizations, the CIA, 
was founded to be an intelligence-gathering body, but quickly ballooned into an expansive 
bureaucracy whose duties became increasingly diffuse. Frank Wisner and Allan Dulles, 
respectively the head of covert operations and the director of the CIA through most of the 1950s, 
were responsible for increasing the budget for the CIA eleven-fold between 1948 and the 
beginning of Eisenhower’s presidency. On its own, the covert operations branch—the violent-
action wing—received $400 million out of the $587 million allotted to the CIA in 1951 (Weiner 
53). Since then, the military-intelligence complex in the U.S. has expanded into a difficult to 
grasp web of federal and state agencies as well as private contractors, an expansion mirrored 
internationally.25 Bureaucratic expansion, an ever-growing set of self-imposed responsibilities, 
and an ethic of secrecy that enforces strict compartmentalization of different inter-agency and 
intra-agency departments do not make for transparency or ready accountability. As such, the 
inefficiencies of the quest for efficient intelligence has proven fodder for authors like Graham 
                                                 
25 Private contractors often work for several governments, especially along the lines of the 
“special relationship” between the U.S. and the U.K. 
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Greene, John le Carré, and Len Deighton who wish to portray the secret services as stumbling 
over their own girth.  
Bureaucratic diffusion of responsibility has also been integral in shaping two other key 
aspects of the modern intelligence agency in cultural discourse: the cruelty and technophilia of 
the secret services. Lack of transparency in the structural and legal underpinnings of intelligence 
agencies have allowed them to push an agenda that is more and more concerned with violent 
action, including extraordinary rendition, torture, and targeted killing (which the agency refuses 
to term “assassination”) missions carried out by drones. Despite the best efforts of the CIA and 
other intelligence agencies, these activities have become public knowledge; yet, once again, it is 
primarily through fiction that the citizens of the U.S., U.K. and other Western powers experience 
these actions. In contrast to those flying in Pakistan, the drones buzzing over the Nevadan desert 
do not fire Hellfire missiles, and the U.S. government is loath to discuss particulars of violent 
covert action that happens abroad. Spy fiction, perhaps problematically, has become the primary 
cultural form through which anxieties over the increase of violence in intelligence work can be 
expressed. We see this in films such as Denis Villanueve’s Sicario (2015), novels like John le 
Carré’s A Most Wanted Man (2008), and even television shows like Homeland (2011) and Burn 
Notice (2007).  
As mentioned earlier, there has been in recent years greater public discourse outside of 
fiction around the issue of domestic surveillance and the role spy agencies play in electronic 
networks. The intelligence world’s fascination with technology is an old one—spy gadgets enter 
into the espionage vocabulary at the same time as spy agencies do—but no branch of espionage 
activity has benefitted more from bureaucratic expansion as the real-world equivalents of Q 
branch. After President Eisenhower’s creation of the NSA in the mid-50s, it quickly became the 
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premiere U.S. intelligence-collecting agency, focusing on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), that is, 
intelligence gathered electronically through monitoring, observation, or interception. By 1956, 
the NSA already had almost 9000 employees and about the same number of contractors, along 
with the most sophisticated computer technology in the world (Macrakis 322). The NSA also has 
changed how the other intelligence agencies function. For example, in 2013, the CIA’s total 
budget was $14.7 billion, of which over half was devoted solely to SIGINT (Grey 274). The split 
within the intelligence community over the primacy of SIGINT over HUMINT (Human 
Intelligence, especially intel gathered from human agents strategically placed in sensitive 
positions) was at one time a bitter point of contention within the intelligence community at large. 
Scholar Kristie Macrakis argues that throughout the Cold War, the Eastern bloc and the U.K. 
were generally on the opposite side of HUMINT/SIGINT split from the U.S., and were, in fact, 
much less reliant for initial intelligence reports on SIGINT and electronically-collected data, 
favoring an agent-based HUMINT system over spy satellites and U2 planes (Macrakis 379). Any 
resistance intelligence agencies in the U.K. and former U.S.S.R. may have had toward SIGINT 
has vanished since 9/11, as shown in the revelations provided by Edward Snowden and others, 
but the conflict over the ethics and efficacy of technological solutions to intelligence problems is 
very much a live one in the cultural discourse of espionage in the West, both within agencies 
themselves and in public media at large.  
The way spy fiction and spy discourse have addressed conspiracy, bureaucracy, cruelty, 
and technophilia in espionage have helped to transform the spy agency from a government 
department into a discursive entity, one with cultural valences as well as political ones. When a 
reader or watcher of spy narratives encounters the spy agency as a discursive entity, she or he is 
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reminded of their subjection to a Foucauldian discipline, which D.A. Miller describes in The 
Novel and the Police as composed of three characteristics: 
(1) an ideal of unseen but all-seeing surveillance, which, though partly realized in 
several, often interconnected institutions, is identified with none; (2) a regime of 
the norm, in which normalizing perceptions, prescriptions, and sanctions are 
diffused in discourses and practices throughout the social fabric; and (3) various 
technologies of the self and its sexuality, which administer the subject’s own 
contribution to the intensive and continuous “pastoral” care that liberal society 
proposes to take of each and every one of its charges. (viii) 
Spy stories remind us constantly that spy organizations are explicitly carrying out number 1, 
surveilling the populace for threats external and internal. They also see themselves as the 
necessary defenders of number 2, a regime of normalcy enforced by that very surveillance. 
Lastly, spy agencies are reliant on the self-policing and public contributions described by number 
3 for help in uncovering the non-conforming, non-self-policing, and thus dangerous Other that 
might be lurking behind the façade of the Self/Same—the Red Scare being the most famous, 
though not only, example of this. But spy fiction is not known as a genre that in general inspires 
a kind of Kafka-esque dread (though there are perhaps exceptions that do). In fact, quite the 
opposite; spy fiction tends to emphasize the heroic overcoming of the conspiratorial, 
bureaucratic, cruel, and technophilic Big Other, regardless of the letters (KGB, CIA, etc.) that the 
Big Other goes by. The spy genre makes stories out of the political and cultural anxieties of 
modern society, but in general the actual plots of spy fiction are focused on the actions and 
reactions of the hero(es), transforming those anxieties into entertainment. The anxiety-inducing 
traits of the spy agency get transmuted into their opposites by the heroic plot: bureaucracy 
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becomes a backdrop to emphasize creativity, conspiracy plots are unraveled by knowledge and 
exposure, cruelty and violence are disparaged and disavowed, if not outright overcome, by the 
forces of strategy and morality, and technophilia is shown to be no replacement for old-fashioned 
human spirit and effort. One reason that this magic trick is so common in spy fiction is that it is a 
necessary move in the effort to make actual espionage activities and organizations into 
entertainment. Spy authors use the tools of fictionalization and narrativization to transform a 
secret world that, as we will see, is actually characterized by conspiracy, slow-moving and large 
bureaucracy, and an increasing technophilia into public entertainment. This necessitates the 
insertion of what Graham Greene might call (after his spy novel of the same name) “the human 
factor”. However, the human factor—the plot-structure that pits human agency against the 
dehumanization of the spy agency—is not just a story-telling convention. It performs some 
ideological work by casting world politics and history as influence-able by lone human actors. 
This is a comforting thought in the late-capitalist world, a world that seems much too large and 
complex for any one person to make much of a difference. But the ability of an individual to be 
an agent, both in the sense of working for an intelligence agency and in the sense of affecting 
international relations, is baked into the appeal of spy fiction, and visible in the themes and 
tropes spy authors use.  
For example, take the way Eric Ambler uses point of view. The Ambler-ian protagonist is 
generally an amateur caught up in a whirlwind of international intrigue. He often feels “in over 
his head,” overwhelmed, and lost. But, Ambler uses this outsider perspective as a critique; the 
Ambler-ian protagonist does not, in contrast to James Bond, ever save the day, but he does 
possess the ability to witness and judge the playing out of structural conflict in the lives of 
individual people. Michael Denning articulates this nicely when he says that:   
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Centrality of point of view [in Ambler’s novels] marks the dominance of an 
ethical mode of thought. The concern for the ambiguity of all points of view, the 
obsessive story of the loss of innocence, and the demystifying reduction of all 
civilization to violence and brute force: all these aspects of the Ambler 
metaphysic join to form a concern for individual ethical decisions [emphasis 
added] in the context of certain established and permanent aspects of human 
nature and experience. (83) 
The concern for individual ethical decisions in the face of large-scale structural difficulties 
places Ambler’s works, and indeed the works of many of the most skilled authors of spy fiction, 
including Henry James, Joseph Conrad, Graham Greene, W. Somerset Maugham, Elizabeth 
Bowen, and John Le Carré, in the tradition of liberal humanism. This tradition of emphasizing 
the importance of individual ethical decisions within the complexities of geopolitical 
machinations has formed the foundation for an ongoing conversation about how espionage 
agencies have and should conduct themselves. Of course, none of the authors go so far as to 
advocate for the abolition of liberal democratic societies or intelligence agencies per se—all see 
spies as serving some kind of necessary function. Some kind of surveillance is always inevitably 
posited as necessary to the social contract. D.A. Miller argues that all novels “confirm the novel-
reader in his identity as a ‘liberal subject’” and thereby also affirms the innate worth, if not the 
particular points of contention,26 of the political, social and cultural regimes which the reader is 
subject to (Miller x). Spy fiction is no exception, despite its sometimes doom and gloom and 
                                                 
26 I.E., a John le Carré novel—for example, A Most Wanted Man—can be read as arguing against 
covert action, but in positing the necessity of doing away with the CIA’s love of covert action in 
order to create a better intelligence agency, the novel still reaffirms the need for intelligence 
agencies.  
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railing against the inhumanity of the world. However, Miller also maintains that the liberal 
subject “seems to recognize himself most fully only when he forgets or disavows his functional 
implication in a system of carceral restraints or disciplinary injunctions” (x). Spy fiction 
accomplishes the confirmation of the reader as a liberal subject despite emphasizing her or his 
functional implication in a system of surveillance, discipline and restraint. In order to understand 
this sleight of hand, it is necessary to examine how that system, metonymized as the spy agency, 
talks about itself and is talked about in cultural discourse at large and in spy fiction in particular. 
When we examine spy fiction this way, we find that even when the author means to position the 
human agent as a critique of an inhuman agency operating in an inhumane world, the act of 
representing that agency in a fantastical manner builds into that critique an element of pleasure 
and acceptance—an understanding that the spy agency is “supposed” to work that way.  
When placing the individual agent against tropes of conspiracy, bureaucracy, cruelty and 
technophilia, the later tropes come to compose integral pieces of something I term the 
“espionage mindset.” The espionage mindset is, is characterized by, and does. It is the 
discursive naturalization of dehumanizing and de-agentifying practices because of culturally 
reinforced expectations that spy agencies are “supposed” to act in that manner. As discussed 
above, even when the agentive opposition exists, the repetitive placement of the inhumane spy 
agency as the contrasted term normalizes the inhumanity. The public, and intelligence workers 
themselves, buy into the characterization. The espionage mindset is itself characterized by 
instrumental thinking, a gamification of politics, and chauvinism for the agency itself, even over 
the nation-state. It does in the sense that all discourses do—it convinces, normalizes, suggests, 
and incentivizes its own position as the dominant ideology within intelligence. The espionage 
mindset is an example of what I termed in the introduction a “cultural lattice,” a framework of 
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easy references created in large part by fiction, material and institutional design, and mental 
heuristic. Decision-making within intelligence work takes place within this particular lattice, 
leading to a disproportionate influence of discursive formations like conspiracy and bureaucracy 
and the spy fiction that helps advance them. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how the espionage 
mindset emerges through this paradoxical mechanism of critique and acceptance, of personal 
agency living within the constraints of state-sponsored agencies, by analyzing the way 
conspiracy and bureaucracy are used to characterize the spy agency. In the next chapter, I will 
show how cruelty and technophilia in intelligence work are themselves products of the espionage 
mindset, artifacts of cultural expectations of intelligence work as much as direct orders from 
superiors.   
The SPECTRE of the Many-Headed HYDRA: Conspiracy and the Public’s Experience of 
Spy Agencies 
Writing about conspiracy in a time when President Trump continues to decry the election 
he won as rigged by systematic voter fraud has caused me to reconsider the role conspiracies 
play in public discourse from the first time I drafted this chapter. In that earlier draft, I posited 
that conspiracies act as a kind of bad-faith Big Other, omnipotent and omniscient and constantly 
menacing. Conspiracies inspire in the subject a paranoid reading of signs, as anything might be a 
clue that the conspiracy exists and is out to get you. These negative psychic feelings in which the 
subject is forced to confront his or her subjectedness to political (and social and cultural) regimes 
beyond their control cry out for a therapeutic working-through. I argued that one of the great 
pleasures of spy fiction is derived from exactly this need for reassurance that the conspiracy can 
be overcome by the heroic secret agent, an act that, in Michael Denning’s words, “returns human 
agency to a world which seems less and less the product of human action” (14). However, I now 
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believe that while conspiracies can function this way in fiction, spy fiction especially, I do not 
think that the reassurance narrative is the reason conspiracy as a kind of belief/believing has had 
a lasting place in cultural discourse. Namely, aside from the pleasure in exposing and 
overcoming a conspiracy, there also exists a kind of deeper pleasure in actually believing one 
exists in the first place. President Trump’s contentions that only a conspiracy could be 
responsible for his failure to capture the popular vote helped me to realize that belief in a 
conspiracy can provide the psychic pleasure of being “in the know.” It is a very strange reaction-
formation, but the belief in conspiracies, in plots so powerful, widespread and secret that they 
can accomplish anything, is a reassuring fantasy that the subject who doesn’t belong to the 
conspiracy but who knows about it must be therefore right, good, and smart—that they are 
privileged subjects who can see the “true nature of the world,” or the true (obviously reptilian27) 
face of the Big Other. The fantasy here is not in overcoming the conspiracy, but in only failing 
because a conspiracy exists. The subject repeats to himself, “The universe had to cheat to beat 
me, but I am on to that game.” I think it is this aspect of conspiracy theorizing that transforms all 
pieces of contradictory evidence into proof the conspiracy exists; a believer can assuage all doubt 
by saying to herself “of course the evidence says there is not a conspiracy, that’s what we would 
expect to find if there were one.” Conspiracies thus help to bring order to a chaotic, 
contradictory, possibly meaningless (or at least without an a priori meaning) social reality. In 
hindsight, I should have seen this other pleasure in conspiracy the first time through—in fact, it 
is essential, to the formation of both spy fiction and formal spy agencies, as I will show through 
an examination of early works in the genre by William Le Queux, Henry James’s proto-spy 
                                                 
27 That a race of intelligent prehistoric reptiles controls world government in conjunction with/as 
the Illuminati is a somewhat well-known conspiracy theory, first put forward by David Icke 
(Bump). 
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novel Princess Casamassima (1886), and Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent (1907). I also 
discuss the continuing legacy of the conspiracy in the discourse of espionage, both in how spy 
agencies are presented in historical discussions of their activities, for example, in the Bay of Pigs 
invasion and in more modern works such as Hitchcock’s North by Northwest (1959), the Bond 
series, the Mission: Impossible films and even the recent superhero film Captain America: The 
Winter Soldier (2014). 
Conspiracy, as mentioned above, has a central place in the shared history of spy fiction 
and spy agencies. Primarily, this place has been that of antagonist, real or imagined. Svetlana 
Bloym defines the conspiracy as “a subversive kinship of others, an imagined community based 
on exclusion more than affection, a union of those who are not with us, but against us” (41). A 
conspiracy is always many-headed,28 shadowy, powerful; their mere existence makes the 
domestic space a possible threatening location. They are often portrayed as the “over there” in 
the heart of the “here”, or the foreign elements hiding within the power apparatus of the nation. 
One has to know about them to stop them. Conveniently, there exists a whole class of 
professionals dedicated to uncovering and rooting out the subversive others working in plain 
sight to undermine “us”: the intelligence agent. I doubt I am being very unique when I observe 
that the threat of the Other is often used as a cudgel to “entice” (i.e. force) people to homogenize, 
to shake off the luxurious apathy of contentment and rally to the defense of the Same. But the 
threat of the conspiratorial Other does more—it convinces people to give up portions of their 
autonomy and agency in order to be better known to their governmental apparatus. The point is 
to distinguish themselves from that Other, to say “I am not him.” Invoking a conspiracy is a 
demand for the license to know who is and isn’t a part of it, and thus a justifying factor in the 
                                                 
28 The villainous conspiracy of Captain America: Winter Soldier is even called HYDRA. 
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formation of groups dedicated to finding that distinguishing information, i.e. intelligence 
services. In fact, some scholars, like Phillip Knightley, take the strong view that the assumption 
that fictional conspiracies were real was the only thing that made intelligence services palatable 
to the general public:  
The history of intelligence agencies has shown us that they justify their existence 
by promising to provide timely warning of a menace. In the Western world we 
have become so accustomed to this menace being the Soviet Union…that one 
wonders what the agencies did before the Red threat existed. The answer is: they 
invented one. … These pre-1914-1918 spy writers projected their fantasies into 
the real world. [William] Le Queux bore some direct responsibility for the 
creation of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, from which all others flowed; 
[John] Buchan became a recruiter of SIS spies. Both decided that the monster 
menacing Britain was Imperial Germany, a proposition enthusiastically supported 
by the intelligence services, who quickly realized that without a threat they were 
out of business. (390) 
Knightley argues that the conspiracy crossed over from the pages of Le Queux and Buchan into 
the real world, that their paranoid imaginings of militant Germany became a cultural paranoia, 
which hastened the actual conflict (WWI) by building assumptions that “they” were out to get 
“us” into policy—the creation of spy services. David Trotter relates how Le Queux, along the 
serialization of his novel Spies for the Kaiser: Plotting the Downfall of England in the Weekly 
News, ran an ad copy before it that read “FOREIGN SPIES IN BRITAIN/£10 Given for 
Information/Have you seen a spy?” Le Queux got numerous replies, most for innocuous things 
like “swearing in German or wearing a wig,” and sent those replies to James Edward Edmonds, 
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head of military intelligence, who used them to convince the Committee of Imperial Defence to 
set up a new Secret Services Bureau (the precursor to MI5 and MI6) (Trotter 31). Needless to say 
that Le Queux and his readers were not actually in possession of any secret information, nor did 
they possess any leads on actual German agents. What they felt was a strong desire to be “in the 
know.” Le Queux’s espionage literature built a cultural discourse for people to participate in, and 
the opportunity to air grievances, paranoias, biases, and prejudices. This discursive space 
allowed for a transformation of the terrifying belief that they lived in a world in which even the 
waiter at the corner restaurant could be an enemy agent into something preferable and 
pleasurable, a confirmation of “what I have always known,” that is, that the world is secretly 
divided into a “them” and an “us.” Participation in this discourse seems like vindication (a 
vindication Le Queux profited on29) and vindication—of the self and the self’s ability to 
discern—feels good. But assuming conspiracies exist and talking about them does not prove they 
are real. Rather, the assumption merely increases the power of the fantasy of conspiracy, and in 
turn of the century Britain this fantasy was powerful enough to create a governmental 
department. 
 The conspiracy is very effective as a fantasy, as a rhetorical bogeyman. Real life 
conspiracies, since they are by definition not widely known while they are operating, can only be 
evaluated in hindsight, at which point they have either achieved their aims and “gone public,” or 
have not and been uncovered. Many end up being quite prosaic, motivated by greed or the desire 
to cover up some illegal actions by its members. As some quick Internet searching will show, it 
is in fantasy where conspiracies take on their most intricate design, and their most imaginative 
and generative powers. Conspiracy theories strike at the heart of social knowledge. Political 
                                                 
29 Le Queux was probably not the first or last conspiracy monger to be in it for material gain. 
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scientist Brian Frederking writes that “Social structures help constitute the interests and identities 
of purposive actors…Human agency is enmeshed in the web of social rules that both constitute 
and regulate agency…Agents and structures construct each other. Rules make agents and agents 
make rules” (364). Imagined conspiracies act as hidden, unreadable social structures that upset 
social legibility by hiding agent loyalty. The “rules” that I play by and the “rules” that I expect 
others to observe are meaningless if the others are hiding their true loyalty and true plans until it 
is too late for me to act. Conspiracies thus threaten to make individual agency by those outside of 
the conspiracy impossible by re-structuring and then hiding social rules. Little wonder, then, that 
the political and social response to those conspiracies that, like Le Queux’s inspired 
Germanophobia, are compelling enough to be believed (despite at times only the scantest of 
evidence30) has been to pre-emptively throw out the rule book. State power offers to expose and 
defeat those fantastical conspiracies that threaten the nation as long as the public is willing to 
give up rights to privacy, due process, habeas corpus, prohibitions against cruel and unusual 
punishments and torture, the Geneva Conventions, etc. But as these conspiracies are more 
cultural imagination than political fact, the deal is a bad one—regimes get more authoritarian on 
the back of a smoke and mirror sideshow or, worse, a witch hunt. Tim Weiner in his book 
Legacy of Ashes describes an example of how the latter has shaped intelligence policy. Weiner 
writes that President Eisenhower was initially reluctant to acquiesce to his intelligence services’ 
demands for more aggressive covert actions, struggling to justify to himself the competing 
                                                 
30 It is true, after all, that Germany was seeking to place spies in position to gather intelligence 
the UK military—but not on the neighborhood corner. Similarly, some US citizens were actually 
Communist spies, and terror groups like al Qaeda do carry out operations designed to harm those 
who do not share their particular ideologies—yet responding to these threats by dismantling the 
fundamental freedoms which peaceful society strives for is a self-defeating tactic, one that only 
exacerbates the crisis instead of ending it by virtue of giving evidence to the enemy that we are 
the villains their own propaganda and conspiracy theories make us out to be.  
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claims of national security and the values of personal liberty and justice the United States claims 
as a nation to hold dear. Eventually though, he relented in the face of anti-Communist hysteria 
from the public and from CIA higher-ups angling for larger budgets, declaring that there were 
“no rules in the game” between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and that American notions of “fair play” 
need to be reconsidered (Weiner 109). The perceived Soviet crisis, like the perceived German 
crisis before it, radically changed how Western intelligence services operated, increasing their 
aggression and willingness to employ covert and illegal actions. Now that, as Hardt and Negri 
point out in Empire, “it is increasingly difficult for the ideologues of the U.S. to name a single, 
unified enemy” and the “globalization of economic and cultural relationships, means that the 
virtual center of Empire can be attacked from any point,” the more geographically locatable 
crisis of fascist or Communistic threat has become an “omni-crisis” of global terrorism, 
authoritarian regimes such as North Korea and Iran, and a resurgent “Russia” problem31 (189; 
59). An Empire convinced that its enemies are in league, legion, and un-locatable has demanded 
a spy service large enough and advanced enough to be everywhere and monitor everyone. 
Conspiracies demand and call into being counter-conspiracies—an imagined “conspiracy gap” 
creates larger and more secretive measures of surveillance, control, and covert action.  
  Fictional conspiracies, essential to the historical beginnings of the spy agency, are still 
popular plot devices in the espionage genre. In the latest Mission: Impossible film (2015), a 
“rogue nation” of special agents has split off from the intelligence services of the world and 
                                                 
31 George W. Bush and his fellow neocons repeating proclamations that the “War on Terror” was 
not solely a war on Islam might have rung hollow to many, but in their repeated insistence, they 
reinforced the idea that danger was everywhere and required the utmost discernment and 
authority to deal with. This logic is what was used to justify the expansion of the duties of 
intelligence agencies to include torture, drone warfare, widespread data collection and 
monitoring, and targeted killing operations globally. 
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devoted itself to black ops, without any oversight or restraint from governmental checks and 
balances or legal frameworks. Tom Cruise’s Ethan Hunt runs, swims, drives, fights, and hangs 
off a plane to stop them. Hunt’s critics in the American intelligence apparatus decry his reckless 
tactics, believing him to be simply lucky, and that one day his luck will run out and the bad guys 
will win. As one might guess, that day does not come in the six months over which the film take 
place. In the recent superhero film Captain America: The Winter Soldier, the fact that a crypto-
Nazi organization has infiltrated the American political and intelligence apparatuses turns out to 
be the reason for the intelligence world’s turn towards militarization, strike-first mentality, and 
unrestricted drone surveillance and warfare. “You’ve held a loaded gun to the world’s head and 
called it safety,” intones Captain America, whose (idealistically mythologized) WWII-era values 
are set in contrast to this new world order. Captain America believes that all the world needs for 
freedom and happiness is an end to tyrants; the conspiracy he faces believes tyranny is necessary 
for stability. Both films’ protagonists are men of great agency—physical, mental, moral. The 
stunt sequences serve to highlight their indomitable nature, their ability to do the impossible. The 
films are popcorn flicks, facile handlings of some very serious issues, turning surveillance, extra-
judicial covert actions, etc. into an excuse for superheroics. (Tom Cruise plays a superhero even 
when his characters don’t have superpowers). But both films, which ultimately feature the heroes 
bringing down these secret cabals through exposure, hit upon a fact long known by spy fiction 
authors: conspiracies make great villains as long as they can stay a secret. One of the most 
classic conspiracies on film is in Hitchcock’s North by Northwest, which stars Cary Grant as 
Roger Thornhill. Roger is mistaken for the nonexistent George Kaplan, and forced to play the 
role of Kaplan against his will and without knowing what game he is playing—or the stakes at 
risk—by a conspiracy of spies aiming to steal and smuggle microfilm containing state secrets. 
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North by Northwest captures the nightmarish unreality of conspiracy stories, in which the 
Lacanian Big Other is vast, unknowable, omni-present, and out to get you, despite your protests 
that you have nothing to do with the matter—that you are not Kaplan. But you are, because 
“they” say so; you do not get to determine your social identity; your agency is lost in the 
machinations of others. This nightmare feeling is perfectly captured in the famous plane-chase 
scene, in which Thornhill is unexpectedly forced to run through a cornfield as a crop duster 
attempts to run him down. The scene comes out of nowhere—the audience, like Thornhill, is 
caught unprepared as the machine turns a bright blue sky and a lazy cornfield into a place of 
danger and terror. The inhumanity of the airplane (Who is piloting it? We never find out.) is 
what makes it such a potent symbol of conspiracy. In fact, when Thornhill can boil down the 
conspiracy plot to its individual members, like secret government agent Eve Kendall and foreign 
spy Phillip Vandamm, he goes from terrified to nonplussed to heroic. Naming the conspiracy 
members defeats them by making them into real people. Realness is the domain of agency, not of 
nightmare. The categorical “real person” may be good or bad or a little of both, but they are 
assumed to be like “us” fundamentally. And so, realness is rarely imputed to members of 
conspiracies, inside fiction or out. For example, in a 1953 essay, literary critic Leslie Fiedler 
argued that the Rosenbergs were incapable of thinking “of themselves as real people” (qtd. in 
Nicholson 258). And how, one might skeptically ask Fiedler, did they think of themselves? 
Obviously as members of a conspiracy, since that is how the U.S. public thought of them!  
 North by Northwest is certainly influenced by John Buchan’s WWI-era book The 39 
Steps, and by Hitchcock’s own film version of the Buchan story. Conspiracies, or rather, fear of 
conspiracies, as argued above, are the genesis of both spy fiction and spy agencies. They were 
there at the beginning with Buchan and Le Queux, and they are still very common in the genre as 
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the nameless force against which the initially hopeless hero must pit himself (and more rarely, 
herself). When the protagonists unmask the conspiracy, name its individual members, and then 
defeat those individuals by foiling their plot by punching—as in Mission: Impossible and 
Captain America, mentioned above—Michael Denning’s pronouncement32 is fulfilled in its most 
obvious form. But heroic derring-do is not the only resolution in the genre as a whole to a 
conspiracy plot, even in the age of Le Queux and Buchan itself. Take Henry James’s Princess 
Casamassima, for example. A kind of proto-example of spy fiction, the novel’s two protagonists, 
Hyacinth Robinson and the titular Princess, have very different narrative arcs relative to their 
agency and the Communist conspiracy that moves much of the plot of the book. The Princess, 
for one, actually finds her agency by conspiring with the Communists, despite—or more 
accurately, in spite of—her aristocratic status. Casamassima chafes under the societal 
requirements of her status and her gender. She sees the largesse provided by her husband, the 
prince, as materialism meant to erode her individuality and independence. “Does he (her 
husband) count me myself, and every pulse of my being, every capacity of my nature, as 
nothing?” she asks (363). The Prince does not understand that his wife would throw away 
security and comfort for agency. Other characters in the novel struggle with the notion as well—
Casamassima at various points is thought to be a spy, and despite her interactions with the 
leaders of the conspiracy and her somewhat condescending claim late in the book to Hyacinth 
that he is "so much out of it now that if I were to tell you [our plans] I fear you wouldn’t 
understand,” she never seems to be quite so essential to those plans that she can change them, 
including her inability to affect the tragic ending of the book which I discuss below (358). 
                                                 
32 As quoted before, “the secret agent returns human agency to a world which seems less and less 
the product of human action.” 
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However, Casamassima’s involvement with the conspiracy is radical and not merely an 
aristocratic affectation. She even eventually shocks her husband enough for him to leave her 
alone. By the conclusion of the novel, Casamassima does see that perhaps her faith in the 
conspiracy is unfounded, and that she perhaps should have spent her desire to overthrow the 
system that oppresses her on better methods than what she did. But she learns that for herself, by 
herself. 
Hyacinth Robinson, ultimately, is a young man torn between his loyalty to a Communist 
conspiracy and his artistic temperament which values bourgeois expressions of liberty, value and 
beauty. Hyacinth is initially an easy convert, believing that “It was for the people the world was 
made; whoever was not of them was against them; and all others were cumberers, usurpers, 
exploiters” (96).  Other characters, however, have serious doubts throughout the first volume of 
the novel that the conspiracy is even real. Before jumping in whole-heartedly, Casamassima, for 
example, does not want to waste her time and energy on mere resentment: “is all this going to 
burst forth some fine morning and set the world on fire? Or is it to sputter out and spend itself in 
vain conspiracies, be dissipated in sterile heroisms and abortive isolated movements?” she 
wonders (195). Regardless, Hyacinth swears his loyalty to the group, and in Volume II gives a 
paradigmatic description of it, one that could apply to generations of conspiracies in thriller plots 
for the next century:  
It’s beyond anything I can say. Nothing of it appears above the surface; but 
there’s an immense underworld peopled with a thousand forms of revolutionary 
passage and devotion. The manner in which it’s organized is what astonished me. 
I knew that, or thought I knew it, in a general way, but the reality was a 
revelation. And on top of it all society lives. People go and come, and buy and 
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sell, and drink and dance, and make money and make love, and seem to know 
nothing and suspect nothing and think of nothing; and iniquities flourish, and the 
misery of half the world is prated about as a ‘necessary evil’ and generations rot 
away and starve in the midst of it, and day follows day, and everything is for the 
best in the best of possible worlds. All that’s one half of it; the other half is that 
everything’s doomed! In silence, in darkness, but under the feet of each one of us, 
the revolution lives and works…The invisible, impalpable wires are everywhere, 
passing through everything, attaching themselves to objects in which one would 
never think of looking for them. (44) 
The notion of invisible wires calls to mind marionettes, and again, the lack of agency that 
characterizes being caught up in a conspiracy. That James is never quite clear just how serious 
this particular conspiracy is33 does not matter to Hyacinth, who takes them at their word as 
plotters, killers, and revolutionaries. He only begins to chafe under the conspiracy’s threat to 
render meaningless the art, society and manners to which he is attracted. Hyacinth holds 
bourgeois sensibility as a high virtue, as that which is called nobility34 in the powerful but is 
attainable for all under a more just society. He is torn by his oath of “blind obedience” and his 
sneaking suspicion that at root the conspiracy is founded on jealousy rather than idealism, that it 
stems from “the intolerance of positions and fortunes that are higher and brighter than one’s 
own” instead of true altruistic motivations (130). Perhaps, he begins to think, only those—like 
his friend Lady Aurora Langrish—that have something they can give up can even be altruistic. 
                                                 
33 Sometimes “They know everything—everything. They’re like the great God of the believers: 
they’re searchers of hearts; and not only of hearts, but of all a man’s life—his days, his nights, 
his spoken, his unspoken words” and other times they seem at worst a bunch of grumblers (341). 
34 Hyacinth himself is the bastard offspring of an aristocrat. 
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Hyacinth is trapped by his oath and his personal feelings. In the climax of the novel, he is 
ordered to shoot a “bad institution,” i.e. a person in political power the conspiracy wants 
assassinated, in the name of revolution. Notice how the conspiratorial language even here seeks 
to erase the man’s individuality—it’s morally difficult to justify killing a person, after all, but an 
institution can be toppled without such moral wrangling. Unable to justify erasing another’s 
individuality for political gain, but unwilling to forsake his own honor by breaking an oath and 
running, Hyacinth instead turns the gun on himself. In suicide, Hyacinth preserves his 
individuality, neither offending bourgeois honor by going back on his word nor becoming a 
pawn for a group that strikes furtively from the shadows.  
 Hyacinth’s conundrum at the end of the Princess Casamassima may strike readers, 
perhaps, as a little silly. I think that this is especially the case because James, who is no 
revolutionary, is loath to imbue the communists with the actual potential to overthrow society. 
The communist conspiracy menaces, but, given that we know several members and what kind of 
people they happen to be, they do not come across as especially menacing. At least though they 
are not the bunglers of Conrad’s The Secret Agent. There are technically two conspiracies in the 
Secret Agent: a conspiracy of anarchists, and a conspiracy by a foreign35 intelligence service to 
foment these anarchists to action in order to provoke British lawmakers to pass more restrictive 
censorship and other security measures.36 The titular secret agent is Verloc, who has been 
reporting on the anarchist group to his foreign handlers (and, it turns out, the British police) but 
is tasked with bombing the Greenwich Observatory. This task, to “throw a bomb into pure 
                                                 
35 Implicitly Russian. 
36 Presumably, this benefits the foreign power by keeping dissidents from that country freely 
publishing radical or anti-government texts in Britain that are then disseminated in the foreign 
country.  
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mathematics” as Verloc’s handler describes it, is meant to be the ultimate attack on order and 
rationality (27). Other targets, like the church or the monarchy, are deemed ineffective as potent 
symbols in the modern age. Given Conrad’s conservatism, this is one of the early indications that 
the Secret Agent is not a better-written retread of a Le Queux book, but rather a critique of them.  
 Verloc’s conspiracies pass the “eye test” for menace, at least at first. Verloc seems to 
have arrived from the continent “like the influenza” (6). Plague imagery is common in describing 
the conspirators throughout the novel, which ends with a conspirator, the Professor, moving “like 
a pest through the streets full of men” (246). The narration warns the reader of Verloc’s, 
potential for contagion, as well as the potential of those like him to undermine a healthy body 
politic, spy or not. Verloc possesses the “moral nihilism common to keepers of gambling hells 
and disorderly houses; to private detectives and inquiry agents; to drink sellers and to the 
inventors of patent medicines” (11). However, Verloc’s nihilism is nothing compared to the 
Professor’s—the latter actively carries a bomb on his person so that he is always a threat to the 
machinery of power and society around him. But Conrad is skeptical that men like Verloc and 
the Professor can actually harm, let alone dismantle, bourgeois law and order. The Secret Agent 
reduces anarchic ideology to personal shortcomings, and the spy plot into, in the words of Chief 
Inspecter Heat, a “domestic drama” (175). Verloc, a fat, lethargic, clumsy, oafish man, lives at 
the fringes of respectable society, true, but:  
the instinct of conventional respectability was strong within him, being only 
overcome by his dislike of all kinds of recognized labour—a temperamental 
defect which he shared with a large proportion of revolutionary reformers of a 
given social state. For obviously one does not revolt against the advantages and 
opportunities of that state, but against the price which must be paid for the same 
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in the coin of accepted morality, self-restraint, and toil. The majority of 
revolutionists are the enemies of discipline and fatigue mostly. (42) 
Verloc’s personal slovenliness are indicative of his lack of restraint, a quality, along with 
habitual laziness, extended to what Conrad might consider the revolutionary type—anarchists, 
socialists, communists or any other of the “thems” over which Edwardian England obsessed. We 
are told that even the Professor, while clearly a different type than Verloc37 is in his anarchic 
philosophy “doing no more but seeking for peace in common with the rest of mankind—the 
peace of soothed vanity, of satisfied appetites, or perhaps of appeased conscience” (65). That 
even Conrad’s revolutionaries secretly possess domestic instincts clues us in on the thematic 
switch the novel is attempting to pull off: The Secret Agent is not actually very political. The 
anarchic conspiracy in the book ultimately resolves in domestic murder, as Verloc is killed by his 
wife after failing to realize how much she cared for her mentally-disabled brother, who is blown 
up accidentally while carrying the bomb meant for the observatory (the indolent Verloc had 
tricked him into unknowingly carrying it). The Secret Agent is not the story of a protagonist, 
using their individual agency and actions, making sense of the world stage of politics, but rather 
the inverse: a protagonist, through bumbling and laziness, making the domestic sphere 
dangerous. It is the home, not the nation, which proves vulnerable, and that not really due to 
political machinations, but to personal failings. 
 Where the Secret Agent has had a lasting influence in the spy genre is a bit unexpected. 
Conrad’s skepticism of professional intelligence agents and agencies in general because of their 
tendency to conspiracy—and even more interesting, inventing and stoking conspiracies in order 
to justify their existence—separates him from most of his contemporaries. In Buchan, or in 
                                                 
37 Who is after all a spy and thus not a true believer. 
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Childress’ The Riddle of the Sands (1903), amateurism is held up as a virtue, as the professional 
spy class is too associated with double-dealing and shady practice to serve as a profession for the 
gentleman heroes that are those novels’ protagonists. The “heroic amateur” type is an implicit 
disavowal of what was a very pertinent historical conversation and shift: the move to official, 
bureaucratic spy agencies. Remember, this is the age of Le Queux; and debate over the ethics 
and efficacy of creating professional spies was an urgent topic. Professionalization, its 
proponents argued, was meant to decrease the likelihood of false or deliberately faulty 
intelligence through mechanisms both material, like a regular salary, and cultural—the 
gentleman civil service agent’s word of honor. Amateurism, in the minds of its critics, led to 
fabrication, as overenthusiastic assets, paid by results and often of a different class or racial 
position than their British military superiors, were incentivized to invent threats. Likewise, those 
in the still fledgling British intelligence apparatus debated the role of secret services in regards to 
intelligence gathering versus covert actions. The Secret Agent, in contrast to the implicit 
disavowal of heroic amateur novels, is quite explicit in its distaste for a professional spy class. 
Conrad’s forces of law and order are not spies but police officers. Though they themselves fall 
victim to the temptations of bureaucratic advancement, the police in The Secret Agent seem to 
have an intuitive grasp on what Conrad finds most dangerous about professional spy games. The 
following passage, spoken by the Assistant Commissioner to the Secretary of State, is both a plea 
for greater policing powers and a clever grasp of the potential dangers of sanctioning covert 
action as a tool of the state: 
In principle, I should lay it down that the existence of secret agents should not be 
tolerated, as tending to augment the positive dangers of the evil against which 
they are used. That the spy will fabricate his information is a mere commonplace. 
 80 
But in the sphere of political and revolutionary action, relying partly on violence, 
the professional spy has every facility to fabricate the very facts themselves, and 
will spread the double evil of emulation in one direction, and of panic, hasty 
legislation, unreflecting hate, on the other. (110) 
This passage, indicative of the attitude towards spy organizations of the book as a whole, strikes 
at the core of the arguments of the time for professionalization and covert operations. The 
Assistant Commissioner portrays the latter as misguided, dangerous, and foolish, as in the 
passage above, because of the “evil of emulation” (or escalation) by rival groups on the one hand 
and the knee-jerk attitudes (“panic, hasty legislation, unreflecting hate”) emulation or escalation 
are likely to produce domestically on the other. Moreover, the Assistant Commissioner intuits 
the relation between professionalization and escalation, worrying that as a professional spy’s job 
performance becomes evaluated by the amount of covert action he accomplishes, the incentive to 
be bolder, riskier, hastier, and deadlier increases. Professionalism was meant to create an 
organizational apparatus that trained its operatives to carry these schemes through to success, 
but, Conrad seems to hint at, a professional service might encourage more hasty action at an 
accelerated pace as intelligence agents compete for promotion or attempt to make a statement 
after a hierarchical regime change. The core covert act in The Secret Agent proves the Assistant 
Commissioner’s point. Stevie’s accidental explosion is the result of a professional spy’s (Verloc) 
poorly thought-out plan necessitated by his desire to keep his paycheck. This poorly-thought out 
plan then leads the Assistant Commissioner (in the scene from which the passage is excerpted) to 
ask for more influence and powers. The plot of the novel suggests that professional incentives in 
espionage lead to dangerous and counter-productive plans, which leads to domestic panic, which 
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leads to an expansion of state power to prevent anarchy. This cycle is antithetical to the 
bourgeois individualism Conrad, and all of the characters in the novel, secretly prize.   
The danger of the spy agency as revealed in the Secret Agent is that it may, due to its twin 
mandates for secrecy and results, become a conspiracy unto itself. This idea is Conrad’s lasting 
impact on the genre. The Secret Agent’s arguments against spy agencies were doomed to fail, 
though critiques similar to Conrad’s certainly kept the cult of the glorious amateur alive both in 
fiction and in government until after WWI. However, the novel’s casting of conspiracy-hunting 
spy agencies as master conspirators themselves has extended throughout the 20th and 21st 
centuries. The odds in a modern spy thriller that the agent’s own organization or a splinter 
segment of it is behind the nefarious actions of the villains in the plot are about 50/50. Conrad’s 
criticisms have been echoed by a politically-diverse spectrum of authors. Cumulatively, their 
skepticism about an organization that operates fundamentally in secret, with broad powers, 
minimal oversight or transparency, and with an operational, organizational, philosophical, and 
monetary drive for results in the name of national security has been justified. Statements such as 
“[m]any of us who joined the CIA did not feel bound in the actions we took as staff members to 
observe all the ethical rules,” which was said by Richard Bissell, Jr. (an organizer of the Bay of 
Pigs invasion) after he was let go from the agency make the CIA, especially, an easy target for 
those looking for conspiracies. Spy agencies are insular cabals skeptical of outside oversight, and 
especially in the beginning, nepotistic in their hiring practices. Valentine Vivian, deputy head of 
MI6, for example, justified his hiring of Soviet spy Kim Philby: “I was asked about him, and said 
I knew his people” (Macintyre 21). Being a hive of like-minds pushed the CIA and MI6 to 
interventionism, especially if they thought it could be plausibly denied. In 1954, the intelligence 
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community, in the words of George Kennedy Young,38 took as its mission “to remedy the 
situation created by the deficiencies of ministers, diplomats, generals and priests” (184). It’s 
difficult to sound more conspiratorial than that. 
And so, given their increasing bent towards clandestine interventionism over the Cold 
War, it makes sense that the organizations originally formed to combat at least semi-fictional 
conspiracies have themselves become the largest single source of conspiracy theories. These 
range from the usual Internet (and before that Usenet, and before that the back pages of specialty 
interest magazines) crackpotism to the subtle suggestions, like in Don DeLilo’s novel 
Underworld, that the CIA and KGB actively kept the Cold War going out of mutual 
departmental interest. Their conspiratorial reputation makes them easy foils not only for authors, 
but for ideological opponents in the real world, whether they be congressional opponents, 
reporters, foreign governments feigning indignation at each other’s intelligence activities,39 
domestic and foreign activists seeking more transparency and a reduction in aggressive actions, 
whistle blowers like Edward Snowden, or even the ideologues of terrorist and/or anti-state 
groups. The moral high ground is difficult for, say, the NSA, to claim when the only excuse they 
offer for their actions is national security, but the organization can’t or won’t define exactly what 
that means or how their operations are actively safeguarding the nation. Most likely, the Western 
intelligence apparatus would lose little in the way of autonomy or agency by proposing each of 
its programs to its executive, legislative, and judicial watchdogs. A national security writ allows 
a wide latitude, and (all justified skepticism about politician capability and morality aside for just 
a second), more transparency would ideologically help that national security mandate to appear 
                                                 
38 One of Philby’s friends and later a deputy director of MI6 
39 Such as the kerfluffle over German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone being bugged by the 
CIA, only for the Germans to be forced to admit that they had bugged John Kerry’s. 
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more palatable to the public, via ensuring that the programs proposed were vetted by 
democratically elected officials. However, the insularity and arrogance of the spymasters turn 
what could be debatable and democratic policy into the fodder for conspiracy. Spy fiction 
remains popular in this age of the NSA for similar reasons to those which made William Le 
Queux popular: it provides a discursive space for people to be in the know, and substitutes the 
actual anxiety of uncertainty for the pleasure of certainty (even when that certainty is certain 
doom). The real pleasure from reading spy fiction is not the heroic overcoming of the conspiracy 
by the protagonist, like Captain America thwarting HYDRA’s sinister plot. That plot structure 
reinforces the agency of the protagonist and, by extension or projection, of any individual’s 
ability to shape the world stage of politics, and so it is a central tenet in the history of spy fiction. 
But this tenet has not survived unscathed the proliferation of fiction about the spy agency as 
villainous. As the superhero-icizing of the spy, beginning with Bond’s increasingly less realistic 
adventures and reaching its logical conclusion with the actual superhero/spy Captain America, it 
has become increasingly less credible for an average person, or even the heroic amateur (John 
Buchan’s Richard Hannay or Hitchcock’s Roger Thornhill) to play a meaningful role in stopping 
the modern conspiracy when that conspiracy has become the sprawling technocratic bureaucracy 
of the spy agency itself. That is a job for super-agent Jason Bourne, not Hyacinth Robinson. But 
knowing about the conspiracy, participating in the cultural discourse that unmasks and names 
them, is still something that spy fiction seems to offer unchanged since the early 20th century. 
Thus, the act of reading or watching reinforces the agency of the reader/watcher directly,40 
inducts him or her into a community of people with shared interests and provides a vocabulary 
with which to talk about the secretive world of espionage. Modern-day spy fiction, especially 
                                                 
40 I.e. without the intermediary step of projection/identification with the protagonist. 
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that slice of it aimed at a popular audience, helps to make spy agencies intellectually graspable 
by boiling them down into conspiracies. Gone are the messiness, inconsistencies, tedium, etc. of 
actual spy work. Agencies become much more monomaniacal than they really are in order to 
provide drama; for example, the latest Bond film, Spectre, reduces all of MI6 to the 00 Section, 
allowing the evil conspiracy within MI641 to threaten Bond with turning the 00 Section into a 
drone and data collection program. I certainly acknowledge42 the troubling rise in importance of 
drone warfare and electronic surveillance to Western spy agencies, and I applaud attempts to put 
these issues before the public, since we apparently cannot count on our intelligence apparatus to 
do so willingly.43 However, attributing this push to the machinations of an evil conspiracy within 
MI6, similar to Captain America’s attribution of all violent covert action to a conspiracy by 
HYDRA, fails to explore with due diligence the legal, moral, ethical, bureaucratic, and technical 
messiness of drone warfare and ignores the many other functions of MI6 (not to mention the 
many other agents not prefaced with a 00). The reduction of the spy agency to a single-issue 
conspiracy is a more popular move in more popular fare. While this is not strictly true—Len 
Deighton’s Ipcress File makes this move, though is not considered low-brow, for example—it is 
a robust enough trend to worry about what might happen when a large portion of the audience 
only has a Hollywood-understanding of intelligence work. As we have seen with the example of 
William Le Queux, complicated situations are not liable to be improved when a public’s 
understanding of intelligence is structured through conspiracy theory.  
                                                 
41 Surprise, or not, this conspiracy is revealed to be old Bond baddies SPECTRE back for the first 
time in the Daniel Craig series. 
42 And analyze, in chapters 5 and 6.  
43 The CIA’s drone program has as of this writing not been officially acknowledged, even though 
it is an extremely poorly kept secret.  
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More transparency from the intelligence community would undoubtedly help to quell 
some of the glut of conspiracy theories surrounding spy work, but more transparency has not 
historically been high on the priority list for these secretive organizations. Partly, this is due to 
the reality that actual intelligence organizations are not a small, super-focused cabal like Ernst 
Blofeld’s SPECTRE, but rather large, bloated, secret bureaucracies. The imagery of Captain 
America’s conspiratorial HYDRA is of a many-headed menace—while the intelligence apparatus 
of the U.S. or the U.K. might have many heads, they don’t all possess the same goals, reach, 
powers, knowledge, access to politicians, technological capability, etc. Picture a very confused 
hydra with unequal-sized heads who has eaten too much and is often a little dizzy. It’s little 
wonder that authors and film and TV makers often attempt to represent spy agencies through the 
lens of farce. This too, like using conspiracy as a stand-in for the spy agency, is a heuristic. 
Farcical works, such as Get Smart, Archer, Spy, Our Man in Havana, etc., also make the 
complex simple, specifically by making spy agencies risible. Good satire is one response, a 
cathartic one at that, to the expansion of power and scope of the intelligence agency throughout 
the 20th and 21st century. But farce is not the only tone with which authors address the role 
bureaucracy has had in the history of espionage. Some turn to stories of the lone talent rising 
above a stifling bureaucratic weight, others write the opposite, stories of the individual crushed 
by paperwork, regulations, superiors, and laws. The stories I have chosen to examine in the next 
section, primarily W. Somerset Maugham’s Ashenden, Graham Greene’s Our Man in Havana 
and Ian McEwan’s Sweet Tooth are indicative of the variations in the bureaucratic spy story. 
Each has different valences and thematic thrusts, but each serve to make the case that, whereas 
conspiracy is the go-to trope for more popular-fiction spy works, the topic of bureaucracy and 
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how it is navigated by the individual allows for more thorough examinations of the role spy 
agencies play in the cultural discourse of espionage.  
Writing in the Machine: Bureaucracy and Espionage 
Conspiracies are small(ish) cabals, deeply hidden either within the halls of power to 
continue secret governance, or adjacent to those in power in order to plot their overthrow. 
Bureaucracies, in contrast, are giant, intricate, inefficient, slow to change and slow to respond to 
external pressures. Bureaucracies are an essential feature of late capitalism, according to Frederic 
Jameson in his book Post-Modernism. Historically, they arise during the shift (as described by 
Foucault) from state sovereignty to governmentality and have accelerated in their growth through 
the late 19th and 20th centuries (xviii). They seem to be fairly opposite to conspiracies in 
structure, but as topoi in spy fiction they often look somewhat similar. This may be because, in 
an idea that goes back to Marx,44 both have the same cornerstone: the secret. The conspiracy is 
the secret Big Other, the bureaucracy the secret Big Same. The secrets of the bureaucracy, unlike 
those of the conspiracy, are official secrets, the (supposedly) strategically hidden inner-workings 
of state power. The spy agency is the trafficker of official secrets, responsible in the state 
apparatus for their production, their mining from the bedrock of the real world via espionage, 
and their transmission and interpretation for the Executive and Legislative branches. In fact, the 
intelligence bureaucracy can make official secrets out of things many people already know: 
geographic and weather data become classified when Military Intelligence needs it for an 
operation, and engineering specifications and techniques become secret when they are used to 
build a Predator drone. While we might say in hindsight that it is obvious that any state 
department would inevitably in the modern age become a large bureaucracy, intelligence 
                                                 
44 From the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
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agencies were initially envisioned as small cadres of professionals acting independently. The 
British intelligence services of the late 19th and early 20th century are not so much organized 
spies but a loose collection of museum curators, academics, military police, and their local 
connections, almost entirely male, and working independently or with very general orders for the 
gathering and storage of militarily or economically beneficial knowledge. But as James Scott, in 
his analysis of the formation of state knowledge Seeing like a State, suggests, this was not a 
tenable arrangement. According to Scott, “The utopian, immanent, and continually frustrated 
goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality 
beneath it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observations” (82). 
Attempting this reduction creates the demand for intelligence and a robust intelligence agency to 
invent and administer the “techniques for grasping a large and complex reality” in order for 
“officials to be able to comprehend aspects of the ensemble” (77). In other words, client demand 
(that is, state demand) fuels expansion—intelligence is a growth industry, as the aims of 
imperialism and later neo-imperialism expand to encompass ever-greater swathes of land, 
people, and cultures. Given that competing imperial powers compete for the same goals (whether 
territory, influence, resources, etc.), conflict between them creates a need for intelligence on rival 
nation-states as well. As the 20th century progressed and non-state international actors 
(corporations, terrorist groups, crime syndicates) became major geopolitical powers, 
governments realized they needed intelligence on them too. As late as the 1950s, factions within 
the CIA envisioned an agency that at its core was a continuation of Wild Bill Donovan’s “old-
boy network of connections from Wall Street and the Social Register” with a few operatives 
from rougher professions in order to enact covert operations (Weiner 7). Director Allan Dulles, 
however, felt that such an agency had no hope of being competitive relative to the agencies of 
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the U.K. and U.S.S.R., and so pushed the Eisenhower administration for greater scope, funding, 
and personnel. Unlike the U.S., the British and Russians had abandoned small intelligence 
operations by the end of WWI—the first Cold War “gap” was the “spy gap,” and it was remedied 
quickly. 
Bureaucracies are rarely if ever lovingly represented in fiction, tending to be seen at best 
as comically ineffective and at worst Kafkaesque. Bureaucracies, especially in spy fiction, but 
also generally across fiction, are anti-individualistic, and those trapped within them are the 
proverbial “cogs in a machine.” Given the immense popularity of spy fiction, the intelligence 
bureaucracy is one of the most represented bureaucracies, despite, or because of, the secrecy of 
its inner workings. But bureaucracies are far too labyrinthine to represent in fiction accurately; 
indeed, that is hardly ever the point. “Bureaucracies” show up not in their specifics, which are 
unreproducible in the course of a narrative, but as a series of obstacles, generally anthropic ones 
such as frustrating superiors or inter/intra agency disagreements on how to handle a situation. 
Like conspiracy, “bureaucracy” in spy fiction acts as a kind of shorthand, a plot device. 
Conspiracy shrinks world politics into a consumable narrative of hidden threat, overcome or 
uncovered by heroic action—it makes the big small so it can be overcome. “Bureaucracy” as a 
trope in spy fiction does not shrink or clarify politics, rather, it leaves them intentionally opaque 
in order to contrast the murkiness of policy against the clarity of individual agency. The 
difference is not all that large, but crucial: conspiracy plots prioritize knowledge and action (the 
conspiracy must be uncovered and dealt with), while bureaucracy plots prioritize frustration and 
creativity (the hurdles of bureaucracy must be overcome by thinking outside the box). Both plots 
are fundamentally about individual agency, but demonstrate it differently. Conspiracy plots 
indulge the fantasy that world political problems are simple enough to be grasped, and solved, by 
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individuals. Bureaucracy plots argue that the individual, not the bureaucracy, is the proper unit of 
politics—that the individual humanity of its component agents should be the (spy) agency’s 
guiding principles.  
Spy authors use bureaucracy for thematic positioning, as a way to make some point about 
the agency of the secret agent, or about the individual worth of people in contrast to the de-
individualization of world politics. Three broader “bureaucratic” tropes in spy fiction that have 
had some relation and relevance to the actual history of espionage are 1) the confrontation 
between stereotypical notions of masculine agency, like assertiveness/aggression, individualism, 
heteronormative sexual relations, etc., and bureaucratic constraints; 2) the use of bureaucracy as 
a hindrance to the uncovering of double agency; and 3) the opposition of bureaucracy to 
creativity, especially to writing. The next few paragraphs address each of these in turn. First, I 
introduce the argument, which is elaborated much more in Chapters 4 and 5, that the version of 
masculinity promoted in spy fiction as the opposite of bureaucracy acts as a discursive prop to 
bolster the idea that covert action is the proper activity of an intelligence agency. The enduring 
popularity of the Bond books and their imitators is essential here, though even spy fiction that 
eschews the theatrics of Fleming and company has participated in the use of a contrast between 
masculinity and a neutering bureaucracy as a storytelling device. Next, I discuss one of spy 
fiction’s best known and loved uses of bureaucracy, as the twisting and turning subterranean 
world of the mole’s den. The mole hunt, in which the protagonist must uncover a traitor (or if he 
or she is the traitor, remain undiscovered), is a classic espionage plot that is fairly unique to the 
genre, one of its least replicable tropes in other contexts. The mole hunt provides intellectual 
pleasures that depend in large part on the reader’s ability to cut through the obstacles and 
obfuscations, generally framed as part and parcel of the spy agency itself, that prevent the mole’s 
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identity from being known in the world of the work. This is the same ability that the protagonist 
must also possess, allowing for an identification between reader and protagonist in their joint 
ability to navigate and overcome an obstructionist bureaucracy. The relationship between reader 
and protagonist is one example of the thematic emphasis of the mole hunt plot: that interpersonal 
relationships and the uniqueness of individuals prove better than institutional rules and 
regulations at ensuring the proper functioning of the spy agency. John le Carré and Graham 
Greene are the masters of this plot. I examine le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier Spy and Greene’s 
The Human Factor for what they can tell us about how the Cold War structured double agency 
and its relation to the bureaucratic structure of the intelligence agency. Lastly, I argue that spy 
authors, with more than a little self-insertion, use creativity in the field of writing as a foil to 
bureaucratic process. Literariness as a character trait of a spy marks that spy as separate, not 
easily assimilated to the anti-individualistic culture of the spy agency. In works such as Greene’s 
Our Man in Havana, W. Somerset Maugham’s Ashenden, and Ian McEwan’s Sweet Tooth, 
literary imagination actually becomes weaponized, both for and against the spy agency. Not only 
does this continue spy fiction’s tendency to lionize individualism on the world stage, it also 
privileges a particular kind of individualism, one in contrast to both the formic conformity and 
unctuous social-climbing of the bureaucracy and the aggressive masculinity of Bond and other 
more pulp-inspired heroes. 
*** 
 Rapid expansion brings with it a host of problems in exchange for greater reach. The 
most immediately noticeable of these problems in the early history of the CIA (the 1950s) was 
the hiring of hundreds of people, not all of whom—rather, not most—had any experience in 
intelligence work whatsoever. These recent college grads were mainly hired because they fit the 
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ideal spy type of the time—that is, they were Ivy League educated, loyal to the values and 
organizations of their class, and increasingly (as the 50s progressed) given to more and more 
aggressive actions in order to prove the supposed superiority of Western anti-Communist 
ideology. I suggest though that this aggression, which was manifest in the groundswell of covert 
action operations throughout the 50s and 60s, was partly45 also a response to the bureaucratic 
structure itself, characterized as an emasculating economic and corporate structure. The 
emasculation of the American male by bureaucratic society was a common theme in the early 
years of the Cold War. The social psychologist Stanley Milgram argued that the results to his 
infamous obedience-to-authority tests showed that “men” were now easily “seduced by the 
trappings of authority” and that the “kind of character produced in American democratic society 
cannot be counted on to insulate its citizens from brutality and inhumane treatment” (Nicholson 
246). Social critic Arthur Schlesinger complained of a “crisis of American masculinity” in 1958 
and books like David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950), William Whyte’s The Organization 
Man (1956), and C. Wright Mill’s White Collar (1951) described the proto-typical middle-class 
man as (in Mill’s words) “pushed by forces beyond his control, pulled into movements he does 
not understand; he gets into situations in which he is in the most helpless position,” (qtd. in 
Nicholson 246). Bureaucracy was seen to strike at the core of American exceptionalism: the 
individual, agentive, spirit that each citizen (especially the male soldiers flocking back as citizens 
into the workforce after WWII) was supposed to possess.  
 In this climate of a kind of perceived masculine malaise, spy fiction offered a 
transportation from the desks of the office to the halls of political power and the exotic ends of 
                                                 
45 The reason I say “partly” here is because this aggression was also certainly a reaction against 
charges of homosexuality in the intelligence world, as I argue in depth in Chapter 4. 
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the earth. The tourism of the Bond books, analyzed at length by Michael Denning and other 
critics, is a tourism of masculine potency, in which Bond goes and does where, what, and who he 
pleases. And, while a simple point, it cannot be overlooked: Bond is an important person in his 
world, not a nameless nobody, but his appetites, desires, and frustrations are similar to those of a 
large swath of his readership. Bond is a consumer of mid-century masculine culture as much as 
he is a producer of it; Bond smokes particular brands (Chesterfields and Players), drinks 
particular drinks (vodka martinis, of course, and other gin and whiskey cocktails) and eats 
particular foods (variants of steak and eggs, primarily). Male mid-century readers may only be 
able to imagine that they could save the world like Bond, but the ability to replicate the 
accessories of Bond’s masculine agency, i.e. his consumption habits, made the spy a potent 
advertisement, and the Bond brand leveraged the spy’s “masculinity that matters” for the express 
purpose of encouraging particular patterns of consumption, and not just of Bond merchandise, 
but also of the other brands and products through which Bond performs his masculinity. In other 
words, the Bond books tied a particular way of being a man to a particular way of being 
important and looking important to society at large. Bond still serves this role; for example, a 
recent GQ article declared one of his outfits “the most influential menswear outfit in movie 
history” (Wolf). This is a fantasy of individuality brought about through the act of conformity to 
a particular model; however, based on the way spy fiction as a genre imitated, innovated, and re-
imagined Bond during the mid-century decades, I would not argue that the irony was common 
knowledge.  
The fantasy of masculinity in the spy fiction of the time derives a good deal of its power 
as a trope from the way authors contrasted the masculine agency of their heroes with the 
bureaucracy of their organization, a fantastic thematic structure that had great resonance with the 
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office-workers wistfully envying Bond smoking a Chesterfield on a beach with a blonde after 
saving the world. When a white-collar worker in the 1950s and 60s wished to seek escape from 
his perceived drudgery and emasculation by immersing himself in the action-adventure of spy 
fiction, he inevitably found in the first few pages the secret agent initially suffering in a corporate 
culture similar to his own. Spies, too, chafed under crusty superiors, like the nameless narrator of 
Len Deighton’s Ipcress File who introduces his boss46 to the reader by saying “Ross and I had 
come to an arrangement of some years’ standing—we had decided to hate each other” (Deighton 
10). Spies too felt like their golden years of masculine potency were being wasted on 
meaningless paperwork, even James Bond himself, who at the beginning of Thunderball bitterly 
laments that he has nothing to do: 
More than a month of paper-work—ticking off his number on stupid dockets, 
scribbling minutes that got spikier as the weeks passed, and snapping back down 
the telephone when some harmless section officer tried to argue with him. And 
then his secretary had gone down with the flu and he had been given a silly, and, 
worse, ugly bitch from the pool who called him ‘sir’ and spoke to him primly 
through a mouth full of fruit stones. And now it was another Monday morning. 
(2). 
Bond’s whining explicitly connects his frustration at the bureaucratic process with misogyny, his 
lack of an outlet for his aggression functioning (in his mind) to transform the women in the 
secretarial pool into aesthetic objects for his pleasure. This sexual frustration is expressed most 
violently in his assessment of his new secretary, who refuses to play that objectified role and 
                                                 
46 The narrator’s luck with bosses does not improve over the course of the book—his next 
superior, who ends up being the mole in the organization, tries to kill him.  
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keeps Bond at a professional distance. Bond especially, since he is often47 introduced 
languishing behind an office-desk at the beginning of the story before being saved by adventure, 
does much to reinforce the idea that homo bureaucratis and homo masculinus are different 
species in the spy world. Even authors that are far more sympathetic to the bureaucrats, for 
example John le Carré, do not dissolve this dichotomy. Le Carré’s hero George Smiley48 is a 
bespectacled, old, fat, cuckolded bureaucrat—he is great at his job, but le Carré goes to great 
pains to describe espionage in such a way that someone like Smiley could be good at it. Le Carré 
sees the Fleming-esque adventure plot as a childish version of covert action, which he views with 
deep suspicion.49 Espionage in le Carré’s oeuvre is a mind game, in Fleming’s it is violence first 
and foremost. The former is suited to the intricacies of bureaucracy—the slower pace allows 
Smiley to carefully consider each of his options before acting, to be as sure as possible in his 
world of murky grayness. The incompatibility between masculine derring-do as an approach to 
espionage versus careful navigation of an intricate bureaucracy is perhaps most memorably 
demonstrated in The Spy who Came in from the Cold, in which the conventionally masculine 
Alec Leamas chooses to be shot on the east side of the Berlin Wall rather than return to an 
agency that has treated him and his love interest as pieces in a larger game. Whether Le Carré’s 
characters successfully (Smiley) or unsuccessfully (Leamas, or also Gunther Bachmann from A 
Most Wanted Man) navigate the intelligence bureaucracy, le Carré builds that navigation into his 
plots, mining inter- and intra-agency frustrations for drama, suspense, pacing and thematic 
                                                 
47 For an example that is analyzed at more length in the next chapter, in From Russia with Love 
Bond is introduced as a “man of war” that “peace is killing” (From Russia 97).  
48 Le Carré mentions in his recent autobiography that Smiley is based on his mentor at Oxford, 
Vivian Greene (Pigeon 2) 
49 This is why Ricki Tarr, a wannabe James Bond in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, is written to be 
an idiot. 
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critique. In contrast, in Fleming’s works, bureaucracy is no match for Bond’s forcefulness. The 
Bond plot uses bureaucracy only as a rhetorical device, as a foil against which to contrast Bond. 
Bond’s relation to bureaucracy can occasionally be cordial—such as when M allows Bond 
“passionate leave” at the end of Live and Let Die with Domino Solitaire—but he generally 
ignores it after the first few scene-setting pages (243). This was a powerful fantasy for the mid-
century reader, and forms part of Bond’s enduring popularity. His direct lineage, the other JBs—
Jason Bourne and Jack Bauer—and Jack Ryan (from Tom Clancy’s books) or Ethan Hunt (from 
Mission: Impossible), also derive much of their popularity from this particular bureaucracy-
bucking fantasy.  
The Bond fantasy not only entertained and titillated financiers, bankers, office workers, 
and pencil pushers—it also tempted actual secret agents into mimicking their most public 
counterpart. I elaborate this theme in Chapter 5, but for now, I must mention that the culture of 
masculinity within intelligence, bolstered by the Bond books, stressed covert action over 
intelligence gathering and inspired many intelligence workers to try to buck their bureaucratic 
constraints like Bond and “get results.” These operations retroactively prove Conrad’s Assistant 
Commissioner correct; over-eager and over-aggressive operations like the Bay of Pigs invasion 
or the CIA support of anti-communist forces in Indonesia, or the arming of the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s were counter-productive in the long-term, serving to discredit the 
Agency and creating future enemies. Bond-ian adventure works much better in fiction than in 
reality; in the words of a former head of JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command), “We had all 
these guys running around trying to be James Bond, and it didn’t work very well” (Mazzetti 82). 
Two separate cultures developed within the CIA specifically, one characterized by oversight, 
analysis, official secrecy, slow-movement, hierarchy, and compartmentalization, the other prone 
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to ignore those bureaucratic protocols in favor of tangible, if questionable, immediate results. As 
journalist Mark Mazzetti reports, throughout the 60 year history of the CIA, traditionally it is the 
“case officers—the spies who go out into the world—[who believe] they are doing the real work 
of the CIA and like to boast that they don’t follow orders from desk jockeys at headquarters” 
(56). This hostility between agent and agency has led to ethical, legal, moral, and operational 
failures. Richard Bissell, the CIA Deputy Director of plans through the late-50s and early-60s 
(the height of Bondomania), acknowledged in hindsight the tension between the bureaucratic and 
legalistic rules imposed in intelligence work and the mandate that intelligence agents produce 
results at any cost—a mandate which too often has led to legal, ethical and moral abuses. The 
combination of aggressive covert action like that planned by Bissell, partly born out of spite at 
the (felt) loss of masculine agency due to hierarchy and bureaucracy, with that very same 
hierarchy and bureaucracy has proven to be worse than either could be separately. In his book 
Legacy of Ashes, as one would expect from the title, historian Tim Weiner chronicles many of 
the failed operations of the early years of the CIA, including the disastrous joint operation with 
MI6 to parachute hundreds of political dissidents, special ops soldiers, and partisan factions 
behind the Iron Curtain, an “ill-fated and tragic” plan that according to official reports resulted 
only in sending hundreds to their deaths in Soviet prisons (Weiner 45).50 Similar farces caused 
the CIA to issue an internal review less than 10 years after its founding, which concluded that 
“too many in responsible positions apparently don’t know what they’re doing” (78). The 
intelligence world at the time still bore the worst excesses of the gentleman’s club as well as the 
trenchant inertia of a hierarchical bureaucracy, so very little changed despite a flood of negative 
                                                 
50 The parachuting operations were poorly planned and executed and were undermined from the 
start by Soviet double agents like Kim Philby.  
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evaluations like the Eisenhower administration’s Doolittle Report, which concluded that the CIA 
was “filled with people having little or no training for their jobs…dead wood exists at virtually 
all levels…[The agency] suffers from mushroom expansion…[and] tremendous pressure to 
accept commitments beyond its capacity to perform” (108). One of the best examples of this is 
the failing-upward of Tracy Barnes, one of Allen Dulles handpicked covert operations planners. 
Barnes fit the image of the gentleman spy—Ivy League, well-connected, a frequent traveler, and 
a connoisseur of languages—but his career shows how ridiculous adhering to that myth of 
masculinity as a hiring protocol really is. Barnes is known now as the planning architect behind 
the Bay of Pigs invasion, which was so poorly thought out that even the FBI tried to stop it 
(Cawelti and Rosenberg 21). Yet, not only did Barnes refuse to heed the many warnings 
available to him that the Bay of Pigs plan would fail, he continued to make hasty and generally 
terrible decisions throughout his tenure as head of covert operations. Former CIA-director 
Richard Helms reflected that “Thanks to Dulles’ constant praise and pushing, Tracy apparently 
remained unaware of his problem,” as did many others who similarly were pushed through the 
hierarchy based on who they were, rather than what they did (Weiner 94). The “dead wood” in 
intelligence of which Barnes is a prime example prevented agencies from adapting to a changing 
geopolitical world. At the end of the Cold War, former CIA Director James Woolsey writes, the 
agency “basically stopped hiring” because of budget cuts and a refusal to lay-off or retire Soviet 
specialists who were felt to have earned their place (225). As a result, the CIA entered the 90s 
without a well-developed Middle Eastern or counterterrorism branch, which would prove to be a 
costly oversight. 
In addition to the particular kind of brash incompetence that arises from a toxic mix of a 
sense of masculinity under attack and few penalties for failure, the growing numbers of 
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intelligence agencies also opened them up to malevolence, both in terms of those with whom 
they worked and those who worked for them. In the first case, pressure to succeed in covert 
operations led quickly to riskier and riskier business partners. The CIA especially had a cavalier 
attitude to working with criminals and terrorists, beginning with Alan Dulles’s proclamation that 
“You can’t run the railroads without taking in some Nazi party members” (39). The CIA’s 
willingness to work with regimes and individuals that could be convicted of war crimes is now 
well known. In the 90s, then-director John Deutch51 tried to curtail the practice of working with 
assets responsible for human rights violations, instituting the “Deutch Scrub” which purged 
many notorious criminals from the CIA’s paybooks and made the hiring of questionable assets 
reviewable (Diamond 206). The decision, and Deutch’s accompanying proclamation that “If 
questions of human rights violations or criminal involvement outweigh the value of the 
information to our national interest, then we will end the relationship with the asset” proved 
controversial, with many arguing that HUMINT is impossible without cultivating relationships 
with some unsavory people, and that gaining assets on the inside of a terrorist cell is more 
valuable to American national security than what those assets may have to do in order to advance 
within that organization (206). Many blame Deutch for the overall lack of human assets in 
sensitive positions in the Middle East in general, both in terms of nation-states like Syria and 
Iran and in non-state groups. On the other hand, Deutch’s intentions were to make the CIA less 
interventionist, less imperialist, and less morally culpable when a former asset proves worse than 
the initial target for intelligence ever was. Deutch’s efforts aimed to redefine the CIA as more 
ethical, to curb some of the worst impulses of the secret agency (and indulge in some others, 
                                                 
51 Deutch was a big proponent of SIGINT as well, perhaps because of his fundamental mistrust 
of human sources. 
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such as more surveillance). This was not an easy task given the large size of the intelligence 
bureaucracy; government departments are not “speed boats,” nimble and quick to adjust course, 
as President Obama has said.52 We will examine the legacy of Deutch’s principles in the “War 
on Terror” in the next chapter, with my analysis of John Le Carré’s A Most Wanted Man. 
The larger an intelligence agency becomes, the more likely it is to be compromised by its 
enemies. The Cambridge spies had to rely on the shield of gentlemanliness to protect their 
cover—and saw those protections waver as “gentlemanliness” fell out of fashion. As agencies 
expanded throughout the 50s and 60s however, the bureaucratic structure itself let rival agents 
hide amongst the sheer numbers of employees. For example, only between seven and twenty 
KGB agents at any one time throughout the Cold War knew the names of all their double agents 
placed within the U.S. In the West, however, the corresponding number (people who knew about 
all double agents in the U.S.S.R.) was in the hundreds, and the information was shared fairly 
freely between, for example, the CIA and the FBI, the CIA and MI6, the NSA and the FBI 
(Diamond 212). Intra-departmental security and secrecy were more wishes than practices, 
despite various moves to “compartmentalize” in response to the several instances of double-
agency over the course of the Cold War. As a case study, the example of Aldritch Ames 
highlights both how entrenched incompetence can become in state bureaucracies and how open 
they are to be infiltrated. Ames was not a very good spy. According to John Diamond, his 
“personnel record was replete with stories of Ames arguing with foreigners, passing out at 
diplomatic functions, and being unable to perform basic work tasks after lunch” (208). He was 
not fired for any of these behaviors—leaving him free to pass to the Soviets the second most-
detailed list of U.S. agents working in the U.S.S.R. to the Soviets in the final years of the Cold 
                                                 
52 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obamas-enchanted-answer/ 
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War.53 Double agency like Ames’ is common fodder for spy stories. When done well, stories 
about double agents—“moles” or “leaks” in intelligence jargon—hold the bureaucracy of 
intelligence up to critique in two key ways: revealing how the pressure to perform at all costs in 
order to move up the hierarchical ladder can induce temptation to sloppy work, and criticizing 
the myopia of the intelligence community to its own shortcomings when those shortcomings are 
structured by the attitudes and beliefs of the community itself. Graham Greene and John le Carré 
wrote several of these kind of stories in their careers, two of which I briefly examine here: The 
Human Factor and Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.  
Determining an order in which to examine these two works is a bit arbitrary. Tinker, 
Tailor is chronologically first (1974) but, as one reviewer for the New York Times wrote in a 
review of The Human Factor, le Carré learned to write this kind of story from Graham Greene, 
who learned it from Joseph Conrad’s The Secret Agent (Leonard). Nevertheless, Tinker, Tailor is 
in many ways the clearer critique as it features more bureaucracy at work. The closest to an 
action scene the novel portrays as happening in real time is a theft of files from the tightly-
regulated, top secret archive—a dramatic moving of paper from one location to the other. While 
the 2011 film of the novel visualizes a shootout only mentioned in the book, clearly in order to 
supply an action beat, it maintains the novel’s emphasis on the hierarchic grid of bureaucracy 
that the characters must navigate. This is shown in the repetition of grids throughout the film: in 
chessboards, stacks of boxes in Control’s apartment, and most strikingly in the top-floor meeting 
room of MI6 (Fig. 1): 
                                                 
53 Interestingly, the fact that Ames burned so many agents, and then the USSR fell immediately 
anyways, has convinced him that espionage is useless. 
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Figure 1: The Circus’ top floor (Tinker, Tailor) 
The chessboard-patterned walls of the top-floor meeting room call to mind the trope of espionage 
as a game, an attitude that George Smiley, the protagonist, sees as endemic to the profession and 
as a detriment to it, as a hindrance that drains the humanity from espionage and encourages 
strategic thinking with human life. Thus, to Smiley (seated at the back-right), the grid pattern is 
also a cage, a symbol of rigidity and hierarchy that Smiley must leave in order to succeed in his 
quest to find the Soviet mole. The men sitting around the table, subject to the grid of the 
audience’s observation as well as the hierarchic grid of the Circus, each represent different ways 
of navigating bureaucracy. The plot of the story is a mole hunt, and the mole, Bill Haydon, is 
difficult to track down not because he is unsuspected, but because he has tied his own success to 
everyone else’s so that removing him means admitting that MI6 has been the KGB’s lackeys for 
at least a decade. Haydon plays the chess-game of espionage well, in other words, and it is those 
qualities that allow him to do so that Smiley most admires about him in the novel: “the slow-
burning skills of the natural agent-runner; his rare sense of balance in the playing back of double 
agents and the mounting of deceptive operations; his art of fostering affection, even love, though 
it ran against the grain of other loyalties” (Tinker 161). Haydon succeeds in rising to the top of 
the hierarchy through charisma, easily influencing the weaker-personality bureaucrats Alleline, 
Bland, and Esterhase, each of whom, according to Smiley, secretly wish they were Haydon 
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(162). But they aren’t, and so each uses a different track. Alleline represents the bureaucratic 
social-climber, leveraging his connections in politics and his control over the Soviet source 
codenamed Merlin, supposedly a Russian traitor informing MI6 of the classified doings of the 
Soviet military, in order to advance through the hierarchy. Bland and Esterhase represent 
different flavors of sycophantism: spite-full sycophancy (Bland), characterized by a willingness 
to put others down in order to make one more attractive to a superior, and spite-less sycophancy 
(Esterhase), which is merely about making oneself look as good as possible. Notably, Esterhase’s 
spite-less sycophancy allows him to survive the events of the novel relatively unscathed. In 
contrast to Alleline, Bland, and Esterhase, Smiley’s success lies in his skill at his job, an 
insufficient protection to prevent his dismissal when Alleline and Haydon oust Control from the 
Circus’s leadership at the beginning of the novel. Smiley’s forced resignation has the effect of 
disentangling him from the bureaucratic structure of the Circus, thus placing him in the perfect 
position to uncover the rot within it. Smiley’s virtues are the virtues of intelligence as careful 
observation and slow-moving conclusions, but the Circus’s vices are the vices that Karl Marx 
describes when he calls a bureaucracy a “circle [or, in Tinker, Tailor, a grid] that no one can 
leave” (qtd. in Denning 135). This becomes apparent once Smiley uncovers the truth about 
Alleline’s vaunted Soviet source Merlin. Merlin is meant to be the Soviet source for an 
intelligence-swap operation, in which the British send worthless information to Merlin, who 
spins it to the KGB as good info so they trust him more, while Merlin sends “valuable” 
information from the KGB to MI6. Given that MI6 has a high level mole problem, the opposite 
is actually occurring: Haydon, Merlin, and the KGB are in cahoots, rigging the swap so that the 
KGB ends up with real info and MI6 with useless Soviet detritus. But because Alleline and his 
cabal have pinned their career advancement on the assumption that Merlin is working for them, 
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they are unwilling and unable to see the situation for what it is—unlike Smiley, who, having 
been dismissed from the agency, possesses greater clarity. Not for nothing is Smiley represented 
on the covers of the books as a pair of glasses (Fig. 2):  
 
Figure 2: Smiley’s Iconic Glasses 
Tinker, Tailor decries the ability of the Allelines of the world, concerned only with their 
advancement through the intelligence bureaucracy, to keep in their sights the goals of 
intelligence work. Seeing the truth in the novel necessitates something like Smiley’s 
obsessiveness with people, their goals, motivations, and personalities, even if the knowledge of 
the Other threatens to erode one’s sense of purpose itself.54 Smiley finds himself in this position 
at the end of the novel, when his identification with Haydon nearly pushes him to reject his 
mission entirely:  
[Y]et there was a part of him that rose already in Haydon’s defence. Was not Bill 
also betrayed? Connie’s lament rang in his ears: “Poor loves. Trained to Empire, 
trained to rule the waves…You’re the last, George, you and Bill.” …Thus Smiley 
                                                 
54 An example of this is when Smiley is about to arrest Haydon, and he wrestles with the tension 
between the dutiful and the personal: “It worried him that he felt so bankrupt; that whatever 
intellectual or philosophical precepts he clung to broke down entirely now that he was faced with 
the human situation” (351).   
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felt not only disgust, but, despite all that the moment meant to him, a surge of 
resentment against the institutions he was supposed to be protecting. (356) 
Given the way the Circus is described in the novel, Smiley’s resentment is an understandable 
one. While not a complete repudiation à la Alec Leamas’ at the end of The Spy who Came in 
from the Cold,55 Smiley’s Gethsemane moment is one in which he and the reader confront the 
thematic resonance of a traitor’s motivations. Haydon is diminished in a bureaucracy, with the 
implication here and throughout the novel that espionage itself is diminished by the way the 
Circus operates. Le Carré’s vision of the intelligence agency in Tinker, Tailor is one in which 
professional advancement and unreflective ideologies create blindspots in a highly 
compartmentalized and hierarchical structure within which a double agent can hide, and that 
these blindspots are made larger by an entity that cannot inspire loyalty or a sense of moral 
purpose in its agents. Only outside of that structure, outside of the endemic narrow-mindedness 
of an intelligence bureaucracy that cannot see its own flaws, can the agent re-assert personal 
knowledge, skills, and motivations as tools of intelligence-gathering. Smiley draws upon his own 
experiences with Haydon and Control and the human capital of fellow intelligence-outsiders to 
find the mole. Fellow spy Peter Guillam is untrusted by Alleline and his group. Researcher and 
analyst Connie Sachs has been fired by Haydon because she was dangerously close to figuring 
out Merlin’s duplicity herself. Jerry Westerby has never worked directly for MI6; he is a reporter 
who sometimes acts as an intelligence source. Without these outsiders and their outsider 
perspectives, MI6 would never have uncovered Haydon; he, and his KGB boss Karla, would 
have been the unknown ringmasters of the Circus.   
                                                 
55 As mentioned elsewhere, Leamas chooses to die with his love interest rather than climb over 
the Berlin Wall due to his anger at the Circus using them as pawns. 
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 Tinker, Tailor positions the personal as external to the bureaucracy of the intelligence 
agency, and as, despite the pitfalls of the personal,56 the only hope to save it. Graham Greene’s 
The Human Factor, in contrast, is a sheer lament at the lack of the personal within the 
bureaucracy of intelligence. It also uses a double agency plot, but in this case the protagonist is 
the Soviet double agent, Castle. Castle became a Soviet mole after the KGB helped him and his 
second wife, a black South African, escape apartheid and the South African secret service 
(BOSS) while Castle was stationed by MI6 in Johannesburg. Castle feels he owes a personal debt 
to the KGB and begins the novel with a personal animus towards MI6, who refused to help him 
and his wife escape, presumably out of fear of ruffling BOSS’s feathers. Despite this, Castle has 
gone undiscovered for some time. The following scene offers some indication why. In this 
particular conversation, the higher-ups of MI6—the director Hargreaves, the doctor Percival, and 
the counter-intelligence expert Daintry—have finally become aware that there is a leak from 
Castle’s section. Greene references the history of Soviet double agency in MI6 in the discussion 
of what to do about finding and stopping the leak. Daintry falls into a satiric trap by espousing 
his trust in the bureaucratic mechanisms—vetting, compartmentalization, hiring practices—
meant to guarantee the integrity of the organization:  
[Daintry:] “Vetting has been done very efficiently since the Blake case broke, but 
we still have a few men who were with us in the bad old days. Some of them even 
go back to Burgess and Maclean… Of course, [Castle] belongs to the slack 
vetting days, but I’d say he was clear. Dullish man, first-class, of course, with 
files—it’s generally the brilliant and ambitious who are dangerous. Castle is 
                                                 
56 Like over-identification, too much empathy, too close of relationships, and emotion—all are 
impediments to Smiley, but ones he turns to his advantage, unlike the always-negative pitfalls of 
bureaucracy.  
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safely married, second time, his first wife’s dead. There’s one child, a house on 
mortgage in Metroland. Life insurance—payments up to date. No high living. He 
doesn’t even run to a car. I believe he bicycles every day to the station. A third 
class in History at the House. Careful and scrupulous. Roger Castle in the 
Treasury is his cousin.” (44) 
Castle is presumed to be safe because he fits into the bureaucratic mold—he isn’t exceptionally 
motivated, is good moving paper, values stability and the continuation of his position over risk, 
knows the right people (or is related to them), etc. Castle on the surface is the kind of person that 
benefits the most from the continuance of the spy bureaucracy, not its undermining. This speech 
is Greene prodding at the vestiges of intelligence as an old boy’s club, and the myopia that such 
an atmosphere can induce. But Greene does not expend all his satire on the easy target (at least, 
the easy target by the late 1970s) of the club-like atmosphere of intelligence. A deeper point 
becomes apparent; for what Daintry does not realize, but that Hargreaves and Percival do, is that 
double agency does not undermine the intelligence bureaucracy: it allows for its expansion—at 
least when those at the top of both sides of the intelligence hierarchy see it as a game that can be 
played poorly or well. As Percival says: “We are playing games, Daintry, games, all of us. It’s 
important not to take a game too seriously or we may lose it. We have to keep flexible, but it’s 
important, naturally, to play the same game” (47). The possibility of double agency creates the 
demand for counter-intelligence and the opportunity to enact larger and/or more intricate 
operations to try to recapture strategic advantage over the other side. For example, Percival 
pushes Hargreaves to allow MI6 to carry out assassinations and uses the possibility of a double 
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agent to make his case that assassination is a valuable tool for MI6 to use.57 Historically, 
instrumentalist assassination as the purview of an intelligence agency arose out of bureaucratic 
expansion, and so Greene’s vision of assassination as part and parcel of the normal functioning 
of the intelligence bureaucracy, instead of an aberration contrary to its goals, has a critical edge 
rooted in reality.58 The sharpest part of this edge is the fact that ultimately Percival, Hargreaves, 
and Daintry decide to kill the wrong man. Castle is too well-hidden as the bureaucratic type, and 
so beneath suspicion. His colleague Davis, on the other hand, has not so easily camouflaged his 
dissatisfaction with intelligence work. At one point, Davis complains to Castle, “‘We sit here 
writing meaningless telegrams. We feel important because we know a little bit more than 
someone else about the groundnuts or what Mobutu said at a private dinner…Do you know I 
came into this outfit for excitement? Excitement, Castle. What a fool I was’” (64). Davis wants 
to be James Bond,59 and the incongruity between his actual bureaucratic position and his fantasy 
of spy work induces a malaise that his superiors code as suspicious. Eventually mistaking a 
romantic tryst as a meet-up with a Soviet handler, Percival poisons Davis and then fabricates a 
natural-causes death certificate. At the same time, Castle, still trusted, gains access to Operation 
Uncle Remus, which involves the apartheid South African government’s use of nuclear weapons 
against African National Congress bases across southern Africa. These twin examples of 
instrumental horror treated as mere bureaucratic function push Castle to blow his own cover and 
                                                 
57 “When we are quite certain he’s our man, then it seems to me we will just have to eliminate 
him. No trial, no publicity. If we can get information about his contacts first, so much the better, 
but we musn’t risk a public flight and then a press conference in Moscow…I know that 
elimination is rather a new thing for us. More in the KGB line or the CIA’s” (48). 
58 Greene was an ex-spy himself, and in his preface to the Human Factor quotes the Hans 
Christian Anderson line “out of reality are our tales of imagination fashioned” (6). 
59 Who is mentioned several times in the book as the paragon of exciting espionage. 
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reveal Uncle Remus to the U.S.S.R., an act which necessitates Castle’s ultimate defection to 
Moscow.  
 Greene makes bureaucracy a critical target by highlighting both its absurd fascination 
with itself and its own functioning and also its callous disregard for individualism. Throughout 
the novel, Greene returns to the conceit of using boxes as a metaphor for bureaucratic 
compartmentalization, and the big-picture blindness that compartmentalization creates. In 
Greene, institutional blindness pertains specifically to morality, ethics, and even actual efficacy, 
all of which require something anathema to intelligence bureaucracies: open collaboration and a 
sharing of ideas. MI6 does not trust MI5,60 BOSS does not trust MI6, and separate departments 
within British intelligence do not even know what the others do.61 Yet, when characters express 
doubt about the wisdom in such an approach to intelligence operations, they are met with the 
fallback tenet of bureaucracy: it’s not my/your job, so there’s nothing to be done. For example, 
after Percival, Daintry, and Hargreaves think they have identified the mole in Castle’s section as 
Davis (which is incorrect), Daintry openly questions the morality of assassination even in the 
face of “certain” evidence a man is a traitor. Percival glances around the room at first, before 
finding an abstract painting of different colored squares on the wall. Percival points out to 
Daintry one specific yellow square and attempts to mollify him by saying “‘There’s your Section 
6. That’s your square from now on. You don’t need to worry about the blue and the red. All you 
have to do is pinpoint our man and then tell me. You’ve no responsibility for what happens in the 
                                                 
60 Hargreaves says, “‘I’m never quite happy with those MI5 types. Somehow they always seem to 
carry with them a kind of police atmosphere. It’s natural, of course, dealing as they do with 
counter-espionage. To me espionage is more of a gentleman’s job, but of course I’m old-
fashioned’” (96).  
61 At one point, Daintry, Percival and Hargreaves have an extended argument over what the other 
MI#s besides MI5 and MI6 even do.  
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blue or red squares. In fact not even in the yellow. You just report. No bad conscience. No guilt’” 
(51). This reply equates carrying out one’s duties to moral behavior—as long as the former is 
completed, the latter is also fulfilled with a clean conscience—“No bad conscience. No guilt.” 
That such logic leads to everything from wastes of time and money to historical atrocities is, and 
was when Greene was writing the book, well-documented as the “banality of evil” in philosopher 
Hannah Arendt’s words. We are plainly meant to shudder at Percival’s willingness to use 
assassination, and an internal assassination at that, as a tool meant to ensure proper intelligence 
agency functioning, and we share Daintry’s lack of conviction62 that Percival’s 
compartmentalization logic absolves him of blame for (wrongly) identifying Davis as the mole. 
Lest the reader think that Greene is only bitter at the Western intelligence apparatus, when we 
finally meet the KGB, their excuses for not acting sooner on the information Castle has given 
them sounds disturbingly familiar; Castle’s KGB handler Boris tells him: “‘But you know how it 
is in your own outfit. It’s the same in ours. We live in boxes and it’s they who choose the box.’ 
How often he [Castle] had heard that comparison in his own office. Each side shares the same 
clichés” (150). Greene is quite clear that the Soviets are also playing espionage as the same game 
as the one Percival explained to Daintry. As it turns out, the only way that MI6 knew they had a 
leak in Castle’s section was because Moscow told them, in an effort to get MI6 to trust a fake 
defector from the KGB. Castle is forced to defect, to leave his wife and child to an uncertain 
future and a vengeful MI6, because of a plot in which he was ultimately only incidental.  
                                                 
62 Daintry, comparing his actions in the Cold War to his father’s in WW1, thinks “The Kaiser had 
not been a Hitler, but in the cold war they were now fighting it was possible, as in the Kaiser’s 
war, to argue right and wrong. There was nothing clear enough in the cause to justify murder by 
mistake” (267). Daintry’s disillusionment with his superiors factors into his decision to give 
Castle a head start on his defection.  
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Both sides demonstrate their willingness to use people instrumentally. However, other 
moments in the text, such as Castle’s skepticism that the firebombing of Dresden in WW2 was 
an equivalent atrocity to Stalin-era purges, refuse an East-West moral equivocation; I argue that 
Greene is not, as New York Times reviewer John Leonard says, engaging in a facile 
simplification of world events in order to claim “the West is just as bad as the East” (Leonard). 
Rather, the critique is that the structure of an intelligence bureaucracy itself creates and 
incentivizes the espionage mindset, which values using people instrumentally, regardless of the 
political ideology that bureaucracy nominally serves. In other words, it is not just that both sides 
share the same cliché that matters, it is what that cliché actually is: a metaphor for the abdication 
of personal responsibility to a professional duty measured by bureaucratic functionality. The 
BOSS officer that hands over the plans detailing Uncle Remus to Castle, who is also the same 
BOSS officer responsible for driving Castle out of South Africa and trying to kill his wife, 
illustrates this logic upon meeting Castle in England. “‘I hope you don’t bear me any grudge,’” 
he says, “After all you and I are professionals, and we are on the same side now’” (128). Castle, 
concerned with the human factor, whether it be his wife and child or Davis—all ultimately 
victims of an intelligence bureaucracy unwilling to treat people as other than pawns—cannot see 
it the same way as the BOSS officer. This perspective leads to his final act of betrayal.  
Greene and le Carré pioneered spy stories in which a spy’s disillusionment with his own 
organization drives the plot, and while these kind of stories have become more common, for 
example in the recent TV shows Deutschland ’84, novels akin to The Human Factor and Tinker, 
Tailor are responsible in large part for the shift in spy fiction’s reputation as genre-fare (or 
“divertissements” as Greene himself once called it) to sophisticated “adult” fiction. Double agent 
plots in which the agent’s psychological and personal motivations for double agency are 
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thematically relevant, as opposed to those in which the double agent exists as a MacGuffin or a 
device for a plot twist, feel more “serious” as literature because they ask the audience to derive 
enjoyment from moral complexity instead of moral simplicity. It would be a mistake to lose sight 
of spy fiction’s tendency to use “seriousness” or “realism” as a feint that disguises its tendency to 
deliver plots that emphasize the importance of the individual or the personal. However, 
bureaucracy plots also use their moralizing as critique of a real-world configuration and the 
pressures that structure places on the ability to gather and evaluate actual intelligence. Tinker, 
Tailor, Soldier, Spy and The Human Factor both feature characters using the mechanisms of 
bureaucracy to deceive it from within. But sometimes the potential for deception can be built into 
the day-to-day incentives of bureaucracy itself, independent of infiltration by double agents. The 
continuation of the Marx quote above about bureaucracy being a “circle no one can leave” is that 
a bureaucracy’s “hierarchy is a hierarchy of information. The top entrusts the lower circles with 
an insight into details, while the lower circles entrust the top with an insight into what is 
universal, and thus they mutually deceive each other” (qtd. in Denning 135). Mutual deception 
by employees more intent on bureaucratic advancement than national security goals has been a 
constant throughout the history of intelligence agencies, even though the make-up of those 
agencies has evolved. Thus, we find accusations in the Eisenhower-era Bruce Report that the 
club-like atmosphere of the secret service was obsessed with “king-making” and staffed by 
“bright, highly graded young men who must be doing something all the time to justify their 
reason for being” (Weiner 135). As the rising importance of SIGINT changed hiring practices, 
we see critiques like this one from national security expert Edward J. Epstein in 1984, who 
commented that the nation’s spies “are not interested in espionage. They are not interested in the 
Soviet Union. They are not interested in communism. They are not Cold War warriors. They are 
 112 
systems analysts. They are technocrats. They are bureaucrats. They are good at putting together 
and working for a bureaucratically efficient organization” (Knightley 381). Soviet double-agent 
Aldrich Ames alleged that the “espionage business was a self-serving sham, carried out by 
careerist bureaucrats who managed to deceive several generations of American policymakers 
about the value of their work” (Diamond 213). The War on Terror has seemingly not changed 
this culture of self-advancement. Former SIS agent Alaister Crooke writes that “the pressure to 
perform produces error after error. People need statistics and want to tick the box about how 
many terrorists they have taken out” (Grey 214). According to journalist Stephen Grey, even al 
Qaeda is aware of these limitations, and they have produced policy papers attempting to educate 
members on the CIA’s lack of translators, dependence on technology, and bureaucratic zeal as 
tools for exploitation (185).  
 The pressure to perform has forced many intelligence agents and assets to move from 
intelligence-gathering to intelligence-creation. Sometimes, this means creating one’s own 
problems and then proposing solutions. This is the case of many of the more interventionist 
agency policies, such as, infamously, the systematic arming and training of the Taliban to resist 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But, in other instances, intelligence sent up the bureaucratic 
hierarchy is outright and deliberate fiction. Tim Weiner reports that Southeast Asian CIA stations 
in the years before the Vietnam War were essentially “paper mills” in which agents and assets 
would turn in reams of made-up intelligence in order to keep the money flowing in (51). Perhaps 
most infamous among assets fictionalizing vital intelligence is Agent Curveball, supposedly an 
insider among Iraq’s chemical weapons program whose deliberate exaggerations and 
fictionalizations were passed on as iron-clad proof that Saddam Hussein was producing chemical 
WMDs, and thus were crucial pieces in the justification offered to the public by the Bush 
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administration for the Iraq War. According to journalist Stephen Grey, Curveball’s CIA handler 
was “too in love” with his source, meaning that since Curveball was giving him the information 
he wanted to hear, he didn’t sufficiently “vet” or “fact check” it (148).  
 If Curveball’s story seems a bit familiar, it may be because it echoes Graham Greene’s 
Our Man in Havana from fifty years before the Iraq War. In the novel, the unassuming British 
vacuum salesman Wormold is recruited into the British secret service rather unwillingly, 
acquiescing mostly because his teenage daughter’s expensive whims compel him to find another 
source of money. Wormold shares a first name with Bond (Jim/James), but little else. Unwilling 
and unable to form a network of informants to keep tabs on the volatile situation of 1950s Cuba, 
Wormold just starts “making things up.” He begins by using the names and positions of people 
he has met in passing, but eventually creates characters out of whole cloth, writing reports based 
on newspaper articles and his own imagination, and sending in detailed drawings of vacuum 
parts with a modified scale to insinuate that they are missile platforms. While his immediate 
handler Hawthorne suspects Wormold is lying (he recognizes the vacuum parts), he does not say 
anything for fear of his own career being damaged. As a result, Wormold’s fictions grow more 
elaborate and are received with more and more seriousness. At the end of the novel, when 
Wormold has finally been caught as a fabricator, he is not even really punished. Instead, he is 
promoted to a position in the U.K. (where he can do less damage) and recommended for an 
OBE.63 This final bureaucratic absurdity, as critic Denis Smyth writes, shows that “[t]he same 
vested interest in maintaining the prestige and therefore the intra-governmental influence of the 
Secret Service—its power to command administrative resources and rewards—prevents 
Wormold’s spymasters from either officially repudiating his literary inventions or disowning him 
                                                 
63 Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, a fairly prestigious award. 
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professionally, once his fictions are revealed” (130). For the secret services to admit that they 
were fooled, whether in Our Man in Havana or in the case of Agent Curveball, is to admit that as 
an intelligence agency they have failed their governmental mandate, their mission to know—a 
mission that supposedly licenses tremendous amounts of money and unethical, immoral, and 
questionably legal tactics.  
 Our Man in Havana is a critique of bureaucracy in the intelligence world, pointing out 
how easy it is for these large organizations to clannishly protect themselves and their members, 
to miss the obvious because it isn’t what they want to hear. Wormold’s imagination is obviously 
a key component in this critique, but Greene gets more mileage out of his fictionalizing spy than 
just a critique of bureaucratic myopia—especially since fictionalizing and the literary are 
slippery concepts in the novel. Writing seems to become a form of covert action, for example. At 
least, as Wormold’s inventions are taken for real intelligence, they become actionable. The 
unassuming people who are the templates for his agents are attacked, and in one case, killed. 
When he hears that one of his agents—whom he did not think was a real person—has been 
killed, Wormold asks himself “Can we write people into existence?” (119). He is stricken with 
fear when he realizes that whether the answer is yes or no, people can surely be written out of 
existence, and he has (inadvertently) done so. Wormold himself is put in danger, almost 
poisoned at a social function. His reports cause meddling on a geopolitical scale, and accelerate 
the destabilization of Cuba. Even though he initially chooses to start fabricating reports in order 
to further spoil his daughter (with the gift of a horse, specifically), we should not take 
Wormold’s unexpectedly potent imagination as Greene warning us that, in the fraught 
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circumstances of the Cold War, personal matters are also political,64 though they certainly are. 
For one, it is not only Wormold that possesses the capacity to be fanciful—the head of MI6 back 
in London won’t listen to Wormold’s handler Hawthorne give him a true account of Wormold’s 
shop or operation: “The small shop for vacuum cleaners had been drowned beyond recovery in 
the tide of the Chief’s literary imagination” (49). Invention seems to be endemic to the 
profession, and its wellspring is a combination of that “pressure to perform” that SIS agent 
Alaister Crooke warned about 50 years later, and the “mutual deception” that Marx describes as 
endemic to bureaucracies. Wormold’s lies could be easily uncovered, but they aren’t, because he 
is handing excuses to take action to MI6 and rival intelligence agencies. In Our Man in Havana, 
Greene gives us an early critique of how twisted intelligence work becomes when agencies are 
allowed to, in journalist Mark Mazzetti’s words, “grade their own work,” by which he means 
create a situation through covert action that then requires intelligence agency intervention to 
understand (81). Greene locates this flaw as a product of laziness in agent recruitment and a 
willingness to believe anything that confirms what the agency wants to hear, made up or not. In 
other words, as an inherent flaw of an organization that operates outside of public scrutiny and 
that has gotten too large too quickly. 
 The novel is quite critical of bureaucratic imagination, which sees what it wants and 
creates figures out of its own image, but Greene is not Kafka. Greene’s Catholic worldview and 
fundamental belief in individual worth will not allow him to grind his characters up in the 
machinery of words like the prisoners of “In the Penal Colony.” Our Man in Havana seems to 
suggest that though literary imagination is misplaced when involved in intelligence work, it is in 
                                                 
64 Perhaps the first iteration of this claim actually emerges as a warning in the propaganda posters 
of the World Wars and the Cold War, as in the advertisement for Scot Towels that asks “Is your 
washroom breeding Bolsheviks?”, before being reclaimed as a political action rallying cry 
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and of itself the antithesis of bureaucratic drudgery, a mechanism that allows agency to flourish. 
Wormold does through his writing, and, again, though this has terrible consequences, we can’t 
ignore that Wormold finds excitement, purpose, resolve, and ultimately love with his secretary 
Beatrice by embracing a creative and agentive side to himself that would have gone untapped as 
a vacuum salesman. The novel begins by setting up reality itself, in Dr. Hasselbacher’s words, as 
something “not to be faced,” as bleak and on the precipice of the abyss: “We live in an atomic 
age, Mr. Wormold. Push a button—piff bang—where are we? Another Scotch please” (11-12). 
“Dream more” Hasselbacher tells Wormold, and he does so, becoming an “imaginative writer” 
as he tells his daughter while he fabricates nuclear missile sites (77). Espionage and agency both 
are revealed to be dependent on fantasy; in the former case, this is dangerous, but in the latter 
case, fantasy ultimately creates a world for Wormold that espionage can’t accurately know, a 
world of individual goals and a personal reality separate from the state and state service. Beatrice 
reminds Wormold of this other definition of reality, of a reality that his imagining has made real. 
She tells him that even when the espionage world seems make-believe, “What happens after 
work is real. I mean, your daughter is real and her seventeenth birthday is real” (102). Embracing 
this personal reality—and ignoring that other one filled with nuclear gloom and doom, 
bureaucratic intelligence agencies, and unscrupulous police captains—is an authorial, agentive 
choice, or so Greene suggests. 
 Our Man in Havana features in a long line of spy novels that link the act of writing and 
espionage. As expected with Greene, the novel’s resolution doubles as a call to embrace quiet 
inter-personal relationships instead of international politics. Writing in spy fiction is a common 
antithesis of espionage because of their shared affinities—attention to detail, the managing of 
characters, the emphasis on plot/plots, the insistence that both involve fabrication. When they are 
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set directly in opposition, writing, at least in the works of spy writers who themselves aspire to 
the literary, is positive and agentive, creating a world that espionage falsely attempts to control 
and know. However, not all “serious” spy fiction ends with a firm renunciation of the political 
for a separate private sphere. Some, instead, posit that a complete disentanglement of the 
political and the private is not possible. In these cases, writing as a trope serves as a shorthand 
for an urgent sensitivity and sensibility to the personal and individual spheres that would benefit 
the intelligence world tremendously. This turns out to be an old theme in the genre, older even 
than the Cold War bureaucratic expansion against which Our Man in Havana reacts. For 
example, W. Somerset Maugham’s prefaces his novel Ashenden with a description of spy work 
as boring and monotonous, needing the authorial flourish to be made palatable to the public: 
“The work of an agent in the Intelligence Department is on the whole extremely monotonous. A 
lot of it is uncommonly useless. The material it offers for stories is scrappy and pointless; the 
author has himself to make it coherent, dramatic and probable” (X). The titular Ashenden is 
himself an author, and regularly compares his life as a spy to the melodramas he writes. The 
comparison isn’t favorable; Ashenden would much rather the people he meet behave more like a 
plot-based fiction, as then they would be more predictable, since his espionage work itself is “as 
unsatisfactory as those modern novels that give you a number of unrelated episodes and expect 
you by piecing them together to construct in your mind a connected narrative” (7). Nevertheless, 
Maugham implies that what makes Ashenden a good spy is his writerly ability to imagine how 
people will react to a given scenario. Ashenden may already feel like a “tiny rivet in a vast and 
complicated machine,” but this novel set in WWI and written in 1928 does not anticipate the 
explosion of bureaucracy in store for the Secret Service in the next few decades (7). Ashenden is, 
in fact, given laughably few orders, as his superiors rely on his status as, in the words of his 
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commanding officer, “the right kind of person” (meaning a gentleman) to see him through his 
missions (2). And since being a writer is part of being the kind of person Ashenden is, the 
scenarios in the book showcase how writerly imagination allows him to read and then manipulate 
the people around him, to take one “little incident” and use it as “a key to their whole lives,” as a 
way “to reconstruct their histories, circumstances and characters” (162). Ashenden isn’t 
Wormold, though, and he knows how to limit his imagination: “but he pulled himself up: he 
could not allow himself the luxury of creation” (162). Ashenden’s writerly gifts are thus in sync 
with the state, despite his literary disposition setting him apart from his more martial colleagues 
(for one, he cannot think of people as numbers as his superiors do, only able to imagine them as 
characters) (54). Unlike Wormold, Ashenden does his duty to the best of his ability, employing 
the creative faculty as a counterpoint to the bureaucratic machine of the secret service, but one 
within the same rhythm. This does not mean that Ashenden the novel is uncritical of the world of 
espionage, however, just that the critique is at the meta-level. It is left to Maugham to exercise 
his literary technique to portray the Service as callous, hypocritical, inept, etc. Ashenden the 
character (who, being based on Maugham, does doubt the probity of his own cause) is forced by 
wartime circumstances into using his gifts for Britain. Ashenden at one point describes 
patriotism as “in peace-time an attitude best left to politicians, publicists, and fools, but in the 
dark days of war an emotion that can wring the heart strings” (46). Reading this as biographical 
mea culpa is hard to resist here—Maugham was an ex-spy himself.  
Ashenden, like Our Man in Havana, likes to play narratively or at a meta-level with the 
conventions of fiction and those of espionage. For one, the book itself is one of those “modern 
novels” Ashenden hates, composed of multiple, fragmented, often conclusion-less stories. The 
narratives resist closure; no spy mission is completed satisfactory: they kill the wrong man, the 
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target commits suicide instead of being blackmailed into treason, a coin is flipped to decide 
whether a factory is to be destroyed and Maugham does not show us the result. Enemy agents are 
shown as human (unlike the German agents in Buchan and other contemporaries), while 
Ashenden’s superior R is at best a dissembling puppet-master and at worst a callous hypocrite. In 
other words, the world of espionage that Maugham portrays is in fact “scrappy and pointless,” as 
he announces in the introduction. The novel feels disjointed and inconclusive, introducing 
characters that seem on the verge of revealing a complicated humanity but who then get 
frustratingly used, abused, or forgotten by the narrative. A fitting symmetry, as revealed by the 
content in the vignettes of the book, with espionage itself. 
Greene, like Maugham with Ashenden, may have written Our Man in Havana or The 
Human Factor out of personal discomfort or dissatisfaction with his time in the secret service. 
Another way that spy fiction authors who themselves have a background in intelligence work use 
writing as a trope is to make their characters writers themselves. This choice signals their 
possession of a creative skill stifled or misused by or otherwise in conflict with the bureaucratic 
intelligence agency. Even Le Carré’s Günther Bachmann65 has written an unpublished novel. 
However, one does not need to be a disaffected ex-spy to position writing as an antithetical act to 
espionage. Ian McEwan’s Sweet Tooth takes place in the late 60s and early 70s, after 
bureaucratic expansion has brought the entrance of women into intelligence services, primarily, 
though not exclusively, as support and secretarial staff. These women faced an entrenched 
disrespect for their inclusion among the old guard. The main character, Serena, has just been 
hired by MI5, but not, as she had hoped, as a field agent. She describes a bit of her training as 
support staff: 
                                                 
65 For a fuller discussion of A Most Wanted Man, see Chapter 3. 
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We were spending more time now with the scores of other girls in the Registry, 
learning the strict rules of file retrieval and discovering, without being told, that 
there were concentric circles of security clearance and that we languished in outer 
darkness…I absorbed the general spirit of the place and, taking my cue from the 
other girls, began to accept that in this small part of the adult world, and unlike in 
the rest of the Civil Service, women were of a lower caste. 
Serena is eventually brought out of the “outer darkness” and given a field assignment. Her task is 
to financially support a young, non-communist leftist writer and push him to publish works that 
conform to MI5’s standards for inoculating political dissent, which allows the creative left to 
express dissatisfaction but in such a way that confirms national hegemony instead of 
undermining it. The task proves noxious to her. Project Sweet Tooth, as it is called in the book, is 
directly inspired by the CIA’s funding of Steven Spender’s Encounter magazine, and many other 
liberal left and centrist art projects throughout the Cold War. But in the novel, the agency’s plan 
is foiled as Serena and the author, Thomas Haley (like Wormold and Beatrice in Our Man in 
Havana) fall in love—love here taking up its stock role as that which is contrary to the spirit of 
bureaucracy and the aims of state control. The ending of Sweet Tooth features a characteristic-
for-McEwan twist, one that firmly sets creative power and emotional agency against the world of 
espionage and the bureaucratic, hierarchic governmentality it represents. It does so through a 
kind of transmutation, in which the text of the novel the reader has just read is revealed not to be 
in the head of Serena (where it has seemed to be) but to be an actual in-universe novel, written 
by Thomas Haley. This is revealed to the reader in the letter that composes the final chapter. And 
it is done in such a way to confirm Serena’s resignation from MI5 and both her and Haley’s 
condemnation of an intelligence bureaucracy willing to treat them both as pawns. Serena’s life, 
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the chronicle of her memories of her induction into MI5, her chaffing under the sexism present 
within it, her hesitance to help the organization control and direct the aesthetic sphere has all 
been weaponized against MI5 in the (published) form of an aesthetic object itself—though one, 
perhaps problematically, written by someone else, a man, both in and out of universe. The 
argument in the book is that the aesthetic sphere and individual will must trump service to the 
state when the state and its institutions abandon service to the people for domination. This 
argument is also, like the novel itself, both in- and out- of universe. Since the novel exists in both 
realities as a novel, it can be both Serena and Hayley’s act of defiance and McEwan’s jab at the 
historical, and ongoing, attempts by government to directly or indirectly determine what is and 
isn’t acceptable as art. In other words, both versions of Sweet Tooth resist the instrumentalist 
espionage mindset, even while portraying the world of intelligence as hopelessly in its thrall.  
McEwan has good reasons for this resistance. Sweet Tooth dates from 2012, 140 years 
since the birth of the intelligence apparatus as a part of the “Great Game.” Those years offer 
plenty of examples that the intelligence community has become more, not less, enamored of the 
espionage mindset. The espionage mindset is hopelessly addicted to complexity, and specifically 
to the belief that complex systems can be mapped, analyzed, and fully understood with the right 
tools and techniques. It is obsessed with secrets and conspiracies, and believes that being in the 
know confers moral and ethical absolution for any action. Seeing global politics through the 
espionage mindset is what led the initial individuals who formally enshrined espionage as part 
and parcel of government action to call it the “Great Game” at the end of the 19th century, and 
the mentality has yet to leave us. The “Great Game” evokes the picaresque of Kipling’s Kim, in 
which the fates of nations turned on the skill and bravado of heroic individuals. Espionage has 
never been so sanguine, and the intelligence world’s turn towards bureaucracy, conspiracy, 
 122 
cruelty and technophilia described over this chapter and the next is not so much an abandonment 
of an earlier ideal but an embrace of the anti-human potential always-already suggested by the 
fundamental belief of espionage: that peoples’ lives, safety, security, and privacy are stakes able 
to be gambled. The Great Game of espionage is a poor master trope in an era in which the vast 
majority of the population of the planet are unwilling and unequal “players” in it—most of us 
caught in electronic webs of surveillance, many fearing that each speck in a bright blue sky 
might rain Hellfire missiles down upon a mistaken wedding or market convoy, some disappeared 
into the black holes of secret prisons despite innocence or mistaken identity. As le Carré himself 
points out, espionage gains much of its power from the secret nature of its business and the 
closely-guarded mystique of its practitioners:  
Nobody can do corporate rot more discreetly than the spies. Nobody does better 
mission creep. Nobody knows better how to create an image of mysterious 
omniscience and hide behind it. Nobody does a better job of pretending to be a cut 
above a public that has no choice but to pay top price for second-rate intelligence 
whose lure lies in the gothic secrecy of its procurement, rather than in its intrinsic 
worth. (Pigeon Tunnel 58)  
Dismantling this mystique means refusing to play the Great Game or indulging in its master 
tropes of geopolitics as contest and human worth as a strategic quantity. Considering that spy 
fiction derives much of its pleasure from telling stories featuring human agency triumphing 
against this anti-human backdrop, one may come to the conclusion that spy fiction is already 
doing its part unraveling the espionage mindset. But as we have seen over the past chapters, the 
relationship is more complicated than that. For example, portrayals of intelligence work as 
conspiratorial or massively bureaucratic, even when these are negative portrayals, reinforce the 
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idea that intelligence work is inherently so, and only heroic willpower can keep an intelligence 
worker can help the individual resist the bureaucracy, expose the conspiracy, or stay relevant in 
the age of the machine. Spy fiction has turned espionage into a culture of the exception and the 
exceptional; that is, a culture that flouts legal and ethical concerns under the absolution of a 
national security aegis, and a culture that promotes the heroic figure/secret agent as an 
exceptional state-actor, one who should have exceptional licenses. As one might imagine, actual 
intelligence organizations are not quick to disabuse the public of its belief that the work of 
intelligence depends upon exception and exceptionality. The former (exception) can be spun to 
justify the espionage mindset’s gamification of human relations and willingness to do seemingly 
anything to uphold its governmental mandate to know, control, and destroy state enemies. The 
latter (exceptionality) drives intelligence agencies towards exclusivity, obscurity (and 
obfuscation), and ideological remove from the public at large. The next chapter discusses how 
the culture of exceptionality of has led to inhumane cruelty and inhuman technophilia. The next 
two chapters after that focus on the exceptionality of the secret agent, and the pinning of that 
exceptionality to changing ideologies of masculinity. It is a pinning that would be impossible 
without support from the spy agency, an organization that operates in both the cultural and 
political spheres, created and molded as much by spy fiction as by policy. The discursive spy 
agency is not the CIA or MI6, but a collection of beliefs, legislation, attitudes, and actions that 
find their expression in the workings of the CIA, MI6, NSA, GCCHQ, Mossad, etc. The 
discursive spy agency is the espionage mindset—prone to conspiracy, devoted to bureaucracy, 
drawn to cruelty, enamored of technology. 
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Chapter 3: The Spy Agency as a Discursive Formation, Part 2: Cruelty and Technophilia 
 
The previous chapter engaged with two trends, conspiracy and bureaucracy, within the 
cultural discourse of espionage that have shaped that discourse into its modern form. Both 
conspiracy and bureaucracy have become such a firm part of the espionage mindset—the cultural 
lattice within the institutional-decision making process of intelligence agencies—that it is 
difficult to imagine talking about intelligence without them. This chapter examines two more 
such trends—cruelty and technophilia—that have become similarly reified within the discourse, 
in part because of the preparatory work done by conspiracy and bureaucracy in changing the 
public’s understanding of espionage. Recall that the conspiracy derives its potency as a trope 
from both fantasies of overcoming conspiracies and fantasies of being stopped only because of 
them. Bureaucracy in spy fiction, in contrast, is either the obstacle to be overcome or worked 
around in a similar manner to the heroic overcoming of the conspiracy, or the pleasure-less final 
crushing weight that renders the hero’s plans impotent (thwarting his masculinity in the process). 
Even when bureaucracy is benign, as in Ian Fleming’s MI6, it is still an obstacle that Bond must 
successfully navigate and ignore in order to accomplish his “real work” of solo (or small group) 
adventuring. Bureaucracy as a defining trope of spy fiction enters into the genre with the mass 
expansions of spy agencies during the Cold War, and, even more specifically, with the classic 
man vs agency plots of John le Carré, e.g. The Spy who Came in From the Cold, and Graham 
Greene, e.g. Our Man in Havana, though the roots of this kind of positioning between the stifling 
or malevolent agency and the individual agent has a somewhat forgotten precursor: Somerset 
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Maugham’s Ashenden. The lineage of Maugham-Greene-le Carré is both the lineage of using an 
agent’s own bureaucracy as a morally compromised, obstructing force and the lineage of spy 
fiction as middle-brow “serious” novels, instead of low-brow/mass market “entertainment.” The 
relationship between an expansion of bureaucracy plots and the spy genre’s move towards more 
mainstream respectability is causal; it is the use of bureaucracy in this way that allows these 
authors to address weightier themes than John Buchan dared, such as moral equivalency between 
oneself and one’s enemy, ambivalence about national duty, the role of individual 
creativity/individual agency versus top-down orders in large organizations, and the 
transcendence of the bureaucratic structure by the individual will. Len Deighton, whose novel 
The Ipcress File pitted the Mod culture of the 60s against the shadowy world of espionage, 
pioneered the influential “lone agent disavowed completely by his corrupt organization” plot 
structure, creating an oft-used spy fiction template that still endures today. This lineage of 
authors, especially le Carré and Len Deighton, have proven quite successful and influential, 
enough that even pulp television spy thrillers such as the 24 series have obstructionist 
bureaucrats as characters. Generally, this has much to do with a general “cog in the machine” 
malaise characteristic of late capitalism. Specifically though, it has had great relevance on how 
the public conceives of spy agencies: as compartmentalized yet expansive, busy but inefficient, 
powerful but bound in red tape. This characterization does more in the public imaginary than 
create fussy bureaucrats for Jack Bauer to ignore. The CIA has capitalized on the public idea of 
itself as an intentionally convoluted and opaque agency. The reiteration of spy agencies as 
bureaucratic megaliths makes shrugging off that monolith seem exciting and daring. We give 
latitude to the secret world because we expect to find it difficult to comprehend. Thus, the trope 
of incomprehensibly complex bureaucracy facilitates a culture of cruelty and moral failure, both 
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in real life—as in the cases I discuss below concerning the role of the CIA in the Vietnam War 
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq—and in works such as le Carré’s A Most Wanted Man (2008), 
Greene’s The Human Factor (1978) or Denis Vilanueve’s film Sicario (2015).   
I call the first topic of this chapter “cruelty,” instead of “evil” or “violence” for two 
reasons; first the general public, and the espionage community,66 acknowledges that torture 
specifically is an extended duration of pain and suffering inflicted by spy agencies on the bodies 
and minds of their enemies and thus, it is not adequately described as violence, which can be 
sudden, swift, and in some cases perhaps merciful, but a particular kind of extended violence 
designed to mentally and physically break incarcerated subjects. Secondly, there are great 
disagreements, even within the agencies themselves, over the necessity, effectiveness, and 
morality of practices such as extraordinary rendition, waterboarding, stress positioning, sensory 
deprivation, and the other cruelties carried out in the name of national security. Thus, it does not 
seem to me to do these debates justice if I were to label all these practices with the blanket term 
“evil,” though I personally think some of them are. “Cruelty” in the secret services has 
fundamentally altered the world’s image of both spy agencies and the nations that seemingly 
give them free reign. This is especially true in the Middle East and Central Asia during the War 
on Terror, as journalist Mark Danner explains: “Post-9/11 America became the America the 
jihadists depicted: an imperial, aggressive, blundering power that managed, by means of lurid, 
deathless images of tortured Muslims, to prove to the world that all of its purported respect for 
human rights and freedom was nothing but base hypocrisy” (Danner xxv). After Abu Ghraib and 
                                                 
66 At least, the American Psychological Association, high ranking members of which have 
colluded with the CIA and Department of Defense to construct and implement so-called 
“enhanced interrogation” techniques, has acknowledged that their role in advising the use of 
these techniques facilitated abuse and miscarriage of justice (“New APA Policy”). 
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Guantanamo Bay, the idea that spy agencies could be unambiguously heroic, already a tenuous 
position in spy fiction after the decades of the Cold War, became unsupportable, leading to a rise 
in plots casting the CIA or MI6 as villainous (A Most Wanted Man, the Bourne films, Sicario), 
comedic parodies of traditional spy fiction (Spy, Archer) and a return of spy stories set in the 
Cold War (Red Joan, The Sympathizer, the Americans, Sweet Tooth). Taken together, these three 
moves in the genre are a reaction against the cruelty on display in the War on Terror, but these 
shifts have also raised questions in the public conception of what a spy agency is and does. For 
example, what does it mean for a spy parody not to take issues of torture, drone warfare, or 
electronic surveillance “seriously,” and who benefits from portraying the CIA as bumbling or 
silly? Does a comedic portrayal keep the agency grounded and cognizant of public opinion, or 
allow further mystification of their actual activities? When the CIA or MI6 is portrayed as “the 
bad guy” in a genre that still gears itself towards entertainment, who is the audience, and what 
kind of entertainment are they consuming?  
The last arch-trope of the spy agency I examine in this chapter is technophilia, or the 
technocratization of the spy agency—the rise of SIGINT over HUMINT, the use of totalizing 
domestic surveillance programs, and the fascination with technological gadgets in the secret 
world. A certain kind of fetishization of machines, special techniques, disguise, and surveillance 
can be found at the very beginning of the genre, in John Buchan’s The 39 Steps, for example. 
The use of sophisticated technology became inextricably linked with the genre through the Bond 
series and Q branch, and their many imitators, in the Cold War. Concurrently, increased defense 
spending allowed the fledgling CIA and NSA to experiment with electronic computing, signals 
collection, and surveillance, rapidly leading to an American advantage when it came to 
technological methods of espionage, a dominance which had both the USSR and the UK 
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worried. In fact, the anxiety of the latter even makes its way into the Bond series itself in From 
Russia with Love. These anxieties were not without cause. As we know now from revelations by 
whistleblowers, the NSA (in partnership with its British and Canadian equivalents, at the least) 
has grown into the most prolific intelligence-gathering organization in the history of the world, 
collecting the digital communications for every single Internet user, algorithmically analyzing 
the meta-data (time, location, and address of sent messages) of all of them, and directly 
observing not only those targeted by a specific intelligence operation, but any that triggered 
certain “suspicious” patterns as read by the algorithm. The intelligence world’s relation with 
technology is often portrayed positively, as in the U.K. TV series Spooks (2002-2011), but can 
also veer directly into the Orwellian Big Brother, especially after the surveillance revelations of 
the early 2010’s. Not surprisingly given the subject matter, this is the tack taken in both the 
documentary about Edward Snowden, Citizenfour, and the Oliver Stone dramatization of his life, 
Snowden. Technology has greatly expanded the reach of intelligence agencies, both their 
capacity to surveil and to kill, especially via remote drone strikes. Critics of this expanded reach 
frequently object on moral, legal, ethical, and efficacy grounds. One of the most common 
criticism is that a reliance on technology erodes the agency’s ability to understand the human 
relationships and factors required for long-term intelligence success. In this chapter, I chronicle 
the ways technology has shaped the way intelligence agencies operate and how spy fiction has 
employed technological tropes and themes to comment on the larger intelligence world, from 
Buchan to Spooks and the Daniel Craig-led Bond films. Cruelty and technophilia are thought of 
as Cold War and War on Terror developments in espionage, but as I argue throughout this 
chapter, the mentality that drove the initial Great Game may have changed in the details, but not 
in the form.   
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Bureaucracy and Cruelty in Spy Fiction: A Most Wanted Man and Sicario 
 As a reminder from the previous chapter, critic Michael Denning asserts that the secret 
agent is a fantasy of a returned agency to a world that feels less like the product of human action 
than the result of capitalist and governmental forces. The three novels I ended the last chapter by 
discussing—Our Man in Havana, Ashenden, and Sweet Tooth— trouble Denning’s proclamation 
not by refuting human agency, since they all do ultimately affirm it, but in questioning the ability 
of a secret agent to embody it. Wormold may think to himself that ““In a mad world it always 
seems simpler to obey,” and Greene does expose the madness at the heart of espionage-politics, 
but Wormold chooses not to obey; he deliberately misbehaves, as it were, and refuses to perform 
the role of the “man in Havana” that MI6 wants (28). Greene, Maugham, and McEwan see the 
bureaucracy of espionage in the same way that Le Carré sees ideology in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, 
Spy—as a threat to the personhood of the agent him or herself. Nor are these the only examples 
of works that echo the same criticisms of Eisenhower’s Doolittle report. Generally, the 
protagonists of these works come out the other end intact—a little more cynical perhaps, with 
shattered illusions about the secret operations of the world, but ultimately affirmed in the value 
of the ideals of bourgeois individualism, of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness despite a 
new awareness of their fragility. This is the Ambler-ian ending, a kind of defeated triumphalism 
or triumphal defeat, common also to other forms of hard-boiled fiction by, for example, the 
works of Hammet and Chandler. I think that genre, and the community that the recognized, 
shared features of a genre creates in consumers, goes a long way to explaining why this type of 
ending is popular. Happy endings in spy fiction are surely a means of entertainment, of giving 
the reader what they want by praising their intelligence (you too are in the know, you too will not 
fall for the machinations of the large impersonal forces of the world) while also massaging their 
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ego and keeping them comfortable (you, unlike the large world-running bureaucracy, know that 
the simple things are the most important). Despite these generic conventions, I think it is a 
mistake to dismiss the idealism behind this kind of ending as solely a move for entertainment, 
and not a critique of an intelligence apparatus that many, not just fiction writers, feel would be 
better served by reconnecting and re-centering those ideals to their practice. Greene means his 
happy endings. 
 Just the same, the ending that affirms the individual against the bureaucracy, even when 
this affirmation comes as a result of a complete renunciation of the intelligence world altogether 
(like in Our Man in Havana and Sweet Tooth) may still be blunting the teeth of any criticisms the 
author intends. Conventional endings are a hallmark of genre fiction, and thus may not be seen as 
capable of making a critical point for the reason that they mark and stigmatize the works that 
feature them as “middlebrow” or “for entertainment.” In other words, the endings devalue the 
message; plot gets in the way of theme. Perhaps this is why John le Carré’s work outside of the 
Smiley books, which tends to eschew any sort of affirmative ending for the characters—hits 
harder than Greene and Ambler. Le Carré’s morals are intended for the reader to learn, but the 
inability of his characters to learn those morals can feel brutal and cynical. His latest works are 
warnings against an intelligence apparatus that has grown powerful enough to redefine 
citizenship and personhood. These late works are noticeably free of affirmations of the individual 
self.67 His 2008 novel, A Most Wanted Man, turned into a film starring the late Phillip Seymour 
                                                 
67 Le Carré has mentioned that those involved in the spy world who read his works often 
complain to him about his seeming unfairness to his former profession. For example, Maurice 
Oldfield, former Chief of the Secret Service, once complained to Alec Guiness with le Carré in 
the room: “It’s young David [Le Carré’s given first name] and the like…that make it that much 
harder for the Service to recruit decent officers and sources. They read his books and they’re put 
off” (Pigeon 15).  
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Hoffman in 2014, seemingly takes a good deal of pleasure in grinding up its protagonists in the 
service of an appeal to a reading public to come to action—though what that action could be is 
sadly unstated, and as a result the novel wallows in malaise and frustration. 
The novel’s scope is no less than an indictment of the entire intelligence community after 
9/11, decrying its focus on SIGINT over HUMINT, the knee jerk assumptions of guilt of Islamic 
peoples, American trampling of state sovereignty under the aegis of a global war on terror, and 
the transformation of intelligence agencies into policing bodies. The plot centers on the figure of 
Issa Karpov, a Muslim Chechen who has inherited millions of dollars in blood money from his 
Soviet general father. Karpov makes his way illegally to Hamburg, where the money is being 
kept in the bank of Tommy Brue. Karpov has been jailed and tortured in Russia and Turkey, and 
his past is a narrative of conflicting accounts and voices. Russian intelligence jailed him as an 
Islamic terrorist, but then again, they hardly need an excuse to jail Chechens. He confessed, 
under torture, to terrorism, but then again, who wouldn’t say anything to make torture stop? He 
claims to be a devout Muslim but does not know some of the basic tenets of Islam. He has 
endured years of abuse and imprisonment, yet he strikes everyone he meets as fragile and naïve. 
In other words, he is a cipher, the titular “Most Wanted Man,” a figure symbolic of Islam itself in 
the eyes of the modern West. To the human rights lawyer, Annabel Richter, who assists him, he 
is an innocent destroyed and displaced by global politics. To the banker Tommy Brue, he is a 
reminder of the past misdeeds of his family and nation; Brue considers his father’s acceptance 
and laundering of Soviet blood money to be shameful, even after he finds out it was done at 
MI6’s request. To Gunther Bachmann, the German intelligence chief in Hamburg, Karpov is 
either a potential agent or a source, a way to entrap the upper echelons of terror cells lured in by 
Karpov’s money. And to the CIA and their allies in the German government, Issa Karpov is just 
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a terrorist, to be disposed of in a secret prison whenever they see fit. It is through Gunther that le 
Carré gives a direct condemnation of the problems of modern intelligence, writing for the 
German spy extended rants, or “sermons” as they are called, such as the following on the 
descent, in Bachmann’s opinion, of intelligence agencies into law enforcement: 
We are not policemen, we are spies. We do not arrest our targets. We develop 
them and redirect them at bigger targets. When we identify a network, we watch 
it, we listen to it, we penetrate it and by degrees control it. Arrests are negative 
value. They destroy a precious acquisition. They send you scrabbling back to the 
drawing board, looking for another network half as good as the one you’ve just 
screwed up. (246) 
Bachmann is a rough and quarrelsome figure, prone to irreverence, alcohol, and treating people 
like pieces in a puzzle. He and his second in command Erna Frey are the good spies, as far as 
spies can be good in a le Carré novel,68 because they are under no illusions about spy work. Le 
Carré insists that seeing one’s job for what it is as a high virtue in a spy; recall Smiley and his 
glasses symbolic of his own clarity of vision. Bachmann and Erna Frey are in the mold of 
Smiley. However, they are not in the same time period. A Most Wanted Man illustrates how the 
intelligence bureaucracy has changed to limit the potential Smileys in its ranks. In Bachmann’s 
BND, committing to a specific, non-hedged, non-bureaucratic course of action is a radical break 
from a culture of oversight, deference to foreign interests (namely the CIA), and red tape. When 
Bachmann does act of his own accord at the end of the book, he bases his reasoning on the only 
thing he can guarantee, his own individual knowledge: “I’m on my own, where I always am. The 
                                                 
68 Which is to say, always compromised by spying, but can be decent-ish given those constraints, 
depending on their personal beliefs. 
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man on the ground knows best. Fuck them” (316). As in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier Spy, le Carré is 
skeptical of spies who act on ideology, especially when it interferes with pragmatism. Bachmann 
wants to use Karpov and his money to ensnare an Islamic religious leader, Abdullah, whom 
Bachmann believes is masking contributions to terrorist groups under charitable donations. 
(Bachmann is right, as it turns out—about 5% of the money that Abdullah distributes to charities 
goes to fund terror groups). Bachmann does not want to arrest either Abdullah or Karpov, who 
he believes is innocent of most everything the Russians have charged him; he wants to use them 
as assets, as entry-ways into understanding terrorist networks and financial flows. Bachmann is 
willing to let Karpov remain in Germany for his involvement, and as for Abdullah, Bachmann 
remarks “If Abdullah is not part of a known network, I personally will make him part of one. If 
need be, I will invent a network, just for him” (246). Note here the connection once again 
between the good spy and the creative author, an analogy that in previous eras of spy fiction 
would signal Bachmann’s ability to transcend, if not entirely subvert, the bureaucratic structure 
of intelligence work. However, in this new era, Bachmann’s plans are destined to be ruined. The 
CIA blows his operation, sending a van crashing into the cab in which Bachmann waits to pick 
up Abdullah and Karpov. Bachmann had sought to “offer [Abdullah] a new definition of loyalty” 
by convincing him (under threat of arrest, but also with a promise of immunity should he 
comply) to become an informant on the terrorist networks he finances (250). But CIA agents 
emerge from the unmarked van, black-bag Abdullah and Karpov, and then whisk them away to a 
CIA black-site prison, a veritable black hole.69 A CIA agent explains himself to Bachmann: “Eye 
                                                 
69 The movie ends here, with a confused and angry Phillip Seymour Hoffman impotently driving 
after the van, then in a circle, then getting out of the car and muttering “Shit, shit” and frantically 
moving offscreen, then the fade to black. It is altogether a powerful ending to a powerful final, 
full performance from Hoffman before his untimely death. 
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for a fucking eye, Gunther. Justice as retribution, okay? Abdullah was killing Americans. We call 
that original sin” (321). Le Carré plainly calls that attitude stupid—and has his whole career. But 
unlike in Tinker, Tailor, political ideology is not an individual hangup, a personal problem for 
the master spy to solve or ignore, as Smiley does, in favor of an approach that prizes human 
relations by prizing pragmatism. A Most Wanted Man argues that in the War on Terror, 
American ideology has become entrenched throughout the espionage bureaucracy. Indeed, the 
bureaucratic structure has made that entrenchment possible by lavishing increased funding and 
influence in the hierarchy on those agents that can deliver immediate results. Bachmann refuses 
to play the bureaucratic game, and for this, he is deemed an apostate. There is a brilliant scene 
late in the book in which Bachmann has to beg permission for his operation from the Federal 
Police, the Judiciary, the Joint Steering Committee for espionage, MI6, and the CIA. The scene 
is an ordinary conference room, with Bachmann and his team giving a PowerPoint presentation 
on the plan to capture and turn Abdullah to the representatives of the various bureaucracies that 
must be appeased for this operation to commence. Le Carré draws the reader’s attention to the 
subtle jockeying and positioning that is happening in this conference room. We see that seat 
position in the conference room (closer to the CIA liaison the better, of course), eye contact, and 
nods of the head are signs and signals, more deterministic of the success or failure of 
Bachmann’s operation than all of the prep work he has done until that point. Bachmann, invested 
in trying to make his case, misses those signs, and as a result is defeated in this meeting. He fails 
to comprehend that the CIA has bullied and bought its way into turning a long-term, intelligence 
gathering operation into a couple of quick arrests (one of a most-likely innocent person) that will 
make the agents involved look good to superiors in Washington and Berlin. But le Carré, in the 
third person narration, makes sure to point out those secret signs to us. 
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 What separates A Most Wanted Man from other le Carré works disparaging the 
shortsightedness and ruthlessness of espionage—for instance, The Spy who Came in From the 
Cold—is that AMWM eschews any moral victory, any affirmation of human life in the face of 
defeat. When Alec Leamas from The Spy who Came in From the Cold climbs back down the 
Berlin Wall to be executed along with his love interest, he is doing so as a renunciation of the 
spy world (represented by Smiley calling to him from the other side of the wall) and its inhuman 
games played with human lives. Leamas is a moral victor; his suicide, like Hyacinth’s in 
Princess Cassamasima, is a final expression of his individuality and a defiance of his Agency. 
Jerry Westerby in An Honourable Schoolboy has a similar fate; he dies defying MI6 and 
attempting to help his love interest. But Bachmann doesn’t even have the opportunity to defy: the 
CIA is already ahead of him; his defiance dies in committee, he just doesn’t realize it. The other 
characters too are left utterly defeated—Karpov and Abdullah obviously so, but Annabel must 
watch yet another client disappear into the bowels of state power with no hope of returning. Brue 
has struggled with making sense of his feelings for Annabel over the course of the novel, asking 
himself if they are romantic, paternal, or idealistic, and if Annabel might represent a second 
chance at a relation with a distant daughter, or an opportunity to be a better man than his father. 
At the end of the novel, he finds not a clarification and fulfillment of any of these emotions, but 
an impotence. The last line of the novel reads “Brue put his arm round her shoulders where he 
had always wanted to put it, but he doubted whether she knew it was there” (322). 
 A Most Wanted Man is a post-9/11 spy novel written by the greatest spy novelist of the 
Cold War. For le Carré both espionage itself and the spy genre have changed. The developments 
in espionage over the 20th century—the expansion, the rigid hierarchy, bureaucratic 
management, the rise of SIGINT, the favoring of covert action instead of intelligence 
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gathering—have made the conventional individual-affirming ending to spy fiction all but 
impossible. Gunther Bachmann’s (as well as Brue’s and Annabel’s) failure at the end of the 
novel reveals the historical limits of the “lone creative” vs bureaucratic machine plot. While the 
critique of bureaucracy (as the stultification of the lone individual talent) inherent in that plot still 
persists in A Most Wanted Man, the actual playing out of an affirmation on par with Our Man in 
Havana seems impossible in the face of the “War on Terror” intelligence apparatus, especially 
the CIA and its oft-resented dominance in Western intelligence work. A Most Wanted Man is 
certainly not alone in terms of current spy stories refusing even a moral victory. In fact, I would 
argue that just as “serious” (i.e.  middle- or high-brow) spy fiction in the Cold War was marked 
by its engagement with bureaucracy vs individuality and the moral closeness between the USSR 
and the West, then post-9/11 “serious” spy fiction is characterized by pessimism, “evil vs evil” 
story structures in which moral compromise is shared by every state and non-state actor in the 
work’s central conflict. This new generation of spy fiction carries the implication that everyone, 
audience included, is complicit in the abuses of the intelligence agency.  
Emblematic of this new trend is Canadian director Denis Villeneuve’s 2015 film Sicario. 
Sicario’s plotting ably demonstrates the worst aspects of 21st century spy work, including 
bureaucratic sleight of hand, sheep-dipping, assassination (i.e. “targeted killing” missions), extra-
ordinary rendition, torture, drone surveillance, and a culture of aggressive masculinity that I term 
“drone masculinity” in Chapter 4. Taken together, these are the worst impulses of the Post-9/11 
intelligence apparatus, and demonstrate their rejection of individuality and the embrace of 
instrumentalist evaluations of their own agents and those they wish to manipulate or remove in 
the name of national security. The film finds FBI agent Kate Macer (played by Emily Blunt), a 
specialist in kidnapping rescue operations and a SWAT commander, recruited to an inter-agency 
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anti-drug cartel task force led by CIA agent Matt (Josh Brolin) and his mysterious partner 
Alejandro (Benicio del Toro). It becomes apparent quickly that Kate has been recruited merely to 
allow Matt to operate within the United States, something the CIA cannot do without a domestic 
agency attached. In other words, she was recruited because Matt felt she could be steamrolled 
into going along with his actual plan: to have Alejandro, a Columbian cartel hitman, infiltrate the 
Sinaloa operation in Mexico, kill their leadership, and allow the Columbians (with CIA 
guidance) to, in Matt’s words, restore “order” to the drug trade into the US:  
[U]ntil somebody finds a way to convince 20% of the population to stop snorting 
and smoking that shit, order's the best we can hope for. And what you saw up 
there [Alejandro infiltrating Mexico in order to track and kill the Sinaloa 
leadership], was Alejandro working toward returning that order. 
When Kate complains about the questionable legality of her mission to her superiors, she is 
asked if she feels that the Agency’s by-the-books tactics have had an impact on drug violence in 
the U.S. or Mexico, to which she replies that she does not feel so. Her supervisor attempts to 
reassure her that her status as a bureaucratic cover for illegal operations by the CIA is a 
worthwhile one:  
I don't have the authority to hire advisors, or authorize joint agency missions, or 
fly agents from Air Force bases. Are you understanding me? These decisions are 
made far from here, by officials elected to office, not appointed to them. So, if 
your fear is operating out of bounds, I am telling you, you are not. The boundary's 
been moved. 
“The boundary’s been moved” serves as a post-script to intelligence operations after 9/11, and 
Sicario does not portray this boundary movement positively, though neither does it flinch from 
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the violence of the drug war, a violence primarily enacted against people in vulnerable socio-
economic positions far from the relative safety of the average U.S. citizen’s experience. Kate’s 
familiarity and frustration with the continuation of this violence (she is shown at one point 
privately looking at photographs of victims of drug-related violence in Juarez, particularly the 
infamous “missing women of Juarez70”) initially pushes her, uneasily, to go along with the CIA 
operation. However, after she learns the full scope of the operation, which involves extra-
ordinary rendition from a Juarez prison of a Sinaloa higher-up, his torture by water-boarding, the 
use of U.S. Army Special Forces as sheep-dipped CIA agents, and the afore-mentioned 
assassinations, she threatens to go public. Sicario remains one of the few films to depict and 
criticize sheep-dipping, the practice of temporarily deputizing Special Forces soldiers into the 
CIA so that they can operate outside a declared theater of war. Sheep-dipping is an especially 
cynical shell game, a bureaucratic sleight of hand in which the spirit of the law is blatantly 
violated to maintain its letter. Ultimately, the end of the film has Alejandro force Kate at 
gunpoint to sign off on a sanitized report of their activities in order to legalize them under her 
protections as an FBI agent, and despite her clear distress at being forced to betray her ethical 
compunctions, she does so, with Alejandro then advising her in the film’s last bit of dialogue: 
“You should move to a small town, somewhere the rule of law still exists. You will not survive 
here. You are not a wolf, and this is a land of wolves now.” There is no redemptive moment, 
Matt and the CIA and Alejandro and the Columbian cartel “get away with it” and the final 
frames of the film show a soccer game in Juarez interrupted by the sound of gunfire, as if to 
emphasize that despite the “success” of the plan, nothing will change. 
                                                 
70 See, for example, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/21/juarez-mexico-women-murdered-
corruption 
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Sicario is pessimistic filmmaking, and many viewers may be put off by its bleak 
worldview. However, it also represents a new possibility in spy fiction in terms of its treatment 
of gender relations in spy film, its use of cinematography more characteristic of art film than spy 
genre fare, and its willingness to bite the hand that feeds so to speak by deconstructing traditional 
spy tropes and highlight the complicity of these tropes in the making of a cruel intelligence 
agency. Having a woman as the main character in spy fiction today is, thankfully, not as 
infrequent as it has been in the genre’s history. The success of everything from spoofs such as 
Melissa McCarthy-led Spy to popcorn action flicks, for example, the Angelina Jolie-starring Salt, 
to the slow-burning prestige TV show The Americans starring Keri Russell show that female 
protagonists in spy fiction appeal to an audience that wants to see them as more than “Bond 
babes.” But whereas Spy and Salt either explicitly (in the former) or implicitly (in the later) make 
the argument that there is no reason a woman cannot assume the cultural role of the 
Bond/Bourne superspy, Sicario criticizes the toxic masculinity inherent in modern intelligence 
work. Without a doubt, Matt chooses Kate to be his bureaucratic cover because he believes he 
can intimidate and control her, and this is, at least partly, because she is a woman. For example, 
after Matt and Alejandro refuse to explain to her why they have border patrol hold dozens of 
captured immigrants for questioning,71 Kate expresses her frustration to her partner in the FBI, 
Reggie, played by Daniel Kaluuya. Reggie says he will “get” answers, to which Kate responds, 
“What makes you think they will talk to you?”; yet, as soon as Reggie demands (not asks for) 
answers, Matt and Alejandro give them. In the background, Kate rolls her eyes. Toxic 
masculinity is on display throughout the film. The CIA agents and Delta Force operatives joke 
                                                 
71 It is because they are looking for a tunnel used by the cartel by which they can sneak Alejandro 
into Mexico.    
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about venereal disease upon Kate’s arrival to their base of operations. Later in the film, a Delta 
force operative semantically links violence and sexuality when he yells out during a fight “Lay 
back and take it.” For Kate, the most immediately threatening instance of the linkage of sex and 
violence occurs when a corrupt police officer poses as a random encounter/pick-up in a bar, 
manages to invite himself over to her apartment, and assaults her in order to find out what she 
knows about cartel activities. To make matters worse, in this situation Matt and Alejandro are 
actually using Kate as bait to draw out just this kind of response from the cartel’s support 
network in the U.S., so that they can further map out that operational network north of the 
border. Kate is unaware, thinking that the guy she is picking up at a bar to blow off stress is a 
chance encounter, and is unprepared for his violence. One way to read the unrelenting misogyny 
that Kate experiences is as a punishment that the culture of intelligence and Special Forces 
inflicts upon her for her own non-conformance to the stereotypical female gender role; recall that 
she is introduced leading a SWAT team in a kidnapping-response operation. Sicario’s 
commitment to showing the unethical/illegal side of intelligence work and its determination to 
erase the idea that intelligence work is Bond-like flair includes showing how a particular type of 
toxic masculinity, which I call drone masculinity, has warped both motivations of intelligence 
workers and operational planning itself. But to do so by heaping punishment on Kate moves the 
film closer to shockers like Wes Craven’s Last House on the Left than Goldfinger, though tonally 
Kate’s story is meant to be tragic rather than exploitative. Nevertheless, images in the film like 
the one below (Fig. 3), which shows Kate showering off blood early in the film after a rescue 
SWAT operation that became violent, associates Kate’s femininity with a fragility under threat 
by the overtly masculine world in which she operates:    
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Figure 3: Emily Blunt as Kate in Sicario 
Alejandro’s “land of wolves” comment at the end of the film (referenced above) links Kate’s 
feminine fragility with the fragility of “law and order” itself, excluding both from the borderland 
struggle of the Southwest, and linking Sicario to works of art72 that use the frontier/border as a 
metaphor for the tenuousness of society itself.  
Sicario is ultimately more concerned with showing how toxic masculinity, inefficient 
bureaucracy, and overenthusiastic wannabe cowboys have transformed intelligence work than it 
is in probing its own use of sexual violence, sexualized violence, and violence-ified sexuality73 to 
advance its theme of border conflict exacerbated by the “wolf-like” nature of both sides, a move 
which has problematic issues in its own right. But despite this oversight, it is a key entry into the 
genre of spy fiction because of its willingness to undermine the traditional assumptions that 
make spy fiction or film a pleasurable read or watch—namely, the assumptions that the spy 
agency works for the public, that intelligence workers “on our side” react in response to a crisis 
                                                 
72 This is a lineage that contains many westerns, from The Searchers to the modern westerns of 
Cormac McCarthy (to which Sicario owes considerable debt), but also spy fiction such as Eric 
Ambler’s Journey into Fear, and more canonical referents like Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.  
73 By which I mean the use of violent imagery to de-sexualize the erotic image, like Emily Blunt 
covered in blood in the shower, or the nude, headless bodies on display in the aftermath of a 
gang-related killing in Juarez. Perhaps the “de-eroticized erotic” is another term I could have 
used, though that elides what is doing the de-eroticization.  
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rather than creating one, that violence is a last resort, that individuals matter on a global scale, 
that heroes exist and can save the day, etc. That the film also challenges the critical 
circumspection that places spy fiction stylistically nearer to kitsch than to high art also places it 
as part of a trend in the genre that can be read as rehabilitative. Sicario and films and fiction like 
it aim to tell spy stories without the thematic, plot, and stylistic “hang-ups” that once caused 
Umberto Eco to decry Ian Fleming as an author who “simulates literature by pretending to write 
literature” (qtd. in Vegso 160). Eco’s sentiment may sound too pithy to be sharp commentary, 
but after one reads enough Bond one does begin to question whether or not Bond’s moral 
haranguing is anything more than an empty parroting of modernist angst, especially given that it 
is never consequential in the execution of his duties (not to mention the skepticism that 
Fleming’s attention to Bond’s consumption habits is less characterization and more 
advertisement). However, literary simulacra or not, the Bond books and films (as I keep 
insisting) have influenced the practice and reception of intelligence work, the results of which 
are portrayed graphically, clearly, and memorably in Sicario. Like all of Denis Villeneuve’s 
work, Sicario is haunting and gorgeous to look at.74 The clearly composed nature of the shots 
lend a deliberate coldness to the film. Unlike in a Bond film, Villeneuve does not want his 
audience to become invested in the success of the intelligence operation. The camera-work in the 
film is skeptical, at times ironic in its framing of the activities of Matt, Alejandro, and the Special 
Forces team they lead under the aegis of a domestic intelligence operation. A good example of 
this skepticism is the following image (Fig. 4), part of a completely silent scene in which the SF 
                                                 
74 The cinematography is by Roger Deakins, who worked with Villeneuve on Prisoners and was 
director of photography on the similarly genre-bending Bond film Skyfall.  
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team march towards the tunnel into Mexico through which Alejandro will enter and make his 
way to assassinate the head of the cartel. 
 
Figure 4: Special Forces Silhouetted In the Colors of a Faded American Flag in Sicario 
The camera ironizes the operation, an assassination mission, by framing it against a red, white, 
and blue sky and silhouetting the operatives against it. By this point in the film, only the most 
unreflective nationalist would consider what they are watching to be a patriotic flag-framing akin 
to George C. Scott’s Patton standing in front of the flag.75 Rather, by referencing that kind of 
full-screen patriotism and muting it in shadow and silence, Villeneuve forces his audience to 
reflect on the unethical nature of the mechanisms that support American democracy. This is what 
spy fiction can do at its finest: expose what critic Roland Vegso in The Naked Communist calls 
the “reduplication of worlds within democracy”, the supposed “need” of executive/state power to 
operate in secret itself in order to defend public openness and public good (141). Sicario 
demonstrates how this reduplication is hidden by bureaucratic structures and inevitably leads to 
cruelty. Sicario does not give a sense that there is a better way that intelligence work could be 
done. Unlike in A Most Wanted Man, there is no Gunther Bachmann to chastise and harangue his 
colleagues (and the reader) with a vision of intelligence that can ultimately be forgiven its means 
because of the subtle, creative genius in achieving justifiable ends. Sicario, instead, argues that 
                                                 
75 In the 1970 film Patton  
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violent means have violent ends, and that cruelty in the service of an ideal demeans that ideal. It 
is a spy film for the post-Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo public perception of the spy agency as an 
institution forever marked by its willingness to employ cruelty. The film’s depiction of 
assassination, extra-ordinary rendition, and water-boarding condemns this cruelty, present not 
only in covert operations designed to overthrow a regime or assassinate a key player in a 
hostile76 organization, but as a means of intelligence collection itself. In the next section, I 
examine the use of torture as an acceptable means of gathering HUMINT (human intelligence), 
as a policy, and its relation to spy fiction, in more detail.   
Torture, Cruelty, and Spy Fiction in the “War on Terror” 
It is one of the most oft-referenced and parodied scenes in film: the nefarious Aurich 
Goldfinger has restrained the infamous super-spy James Bond on a metal table, and a high-
powered laser is slowly inching its way up, slicing through the metal table and threatening to do 
the same to the agent. Given that the laser is moving feet-to-head, it threatens first Bond’s 
genitalia—got to hit him where it counts, after all. “Do you expect me to talk?” snarls Bond. “No 
Mr. Bond, I expect you to die,” chuckles Goldfinger in reply. One might be skeptical of this; if 
he wanted Bond to die, he could have aimed the laser at his head first, or, as Scott Evil in the 
parodic Austin Powers movies suggests to his Goldfinger-esque father Dr. Evil, just shoot him 
and be done with it. But Bond villains hardly ever really want Bond dead, at least immediately. 
They want him to suffer first. In this sense, cruelty in spy fiction is not new. The perils of 
suffering at the hands of the enemy and the near-escape from a certain and brutal death that a 
hero braves are the supposed pleasures of the reader. Torture in the fiction of masculine bravura 
is always a marker of sadism on the part of the enemy, the final proof that there is an irreducible 
                                                 
76 Whether the hostility is actual, perceived, hypothetical, or wholly imagined is incidental. 
 145 
gap between hero and villain, between he-who-resists and he-who-likes-to-inflict. In this strain 
of spy fiction, torture is not about interrogation or information—the only information transmitted 
is to the audience, to the reader, not to the torturer, and that information communicates the 
steadfastness of the hero, the depravity of the villain, and, metonymically, the truth of the hero’s 
cause and the falsity of the villain’s. Even in the more “serious” spy fiction, in which tortures are 
far less over-dramatic than a death course that ends with a giant squid77 and far more effective at 
extracting intelligence, the torture is still not about the intelligence. When Jim Prideaux is 
tortured by the KGB in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, the fact that he talks is immaterial to the plot 
of the book—the Soviets already know everything about MI6 because of their mole Bill Haydon. 
Le Carré includes the torture to contrast Smiley’s cerebral intelligence gathering process with the 
KGB’s physical one, to develop Prideaux’s character as damaged and forlorn, and, like much of 
the “realism” in Le Carré, to further distance his works and his villains from the cartoonishness, 
and thus the perceived moral simplicity, of Fleming and Goldfinger.78 Torture and cruelty in spy 
fiction before the “War on Terror” exist functionally in the story, and are not ever the point of 
the story. In other words, spy fiction historically poorly equips us to confront the role of torture 
and cruelty in the actual practice of espionage, a confrontation made unavoidable and urgent 
since 9/11. 
 The use of torture by intelligence agencies and secret police did not begin in the early 
2000s, nor did the CIA only begin to use techniques like waterboarding, stress positioning, 
forced exercise, sleep and sensory deprivation, and humiliation in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a 
                                                 
77 Dr. No’s plan in the books. The movie tamps it down a little, but not much. 
78 I say “perceived” because I am not certain that the Bond books are as simplistic as they may 
first appear (at least not all of them), and I also somewhat dispute the idea that cartoonishness 
equals simplicity and realism equals complexity.  
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1960 CIA handbook describing the uses of these techniques for intelligence gathering 
demonstrates, to call these “enhanced interrogation” tactics79 an “abuse” of guidelines is 
incorrect—they are the guidelines, followed to the letter (Danner 504). Plainly these guidelines 
are torture, meaning that the policy of using torture on captured targets for the purpose of 
extracting information has been ingrained in the policy of US intelligence since at least 1960. We 
now know that within the Bush administration and the intelligence community at large, there was 
significant disagreement over the use of torture; after being briefed on the subject, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft reportedly said: “Why are we talking about this in the White House? 
History will not judge this kindly” (505). Ashcroft’s position was shared by the FBI, whose more 
conventional interrogation techniques had proved effective in getting crucial information from 
the first wave of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, and also by many in the US Army’s Military 
Intelligence branch. For example, Lt. Gen. John Kimmons, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence, has stated that “[n]o good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices” 
(546). Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that torture as an intelligence gathering tool is 
ineffective, independent of the morality and legality of it. The combination of the fact that the 
tortured will give any information in order to get the torturers to stop and the torturer’s belief that 
any information given under physical pain must be correct—a psychological post-hoc 
justification for the infliction of that physical pain—creates a toxic mix of misinformation being 
taken as gospel. This was the case of one of the architects of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shaik 
Mohammed, who told an International Red Cross team investigating Guantanamo prison, “I gave 
a lot of false information in order to satisfy what I believed the interrogators wished to hear in 
                                                 
79 One of the favored euphemisms for them among the Bush administration along with “alternate 
set of procedures.” 
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order to make the ill-treatment stop.…I’m sure that the false information I was forced to 
invent…wasted a lot of their time and led to several false red-alerts being placed in the United 
States” (515). The wasted time and effort spent investigating information such as that provided 
by Khalid Shaik Mohammed led Colin Powell’s chief of staff Lawrence Wilkerson to admit: 
It has never come to my attention in any persuasive way…that any intelligence of 
significance was gained from any of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay other than 
from the handful of undisputed ring leaders…clearly no more than a dozen or two 
of the detainees, and even their alleged contribution of hard, actionable 
intelligence is intensely disputed in the relevant communities such as intelligence 
and law enforcement. (540) 
Nevertheless, the CIA convinced the administration to allow it to take over interrogation at the 
“black site” prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, Thailand, and at least four other countries (502). There, 
away from public scrutiny and political oversight, the CIA engaged in “policies and practices 
developed and approved for use on al Qaeda and Taliban detainees who were not afforded the 
protection of the Geneva Convention” due to their non-state combatant status (393). Due to a 
culture of impunity in the CIA, torture was used in Iraq as well, even though many of the 
captured Baathist and Republican Army soldiers there would, in fact, qualify for Geneva 
Convention protections. It was from one such Iraqi prison site, Abu Ghraib, and the leaked 
photos taken by Military Police demonstrating their abuse and dehumanization of the prisoners 
there, that the CIA’s open secret of torture was confronted by the public at large. These photos 
showed military police posing with prisoners in dehumanizing and humiliating poses, but despite 
the best efforts  of administration officials such as General George R. Fay to distinguish the 
behavior of these Military Police (which he termed “serious incidents”) and that of intelligence 
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workers using waterboarding for intelligence gathering, the role of torture in espionage, and the 
cultural realization that “we”, i.e. the U.S. intelligence services, were the torturers, has greatly 
affected the cultural discourse of espionage and the image of the U.S. and Americans abroad 
(403). 80   
 Given the damage done by torture to the cultural image of America and the fact that 
torture simply does not work, why engage in it at all? Critic Elaine Scarry, in her study of the 
philosophical underpinnings of torture and war, The Body in Pain, argues that the idea of 
torturing for information and the public rhetoric that posits gaining information as an excuse to 
torture, is fundamentally untruthful. According to Scarry, the interrogation is not the reason for 
torture, but part of the torture itself: “the interrogation does not stand outside an episode of 
torture as its motive or justification: it is internal to the structure of torture, exists there because 
of its intimate connections to and interactions with the physical pain” (29). The questioning and 
searching for information is torturous because it reminds the person being tortured that he is a 
body in pain and that he, being “weak”, would capitulate utterly to his torturers if it would make 
the pain stop. In this way, confessing or surrendering information is a self-betrayal, akin to the 
way that the prisoner’s own body is made to hurt him through forced exercises and stress 
positions (47). So, if intelligence-gathering is not the actual reason for torture but actually 
                                                 
80 Torture, much like drone warfare (discussed in later chapters) also creates new enemies by 
helping to confirm the worst visions of the West in the Islamic world. For example, in response 
to Abu Ghraib, Sheik Mohammed Bashir had much cause to say: “It was discovered that 
freedom in this land is not ours. It is the freedom of the occupying soldiers in doing what they 
like…abusing women, children, men and the old men and women whom they arrested randomly 
and without any guilt. No one can ask them what they are doing, because they are protected by 
their freedom…No one can punish them, whether in our country or their country. They expressed 
the freedom of rape, the freedom of nudity and the freedom of humiliation” (Danner 392). 
Somewhat lost in the discussion of the efficacy or not of torture as an intelligence-gathering 
technique is the idea that much of the time the moral high ground is quite a useful and strategic 
position to take. 
 149 
another form of it, why pretend that it is the reason? Unsurprisingly, the rhetorical use of 
intelligence-gathering as a justification for giving detainees “a hard time” (as the official CIA 
parlance calls it) is for the other “body” involved in torture: the body politic (Danner 510). 
Scarry remarks: 
Almost anyone looking at the physical act of torture would be immediately 
appalled and repulsed by the torturers. It is difficult to think of a human situation 
in which the lines of moral responsibility are more starkly or simply drawn, in 
which there is a more compelling reason to ally one’s sympathies with the one 
person and to repel the claims of the other. Yet as soon as the focus of attention 
shifts to the verbal aspect of torture [that is, the “questioning” and the “betrayal of 
information”], those lines have begun to waver and change their shape in the 
direction of accommodating and crediting the torturers. (35) 
Scarry is formulating here that torture has an audience beyond the bodies in the room, that it has 
a discursive part in a regime’s constant need to justify itself. Claiming that the information 
gained from torture is vital to state-security, the logic that underpins Dick Cheney’s statement 
that “I have no problem [with torture] as long as we achieve our objectives,” is part of a political-
theater that has as its aim the convincing of moral superiority of the torturing regime and the 
physical and mental inferiority of those being tortured (Friedersdorf). Speaking of Cheney and 
political theater, from the same Meet the Press interview, Cheney redefines torture several times 
in just a few minutes, depending on the rhetorical use he needs the word to have, in order to 
avoid directly admitting that the actions taken by CIA interrogators were morally wrong. In 
sequence, he claims that rectally force-feeding detainees was not systematically-sanctioned 
torture because it wasn’t in the CIA guidelines for interrogation, a defense that shifts the culprit 
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from the U.S. regime as a whole to a few “bad actors.” He then claims that enhanced 
interrogation itself is not torture in an attempt to issue a blanket disavowal of any U.S. 
involvement in torture. However, this directly contradicts his previous talking points, because 
“enhanced interrogation” is most definitely in the CIA guidelines for interrogation, and thus 
should, ostensibly, fall into his justification of torture as acceptable if it achieves its objectives. 
Lastly, he attempts to transform the meaning of the word torture entirely to make it into an 
ontological category that Americans by definition cannot engage in, claiming that torture is 
actually “what 19 guys armed with airline tickets and box cutters did to 3000 Americans on 
9/11” (Friedersdorf). Cheney plays fast and loose with language in order to avoid saying on the 
record that American policy supports torture, and as a result reveals the discursive nature of the 
concept of torture itself. Scarry points out the insidiousness of this discursive use of torture as a 
spectacular speech act in which the pain of the tortured is not the primary point of torture itself: 
“[Torture] goes on to deny, to falsify, the reality of the very thing it has itself objectified [pain of 
the tortured] by a perceptual shift which converts the vision of suffering into the wholly illusory 
but, to the torturers and the regime they represent, wholly convincing spectacle of power” (27). 
While we cannot forget that the pain is very real to the tortured, in the manner that Scarry is 
describing it, torture is analyzable as a cultural act.81 I argue that too much of spy fiction has 
participated in this cultural act by reifying torture as the job of the spy, and, ignorant of reality, 
as always effective as an intelligence-gathering tool when used by the “good guys.” Spy fiction, 
for example, the show 24 or the film Zero Dark Thirty help “sell” torture as justifiable to the 
                                                 
81 Scarry points out the overlap of vocabularies of cultural productions and torture: “It is not 
accidental that in the torturers’ idiom the room in which the brutality occurs was called the 
‘production room’ in the Philippines; the ‘cinema room’ in South Vietnam, and the ‘blue lit 
stage’ in Chile: built on these repeated acts of display and having as its purpose the production of 
a fantastic illusion of power, torture is a grotesque piece of compensatory drama” (28). 
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public, especially to the American/Western public, through their use of specific tropes, scenarios, 
and standardized scripts.  
 Spy fiction offers a long historical visual and linguistic vocabulary of torture and cruelty, 
from Bond’s torture at the hands of le Chiffré to Ethan Hunt’s beatings at the hands of the 
“Rogue Nation” in Mission Impossible 5. But these are examples of heroes being tortured by 
villains. As critic Maggie Nelson argues, “There is, however, evidence to suggest that the advent 
of glorified torture in popular entertainment serves a political function, insofar as it creates a 
network of identifications through which people find themselves warming to torture and torturers 
at a time when our government has begun to permit and utilize torture” (63). I might call this the 
“Jack Bauer for President” effect, after an Internet meme lionizing by far the worst fictional 
offender of easy, consequence-free, always-useful torture. Over the course of the show 24, each 
season of which is structured around the conceit that agent Jack Bauer has only one day to avert 
a terrorist plot, Bauer goes out of his way to enact the philosophy that torture—whether the 
breaking of fingers one by one to get someone to talk, capturing and threatening a suspect’s 
family, or shooting a criminal in the knee after he was already in custody—is justifiable in 
situations of intense need. This need is frequently given visual form, represented on the screen 
by a ticking clock (Fig. 5) that reminds the audience both that the events on the screen happen in 
real time and of Bauer’s urgent need to get information.  
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. Figure 5: The Ticking Clock from 24 (Pinedo) 
The clock is half of Bauer’s justification for torturing; the other half is that Bauer pretty much 
always gets the information he needs, and the physical pain is always the necessary part of 
getting that information. For example, in the figure above (Fig. 5), Bauer is interrogating the 
already-captured criminal Tomas Sherek. Bauer’s bad-cop routine of throwing the table around, 
screaming in Sherek’s face, and pointing a gun at him fails to intimidate Sherek. Again, this 
takes place in a government agency’s HQ, and even though the other agents yell impotently at 
Jack to stop, that he does not face lasting consequences for this act reinforces the idea that most 
intelligence workers condone torture or want to do it, and need the Jack Bauer “types” (uber-
masculine, angry, loose-cannon, etc.) to do the “dirty work” that others won’t. Quickly 
exasperated by Sherek’s refusal to talk, Bauer shoots him in the kneecap, and immediately 
Sherek confesses the next plot point Bauer needs in order to rush off to the next action sequence. 
In this way, 24 links scenes of torture to audience enjoyment; torture makes the story progress, 
and so in this sense too it is “justified” by its status as plot device. Torture as plot device 
normalizes it for the audience, places it within the context of other story-structure mechanisms. 
This reinforces aspects of the cultural discourse in which uncritical representations of mythically 
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effective and deserved82(within the logic of the show) torture fall within the range of “normal” 
things to show on network TV. The cavalier attitude on the part of the show’s producers to 
portray torture positively, and the possible pernicious effects on audience behaviors that this 
positive portrayal may have, actually concerned some members of the military-intelligence 
complex. A 2007 New Yorker article reports that US Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan 
flew to LA to talk to 24’s producers, hoping “to convey the severe, adverse effects they felt the 
show’s depiction of torture was having on American soldiers, who seemed to be increasingly 
seduced by Bauer’s ‘whatever it takes’ motto, and decreasingly inclined to take seriously the 
importance of adhering to international and military law” (qtd. in Nelson 64). The producers did 
not listen to Brig. Gen. Finnegan, as the show, which continued to be quite popular (and in fact 
was recently rebooted on Fox) and continued to portray torture as effective and necessary. 24 
was on the air concurrently with the larger public discussion of torture as an intelligence-
gathering tool, and it clearly argued for a particular vision of torture as “good entertainment.”  
Of course, spy fiction is too large a genre to argue that all of it aligned during the mid-
2000s with 24 in its depictions of torture. In fact, there are plenty of anti-torture messages, 
especially in regards to physical torture, to be found in spy fiction of the time-period, from the 
pulpy (TV’s Burn Notice), to the expected (John le Carré’s A Most Wanted Man), to the literary 
(Viet Thanh Nguyen’s Pulitzer-Prize winning novel The Sympathizer).83 These anti-torture 
                                                 
82 Bauer never tortures someone who actually doesn’t know anything, or a true innocent, in 
another near-mythical assertion of the usefulness of torture. 
83 These refutations of torture are often phrased very similarly; here is Burn Notice’s protagonist 
Michael Westen: “A lot of people's first instinct when they need information out of a captive is 
to grab a baseball bat or a gun... The fact is, torture is for sadists and thugs. It's like getting 
groceries with a flame thrower; it doesn't work and it makes a mess” and here is the 
Sympathizer’s agent Claude: “Brute force is not the answer gentlemen, if the question is how to 
extract information and cooperation. Brute force will get you bad answers, lies, misdirection, or, 
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messages have different thematic roles; for example, in Burn Notice and A Most Wanted Man, 
Michael Westen’s and Gunther Bachmann’s (respective) anti-torture stances mark them as the 
“good spies” in contrast to their enemies, whereas Claude’s proscription that physical torture 
doesn’t work in the Sympathizer spurs him (and his students) to use increasingly more terrifying 
methods of psychological torture. However, what these anti-(physical)torture messages fail to 
counter-act is the feeling of catharsis that an audience can feel watching “the bad guy” suffer and 
the “good guy” win. Spy fiction that glorifies torture, such as 24, draw upon masculinist, racist, 
and imperialist tropes, for example “bad guy=brown, good guy=white” and “real men are 
violent” to set up the torture scene as a morality play, ending with the release of strategic 
information by the tortured as a confession of their sin and an affirmation of the rightness of the 
torturer and the institutions and cultural structures they serve—the CIA, the U.S. military, the 
U.S., the West, etc. Defenses of actual torture being committed by U.S. personnel as justifiable 
catharsis have been made by torture apologists such as Rush Limbaugh, who remarked in 
reference to Abu Ghraib and the Military Police abuses there that “I’m talking about people 
having a good time, these people [the MPs], you ever heard of emotional release?” (Nelson 63). 
This kind of defense of torture, whether offered by 24 or a talking head, upholds the pernicious 
idea that the body of the Other is the body that can and should be tortured for the benefit of the 
Self, the nation. As Brig. Gen. Finnegan tried to warn 24’s producers, when a nation as a whole 
believes this, the possibilities and actualities of cruelty in the day to day operations of the 
intelligence world multiply exponentially. Phillip Zelikow, who served on President Bush’s 
National Security Council, provides us with a glimpse of an executive branch that feels it has a 
                                                 
worse yet, will get you the answer the prisoner thinks you want to hear. He will say anything to 
stop the pain.” (“Comrades”; Nguyen 169) 
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public mandate to torture enemies of the state; instead of debating the efficacy and morality of 
torture, Zelikow says, the Bush administration was only interested in legality: “‘The focus, that 
is, was not on ‘what we should do’ but on ‘what can we do.’” (qtd. Danner 542). The answer 
was, as we know now, the dehumanization of prisoners, the creation of enemies abroad, and yet 
another mark of shame in the history of intelligence work. President Trump has vowed a return 
to these practices, saying that he will “bring back a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding,” an 
opinion in direct conflict with his military and security advisers and all the evidence and hard 
lessons of the past fifteen years (O’Toole). Clearly, the public and media cannot sit by and idly 
let this happen. Spy fiction, including the new revival of 24, must also play a part, perhaps by 
showing the consistent failures of torture as a means of intelligence gathering. 
Technophilia, SIGINT, and the Attack on Privacy 
 The ethics of our intelligence services engaging in systematic torture of prisoners has 
been one of the two most public intelligence news stories since 9/11. The other is undoubtedly 
the exposure of the NSA’s domestic surveillance program and the capacity of intelligence 
agencies to collect and analyze all electronic personal communications both domestic and 
international.84 Perhaps though we should not be all that surprised at these allegations, first 
revealed by whistleblowers Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden (among others who acted as 
whistleblowers within the intelligence world). Spy services may have paid lip service to the idea 
                                                 
84 Other candidates for top intelligence stories include the rise of drone warfare, the militarization 
of the CIA, and the failure to find WMDs in Iraq. However, I would argue that the public at large 
has yet to wrestle with these developments in the same manner as torture and electronic 
surveillance. Despite their importance (I spend ample time on the first two over the next few 
chapters), they have not shifted the public discourse of espionage in the same way. The effects of 
drone warfare and intelligence agency militarization are not as immediately visible and visceral 
to the American public as torture allegations, which shock and appall, and electronic 
surveillance, which directly effects everyone who has ever sent an email or text message. 
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that “gentlemen do not read another gentleman’s mail” at their inception in the late 19th/early 20th 
centuries, but this has always been more spin than substance (Macrakis 379). The NSA’s long-
running and long-reaching PRISM program, which intercepted and stored the domestic phone 
records of every phone in the U.S., has been declared unconstitutional,85 but PRISM is in many 
ways only the tip of the iceberg of the intelligence community’s commitment to electronic 
surveillance and signals intelligence (radio, satellite, wiretapping). From tapping East German 
phone lines in a secret tunnel under Berlin to PRISM, the CIA, FBI, and NSA have made 
gathering and interpreting information electronically a cornerstone of its practice. In fact, 
SIGINT is a growth industry. As I mentioned in the introduction to these two chapters, as of 
2013, the CIA’s total budget was $14.7 billion, of which over half was devoted solely to SIGINT 
(and of course, the NSA entirely focuses on SIGINT) (Grey 274). Really, the shift to SIGINT 
makes a certain kind of sense. SIGINT is a computer-age extension of the same simplification 
and abstraction impulses that scholar James Scott argues led the state’s bureaucratic 
development. As Scott writes, “the only way to accomplish [the governing of a modern state] is 
to reduce an infinite array of detail to a set of categories that will facilitate summary descriptions, 
comparisons, and aggregation” (Scott 77). Scott lists census data, mapping efforts, cadastral lists, 
etc. as the tools of simplification and surveillance for the modern state, a list that I think can now 
be expanded in the computer age to include phone meta-data, GPS tracking, Facebook posts and 
intercepted emails. SIGINT allows intelligence agencies to map connections and relationships 
between individuals and groups without tipping off anyone in that group that they are being 
surveilled. This is undoubtedly an advantage to an espionage agency. Scholar Kristie Macrakis 
writes that proponents of SIGINT in the intelligence community are quick to harp on this and 
                                                 
85 http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/16/justice/nsa-surveillance-court-ruling/ 
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other advantages of using technical means of intelligence-gathering over relying solely on human 
agents: “Advocates of technical intelligence often argue that machines are less risky than 
humans: they do not lie, spend time in prison when caught, or betray their country. Because they 
do not possess a long list of human weaknesses, they also cannot be persuaded to betray their 
own country by the enemy” (380). Given the number of double agents highly placed in both U.S. 
and British intelligence over their histories, one can imagine why this might be compelling. 
Lastly, intelligence agencies may be bolstered in their use of wide-reaching SIGINT technology 
by the seeming lack of outrage among the public whenever they are caught. Though public 
outcry over PRISM did lead to its day in court, the outrage has seemingly faded, leading to a 
slow creep by our intelligence agencies back towards the power and practices that they 
ostensibly abandoned post-Snowden.86  
 Reasons for a lack of sustained public outrage are numerous. Perhaps a culture that shares 
so much of itself with strangers online is not overly concerned with a few more strangers looking 
in.87 Or, maybe, recent intrusions by Russian state-sponsored hackers on our political institutions 
provide a strong impetus to bolster our own cyber-security and cyber-warfare divisions for 
defense and retaliation (Kelly). The Soviets prized themselves on being better at HUMINT and 
leaving SIGINT to the West, and, as far as the public record corroborates, the KGB held a 
distinct advantage throughout the Cold War when it came to turning double agents and extracting 
                                                 
86 For example, the Obama administration in January 2017 ok’d an expansion in who the NSA 
can share their collected information with, once again setting up the framework for the kind of 
inter-agency collusion that caused Edward Snowden to come forward in the first place: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/politics/nsa-gets-more-latitude-to-share-intercepted-
communications.html 
87 This was the explanation given to me by my class of undergraduates while teaching a unit on 
SIGINT in my history of espionage class. They did not feel they had anything to “hide” and were 
unswayed by my arguments that privacy is a foundation of personality, and that they might want 
safer spaces to explore their identity and beliefs without the NSA or FBI monitoring them. 
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sensitive information from blackmailing schemes (Mackrakis 379). However, Putin’s Russia has 
bolstered its SIGINT capacity and activity considerably. It would not be the first time that an 
intelligence agency seizes upon an actual threat as a reason to expand its own power base, and 
given the Russian interference was targeted to help Donald Trump gain the Presidency, liberals 
may find themselves swayed to the intelligence community’s cause in this situation in order to 
prevent it from happening again. I expect that the hostility between the President and the 
intelligence community over Russia might make for some strange bedfellows, and increased 
support for cyber-monitoring among the center-left could be one result; or perhaps, in an effort to 
save face, the right will swing back and encourage a cyber-war with Russia. Finally, public 
apathy towards systematic, warrantless domestic and international surveillance may come in part 
from a feeling akin to the one expressed by agent Tom Braden in a Saturday Evening Post article 
after Encounter magazine88 was revealed to be CIA-funded: “I’m glad the CIA is immoral” 
(Barnhisel 139). This attitude, encouraged by intelligence agencies, tacitly agrees with the 
assertion made by former intelligence officials Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks that:  
[t]he intelligence profession, because of its lofty “national security” goals, is free 
from all moral restrictions. There is no need to wrestle with technical legalisms or 
judgments as to whether something is right or wrong. The determining factors in 
secret operations are purely pragmatic: Does the job need to be done? Can it be 
done? And can secrecy (or plausible denial) be maintained? (Cawelti and 
Rosenberg 15) 
SIGINT collection seems at first glance relatively harmless an intrusion in exchange for 
increased national security. This might be especially true for those who feel that the state already 
                                                 
88 The non-Communist leftist literary and policy magazine run in part by Stephen Spender.  
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works for them, those who have not had to deal with the consequences of increased surveillance 
and policing in their communities (i.e. those who possess the racial/ethnic/class/sexuality etc. 
privileges that allow them to feel protected, instead of targeted, by state power).89 These are all 
compelling attitudes and beliefs capable of shaping the cultural discourse of espionage in general 
and SIGINT in particular. But I suggest there is another factor that has tailored how the public 
interprets and responds to the growing role of SIGINT in intelligence and the revelations that the 
technical tools of espionage have been used indiscriminately (including against US citizens) 
under a national security mandate. This factor is, as I’m sure comes as no surprise, how spy 
fiction, film, and TV have engaged with SIGINT, a relation I now turn to in order to explain how 
representations of SIGINT have conditioned the public to accept its rise in intelligence as 
inevitable, if not always desired.  
 Spy fiction, at least, as a genre claiming to represent the world of espionage, shares both 
its intended subject’s (espionage) and its original cultural moment’s (modernism) fascination 
with technology. Given that spy agencies, spy fiction, and literary modernism are roughly 
contemporaneous in their historical genesis, some overlap is inevitable. John Buchan’s obsession 
with planes, trains, cars, the telegraph and the radio in the Richard Hannay books can be 
analyzed in terms of the early 20th century fascination for speed, steel, and the marriage of 
machine and man. Over the course of the 20th century, spy agencies have shown that they share 
spy authors’ fascination with technology, sometimes to strange and/or counter-productive ends. 
                                                 
89 There is a moment in the documentary CitizenFour in which a segment of a CNN program 
discussing Edward Snowden and surveillance is shown. The news ticker at the bottom mentions 
the at the time on-going George Zimmerman trial for the shooting of Trayvon Martin. I 
remember thinking upon seeing that juxtaposition that perhaps the Snowden revelations might 
trigger an awareness in the general public of the feeling of being constantly surveilled, 
something with which many minority groups are all too familiar.  
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For an example, the CIA once surgically implanted microphones into stray cats in the hope that 
they would pass close enough to the Soviet embassy in Washington for the agency to listen in to 
the goings on inside (Macrakis 382). Ventures like this one, as ill-conceived as it was, did not 
dampen the enthusiasm for technical spying. Nor has the argument that an over-reliance on 
SIGINT undermines the ability of a spy organization to gather reliable HUMINT and to place 
agents strategically in “enemy” organizations. This critique, made by many within the official 
spy community, like former National Security Advisor Brent Snowcroft, and by many outside 
the spy community, like, as we will see, John le Carré, have fallen on deaf ears (Grey 10). By the 
end of the 1970s, the head of the CIA (Adm. Stansfield Turner) was proclaiming that technical 
spying “all but eclipses traditional, human methods of collecting intelligence” (Grey 3). 
Historians of intelligence agencies such as Stephen Grey, Tim Weiner, and Kristie Macrakis 
identify the expansion of SIGINT from Eisenhower to the present day as the expression of a kind 
of “technophilia” within the intelligence community. I argue that this technophilia is not separate 
from the ways technology operates within spy fiction. Increasing technological capability in 
actual espionage has changed how characters within spy fiction do their jobs, and allowed for 
new plots and characters to take shape in response to new technologies. Conversely, the 
metaphoric and aesthetic importance of technology in spy fiction can influence the larger 
discourse of actual espionage, shaping beliefs and practices around the use and efficacy of 
technological systems in spycraft.  
The metaphorical role of technology in spy fiction is described by critic Alan Hepburn as 
a kind of prosthetic, an extension of the capabilities of the agent and the agency, “dispers[ing] 
masculine authority by extending it through space and time” (210). Thus the human ear becomes 
the listening device, the eye the remote camera. Hepburn’s analysis depends upon an earlier 
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substitution: that the agent in spy fiction is a metaphoric reflection of the agency that produces 
him (or her, but mostly a lot of hims). Thus, the agency finds its personification in the agent, and 
the agent finds his metonymization in his tech. Bond’s Walther PPK pistol is inseparable from 
his purpose within MI6; the listening equipment with which Stasi officer Wiesler in The Lives of 
Others uses to spy on his targets becomes so associated with his character that the central moral 
conflict of the film becomes “will Wiesler cease to be the Stasi’s ear by putting down the 
headset?”, or, in other words, can the human come out from behind the technological device that 
makes him a spy. 
 
Figure 6: Wiesler the Conflicted Ear from The Lives of Others 
Even when a work seems to be pitting the solitary, skilled, cunning spy against the technological 
agency hunting him down—a situation which might be read as an endorsement of a Luddite 
point of view—technology still accomplishes its second metaphorical role: as a symbol of the 
omnipresent and omniscient capability of the spy agency. Alan Hepburn recognizes this in the 
plot of the 1971 novel The Day of the Jackal, in which the titular assassin, a clever and 
dangerous man, is ultimately foiled because the agencies chasing him use the semi-visible power 
of technology to see through his disguises and bluffs: tapping phone lines reveals that the 
villainous Jackal has a mole on the council tasked with hunting him, databases make sorting 
through the Jackal’s assumed IDs quickly possible, cameras force him to abandon the costumes 
he wears before he can exploit their full potential. Had Hepburn wished to expand his analysis, 
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he could have found parallels throughout the history of the genre, from Hannay trying to hide 
from a surveillance plane in The 39 Steps, to Jason Bourne being identified from across the 
world by a bank camera in The Bourne Identity, to the two most recent Bond films, Skyfall and 
Spectre, which both find 007 struggling to assert his relevancy in an intelligence landscape that 
prioritizes drones and internet data collection. While authors may mine conflict between the 
human agent and the technical world that entraps him for plot-related drama, more often than 
not, any existential friction between a heroic spy protagonist, such as Bond or Bourne, and the 
technological capability of a changing espionage landscape gets resolved. In other words, few 
works conclude with a Luddite point of view, fully endorsing a retreat from technical espionage. 
For example, Bond’s antagonists are generally more technologically capable than he, especially 
in the new, Daniel Craig-led films: Javier Bardem’s villainous Silva from Skyfall is a master 
hacker, and Spectre reimagines long-time Bond bad guy Ernst Blofeld as a network surveillance 
whiz, played by Christoph Waltz. Ostensibly, these films pit the low-tech, uber-masculine Bond 
against a high-tech menace that he can’t simply punch or shoot into submission. But those battle 
lines are blurrier than they first appear. Despite the Daniel Craig Bond’s penchant for angst and 
loner-ism, the character is fundamentally a team player, so much so that Craig’s Bond learning 
he can’t do it alone structures the arc of his character development, starting with his isolation 
after the death of Vesper in Casino Royale and culminating in his acceptance of the people in 
MI6 as his family and his retirement from the business of MI6 to romance Dr. Madeline Swann 
at the end of Spectre. Bond’s team in Skyfall and Spectre supplements his own technological 
inefficiency, especially in the person of Q, played by Ben Whishaw.  
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Figure 7: Ben Whishaw as Q from Skyfall 
Figure 7 demonstrates both the intended appeal of the new Q and his role in the franchise. Bond 
stands off to the side, useless here in the technical domain. But he looks on approvingly at Q. 
Critic Claire Hines identifies the new Q as emblematic of a new kind of masculinity—one that 
shows technical expertise, but is also polished, urban, hip, and unafraid to demonstrate traits 
traditionally coded as feminine.90 Hines argues that Q supplements Bond as a symbol of 
masculinity, in that the film’s willingness to place Q as the necessary missing piece in Bond’s 
MI6 can also be read as a tacit acknowledgment that the masculinity Bond represents is 
incomplete without its softer, less aggressive and less aggressively heterosexual supplement. 
Hines’ argument about Q, as compelling as it is in regards to the changing nature of masculinity 
in the Daniel Craig Bond films as opposed to Fleming’s original stories or the Connery version, 
elides the surface-level observation that the new Q also supplements Bond as a technological 
expert (in the plot), as evidenced by his introductory scene in Skyfall. The scene takes place in a 
museum. Bond gazes at a painting of a battleship from the Napoleonic Wars being hauled away 
for scrap by a steamship when Q [whom Bond has not yet met in this iteration] sits by him. The 
following conversation ensues: 
                                                 
90 In her paper “‘Now Pay Attention 007’: The New Q, Contemporary Masculinity, and the Bond 
Franchise” delivered at the “Spies on British Screens” conference, June 17, 2016.  
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Q: Always makes me feel a bit melancholy. Grand old warship being 
ignominiously hauled away for scrap…the inevitability of time, don’t you think? 
What do you see? 
B: A bloody big ship. Excuse me. [Makes to leave] 
Q: 007…I’m your new quartermaster.  
B: You must be joking 
Q: Why, because I’m not wearing a lab coat? 
B: Because you still have spots. 
Q: My complexion is hardly relevant. 
B: Your competence is. 
Q: Age is no guarantee of efficiency. 
B: Youth is no guarantee of innovation. 
Q: Well, it has it, I can do more damage on my laptop sitting in my pajamas 
before my first cup of Earl Grey than you can do in a year in the field. 
B: So why do you need me? 
Q: Every now and then a trigger needs to be pulled. 
B: Or not pulled. It’s hard to know which in your pajamas…Q. 
Q: 007. [They shake hands] 
This conversation is as succinct a demonstration of spy fiction’s compromise between human 
agency and the lure of technophilia as one could imagine. Bond’s worth as a human agent is not 
being contrasted to Q’s technical espionage here. Rather, the two men and the approaches to 
espionage they represent (technophilia and covert action) are supplemental to each other. Bond’s 
job is to be a smart triggerman, drawing on his own agency and world experience—his 
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HUMINT—whereas Q’s SIGINT and technical sabotage does the day-to-day damage of 
espionage. Both need each other, Bond as the physical executor of Q’s computer code. The 
gadgets Q hands to Bond at the end of this scene—a gun and a radio side by side in a case—
mirrors Bond (the “gun”) and Q (the “radio”) sitting side by side and their equal partnership in 
espionage. Q’s engagement in electronic surveillance, hacking, etc. are essential to the success of 
Bond and the MI6 he represents. Like Bourne’s reliance on rogue CIA computer analyst Nicky 
Parsons, Bond’s reliance on Q shows the genre’s embrace of technology as a kind of 
inevitability. It simply isn’t possible, even for the best (fictional) spies in the world, to engage in 
espionage without tech support. I argue that the pleasantry and amicable bantering characteristic 
of Q’s and Bond’s partnership (or Bourne’s and Parson’s, or Gibb’s and Abbie’s from NCIS, 
etc.) does some ideological smoothing over of the truly disruptive history and potential of 
technical espionage and its symbiotic relationship with violent covert action. Moreover, this 
smoothing out is happening in how technophilia is portrayed in spy fiction, and I mean portrayed 
as both text and subtext, explicitly and implicitly. Thus, an analysis of the 
metaphoric/supplemental relation between tech and agent misses some of this presentation; in 
order to catch it, we must focus on the aesthetics of technology within the genre. 
My use of “aesthetic” to describe an argument about appearances and surfaces in spy 
fiction may seem out of place, but part of what I am presenting is indeed the idea that 
appearances, in the sense of beauty and judgments of beauty, matter in a cultural discourse. 
Advertisement is built on the principle that ideas can take on some of their luster from the 
glamour of their aesthetic packaging, and as I have been and will continue to argue, intentionally 
or not the spy genre can advertise for a certain kind of espionage practice, agent, or agency. And 
so it is significant to note that the characters who embody this tech-support espionage are near 
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universally portrayed as young and attractive, and that this, perhaps inadvertently, makes the idea 
of cyber-surveillance uncomfortably sexy: 
     
Figure 8: Ben Whishaw from Skyfall, Julia Stiles from The Bourne Supremacy, Alicia Vikander 
from Jason Bourne, and Kit Harrington from Spooks—Who wouldn’t want to be spied upon by 
them? 
Undoubtedly, the decision to cast young and attractive people as tech-savvy spies has more to do 
with the “young and attractive” part than the “spies” part. In other words, I doubt the film 
industry has a specific agenda to promote SIGINT as hip. Nevertheless, Hollywood’s desire to be 
successful in key demographics means putting the best looking computer experts ever on screen, 
fingers dancing effortlessly over keyboards. Bloodless, simple, easy. The spy film version of 
technological spycraft is aesthetically pleasing, incredibly effective, easy to do, and necessary for 
spy work, in the sense that the plot can’t move forward without it. While technological espionage 
is essential to intelligence work today may in fact be true to life—it is hard to imagine a real 
world spy agency being very successful while eschewing SIGINT entirely—the effect of the 
aestheticization of technological espionage as a whole is a normalization of data collection, 
surveillance, and privacy violation. SIGINT is not just shown as the usual practice of a spy 
agency (a portrayal which can inspire resistance), but as the cool and desirable practice of a spy 
agency. The desirableness of SIGINT is on full-display in Spooks, a U.K. television show 
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featuring a young cast of MI5 agents who use cutting-edge technological devices and 
surveillance techniques to save the day. The show clothes MI5 in the cultural language and 
aesthetic of Silicon Valley.91 Filming for the episodes makes good use of the London dock 
district, the “new” and modern London, for its backdrops and locales. Its characters are, like Ben 
Whishaw’s new Q, intentionally hip, attractive, and willing to “bend” the rules, both written and 
unwritten, in a manner that will accomplish the mission.  
 
Figure 9: An establishing shot from Spooks portraying the gleaming modernity of the Dock 
District, and the cast of Spooks season 1. 
While this inevitably, given it is a modern spy show,92 results in shootouts, Spooks prominently 
features technological surveillance, hacking, the creation of malware designed to exploit 
computer systems, and various other 21st century tools of the SIGINT trade. Spooks is 
entertaining, engaging, and very cool. But that is part of the discomfort Spooks and media like it 
engender in critics wary of how spy fiction can shape the cultural discourse of espionage. As an 
illustration, let’s contrast the design choices in Spooks with those in the recent film version of 
                                                 
91 Nor is it the only TV show to combine espionage plots with tech aesthetic; in the U.S., 
Scorpion is a similar, though worse, procedural in which attractive “geeks” use bleeding-edge 
tech to thwart terrorists, and a “hacker” character is pretty standard fare for any law-
enforcement/FBI procedural at this point (see CSI, NCIS, Criminal Minds, etc.).    
92 And thus well into the age in which violence and espionage have become inseparable in the 
public imagination. 
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Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, discussed earlier, and a pinnacle of (masterfully designed) 
intentional uncoolness. The aesthetic emphasis in Tinker, Tailor draws us in to the strategic 
mind-games and the relationships of the characters trapped within the brown-beige chessboard of 
the 1970s Circus; the cutting-edge aesthetic of Spooks inverts this, emphasizing a frictionless93 
kind of espionage, one in which tech, agent, and agency work together to operate at maximum 
efficiency. The computer monitors in Spooks are so omnipresent that they provide the lighting 
for some scenes. Technology becomes a character in its own right, an integral piece of the team. 
In Tinker, Tailor, the framing grids draw our eyes to and emphasize the totality of the characters 
playing the game within. In Spooks, the diffuseness of the electric glow provided by monitor 
screens transforms the main characters into hands and faces, seemingly parts of their 
sophisticated machines. Despite the fact that Tinker, Tailor and Spooks both date from the early 
21st century, their thematic thrusts are totally opposite: the former shows its 1970s origins as a Le 
Carré novel by being about the importance, and failures, of HUMINT, while Spooks’ lionization 
of SIGINT places it squarely in the current aesthetic of technological inevitability in espionage.   
Technological inevitability in spy fiction appears in another aesthetic location as well, 
namely, at the level of the “MacGuffin.” The term “MacGuffin” was popularized by director 
Alfred Hitchock, who describes it as a catch-all term for the plot device that sets a story in 
motion: “plans or documents…a secret, it doesn’t matter what it is” (Truffaut 138). Famous 
examples of MacGuffins in fiction, such as the Maltese Falcon or the Holy Grail (in either the 
Arthurian grail mythos or Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade), are generally items, but can, in 
                                                 
93 Another example of frictionless espionage: in the Bourne Identity the head of the CIA brags 
“Our transmissions equipment is literally instantaneous” as a way to convince the other heads of 
U.S. intelligence to entrust the job of finding Bourne to the CIA (Ludlum 255). Nothing is said 
about the suitability of the CIA for the task, and given their ultimate handling of the case, this 
becomes a costly oversight. 
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practice, be anything. The point, as Hitchcock points out, is not what the characters are chasing, 
but that whatever it is “be of vital importance to the characters” (138). The MacGuffin is thus 
treated as a kind of empty signifier, an aesthetic choice by the writer and/or director and prop 
designer, but not one meant to be thought very deeply about. However, that doesn’t mean we 
should not think shallowly about them. MacGuffins in spy fiction have become increasingly 
technical over the last century. From the beginning of spy fiction to the time of Hitchcock (who 
first talked about MacGuffins in the context of his adaptation of John Buchan’s The 39 Steps in 
1935), MacGuffins were plans—invasion plans, operation plans, sometimes technical plans for 
new battleships or aircraft. These choices match an era preparing once and then again for a world 
at war. But a spy agency is no longer solely a war-prevention service; as mentioned throughout 
this project, agencies are larger, more bureaucratic, more devious, more micro-managing, more 
segmented, better networked, better funded, and crueler than their architects could have 
imagined. Technological capability and organization have made this expansion of espionage (its 
aims, agencies, and abilities) possible. Also, the U.S. or U.K. being invaded by a large occupying 
force is no longer a cultural or political fear. Thus, given these changes in the structure of the 
intelligence agency and the cultural milieu it finds itself in, spy fiction has had to adapt its 
primary MacGuffin design in order to adhere to an assumed fidelity to the reality of espionage. 
The Mission: Impossible films provide excellent examples of the genre’s embrace of 
technological MacGuffins: in the first film Ethan Hunt is after a CD-ROM loaded with agent 
identities; in the third, he is after a technological doodad called the “rabbit’s foot” that the 
audience, in true MacGuffin fashion, never quite finds out what it does other than blink with 
LED lights; the fourth features a missing nuclear briefcase; and the fifth an electronic file ledger 
showing financial support for illegal espionage activities. Stolen computer files, superweapons, 
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and the various other technical MacGuffins of the Mission: Impossible films and beyond 
reinforce the aesthetics of technology within the genre, an aesthetic that portrays technology as 
the means and ends of spycraft. For the public watching these films or reading these stories—
especially those of us not privy to the day-to-day details of spy work—it becomes difficult to 
imagine espionage without its techy tools and gadgets. The use of technologically sophisticated 
and relevant MacGuffins make a spy story feel current—so current and up-to-date that the 
audience can feel “in the know” after having read or seen it. The striving to show the “very 
latest” aesthetics of technology is another technique to increase the perceived “realism” of the 
fantastical spy plot. But the effect of this aesthetic is to link espionage to a certain kind of 
unreality, an unreality in which the work of espionage is inseparable from the operation of 
technology. Frederic Jameson in his seminal work Post-Modernism identifies this unreality as 
the result of the difficulty for a work of art to accurately convey the networks of power, labor, 
control, and exploitation that undergird society:   
The technology of contemporary society is therefore mesmerizing and fascinating 
not so much in its own right but because it seems to offer some privileged 
representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more 
difficult for our minds and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentered 
global network of the third stage of capital itself. (37)   
The goal of the spy agency is precisely to grasp that network of power and control and then to 
influence it. This is a task bordering on the impossible, even when billions of dollars are spent on 
its execution. But it is possible in spy fiction. And so representations of technological mastery in 
the genre are in some sense creating the meta-fiction inherent in the espionage mindset: that 
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spying can be a solved game if only one possesses the right tools and toys. Technology is the 
solution to the problem of knowing one’s fellow man.  
 Much like the Bond-fantasy of covert action which I discuss in the next chapters, this 
idea, presented in fiction, has proven seductive for spy agencies. The two fantasies—covert 
action and technological supremacy—share some commonalities. For example, the most salient 
commonality is the idea that covert action and SIGINT are more effective and less risky than 
traditional human-intelligence gathering methods. Philosophically one can see an 
instrumentalism inherent in the shift of the secret agent to covert action; information-gathering 
does not produce the kind of instant result that covert action does, leading to an embrace of the 
latter by a bureaucratic structure in which promotions and privileges are tied to spectacular 
successes. The same instrumentalism is at work in the embrace of actual instruments as a 
perfected version of the human secret agent—technology promises more, better, faster and safer 
results than relying on all-too fallible humans. We can see that increasingly over the 20th century, 
manpower in espionage has been replaced by computing power. The Killian Committee’s 
recommendation to the U.S. Senate in the mid-1950s already hinted at this replacement ethos, as 
it concludes that conducting traditional espionage operations in the U.S.S.R. was too costly and 
difficult to maintain, and recommended increased use of satellite and spy plane reconnaissance 
instead (Weiner 113). This report fueled Eisenhower’s increased funding and enthusiasm for the 
NSA in order to create the premier intelligence agency capable of leading espionage into the 
fledgling computer age. In 1982, the Sunday Times ran an article on the GCHQ, Britain’s NSA 
equivalent, entitled “Exit Smiley, Enter IBM” (Knightley 374). A report on big data espionage in 
Afghanistan concluded that the DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) project 
Nexus 7, a 2011 program that collated and analyzed data submitted by informants on the ground 
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to predict terrorist activity, was accurate between 60 and 70 percent of the time (Weinberger). 
That’s not bad, as these things go, but to describe being accurate two-thirds of the time as 
“literally being able to predict the future”, as one intelligence official did, speaks to a culture of 
technophilia in which the newness of the idea behind the tech unduly influences its 
implementation and evaluation (qtd. in Weinberger). The CIA too has experimented with a 
similar project to Nexus 7, an Artificial Intelligence named KARNAC designed to do the work 
of HUMINT—“track leads, form hypotheses, narrow outcomes” and identify targets—faster and 
with less errors (Singer 277). Though less data is available about KARNAC than Nexus 7, even 
the program’s supporters admit it is not perfect; especially when fed inaccurate initial 
information, KARNAC jumps to a hasty conclusion, as many human agents have done before it. 
Clearly, big data and AI analyses have not brought a swift end to terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Syria, or Yemen. Nexus 7 was shuttered a little over a year after its implementation. Journalist 
Stephen Grey describes multiple cases of mistaken identity, bad geo-locating, and confused 
surveillance resulting from over-reliance on SIGINT and a lack of effort developing traditional 
HUMINT sources—sometimes with fatal ends, as in the case of Afghan Parliament member 
Zabet Amanullah, who was erroneously identified as a terrorist by a SIGINT algorithm and 
subsequently killed. But chillingly, the failures of Nexus 7, KARNAC and other AI pattern-
recognition systems has not dampened enthusiasm for such projects. Setbacks—whether the 
fizzling out of Nexus 7, cases of mistaken identity as in the case of Zabet Amanullah, the 
misidentification by electronic surveillers and subsequent drone bombing of a market convoy 
(discussed in Ch. 5), or the immediate backlash to the Snowden revelations of domestic 
surveillance—scarcely seem to give pause to our intelligence officials. Grey writes that in the 
culture of modern intelligence, “Cool gadgets and smart techniques inspired awe and a 
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confidence that was comparable to religious zeal” (Grey 209). Likewise, journalist and foreign 
policy expert Noah Shactman warns that “instead of us telling machines where to go, it is 
increasingly machines telling us” (Singer 109). In other words, intelligence agencies, like lay 
audiences, seem to find the spy-fiction fantasy of total knowledge through technology highly 
prescriptive and persuasive. 
SIGINT continues to grow in proportion to other espionage activity. This despite few 
unquestionable successes94 and much criticism. This criticism comes from both inside and 
outside the espionage industry, and takes two primary forms: overreliance on SIGINT erodes the 
more crucial ability of spy agencies to develop HUMINT, and that digital espionage threatens 
civil rights and liberties. The former criticism begins with U.S. National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft’s warnings that the CIA was getting worse at human intelligence in 1994 (Grey 10). 
Journalist Stephen Grey points out that “getting worse at human intelligence” means losing 
something fundamental to espionage work: cultural and regional understanding. Given state-
sponsored espionage’s origin in map rooms, museums, traveling diplomats, undercover 
geographers, and Orientalists, cultural knowledge has held a central place in intelligence 
analysis, used for determining potential allies in the region, plotting out possible consequences 
and power vacuums of covert actions, recruiting “runners” and other local “assets” to go where 
foreign spies cannot, etc. Proponents of SIGINT may claim that cultural knowledge is not 
objective, that human agents can be duped whereas recorded phone calls stand for themselves, or 
that the CIA, or any other agency for that matter, should not bother itself with local concerns but 
only with their overarching goals and objectives. Other critics of cultural embeddedness and 
                                                 
94 Probably the biggest SIGINT triumph is that spy satellite SIGINT allowed the U.S. to count the 
U.S.S.R.’s nuclear missile launch sites, allowing for a more accurate negotiation process in the 
signing of the nuclear disarmament SALT and START agreements (Andrew 328). 
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network-building HUMINT might argue that it is little more than manipulation, done by pseudo-
experts who bring in their own bias and thirst for results to vulnerable populations. Electronics 
are cleaner, this line of thinking goes, less opportunities for human messiness to interfere. There 
is undoubtedly some wisdom in this—especially given the CIA’s penchant to use local forces to 
fight their battles for them, often to disastrous results for those local forces (for example, in 
Cambodia during the Vietnam war) or in the long term for the U.S. (for example, arming the 
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan). But as mentioned above, machines err, and interpreters of 
machines err by having ingrained or implicit cultural bias in their interpretations of 
electronically-gathered data. An outsized faith in the “objectivity” of SIGINT is more 
technophilia than fact. Former MI6 agent Sir Alastair Crooke warns that the shift to SIGINT and 
espionage-at-a-distance dehumanizes the people on the ground, reducing them to meta-data and 
blips on a screen that are at best inessential and at worst expendable (Grey 242). Likewise, U.S. 
Army Lt. Col. John Nagl warns that without human connection and relationships on the 
ground—i.e. in the theaters of conflict in the world—lasting peace in the age of international 
terror groups is impossible:  
Counterinsurgency is a long, slow process that requires the integration of all 
elements of national power—military, diplomatic, economic, financial, 
intelligence, and informational—to accomplish the tasks of creating and 
supporting legitimate host governments that can then defeat the insurgency that 
afflicts them…It cannot be done long-distance or over croissants and lattes in 
teak-lined rooms. It is done in the dirt, over chai, conversation, and mutual 
understanding. (Singer 214-215) 
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As he is a counter-terrorism expert, Lt. Col. Nagl may not be surprised that one of those 
international terror groups agrees with him. Al Qaeda produces white papers and other 
documents analyzing weaknesses in Western intelligence agencies, and primarily lists a lack of 
willingness to do the ground-network HUMINT building, an overreliance and potentially 
exploitable faith in technological surveillance, a lack of Arabic translators, operatives, and 
double agents, and a bureaucratic emphasis on quantitative results (Grey 185). Lt. Col. Nagl 
might be more surprised to find that WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange also considers the 
intelligence community’s increasing reliance on technology to spell doom for the long-term 
future of these organizations, though not for the same reasons. Assange argues that digital 
espionage requires the hiring of people (such as Edward Snowden) who are skilled in computer 
use, and fluent with the culture of the Internet, and that “this means they are hiring our moles 
[i.e. those willing to leak information on principle] in vast numbers” (Hedges 182). Assange 
predicts an internal collapse in an intelligence apparatus plagued by constant leaks and internal 
sabotage made more damaging by the expansion and dependence on technical espionage. 
Historically, there are three spurs for double agency: money, blackmail, and ideology. Assange’s 
argument—that a computer-literate, Internet-educated, millennial spy force will not share as 
absolutely the ideology of the CIA and NSA higher-ups that employ them—may be in the 
process of proving correct, given the culture of leaks and reveals throughout this decade, from 
Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden to the Clinton email fiasco to the daily drip of 
embarrassing details from the Trump administration.  Journalist Jenna McLaughlin identifies the 
intelligence system’s dependence on contract labor as one reason why leaks have become more 
prevalent: “In recent years, the intelligence community has largely failed to detect insider threats 
and stem leaks from contractors. Thousands of private companies and their employees make up a 
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massive percentage of the intelligence community’s workforce. As of a decade ago, about 70 
percent of the intelligence community’s budget was spent on contracts, according to the 
Congressional Research Service.” A recent leak of NSA and CIA hacking tools prompted one 
former cyberintelligence official to opine that “[t]here really isn’t a never-ending supply of tools 
and techniques. I don’t know if our SIGINT [signals intelligence] ability will recover from this 
for decades. I mean that with deadly seriousness” (qtd. in McLaughlin). The SIGINT agencies 
are facing a serious loss in trusted and well-vetted manpower through contractor work and a loss 
of capability because of constant leaks and a lack of innovation. This might be less worrying, or 
even positive, were our espionage system not structured to be so weighted in favor of electronic 
surveillance.  
SIGINT, touted as making espionage less risky due to the removal of the human factor, 
alienates the people (both the spies and the spied upon) impacted by espionage. This alienation 
breeds risks—risks that those caught without cause in the wide net of surveillance will not trust 
the intelligence apparatus, risks that overconfidence in a so-called objective espionage will lead 
to error, risks that reliance on computer networks opens up sensitive information to hacking and 
leaking. However, it is difficult to imagine the proverbial genie returning to the bottle in this 
case. Disagreements on whether the intelligence community’s focus on SIGINT has an outsized 
prominence compared to the necessities of continuing long-term HUMINT are in a sense 
disagreements over what constitutes the architecture of state power in the 21st century. Critics 
that decry the seeming abandonment of the practice of developing HUMINT networks argue that 
people are still making political and military decisions, and knowing, influencing or coercing 
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those people is crucial to the job of an intelligence agency to protect national interest.95 But the 
knowledge of digital infrastructure and the electronic exchange of information are arguably more 
valuable now than a knowledge of the railroads of a foreign land, precisely because knowing 
how people communicate allows direct mapping of human networks. It is as if the unconscious 
desire of the spy agency—a desire to become the all-seeing eye, which it has had since its 
inception as a cultural construct and political reality in the late 19th century—is finally possible. 
Before the digital age, intelligence depended on inference and gauging the reliability and 
trustworthiness of the relationships between human agents (in both the official sense of agent and 
in the sense of agentive human beings). The desire to know without guesswork, without having 
to depend on potentially uncontrollable others has proven to be an especially intoxicating desire 
for an organization that is primed already to believe itself to be the guarantor of safety and 
security for millions of people.  
I argue that spy fiction fuels this desire in its assumed role as the mirror of the profession. 
Looking into this mirror shows a gleaming, frictionless, sexy, effective surface, a world in which 
technological superiority aligns with both moral and political superiority—a world in which the 
good guys use good gadgets to stop the bad guys. Spy fiction melds technological superiority 
with heroic derring-do, as the complicated and decidedly mixed record of real-life SIGINT bows 
to the pressures of the genre to deliver escapism, if not always a happy ending. Even writers who 
are critical of the technophilia of the intelligence community, such as Graham Greene, can blunt 
their own criticisms when trying to balance character, plot, and moral. Our Man in Havana 
                                                 
95 Note how different this mission is than President Truman’s “secret news service” blueprint for 
the CIA. That an intelligence agency’s remit requires interference and involvement in 
international affairs is taken for granted in this debate, even by some who ought to know better 
by now.   
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portrays MI6 as technical dilettantes, eager and anxious over technology’s changing role in 
espionage and in geopolitical struggles to the point of absurdity: they are unable to tell vacuum 
parts from weapons of mass destruction because they desperately want evidence of the latter. 
However, Greene’s disdain for taking his former profession seriously and his decision to 
subsume the espionage plot to a love story (with a love story happy ending) between Wormold 
and Beatrice turns possible vitriol into bemused scoffing. Oliver Stone’s recent film Snowden 
offends similarly, unfortunately. Stone chooses to make Edward Snowden (played by Joseph 
Gordon Levitt) into a spy hero, focusing the tension of the film on the question of 1) whether he 
will get caught, which is a source of ineffective tension given that the audience knows he did 
not96 and 2) whether his relationship with his girlfriend will survive his work with the NSA and 
his betrayal of them. In lionizing his subject and attempting to use the same cinematic language 
as more conventional genre fare in order to draw in his audience, Stone ends up making the 
revelation of the largest domestic surveillance apparatus history has ever known incidental and 
kind of boring. The impulse Greene and Stone have, to tell a human story97 in the face of an 
increasingly inhuman (because technophilic) and inhumane (because cruel) espionage agency, is 
an understandable one. But there is a key difference between telling a human story about spies 
and telling a story that argues for the re-centering of the human—human agents, human 
considerations, human ethics, human relationships—in espionage work.  
                                                 
96 One scene that illustrates this pseudo-tension is when Snowden is leaving his NSA facility with 
the stolen files on a small drive he has hidden inside a Rubix cube. Snowden must pass through 
an X-ray machine to leave, which will pick up the drive. The scene is shot and scored to 
maximize audience tension, but we know the outcome already—he is going to get away with the 
drive—so it falls flat. 
97 By this, I mean a story that valorizes humanistic qualities—agency, human emotion (especially 
love and romance), community, etc. 
 179 
If one wished truly to tear up the stitching that spy fiction has done in portraying 
espionage as inseparable from technological inevitability, one must do the latter of these. And 
this means making a work that potentially makes one’s audience uncomfortable. Perhaps the best 
example of someone doing this in the genre is le Carré’s A Most Wanted Man, discussed earlier. 
It is a savagely critical book, and its refusal to resolve in a way comforting to its audience makes 
its anti-bureaucracy, anti-technocracy, anti-cruelty stance more jarring. Gunther Bachmann is 
spy fiction’s greatest advocate for HUMINT over SIGINT, and in one of his several lectures in 
the book, he lets the reader know it: 
[Bachmann] warned them that however many of the latest spies’ wonder toys they 
had in their cupboards, however many magic codes they broke and hot-signals 
chatter they listened to, and brilliant deductions they pulled out of the ether 
regarding the enemy’s organizational structures, or lack of them, and internecine 
fights they had, and however many tame journalists were vying to trade their 
questionable gems of knowledge for slanted tip-offs and something for the back 
pocket, in the end it was the spurned imam, the love-crossed secret courier, the 
venal Pakistani defense scientist, the middle-ranking Iranian military officer 
who’s been passed over for promotion, the lonely sleeper who can sleep alone no 
longer, who among them provide the hard base of knowledge without which all 
the rest is fodder for the truth benders, ideologues and politopaths who ruin the 
earth. (236) 
Bachmann is clear that he believes espionage to be a human-relations activity. But he is also 
ranting and raving on this point, shown by the text taking on the characteristics of a rant: 
appended clauses and phrases running on until they find their end in an insult. The implication 
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here is that Bachmann himself might be blinded by his own biases—and indeed, Bachmann, the 
HUMINT advocate, ultimately fails to realize how he and his team are being used by the 
colluding CIA and his own BND (German foreign intelligence) superiors.98 Bachmann ends the 
book alone, confused, and angry at a system that prioritizes the quantitative, instant results of 
black-bagging “terrorists” (though Issa is probably not one) to the development of human 
intelligence networks. Ironically, it is Bachmann’s own failure to develop relationships within 
his secret world, a difficulty for his arrogant and irritable personality type, which dooms his 
operation and most likely his career. Bachmann’s defeat at the end of the book, however, should 
not be read as an endorsement of the “wonder toys” that he decries in his speech. Better SIGINT 
would not have helped Bachmann convince an entrenched-in-its-mindset intelligence apparatus. 
But le Carré, unlike Bachmann, is skeptical that the tactical-ization of human relationships into 
HUMINT would have been any more beneficial. Bachmann may resent the CIA’s ideological 
predilection to turn people like Issa Karpov and Abdullah (the philanthropist/financial backer) 
into a quantifiable score—tick marks in the war on terror—but he is stymied by his own myopia 
in trying to turn them into assets. This is what separates AMWM from other critiques of 
technophilia in the spy genre; whereas Our Man in Havana and Snowden find redemption and 
resolution, and the possibility for happy endings, outside and apart from the secret world of 
espionage, le Carré wrestles with the possibility that the “outside”—a world in which espionage 
has no reach or loses its power—cannot exist in a world in which spy organizations are willing to 
place results over ethical and moral concerns. The problem isn’t merely the technology, even 
given its seductive visions of easy solutions to complicated problems; rather, it’s the espionage 
                                                 
98 As discussed earlier, this collusion becomes apparent to the reader, though not to Bachmann, in 
a joint intelligence briefing. Bachmann misses the non-verbal cues and shifts that would have 
tipped him off that his operation has been compromised. 
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mindset of those who wield that technology, those who see human behavior as something to be 
solved in the first place, which leads spies and spy agencies into trouble. The attitudes and 
beliefs of the Great Game are still with us, even as extraordinary rendition, torture, drone 
warfare, and all-encompassing surveillance have made that “Game” far less sporting for those of 
us who do not wish to be caught up in the espionage mindset—all of us who are unwilling 
players. 
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Chapter 4: Hannay, Burgess, and Bond: Drone Masculinity and the Making of the Modern 
Intelligence Agent 
 
On January 27, 2011, a former high school football star, U.S. Green Beret, and 
Blackwater contractor—Raymond Davis—shot and killed two Pakistani men on a street in 
Lahore. A car coming to help Davis killed a third man before driving off, leaving Davis to be 
arrested by Pakistani authorities. The U.S. State Department argued that Davis should be 
released under diplomatic immunity, while the Pakistani government insisted that diplomatic 
immunity did not apply to murder charges. Additionally, the Pakistani government openly 
questioned Davis’s role in the country, despite the Obama administration’s classification of him 
in public as a “diplomat.” As it turns out, the Pakistanis had ample reason to be suspicious. As 
journalist Mark Mazzetti puts it, Raymond Davis was much more than a state department 
employee; he was “the face of an American spy agency, the CIA, that has been transformed…No 
longer a traditional espionage service devoted to stealing the secrets of foreign governments, the 
CIA has become a killing machine” (Mazzetti 4). Despite widespread protests against Davis, the 
U.S., and the drone program in Pakistan—which Davis, as the acting CIA station chief in 
Lahore, helped to oversee99—Davis was released in March after the victims’ families were paid 
$2.4 million in monetary compensation from a source that Mazzetti indicates may have been 
                                                 
99 An arrangement made necessary because the U.S. is not in a declared state of war with 
Pakistan, thus making it illegal for the armed forces, such as the U.S. Air Force, to operate in the 
country, but the CIA faces no such legal barriers (in exchange for less legal protections should 
they get caught).  
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U.S. government-connected. Davis has since disappeared back into the intelligence apparatus 
that produced him.   
 The next two chapters chronicle the making of Raymond Davis within modern 
intelligence agencies. I argue that Davis has been recruited into, trained by, and promoted 
according to the standards of a new masculinity developed within intelligence agencies and 
Special Forces, one that I term “drone masculinity.” Like the paternalist discourse that critic 
Mary Renda identifies as operating in the U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915-1940)100, drone 
masculinity is a discursive formation, a cultural script reinforced not only by the institutional 
practices of intelligence agencies, but also by popular media—specifically for this chapter, but 
not exclusively, in spy fiction and film. Drone masculinity can be characterized by a belief in 
objectivity (as opposed to subjectivity) and in objective-based approaches to intelligence and 
war, a belief in the value of violence and aggression to protect national interests, and a 
willingness to subsume personal agency to a hierarchic and bureaucratic structure in exchange 
for cultural and sexual rewards. Drone masculinity is potent because it links fantasies of 
masculine id, of unfettered male agency, to state service and institutional bureaucracy. As a 
result, both violence and sexuality become matters of quantification, and high enough “scores” 
are rewarded by advancement within the system that promotes the drone masculine mindset. 
Drone masculinity as a term connotes the disposability of the human agent—the “drone”—as 
well as the cultural conditioning inherent in a cultural formation of masculinity that induces an 
individual to accept his position as disposable. The ethos of intelligence agencies that have 
embraced drone masculinity is one that is objectifying and aggressive, and prioritizes hierarchic 
and bureaucratic structure over the personal initiative and agency of intelligence workers. Drone 
                                                 
100 Discussed in the introduction to the dissertation. 
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masculinity is not the only available governing discursive formation for spy agencies and their 
relations to their agents, their superiors, their enemies, and their public; it is, in fact, a historical 
formation, one that drastically changed the role and function of intelligence agents and 
intelligence agencies in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
In this chapter I chronicle those changes in intelligence attitudes and practices. I show 
how these changes result in large part from the dominance of certain competing masculinities in 
spy fiction and intelligence work at various points in time, from the homosocial patriotism of the 
early twentieth century to the rise of drone masculinity in response to a crisis in masculinity and 
espionage after World War Two to the embrace of actual drone warfare in the early twenty-first 
century. Drone masculinity has its origins in a larger cultural discourse, in this case, the 
discourse of intelligence and espionage. In order to understand its origins in popular culture 
around mid-century, and its growth in power and influence throughout the latter half of the Cold 
War and the beginning of the War on Terror, we must delve in to the representations of 
intelligence agents across the twentieth century, and how those representations affected the 
public’s, and the intelligence world’s, conception of who spies are and what they do. Essential to 
my argument is that certain prevailing ideologies of masculinity have proved crucial in the lay 
population’s understanding of intelligence work and workers. For organizations that work in 
secret, what the public “knows” about their operations can serve as broad license or cover for a 
huge range of activities—as long as those activities can fit within the dominant cultural discourse 
of espionage. In other words, culture sets limits on what spies are “supposed” to do, and further 
what spies do inspires cultural actors and creators such as writers and filmmakers. This means a 
change in one affects the other; shifting cultural norms in espionage can change spy fiction, and 
changes in spy fiction can shift the boundaries of the practices of espionage. An integral piece of 
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the cultural discourse of espionage concerns the masculinity of the spy agent and spy agency. 
The particular dominant masculinity in the discourse of intelligence has changed considerably 
over the past century. The traits, behaviors, and attitudes that constitute masculinity are always 
contested terms within patriarchal structures. National intelligence and Special Forces, as 
patriarchal structures themselves, have been both shapers and subjects of these vacillations. 
Cultural figures, such as James Bond, influence or reinforce certain kinds of masculinities via 
imitation and idealization, and so a large portion of this chapter is devoted to the reciprocal 
relationship between the cultural and the organizational, and how both have been affected by 
changes in the concept (or concepts) of masculinity operating within the intelligence community 
at large. I begin by discussing the patriarchal, aristocratic homosociality of early intelligence 
agencies in the U.K. and its representation in the Richard Hannay stories of John Buchan. 
Having established that particular kind of gentlemanly masculinity as dominant in intelligence 
work and in conceptions of agents, I then tell the story of its decline, a process that happened 
over the course of the first half of the twentieth century and can be traced in the cultural figures 
of Oscar Wilde, T.E. Lawrence, W.H. Auden, and, finally, in the Cambridge Spies Guy Burgess, 
Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby. Drone masculinity was the replacement discursive script on 
hand once gentlemanly homosociality had worn out its welcome, and I end this chapter arguing 
that the outsized influence of James Bond has made many of the most culturally salient aspects 
of drone masculinity palatable to the public and to intelligence agencies, especially, and perhaps 
unexpectedly given Bond’s British origins, within the CIA. To demonstrate how drone 
masculinity functions, I analyze several Bond texts, including Casino Royale, From Russia with 
Love, and several short stories, while also showing how Bond’s popularity played out within the 
intelligence community. I then, in the next chapter, move to the consequences of drone 
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masculinity in modern day intelligence, first by discussing the growing role of covert action in 
espionage, and then by arguing that drone warfare is the technological fulfillment of drone 
masculinity for intelligence agencies that wish to remain aggressive and focused on violent 
covert action101 while at the same time removing as much human agency, and human error, as 
possible from spy work. Lastly, I conclude these two chapters with a kind of postscript—
readings of The Bourne Identity novel and film; John Le Carré’s classic novel Tinker, Tailor, 
Soldier, Spy; and John Banville’s The Untouchable. In this postscript, I hope to point to alternate 
masculinities within the genre of spy fiction that react to and contradict drone masculinity. This 
has two aims; the first is to show that the genre itself is not defined solely by its associations with 
drone masculinity. The second is to suggest that, given the power of fictional figures in the 
shaping of the spy as both a pop culture fixture and an operational agent in the past, perhaps spy 
fiction can influence the current climate of intelligence work to move beyond a culture of drone 
masculinity that has made it more aggressive, less accountable, and potentially less effective.  
The Public School Boy Goes to War: Buchan, Hannay, and Sandy Arbuthnot 
 When Jimmy Carter cut CIA funding in the 70s, the agency decried that it had been 
“emasculated” (Knightley 365). This turn of phrase draws upon a history of patriarchal power, 
nepotistic promotion, and self-mythologizing in the intelligence community that connected 
intelligence work to masculine authority. As we will see, masculinity is shorthand in the 
discourse surrounding espionage for trustworthiness and authorized or licensed agency—the 
presumptive ability to act in the best interests of the nation. But masculinity is a kind of moving 
target, a discursive formation that changes in its composition as social, cultural, public and 
political forces negotiate and renegotiate its terms.  When the “operational” (i.e. in use by those 
                                                 
101 Instead of human-intelligence network building. 
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that make up the power structure of the intelligence community) definition of masculinity is in 
flux, as it was at several moments over the course of the long twentieth century, the intelligence 
apparatus, having pinned its own legitimacy to that of the masculine authority of its constituent 
members, finds itself in crisis. The world of espionage, like the world of spy fiction that mirrored 
and shaped it, began as the terrain of aristocratic British gentlemen, for whom “gentlemanliness” 
itself was a kind of masculine authority tied to class, upbringing, education, and attitudes. 
Gentlemanliness was a protection against the charge of being a “spy,” an agent of the Other, a 
subversive person, a danger to the state. Gentlemen were scholars, experts, agents of the Empire, 
players of the Great Game. The lineage of this figure progresses from men both real and 
fictional: Richard Burton, Colonel Creighton from Kipling’s Kim, Alexander Burnes. These men 
were above reproach, because they controlled the mechanisms of reproach. The institutions 
which brokered social and political power—government, social clubs, secondary school, 
academia at large—in the U.K. in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries were deeply 
interconnected through the overlapping personal, homosocial relations of their members. In 
effect, membership in one of these institutions was membership in all of them, at least for a man 
who was known to be “one of us.” In the United States as well, according to historian Robert 
Dean, a similar notion of a “brotherhood” of privilege, power, “service,” and “sacrifice” was 
central to the “identity narrative” of the foreign policy establishment (13). Dean continues on: 
“[Brotherhood] is not simply a metaphorical use of language; it refers to a ritual pattern enacted 
in the course of an individual’s life in a sequence of sex-segregated institutions” (13). Critic Alan 
Sinfield also highlights the importance of sex-segregation and the “disciplining” of boys and 
young men who did not conform to the standard masculine roles expected of them in the U.K.’s 
public school system:  
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[T]he parting of boys from the women who were generally dominant in their 
childhood, and subjecting of them to systematic brutalization, were not the 
incidental price of a ‘good education’; they were the point. Thus boys might 
develop a man-to-man loyalty, and an insensitivity, suitable for the prevailing 
pattern of cross-sex relations,102 and for service to Britain’s imperial destiny, or in 
the law, administration, the army or business. (65) 
Sinfield’s analysis of the public school system makes clear that the homosocial relations amongst 
the governing class of the U.K. were the essential feature in an education fashioned for one over-
arching purpose: to run an empire. Formal intelligence agencies arose for the same purpose in the 
last decades of the 1800s and the first of the 1900s, and this branch of government service, like 
all others, was predicated on homosociality. But the history of espionage and of spy fiction make 
visible to us the constant anxiety within this ruling apparatus over what it considered the most 
dangerous corruption of this homosociality: homosexuality. Eve Sedgwick’s Between Men and 
Epistemology of the Closet investigate the relationship between these homosocial institutions and 
homosexuality, and also interrogates the reaction-formation against that linkage on the part of 
soi-disant heterosexual social agents and institutions. She argues that “because the paths of male 
entitlement, especially in the nineteenth century, required certain intense male bonds that were 
not readily distinguishable from the most reprobated bonds, an endemic and ineradicable state 
of…male homosexual panic became the normal condition of male heterosexual entitlement,” 
(Epistemology 185).  Exclusion of homosexuals and the fear that they might be infiltrating the 
highest level of power to advance their own “subversive” agendas became a part of male 
                                                 
102 In other words, for a pattern of heterosexual relations that coded rationality and coldness as 
masculine, and considered it feminine to show emotion and empathy.  
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privilege, and the public performance of homophobia another method of demarcating who could 
be trusted to act in the interests of the state, and who could not be. That homosexuality was seen 
as so antithetical to the nation is a direct byproduct of the integral role exclusive male-male 
bonds play in forming the nation.  
A few qualities of spy fiction particularly make the genre a useful place to examine both 
the prevalence of homosociality as the “glue” of the imperial U.K. and the kind of rigorous, 
insistent exclusion of homosexuality that Sedgwick and others like Alan Sinfield, Cameron 
McFarlane, and Jonathan Goldberg describe. For example, the fact that power-relations, secret 
organizations and machinations, politics, and the safety of the nation are the stuff of spy fiction’s 
overt plots, not to mention the genre’s penchant for broad character types that signify to the 
audience their status as either trustworthy or suspect, naturally raises the critic’s ideology alarm, 
inviting skeptical readings precisely because of an apparent openness.103 Another reason to 
examine spy fiction for its relation to masculinity, or rather, to cultural narratives of 
masculinities, is the lineage that spy fiction shares with adventure fiction. Critic Joseph Kestner’s 
work on the relationship between John Buchan’s early spy-genre Richard Hannay stories and the 
adventure genre usefully outlines an architecture of that relation in a way that emphasizes the 
central role of masculinity to both. Kestner begins with masculinity critic Martin Green’s 
argument that “the adventure tale [is] historically speaking the most important of all our literary 
forms…Adventure has been the liturgy—the series of cultic texts—of masculinism” (84). When 
one examines the genre that encompasses H. Rider Haggard, Robert Louis Stevenson, Kipling, 
Burroughs, etc., it is easy to see how deeply connected these texts are both to cultural notions of 
                                                 
103 Though see the discussion of Michael Denning’s book Cover Stories in the introduction of this 
dissertation for a more thorough account of the possible pitfalls and rewards of this approach. 
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masculinity and to the nascent genre of spy fiction that began to emerge in the 1890s. That the 
colonial adventure tale reached its zenith at the same time that spy fiction began—as both 
paranoid invasion literature and in a more picayune form in Kipling’s Kim—is not coincidence. 
Critic Elaine Showalter suggests that that decade was marked by a ‘crisis of masculinity’ in 
[British] culture, arguing that “the dehumanizing effects of industrialization; difficulty in 
policing the Empire; the physical deterioration of army recruits; the emergence of the New 
Woman; the rise of Germany and its naval power; the economic competition of the United 
States; invasion scare literature; the falling birth rate; labour unrest; ‘race’ degeneration; and the 
fear of secret and terrorist societies” had combined to elicit this “crisis” “on all levels—
economic, political, social, psychological, as producer, as power, as role, as lover” (qtd. in 
Kestner 82). The adventure tale, and the early spy stories spun-off from the adventure genre, 
dramatizes and simplifies this multi-faceted crisis into one plot line and then solves it, creating 
an imaginative space in which masculinity is called into question but ultimately reaffirmed. 
Additionally, the protagonist’s masculinity is always reaffirmed in such a manner that also, as 
the analysis of Linda Dryden reminds us, grounds the hero’s capability in his masculinity, and 
his masculinity in his national character and its (generally racialized) “superiority” (qtd. in 
Kestner 83). Finally, Kestner presents critic Graham Dawson’s argument that what passes as 
masculinity in a given cultural moment is itself a discursive formation, that “masculinities are 
lived out in the flesh, but fashioned in the imagination,” meaning that these adventure tales and 
their depictions of chauvinistic masculinity did more than entertain audiences (84). Dawson 
continues: 
As imagined forms, masculinities are at once ‘made up’ by creative cultural 
activity and yet materialize in the social world as structured forms with real 
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effects upon both women and men…The narrative resource of a 
culture…therefore functions as a currency of recognizable social identities…The 
narrative imagining of lived masculinities is powerfully shaped by such a 
repertoire of forms. It organizes the available possibilities for a masculine self. 
(qtd. in Kestner 84) 
As we will see throughout this chapter, Dawson is not only right to suggest that cultural 
imaginings “organize the available possibilities for a masculine self,” but his analysis can be 
extended further: these “narrative imagining[s] of lived masculinities” organize the possibilities 
for the male-dominated intelligence service throughout the twentieth century. They do so by 
making desirable, and thus rewardable, certain kinds of masculinity; for example, boy’s 
adventure tales in the late Victorian period functioned to promote a kind of masculinity that was 
gentlemanly, nationalistic, skilled, resourceful, and carefully enmeshed in homosocial 
institutions and relations that conferred legitimacy to their adventures.104 As we will discuss 
later, spy fiction can and has promoted other kinds of masculinity than this, but the congruence 
between the genres in the age of Kim and Riddle of the Sands meant that spy stories began with 
the same tropes in play, including those surrounding this particular vision of masculinity. But it 
wasn’t just early spy authors, dabbling in genre experimentation/origination, who were 
influenced in this way. Early generations of formal intelligence agencies were staffed by men 
                                                 
104 In other words, the protagonist’s homosocial relations are what separates him from the 
villains, who do not properly share in the legitimacy of membership in British power structures. 
This legitimacy is the difference between the gentleman adventurer and the pirate (like Jim and 
“Gentleman” Brown in Lord Jim), or, in early spy fiction, between the amateur British spy and 
the foreign professional. For example, in Erskine Childers’ The Riddle of the Sands,  Carruthers 
and Davies, the protagonists, are proved to be worthy of the club atmosphere they come from by 
uncovering that the British expat Dollmann has thrown away his honor to help plot a German 
invasion.  
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who were boys in precisely this era of the heyday of the colonial adventure tale.105 They were 
also themselves colonial officials and ex-military men, and they drew openly on both their 
experiences in these homosocial institutions and their childhood readings for inspiration in the 
field, the planning of intelligence operations, and even how to relate bureaucratically to their 
superiors. Thus, both early intelligence agencies and spy fiction share an origin in the male-male 
bonds that constituted the power structure of the nation, bonds which were delineated and 
reinforced in cultural narratives of adventure.  
Of course, when speaking of the twin overlaps between popular adventure and early spy 
fiction and forms of masculinity, one name stands paramount: John Buchan, whose work helped 
to distinguish spy fiction as a distinct entity from adventure fiction and whose life provides 
ample evidence of the role of homosociality in political success in the early twentieth century, 
whether in his advocacy for the re-enlistment of T.E. Lawrence (discussed below) or his ultimate 
appointment as Governor General of Canada. Buchan’s most enduring creation is Richard 
Hannay, gentlemanly spy extraordinaire, the star of five Buchan novels including the so-called 
“War Trilogy” of The 39 Steps, Greenmantle, and Mr. Standfast. Hannay begins and ends as an 
amateur intelligence agent, roped into unraveling the caper by virtue of being the right “kind” of 
person in the right place at the right time. But in 1916’s Greenmantle we see Hannay officially 
acting as a spy, under cover, behind enemy lines. Greenmantle directly connects the 
“homosocial, not homosexual” male-male relationship to the health of the nation through 
Hannay and its secondary protagonists and their World War One-era mission to Istanbul. Hannay 
and his compatriots—Sandy Arbuthnot, Peter Pienaar, and John Blinkiron—each represent a 
different approach to masculine authority and the licensed agency it confers, but it is their ability 
                                                 
105 Not coincidentally, “Kim” Philby got his nickname from the Kipling book (Macintyre 35). 
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to cooperate with each other and other men that ultimately allows for success: Blinkiron’s wealth 
and public persona buys influence, Peter’s hunting and tracking skills prove invaluable even in 
wartime, Sandy’s academic knowledge and mastery of disguise allows him to work with various 
factions within Turkey, and Hannay’s resourcefulness and moral compass keep the whole 
enterprise moving. The novel is plainly a wish-fulfilment fantasy in which the very skills schools 
like Eton preached get a chance to shine in turn. This plot is sometimes referred to an “Eigen 
plot” after the mathematical concept, and is common in thrillers featuring a team. Eigen plots, 
especially those like Greenmantle’s featuring a team of all men, reinforce the tool-like efficacy 
that can get attached to cultural notions of masculinity, a feature that will become part of the 
groundwork for drone masculinity in particular. This band of gentlemanly brothers is not without 
temptation, though. Beautiful but dangerous German millionaire and operative Hilda von Einem 
proves to be a formidable enemy, a femme fatale whose gender and national Otherness threatens 
the heroic masculine bonds of Hannay and Co. In the following passage, Buchan connects von 
Einem’s Otherness with an ability to subvert and reverse the male gaze, an effect which Hannay, 
steeped in a patriarchal masculine world, finds uncanny: 
Her cool eyes searched me, but not in suspicion…She was sizing me up as a man. 
I cannot describe that calm appraising look. There was no sex in it…This 
woman’s eyes were weighing me, not for any special duty, but for my essential 
qualities. I felt that I was under the scrutiny of one who was a connoisseur in 
human nature…To be valued coldly by those eyes was an offence to my 
manhood. (Greenmantle 90) 
This passage posits manhood as a discrete quality that can be “appraised”, “weighed”, 
“scrutinized” and, perhaps most revealingly, “offended.” The language blurs that of 
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commodification and essence, and the last sentence indicates that such blurring, since it suggests 
that manhood/masculinity is something discrete and variable instead of fixed and essential, is an 
assault on Hannay’s sense of his own place in the cosmic order. Greenmantle extolls the virtues 
of a traditional masculinity that genre-expectations and Buchan’s nationalistic bent ensure as 
ultimately invincible, but nevertheless the text mines significant thrills from the suggestion that 
masculinity might be vulnerable and contingent, something that can be earned and lost. Von 
Einem functions in the text as a plot device to tease (primarily male) readers with the (never-
realized) potential of masculine failure, as well as to titillate them with the erotics of 
surrendering control. She does almost succeed in seducing Sandy Arbuthnot to her cause over 
the course of the novel, but is ultimately rebuffed in a manner that re-links the immediate male-
male bonds Sandy is invested in with the larger structure of the nation: “‘I stay with my friends,’ 
said Sandy [to Hilda]… ‘You can offer me nothing that I desire…I am the servant of my country, 
and her enemies are mine,” (138). In other words, Buchan posits patriotic homosociality as the 
core value of the secret agent, the component of masculinity that does not wither under von 
Einem’s castrating gaze. 
 But Sandy’s temptation by von Einem is more than an opportunity for Buchan to extoll 
the virtues of manly co-operation and the gentleman’s club atmosphere of international politics. 
The mere hint that Sandy could be tempted by von Einem offers a tacit confirmation that Sandy 
is indeed straight. I argue that this confirmation is doing some work beyond the kind of generic 
trope of the proto-femme fatale that von Einem represents. Nor is von Einem solely a metaphor 
for the attractiveness of some aspects of imperial German ideology—the attraction of the Same 
that must be repudiated to view the Germans of World War One as the enemy.106 Rather, Buchan 
                                                 
106 Discussed in Chapter 6. 
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is already, in 1916, responding to and attempting to head off what would become the loudest and 
most damaging criticism of the gentleman spy and intelligence agencies: the suspicion that the 
public school, Oxbridge, aristocratic government official was, in writer (and friend of Ian 
Fleming) Cyril Connoly’s words, “in the last analysis homosexual,” (qtd. in Carlston 159). 
Buchan is quite aware of how damaging the charge of homosexuality can be to a male subject’s 
credibility and even their likeability, since he uses the hint of homosexuality to further demonize 
the German officer Strumm:  
At first sight you would have said it was a woman’s drawing-room. [But] There 
had never been a woman’s hand in that place. It was the room of a man with a 
passion for frippery, who had a perverted taste for soft delicate things. It was the 
complement of his bluff brutality. I began to see the queer other side to my host, 
that evil side which gossip had spoken of as not unknown in the German army. 
The room seemed a horribly unwholesome place, and I was more than ever afraid 
of Strumm. (Buchan 40)   
In context, the “evil side” and the “queer other side” are one and the same, and are clearly 
signaling that Strumm, and thus Germany, the enemy, are compromised by their homosexuality. 
Hannay’s experiences in Strumm’s home (which is an otherwise stereotypically Gothic castle) 
expose what he (Hannay) sees as the pervasive perversity that has transformed the Germans into 
the “bad guys” of thriller books. Buchan wants the reader to know that “softness” in a man is 
perversion, and that the Germans—who before the War were not seen as culturally or racially 
very different from Christian, white England—are Othered by, and compromised by, this 
perversion. As it did for von Einem, the text figures the challenge (Strumm’s “queer other side”) 
to Hannay’s and Buchan’s conception of homosocial masculinity as a reversal of the traditional 
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male gaze. In this case, Strumm intentionally walks in on Hannay bathing, causing the British 
agent (who is under cover) to feel exposed physically and psychologically. When Joseph Kestner 
analyzes this moment of literal and symbolic nudity, he terms it “an interrogation of whether 
[Hannay] can sustain the penis/phallus equation of dominant masculinity”—in other words, 
whether he has the goods to back up his talk (Kestner 89). Strumm’s challenge fails, as Hannay 
is not shaken enough by the intrusion to blow his cover (or his host). But, unlike Kestner, I argue 
that Hannay is not the member of the fellowship the text is most concerned about—it is Sandy 
who is tempted by von Einem, and who, like Strumm, is an aristocrat, a polyglot, a master of 
disguise, and an unashamed Orientalist (in both the sense of expertise and of desire for a 
fantasized version of the Other). Sandy though, when the chips are down, is heterosexual, 
homosocial, and a patriot, and thus, in Buchan’s world, untainted with evil or moral weakness. 
The problem, for Buchan as well as the intelligence community as a whole, is that one of the 
real-world models for Sandy, Buchan’s friend T.E. Lawrence, was not without a “queer other 
side,” nor was he the only one with such a side who was highly placed in military intelligence. 
The cumulative exposures of homosexuality and other “deviant” behavior in espionage and in 
the aristocracy throughout the early twentieth century weakened both patriotic homosociality’s 
place as the defining characteristic of the British secret agent in fiction and the real-world 
cultural, political, and social apparatuses that produced spies who sought to model themselves on 
Richard Hannay, Sandy Arbuthnot, and the gentleman adventurers of the late 19th and early 
twentieth centuries. Following the revelations of the Cambridge Five and the linking of 
homosexuality, gentlemanliness, and Communism, the idea that the Hannay and Sandy types 
could actually have the nation’s best interests at heart became outright laughable. It was at the 
point of Burgess’ and Maclean’s defection that the previously invincible-seeming masculinity of 
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Buchan’s Hannay novels was discarded among the intelligence world. Naturally though, this 
change was precipitated by a history of erosion of this particular masculinity in the cultural 
discourse of espionage. In the next sections, I examine how both the history and imagined 
history of espionage helped to lay the groundwork for the overthrow of the “gentlemanly” 
masculinity of patriotic homosociality and set the stage for its replacement by drone masculinity, 
aggression, technocracy and bureaucracy in intelligence work. 
The Foreign Sodomite Becomes Domestic 
 The groundwork for the questioning and ultimate shift in the governing cultural 
formation of masculinity within intelligence work can be found in spy fiction’s particular role in 
shaping how the public conceives of espionage as both a cultural force and as an actual practice. 
This shaping role goes back to the beginning of the genre itself in the 1890s invasion literature of 
William Le Queux and its depictions of German spies hiding out around every corner.107 Nicolas 
Hiley, author of “Decoding German Spies,” argues that Le Queux characterizes his invented 
German spies in such a way as to connect the world of espionage and the world of “perversion”, 
especially sexual perversion (including homosexuality), in order to stoke a public panic that 
would lead to the creation of the first official counter-intelligence agency (and sell a lot of Le 
Queux books) (65). Through Le Queux and his imitators’ efforts, “perversion” becomes linked to 
fantasies of foreign espionage agents.108 This connection between the two secret worlds (of 
perversity and espionage) was primarily used before World War One to characterize the foreign 
                                                 
107 I engage with Le Queux and the Othering of German spies more prominently in Chapters 2 
and 6. 
108 For an example (from a better writer), one may think of Verloc’s shop in Conrad’s The Secret 
Agent as the archetypical nexus point between the lower class, sex-obsessed, vaguely foreign 
elements that inevitably came together to compose the figure on the fringes of Victorian society 
working actively to bring it down. 
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spy rather than the domestic agent. As critic David Stafford argues: “The character and behavior 
of enemy spies in Edwardian fiction, therefore, is of importance in helping to establish and 
emphasize the value and legitimacy of the gentleman secret agent” (qtd. in Hiley 68). Thus, 
“perversion” was a reliable method to identify political subversives in addition to moral ones. 
This attitude, as I mentioned in the introduction, carries through the revelation of the Cambridge 
spy ring and the Lavender Scare in the U.S., but in the first decades of the twentieth century the 
thought that British government and intelligence workers might be implicated under its wide 
sweep was not yet conceivable. Homosexuality among the public school set was the very 
definition of D.A. Miller’s “open secret.” The conscious policing of this secret among the 
members of those institutions responsible for conferring social status in a patriarchal society —
the club, the school, the government office—ensured that the secret only, as Alan Sinfield’s 
writes, “hovered on the edge of public visibility,” instead of becoming a full public spectacle or 
disappearing altogether into the private sphere (and thus becoming untraceable and even more 
“dangerous” to the social order) (Sinfield 9). The protective aegis of these institutions, and the 
“gentlemanly” masculinity that membership in them conferred, functions up until the First World 
War as “a kind of social security, defending the privacy of private life from its invasion by 
policelike practices of surveillance” (Miller 15). The fear of these homosocial institutions was 
that this open secret among the members might become a public fact, and in so doing expose the 
entire ruling apparatus as filled with, in the words of one 1918 right-wing magazine article on the 
use of English homosexuality as a blackmail device by German spies, “evils which all decent 
men thought had perished in Sodom and Lesbia” (qtd. Hiley 65).  
 As the above quote implies, World War One-era paranoia over espionage attacks and 
security concerns grafted very quickly on to pre-existing prejudices against homosexuals. 
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Cameron McFarlane in his study of the figure of the “sodomite” in the 17th century is already 
alert to the ease with which the penetration of sodomy can be shifted into the penetration of the 
nation: “the act of sodomy introduces the alien into the social order and the sodomite thus 
becomes a substitute alien—so like the enemy—reproducing internally foreign corruption and 
danger as domestic perversion and deviance” (58). The (il)logic here, that connects secretive 
(because prohibited) meetings between men for sexual purposes with secretive (because 
conspiratorial) meetings for political purposes extends well into the twentieth century. This logic 
has infused the cultural discourse of espionage with a special attentiveness to the overlaps, both 
real (Guy Burgess) and imagined (the Lavender Scare), between homosexuality and betraying 
national security, either through deliberate action or vulnerability to blackmail.109 The specific 
attachment of subversive homosexuality to the ruling class and to government and intelligence 
workers in particular is the stigma that would ultimately lead to the replacement within 
intelligence of the late-Victorian/Edwardian patriarchal, patriotic homosociality as the dominant 
masculine discourse, and thus the replacement of the people and organizational structures 
steeped in that discourse as well. This stigma begins to adhere to this specific class of military 
and intelligence agent after the First World War due to a crisis in masculinity exacerbated by the 
failures and carnage of the Western Front. McFarlane, quoting from Jonathan Dollimore’s 
                                                 
109 This logic is on full display in author and journalist Countess Waldeck’s proclamation that 
“Homosexuals make natural secret agents and natural traitors” in her infamous 1960 pamphlet, 
“Homosexual International,” which argued that homosexuality was integral to Communism and 
vice versa (Carlston 176). Waldeck and her ilk, like a broken clock, were not always wrong in 
the sense that homosexual honey traps (luring a target into a compromising position via a sexual 
enticement in order to photograph the encounter and blackmail the target into giving up 
information) were considered fair game by both sides of the Iron Curtain, though this is arguably 
a greater argument for the destigmatization of homosexuality than anything else. Additionally, 
Guy Burgess is known to have used homosexual rendezvous as a cover to meet with his Russian 
handler—though this is very much the exception and not the rule. 
 200 
formulation of disavowal and displacement as the basis for the legitimation of social order, 
theorizes why such a moment of crisis might lead to the stigmatization (in this case, as 
homosexual) of a group previously immune to such a charge: 
When groups whose authority is sanctioned by the dominant term in the 
order/disorder binary actually produce disruption—say, by fighting among 
themselves—such conflict threatens to delegitimate order by reproducing the 
binary within the dominant term itself. Authority maintains its legitimacy, 
however, and restabilizes the binary by identifying the disruption with the 
demonized figures signified by the binary’s subordinate term. To call disruption 
‘sodomitical’ is thus to enact a displacement of responsibility for it, making it 
appear as though it were a perversion of the institution of “order” rather than their 
effect. As Dollimore elucidates, such displacements of crisis “on to the sexual 
deviant, be he or she actual, imagined, or constituted in and by the displacement, 
are made possible because other kinds of transgression…are not only loosely 
associated with the sexual deviant, but ‘condensed’ in the very definition of 
deviance” (237). This process of displacement is, naturally, most prevalent during 
periods of intensified social crisis. (80) 
I argue that World War One provided just such a period of intensified social crisis, and the twin 
strain of having to differentiate and define the German people as separate from the English and 
thus the Enemy, and the resultant political infighting among liberals and conservatives in 
England over wartime and immediate post-war decision-making primed a new era of 
homosexual scapegoating, one that took as its target the English ruling class and their monopoly 
on defining masculinity. In other words, when the War proved that traditional ideologies of 
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masculinity did not guarantee honor, victory, or safety, the response was to disavow those 
notions of masculinity, not by calling into question the idea that masculinity equals authority 
itself (alas), but by questioning whether what had appeared to be masculinity (this patrician, 
nationalistic homosociality) might not be compromised by proximity with its Other, 
homosexuality. The discourse of espionage in turn provided those who would wield homophobia 
as a cudgel a ready-made language of threat and a repository (largely spurious and embellished) 
of instances in which those formerly defined as “gentleman” were undone or compromised by 
their sexual deviance. I agree with critic Erin Carlston that this language was already in play 
before the Cambridge Spy Ring finalized the image of the Communist spy as gay or seeking to 
exploit homosexuality for blackmailing purposes. As she tells us, long before the Cambridge spy 
ring,  
British writers had helped fashion an image of the left-wing intellectual—
particularly the homosexual intellectual—as a subject exceptionally inclined to 
disloyalty and alienated from the dominant national culture; these writers both 
responded to and helped invent the context within which they, and the Cambridge 
spies, would be understood as traitors. (142) 
Carlston’s research in her book Double Agents focuses on the Auden circle,110 but to that lineage 
I would like to add, following Alan Sinfield, the specter of Oscar Wilde, and most relevantly, 
since most directly tied to intelligence work and espionage, T.E. Lawrence. 
*** 
                                                 
110 The poet W.H. Auden and his friends, collaborators, and associates, like Steven Spender and 
Christopher Isherwood. The Auden circle combined the images of gentlemanly leisure, 
Modernist experimentation, academic sensibilities (all were Oxbridge educated), left-leaning 
politics, and homosexuality.  
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The Wilde/Lawrence/Auden “Type” in the Inter-war Period 
The change in the dicourse of masculinity that intelligence work experienced after the 
Burgess defection and the unveiling of the Cambridge Five had its groundwork laid in two 
conceptual pairings: 1) that of homosexuality with treason (and specifically Communism), which 
as discussed above has old origins; and 2), a newer pairing that linked the governing class as 
susceptible to homosexuality (and thus, as not masculine). While the Burgess and Maclean 
defections provided the final impetus for the intelligence world (in both fiction and reality) to 
change its conception of the ideal agent, no one event could have affected that change alone. In 
this section, I argue that this conceptual linking between homosexuality, treason, and the 
“gentleman” occurred in no small part due to the public personas of Oscar Wilde, T.E. 
Lawrence, and W.H. Auden. Wilde, Lawrence, and Auden were each interpreted by the public 
and press through the lenses of changing cultural norms around masculinity, class, and sexuality, 
while at the same time each one of them, due to their large public personas, shifted the cultural 
discourse of masculinity, especially of masculinity among the “gentlemanly” class. In beginning 
with Wilde, I take after scholar Alan Sinfield, whose work The Wilde Century takes as its central 
thesis that the visibility of the Oscar Wilde trial tied together various, separate strands of modern 
homosexuality and appended them to the figure of Wilde: “at that point, the entire, vaguely 
disconcerting nexus of effeminacy, leisure, idleness, immorality, luxury, insouciance, decadence 
and aestheticism, which Wilde was perceived, variously, as instantiating, was transformed into a 
brilliantly precise image” (Sinfield 3). Sinfield argues that the Wildean type became what a gay 
man “looked like” to the British in the early twentieth century, and even though far from 
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factually accurate111, the idea that the upper-classes, especially left-leaning aristocrats and 
academics, tended toward or were easily seduced into homosexuality—and thus were threats to 
the domestic order—took hold among the upwardly mobile middle-class. The cultural term most 
contested between the old guard and new was that of “manliness” or masculinity. Traditionally, 
given its relation to political power and patriarchal aristocracy, manliness was the domain of the 
upper classes to define, and so, as expected, it was defined to be the attitudes and beliefs they 
valued—Richard Hannay and the other heroes of Greenmantle being examples of these attitudes 
and beliefs. However, in the eyes of many, the War had done irreparable damage to the cultural 
image of the sporting soldier, the unflappable English gentleman, as the ideal man. Critic Martin 
Green suggests that, among the upper classes, a rebellion against traditional Victorian 
masculinity and the attitudes that supported it took hold of many who came of age during the 
post-war period: “They refused to grow up into men of responsibility, fathers of families and of 
the state, soldiers,” (qtd. in Sinfield 132). Concurrently, according to Sinfield, “manliness [was 
becoming] a particularly middle-class preoccupation. The newly-dominant middle class justified 
itself by claiming manly purity, purpose and responsibility, and identified the leisure class, 
correspondingly, with effeminate idleness and immorality” (68). The middle-classes and their 
far-right allies in the nobility seized on the Wildean type as an explanation for the turn away 
from Victorian masculinity among the aristocracy in the inter-war years, an explanation that also 
functioned more broadly to discredit the aristocratic ability to set the terms of what “manliness” 
was. These class-based tensions over who can and should be able to define masculinity 
overlapped significantly with the debate over who can and should be in charge of the 
                                                 
111 Homosexuals aren’t more likely to be security risks, there was no homosexual conspiracy to 
overthrow the government, upper class aesthetes weren’t all gay, etc.   
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government (given the masculine=proper authority pairing endemic to patriarchy itself). This 
overlap, and the prevalence of the Wildean type as a stigmatic label, helps us explain how a 
figure like T.E. Lawrence, who as a soldier, an establishment figure, and an intelligence agent fit 
many of the older definitions of the ideal man and the ideal citizen (he was the model for Sandy 
Arbuthnot, after all) moved in the cultural landscape from a national hero into a pariah. 
Lawrence is perhaps most familiar to modern-day audiences as the central larger-than-life figure 
of the film Lawrence of Arabia, but as I will show, lost without the context of the film’s creation 
is the fact that the movie was actually a rehabilitation project, considered feasible by friends of 
Lawrence in the 60s due to shifting attitudes towards sexuality in the U.K. The quasi-mythic 
protagonist of the film, a figure which one film reviewer in the Listener calls a “superior Richard 
Hannay” and someone who “gives us the picture of imperialism we all crave for: the man 
himself stimulates our nostalgia for lost glory, while his doubt and anxieties act as a sop to our 
conscience”—was very much not the image of Lawrence in the 1940s and 50s (qtd. in James 
449). During those decades, Lawrence’s outsized reputation was the object of a systematic attack 
carried out in the name of truth. In fairness, Lawrence was at times an inveterate liar, but this 
attack was heavily homophobic in tone. This dismantling of the myth was led by biographer 
Richard Aldington and military figures like Major General Lord Burnham who wished to 
distance themselves from Lawrence’s character, by which was clearly meant his “queerness”—
his theatricality, lack of respect for authority, sardonic nature, academic (indeed, Modernist) 
leanings, and his sexuality.  
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Lawrence’s sexuality is still a debated topic in biographies and studies of the man, but 
what is uncontested112 is that Lawrence had homosexual masochistic tendencies, and indeed 
sought out places and people with which to express this preference during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Lawrence’s biggest mistake, at least from the perspective of those like his brother and literary 
executor A.W. Lawrence who wished to keep his sexual proclivities hidden from the public, was 
his refusal to hide behind the protective shield of gentlemanliness. His refusal, in concert with 
his extensive political and social connections knowing about that refusal and seeking to cover for 
him, undoubtedly weakened the effectiveness of that shield at deflecting attacks from a rising 
upper-middle class, anxious to poke holes in aristocratic holds on political power. The most 
spectacular manifestation of Lawrence’s unwillingness to play the gentleman card took the form 
of his attempts to re-enlist under another name entirely, shedding his rank and his fame. It is 
easy113 to psychologize Lawrence, his enlistment and re-enlistment, his attendance at Chelsea 
flagellation clubs or his payments to John Bruce throughout the 20s and 30s for regular beatings. 
Lawrence was, on his own admission, raped while a Turkish prisoner at Deraa, and that 
undoubtedly affected his sense of self and his sense of his own sexuality in ways that are difficult 
to parse given Lawrence’s proclivities in his letters and writings towards both understatement 
and braggadocio. Instead of psychologizing however, I wish instead to concentrate on how 
Lawrence was “read” both as a public figure and, later in a comparison to Fleming’s Casino 
                                                 
112 What is contested is whether or not Lawrence sought out lasting homosexual relationships, 
whether or not he engaged in homo- or hetero-sexual sex willingly at any point in his life, and 
the role of the trauma stemming from Lawrence’s rape in prison in Deraa on Lawrence’s own 
determination of his self-worth and his sexuality, including, recently, questioning of Lawrence’s 
account of it entirely (James Barr’s 2006 biography Setting the Desert on Fire doubts the story 
entirely). In a letter to EM Forster, Lawrence in no uncertain terms describes himself as being 
raped, and actually declares himself “unclean” as a result, but it is unclear whether this feeling 
stems from the violence of the act, the homosexual nature of it, or both (Letters 360).  
113 And interesting. 
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Royale, in his own words from his autobiography, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. By the end of his life 
in 1935, and until the film’s rehabilitation project, Lawrence was read through the lens of the 
crystallization of homosexual identity begun by Wilde, and continuing through the Auden circle, 
Lawrence himself, and ultimately Guy Burgess. Lawrence’s contribution to this chain of 
associations is to begin building the idea that the subversive type can be firmly placed within the 
governing institutions of power, even in the military and intelligence worlds. Lawrence was not 
just well-connected and of aristocratic bearing and education—he was an Army officer and an 
intelligence agent, privy to the secrets of the state while harboring secrets of his own. 
Like Wilde, Lawrence was perceived as being aloof, strange, and removed from the 
common man, typified by Lawrence as the common soldier in his memoir of his own time as a 
(re)enlisted114 RAF private, The Mint. Lawrence makes clear in The Mint that he wished 
enlistment under a different name would allow him to shed the social, class, and emotional 
differences that he felt removed him from the “monopoly on manliness” that the common soldier 
possessed, though he also at the same time acknowledges that the experience will probably only 
serve to reinforce those differences and Lawrence’s sense of his own strangeness (Mint 90). For 
example, one chapter centers on Lawrence trying to cheer up a fellow soldier who is being 
pressured into marriage due to his girlfriend’s accidental pregnancy. It would seem that 
Lawrence intends this chapter to be about male solidarity in the Royal Air Force (which 
Lawrence desperately sought), as the men think of ways to keep the air man from being 
transferred away from his girlfriend, to get married quickly in a civil ceremony, and (hinted at 
more obliquely) to secure an abortion for her in a military hospital. Yet the chapter is full of 
                                                 
114 Lawrence took a false name and enlisted in the RAF in 1922, seeking comfort and silence in 
the routine of an enlisted private’s life. 
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contradictions between Lawrence’s upper class status and his desire to divest himself of that 
status. For example, Lawrence asserts that “in the RAF all men are equal” and yet is called posh 
at the bar because he won’t drink beer, only a port wine (110). Likewise, when Lawrence 
discerns that the despondent air man does not have the money to accomplish any of their plans, 
he gives him the needed funds. Lawrence then realizes that getting the money was the sole point 
of the man’s invitation to go out drinking, remarking, “The money was what he had wanted all 
the time, but his hardness had made him too brittle to ask me directly” (101). This admission 
permits Lawrence to reflect on his general estrangement from the masculine identity of the 
enlisted man: “You see, I cannot play at anything with anyone: and a native shyness shuts me out 
from their freemasonry of fucking and blinding, pinching, borrowing, and talking dirty: this 
despite my sympathy for the abandon of functional frankness in which they wallow” (110). 
Lawrence’s wish to join in seems tragically shortsighted, as the very qualities that repulse him—
the misogyny, boisterousness, aggression, and pathologization of homosexuality—are the very 
bulwarks of the kind of masculinity he envies in his squad mates. Over and over in the Mint and 
in Lawrence’s letters from the same time period, Lawrence finds himself unable, though 
ostensibly willing, to shed his upper-class sensibilities. He is put off by the vulgarity and 
“frankness” that he perceives as characteristic of their “monopoly on manliness.” In one letter to 
Robert Graves, Lawrence’s disgust at barracks talk has him at his wit’s end. However, his 
complaint that the men’s constant gossip of “fucking” with their girlfriends, wives, prostitutes, 
and one-night stands has put him off of the idea of sex permanently must have caused Graves to 
laugh, for as Graves and Lawrence’s other friends and associates such as E.M. Forrester, Lady 
Astor, Mrs. Bernard Shaw, Clare Sydney Smith, and John Buchan already knew, Lawrence had 
never entertained the idea of heterosexual relations (James 416). They had been apologizing for 
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it for years by the time that particular letter was written. In his autobiography, Lawrence’s 
colleague at the British Museum Leonard Woolley recounted an anecdote about Lawrence 
persuading his Arabic companion Dahoum to pose naked for a sculpture as a gift for Lawrence. 
Woolley insisted after this anecdote that Lawrence was “in no sense a pervert” but merely “liked 
to shock”—a defense regularly offered up to defend Wilde as well (69). Lawrence’s behavior 
attracted these kinds of defenses throughout the 1920s and until his death in a motorcycle 
accident in 1935. His dandy-ish snobbery, academic superiority, and Wildean flippancy, coupled 
with the open secret of his masochistic practices,115 won him many enemies intent on 
dismantling the mythic figure of Lawrence of Arabia with accusations of moral perversion. This 
was easy for them to do, as Lawrence, an upper-class, intelligent, eccentric, aesthetic 
homosexual man already fit the Wildean image. But Lawrence added a key dimension to that 
image: Lawrence was not removed from the military and political spheres; rather, he was 
enmeshed and celebrated within them. To his friends, Lawrence was one of “us,” a gentleman, 
who, though eccentric, was “in no sense a pervert” but an asset to the early days of military 
intelligence. To his enemies, Lawrence represented the fox in the henhouse, a symbol of moral 
weakness compromising national strength by virtue of the nepotistic political and social 
apparatus that tolerated and covered for him. Lawrence himself was aware of this criticism, 
writing to John Buchan (by this time highly placed within the political system himself) an 
apologia for his military and intelligence exploits and accomplishments, ending it with “I tell you 
all this not to boast of it, but to show that you and [Stanley] Baldwin, in gratifying what may 
have seemed to you my indulgences, have not harmed the public service” (James 434). 
                                                 
115 Lawrence was blackmailed on several occasions by underworld figures who discovered his 
homoerotic and masochistic relationship with John Bruce and his attendance at sadomasochistic 
parties. Lawrence’s friends often paid these blackmailers off (James 414). 
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Nevertheless, by the time Richard Aldington’s deconstructive biography of Lawrence—which 
included a chapter on Lawrence’s homosexuality clearly intended as a smear—was published in 
1954,  Lawrence’s friends had, for the moment, lost the battle to show him as having “not 
harmed the public service” (440). Aldington’s book was not just an attack on Lawrence and the 
embellishments and outright myths that had grown up around him (partly by his own wishes), it 
was also an attack on the cabals of power that had elevated and sheltered Lawrence from 
criticism while he was alive—an attack on the “gentlemen” of the inter-war years. 
Aldington’s deconstruction of Lawrence was an inevitable consequence given that 
Lawrence seemed to inhabit and solidify the nexus between the ruling class gentleman and the 
homosexual, and the homosexual and the spy. Throughout the inter-war years, these links grew 
from plausibly deniable (at least for those who wielded the political power to deny) to accepted 
as general wisdom. Nor were these links entirely imposed; as Erin Carlston argues, some left-
wing aristocratic men, most notably in the Auden circle, embraced the metaphorical potential of 
the spy. Of course, in Auden’s writing the spy is not the agent of the state—not Hannay or Bond 
or even Somerset Maugham’s Ashenden. Rather, Auden intends the spy to stand as a subversive 
figure, a double agent in the heart of a culture that may have use for him but does not claim him 
(Carlston 154). According to Carlston, the spy in Auden is a figure for the anxiety of the ruling-
class homosexual, invested with power but nevertheless always living a life under cover (157). 
This is particularly visible in the 1928 Auden sonnet the “Secret Agent”, which blurs the 
boundary between a spy mission and a homosexual rendezvous, and between counter-
intelligence and a homophobic society:  
Control of the passes was, he saw, the key 
To this new district, but who would get it?  
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He, the trained spy, had walked into the trap 
For a bogus guide, seduced by the old tricks. 
At Greenhearth was a fine site for a dam 
And easy power, had they pushed the rail 
Some stations nearer. They ignored his wires:  
The bridges were unbuilt and trouble coming. 
The street music seemed gracious now to one 
For weeks up in the desert. Woken by water 
Running away in the dark, he often had 
Reproached the night for a companion 
Dreamed of already. They would shoot, of course,  
Parting easily two that were never joined. 
Richard Bozorth reads the poem’s suggestive diction, like “passes,” “seduced,” and “tricks,” as 
indications that the sonnet “allegorizes cruising as espionage,” (qtd. in Carlston 161). However, 
Carlston goes further, explicating the various sources of frustration in the poem, both internal—
the “trained spy” realizes he has fallen for “old tricks,”—and external in the form of the “they” 
that have ignored his cables, leaving him stranded to face trouble, and another “they” who will 
shoot at two lovers who were never allowed to be together (162). Carlston’s reading of the spy in 
the poem is as a symbol of external, homophobic and class tensions and the internal conflicts that 
these tensions “engender and are engendered by” (159). Carlston extends this reading to all of 
Auden’s uses of spy and espionage figures throughout his poetry of the late 20s and early 30s. 
For Auden, the open secret of homosexuality among Britain’s elite combined with the “social, 
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political, and psychological pressures” on the gay upper-class male made him feel like a double 
agent, whose power and influence depended both on the connections provided by homosocial 
and frequently homosexual networks and the public disavowal of homosexuality in order to 
appear trustworthy (159).  
 As one would expect, Auden’s playing with the trope of the upper-class homosexual as 
spy, and thus as a danger to national security, fed in to the already-prevalent cultural discourse 
on the dangers of homosexuals in positions of power. Like Wilde before him, Auden seemed to 
crystallize an image of a certain “type” of gay man; this “type” though was not, like Wilde, 
simply inherently untrustworthy or weak (because not conforming to bourgeois masculinity), but 
actively engaged in subverting the aims of the nation. Lawrence and later his friends and family 
at least had a patriotic myth to fall back on when accusations reached their fever pitch. Auden, 
with his immigration to the U.S. at the onset of World War Two, had forsaken the chance of this. 
Even in the U.S., he could not escape a cultural image which he himself had contributed to: 
Carlston relates one of Auden’s anecdotes in which his US neighbors came up to him 
hesitatingly and questioned whether or not he was a foreign agent. “Obviously,” Auden writes, 
“they thought I’d come off a submarine” (qtd. in Carlston 146). Auden was read as a spy. His 
homosexuality, aristocratic and aesthete airs, intelligence, and uneasy relation with conventional 
notions of national pride coded him as suspicious and subversive, as with Wilde and Lawrence. 
However, the entrenched nature of patriarchal, homosocial masculinity among the elite meant 
that it was not an easy discursive formation to be completely overturned, despite the weakening 
and doubts sowed in the public imaginary by Wilde, Lawrence, and Auden. In fact, it would take 
another World War, a reorganization of the international landscape, and the revelation that 
several of the “gentlemanly” brotherhood were actual traitors to link espionage, duplicity, 
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aristocratic gentlemanliness, and homosexuality so firmly that both intelligence agencies and 
intelligence fiction, that is, both the institutional and the cultural spheres, would feel the need to 
change who they could trust as a useful and loyal secret agent. I now turn to this pivotal cultural 
moment in the history of espionage, the 1951 defections of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean 
and the immediate cultural and political contexts and aftermath. This moment of crisis in the 
governing cultural formation of masculinity is also the beginning of the modern intelligence 
agency and modern intelligence agent.  
The Cambridge Spy Ring and the Lavender Scare 
On May 25th, 1951, Guy Burgess, a former intelligence officer and a Foreign Office 
official, arrived at the house of Donald Maclean, another Foreign Office diplomat and the former 
Second Secretary at the British embassy in Washington. The two men packed a few bags and 
boarded the Falaise, a pleasure boat headed to Saint-Malo in France at midnight. Though 
Burgess shouted, “Back on Monday!” to one of the dockworkers as he boarded the boat, neither 
man would return to England. Burgess and Maclean were defecting to the Soviet Union; they had 
both been recruited to be Soviet agents at Cambridge in the 1930s and had been feeding Moscow 
high-level intelligence ever since. The resulting scandal of the revelation of their decades-long 
treason and their sudden defection upended British and American intelligence and governmental 
work. In Britain especially, the “missing diplomats” as they were called caused a soul-searching 
inquiry that would eventually reveal two other highly placed Soviet agents, Kim Philby and 
Anthony Blunt, and fundamentally change the way MI5 and MI6 operated.  
The uncovering of the so-called Cambridge Spy Ring was also a symbolic betrayal of the 
principal assumption of the British secret service: that the “gentleman,” meaning the ruling-class, 
Oxbridge-educated male, was above reproach, and thus could be trusted with national safety and 
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security in the most dangerous of contexts. This betrayal deeply affected those within the 
intelligence apparatus. For example, John Le Carré, who was forced out of espionage when his 
name was given to the Soviets by Kim Philby and whose novel Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy is 
profoundly influenced by the Cambridge Spies, extolled, “Effortlessly [Philby] played the parts 
which the establishment could recognize—for was he not born and trained into the 
establishment! Effortlessly he copied its attitudes, caught its diffident strammer, its hesitant 
arrogance; effortlessly he took his place in its nameless hegemony” (qtd. in Denning 119).  
Likewise, Cyril Connoly writes in his book The Missing Diplomats (published by fellow 
intelligence-worker Ian Fleming), “Two facts distinguish Burgess and Maclean from the so-
called ‘atomic spies’—first, they are not known to have committed any crime, second, they are 
members of the governing class, of the high bureaucracy, the ‘they’ who rule the ‘we’ to whom 
[other, middle or lower class spies like Edward Fuchs] belong” (15). The solution for an 
embarrassed intelligence establishment, though painful to the old boys’ club of intelligence, was 
to make sure that Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt would no longer be a part of the “they.”  
 The groundwork for this revision in who could be a secret agent, as we have seen, had 
been laid in Britain by the increasingly public linkage between the gentleman state servant and 
the subversive homosexual. Guy Burgess was openly gay, and Anthony Blunt, though more 
reserved than Burgess and whose revelation as a spy did not come until the 70s, was also 
homosexual. Burgess’s homosexuality made him the primary instigator in the public imaginary.  
Despite MI5 director Vernon Kell’s open hostility to homosexuals and Catholics for being 
“disgusting and unreliable” and having “loyalties that extended beyond Britain,” the gentlemanly 
code, or the open-secret of the closet, prevented Kell and others in intelligence from addressing 
in public how this particular case touched the highly charged signifiers of homosexuality, 
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espionage, and the upper classes (Carlston 177). This silence became a part of the scandal itself; 
the Sunday Pictorial, not subject to the same codes of silence as a government intent on 
protecting its privilege, wrote that “this sordid secret of homosexuality—which is one of the keys 
to the whole scandal of the Missing Diplomats—is ignored by the Government White Paper” 
(Carlston 179). Cyril Connoly’s The Missing Diplomats is basically an extended apologia for 
Maclean, outlining a case in which Burgess, characterized as morally perverse, bullied and 
cajoled a psychologically weaker (and too often inebriated) Maclean into spying and then 
defection. On the other side of the Atlantic, U.S. intelligence and the State Department were 
furious that the British had failed to find the two (later three, then four) Soviet moles. J. Edgar 
Hoover, who did have Maclean under surveillance while he was in Washington, also specifically 
pointed, as a cause for the deception, to the British over-reliance on “gentlemanliness” as a mask 
for any conduct that Hoover116 believed undermined national security (Carlston 179; Macintyre 
187). While Anglophile proponents in the CIA like James Jesus Angleton117 protested the writing 
off of the British gentleman as fundamentally a security risk, the subsequent defection of Kim 
Philby in the 1960s and the way that Philby’s defection was seemingly so lightly regarded by the 
Brits118 eroded even Angleton’s nigh-boundless faith in the virtues of gentlemanliness 
(Macintyre 160). After Philby, the U.S. State Department could not resist rubbing the British 
                                                 
116 Hoover’s attitude here and throughout the Lavender Scare was potentially quite ironic given 
the recent trend in discussions of Hoover to make the case that he himself was a closeted 
homosexual or was in other ways queer in private. 
117 A CIA deputy chief, obsessed with the lifestyle of the British gentleman. 
118 John le Carré writes of a conversation he had with Philby’s friend and former colleague in 
MI6, Nicholas Elliot, about the difference in attitudes among MI6 and Parliament towards the 
treason of the Cambridge Five and that of John Vassall, the homosexual clerk of the U.K.’s 
Naval Attaché to the U.S.S.R. who was sentenced to 18 years in prison for spying for the KGB. 
Eliot’s response—‘Ah well, Vassall—well, he wasn’t top league, was he?’—indicates how class 
distinctions and gentlemanliness can massage treason into something apparently more tolerable 
in the eyes of a culture steeped in patriarchal homosociality (Pigeon Tunnel 181).   
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intelligence lapse in their faces, sending them a scathing indictment of the security failures 
surrounding Burgess and Maclean that included the line: “In the State Department repeated 
drunkenness, recurrent nervous breakdowns, sexual deviations and other human frailties are 
considered security hazards and persons showing any one or more of them are summarily 
dismissed” (Macintyre 164).     
 This communique was true, however, for only one of those categories: sexual deviance. 
In practice, as critic Erin Carlston explains, “in a culture that criminalized homosex [sic] and that 
in addition was saturated in both Freudian and Protestant conceptions of normative sexual 
behavior, only homosexual conduct was assumed to be relevant to the psychological and moral 
profile of the traitor” (182). Drunkenness, in contrast, was far from verboten; alcohol was the oil 
that lubricated the cogs of the growing bureaucracy of intelligence agencies. As just a few (of 
many possible) examples, Bill Harvey, former FBI deputy chief and the head of CIA counter-
intelligence at the time of the defections, is described by biographer Michael Holzman as “a 
bloated alcoholic with the manners of a comically corrupt cop in a Raymond Chandler thriller”, 
and his deputy chief (and Philby apologist) James Jesus Angleton was one of the few men who 
could keep up with Philby and Burgess in drinking bourbon (Macintyre 148). But Congress 
never systematically interrogated the many lushes that made up the upper echelons of the FBI, 
CIA, or State Department, nor ever called for the expulsion of “bloated alcoholics” from 
government work—that was reserved for Communists and homosexuals, which were in the 
minds of many the same thing. The U.S. in the early 1950s was in the midst of the Lavender 
Scare, an offshoot of McCarthy’s Red Scare that in many ways was even less rational and more 
destructive. The Lavender Scare, in which a series of internal and Congressional investigations 
into homosexuality in the State Department, most notably the Hill-Wherry Subcommittee and the 
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Hoey Committee, led to the purging of anyone119 in the State Department and other federal 
government departments that could be accused or linked to “sexual deviance,” i.e. (male) 
homosexuality. The fundamental logic behind the investigations and purges can be summed up 
by the following quote by Senator Kenneth Wherry: “You can’t hardly separate homosexuals 
from subversives” (Johnson 176). Note that the link between homosexuality and treason finding 
a toxic expression in the anti-Communist fervor of the late 40s and early 50s Lavender Scare is 
the same logic that Cameron McFarlane has identified as being a feature of the Renaissance, the 
same logic that hung over the Wilde trial, and the same logic that Lawrence had to assure his 
patrons was not true in his particular case. While there was some talk of direct connection 
between homosexuals in government being active Communist agents, especially on the right,120 
most of the rhetoric hinged on the argument that homosexuality was moral weakness, and that 
moral weakness in one area meant a susceptibility to bribery, corruption, or—most worryingly to 
the Hoey Committee—blackmail by the Soviets.  
Two key pieces of testimony reinforced this view. The first was the testimony of Admiral 
Roscoe Hillenkoetter, head of the fledgling CIA, who told the story of Alfred Redl, the leading 
figure of pre-World War I Austrian intelligence. Redl, so Hillenkoetter explained, was 
homosexual, and the Russians covertly arranged for him to meet with a boy for sex and then 
blackmailed him into betraying Austrian military positions and capabilities. Modern historians 
doubt the veracity of this story—Redl seems to have worked with the Russians, but for that 
oldest of traitorous motivations, money, rather than out of blackmail.121 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
119 Ultimately around 400 people (Dean 88) and (Johnson 21). 
120 Guy Gabrielson, Chairman of RNC in 1950 at beginning of the largest set of purges, 
remarked: “Perhaps as dangerous as the actual Communists are the sexual perverts who have 
infiltrated our government in recent years” (Johnson 18).  
121 See David Johnson, The Lavender Scare 109. 
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Hillenkoetter’s testimony and position as the new head of American foreign intelligence weighed 
heavily on the Committee’s deliberations. The second key testimony was from the White 
House’s panel of experts, psychologists and scientists that the State Department actually 
assembled to downplay the threat of homosexuals in government by using studies by famed sex 
researcher Alfred Kinsey and other sociological data to demystify homosexuality. This backfired 
spectacularly, as the already-prejudiced senators took the revelation that homosexuals could not 
readily be identified from the general population as proof of their excellent potential for 
espionage. Senator Mundt, after asking a testifying researcher if an x-ray could detect 
homosexuality and being told “no”, concluded that homosexuals were the “worst conceivable 
security risk” and since “there is no means of detecting them and the percentage is as high as 
[researchers] indicate, we just are not going to have any security in this country” (Johnson 114).  
Congress’s ultimate conclusion was unequivocal, as represented by the Hill-Wherry 
subcommittee verdict below:       
It is the opinion of this subcommittee that those who engage in acts of 
homosexuality and other perverted sexual acts are unsuitable for employment in 
the Federal Government. This conclusion is based upon the fact that persons who 
indulge in such degraded activity are committing not only illegal and immoral 
acts, but they also constitute security risks in positions of public trust. (qtd in 
Dean 63) 
Certainly, there were other political motives at work in the removal of homosexuals from the 
State Department. Republicans were angry over Truman’s containment doctrine, favoring a more 
aggressive approach. Yet even here, according to historian Robert Dean, Republicans were using 
the rhetoric of homosexuality and effeminacy to disparage any seeming appeasement of the 
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U.S.S.R. or other communist regimes (Dean 65). Just as in the U.K., the issue at hand was a 
struggle over who could define masculinity, and who could wield the political power attached to 
that definition. As Dean writes, “The public performance of “respectable” masculinity became 
increasingly crucial as a test of political legitimacy for men in public life” (66). This 
“respectable” masculinity, at least at the upper echelons of the government, had been not much 
different from the aristocratic Oxbridge type in England. These men who walked the halls of 
Harvard and Yale and then Wall Street and the State Department were clearly the target of the 
anti-Communist and anti-homosexual purges. Joseph McCarthy remarked that “the bright young 
men in the State Department who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who 
have been the most traitorous,” while Washington columnist John O’Donnell was even more 
direct in his assertion that anti-New Deal Republicans felt the State Department was a “secret 
inner circle of highly educated, socially highly-placed sexual misfits…all easy to blackmail, all 
susceptible to blandishments by homosexuals in foreign nations” (74; 72). These attacks had 
political heft, indicating that the same or similar connections to those in the U.K. between 
homosexuality, education, class status, government work—especially intelligence and diplomatic 
work, as lawmakers seemed to be immune from the stigma—and betrayal were in the cultural 
discourse. The background and life experiences that had just a few years before been attached to 
an idealized “gentlemanly” masculinity, a masculinity that was considered to be perfect for 
government service, was being called into question. Intelligence agencies on both sides of the 
Atlantic rushed to answer these questions by attempting to, intra-organizationally and publically, 
redefine the kind of man122 that could be trusted enough to be a “secret agent” for the state.  
                                                 
122Recently, women have begun to be seen as more than secretaries in intelligence work—
specifically in analysis and management. We can see this effect in popular culture through more, 
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 For some within espionage, this redefinition could not come fast enough. By the time 
Burgess and Maclean defected and James Bond debuted (one year after the defections), certain 
contingents within both the American and British spy organizations had begun, with only limited 
success, the turn to covert action that would characterize espionage throughout the Cold War. 
These would-be reformers had begun to make their complaints with the old guard known during 
the Second World War, but wartime establishment changes are somewhat rare, especially in an 
era in which the shield of gentlemanliness that protected the scions of intelligence work was still 
mostly intact. These early grumblings presage the narrative that really entered the public 
discourse only after the Burgess and Maclean defections: namely, that the spy recruited directly 
from the University was ill-suited, because too effeminate, academic or homosexual, for a new, 
and increasingly more violent, kind of covert action. This narrative was coterminous with a rapid 
expansion in intelligence work fueled by the geopolitics of World War Two and the Cold War. 
The result was a change in the makeup of the intelligence community, especially “in the ranks” 
as opposed to the top leadership. Increasingly over the course of the Cold War, middle-class 
functionaries and bureaucrats, and soldiers from all classes, were swept into intelligence 
fieldwork, which began to range from traditional intelligence gathering and propaganda to more 
violent operations like sabotage, targeted killings, and planning the overthrow of entire regimes. 
These new hires brought their cultural backgrounds and attitudes with them, and these attitudes 
were often hostile to the gentleman’s club atmosphere of the upper echelons of the CIA and MI6. 
When the defections did happen, the intra-intelligence hostility between proponents of 
conventional espionage and those of covert action threatened to come to a head. 
                                                 
and more varied, works that feature female protagonists, but the effect on the institutional culture 
of intelligence work is harder to gauge in the short term.     
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The Burgess and Maclean defections, taking place within the context of the Lavender 
Scare and seemingly confirming its correctness, convinced the public and policy makers that the 
intelligence world was blind to its own shortcomings. In other words, the defections were the 
final proof for an already skeptical audience both inside and outside the secret world of 
intelligence that the shield of gentlemanly silence did not only protect state secrets, but allowed 
enemies of the nation free rein behind closed doors. The pressures of the defections were to 
affect spy fiction as well, given that spy fiction is the primary way culture at large experiences 
espionage. Spy fiction and the history of espionage were perhaps at no point since the beginnings 
of the genre so closely connected; for, just as the birth of spy fiction coincided with and 
influenced the birth of spy agencies, so this major redefinition of what spy-work was and who 
could do it found its fictional representation springing into being out of the same cultural miasma 
that instigated the change in intelligence work itself. The cultural representation of the new spy 
that was to come out of this moment of crisis in intelligence and crisis in masculinity, as we will 
see, subsequently influenced the direction that the intelligence community developed. By the 
early 1950s, the culture of espionage, under suspicion due to allegations of nepotism, croney-
ism, Communism, and homosexuality, clearly could not be marketed and represented to the 
public in the same way it had in the days of Richard Hannay and Sandy Arbuthnot. In short, 
within the intelligence world and without it, the stage was being set for the emergence of that 
most famous spy, James Bond, and the drone masculinity that he helps to originate in the cultural 
discourse of espionage. Ian Fleming’s James Bond serves to soothe over the skepticism some felt 
about a profession that seems inherently dishonest and institutionally compromised. Bond’s 
success in the marketplace undoubtedly has multiple related causes; for example, as Michael 
Denning argues, Bond figures a yearning for a particular representation of the superiority of the 
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English tourist in an age of decolonization and the end of the Empire (Denning 102). However, 
another crucial and under-examined factor in Bond’s popularity was that the public-school spy 
image that Bond represents addresses some of the criticisms leveled against actual public-school 
spies from without and within the intelligence apparatus after the Burgess and Maclean 
defections. The intelligence worker, a servant of the state, must be trustworthy. Thanks in large 
part to Bond and his popularity in the wake of the defections and the dawn of a new kind of spy 
service, trustworthiness would become lastingly linked to heterosexuality, violence, and 
professionalism. 
James Bond, Drone Masculinity and the Making of the Soldier-Spy 
Bond represents an answer for a public that had deep doubts about the effectiveness and 
competence of its intelligence apparatus during a historical moment which seemed to continually 
reinforce the need for intelligence services. In other words, Fleming’s stories and their later 
movie versions allowed the public to once again see spies as heroes, as trustworthy servants of 
the state. Bond, emerging after the Burgess and Maclean scandal and the Lavender Scare, 
replaced an older template for the pop-culture spy—which was something akin to John Buchan’s 
Richard Hannay—because that older template had been irreversibly damaged in the cultural 
imagination. This new template linked masculinity, heterosexuality, trustworthiness, and the 
capacity to inflict and endure violence in the name of the state. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in scenes where Fleming creates a scenario that puts it to the test. As readers and audiences 
are quite familiar, Fleming and later writers have created some, let’s say, convoluted tortures for 
Bond to endure. But arguably the first such torture scene is the most harrowing, despite being the 
simplest, as it involves nothing more than a wicker chair and a knotted rope. Midway through 
Casino Royale (1953) the villain, Le Chiffre, has Bond stripped and tied down, and proceeds to 
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smash his genitals to get him to reveal where he has hidden his poker winnings. Le Chiffre does 
not attempt to hide the symbolic and psychological blows he inflicts in addition to the physical, 
telling Bond that this form of torture is always effective because: “It is not only the immediate 
agony, but also the thought that your manhood is being gradually destroyed and that at the end, if 
you will not yield, you will no longer be a man” (Casino 115). Pinning down exactly what it is 
under threat here, or in other words, what it means for James Bond to be a man, will help reveal 
how Bond is a pivot-point in the development of the spy in contemporary popular culture. Bond, 
strapped to the wicker chair as Le Chiffre winds the rope, worries about an induced homosexual 
attraction (one that would, in a post-Burgess era, compromise his trustworthiness as a secret 
agent):  
[Bond] had been told by colleagues who had survived torture by the Germans and 
the Japanese that towards the end there came a wonderful period of warmth and 
languor leading into a sort of sexual twilight where pain turned to pleasure and 
where hatred and fear of the torturers turned to masochistic infatuation. It was the 
supreme test of will, he had learnt, to avoid showing this form of punch-
drunkenness. (113) 
Note how this passage connects homosexual attraction to security risks—Bond must resist 
infatuation with Le Chiffre so that he does not give Le Chiffre what he wants, which is specific 
information (where Bond has hidden the money), but also a kind of submission to his will. Bond 
is rescued from Le Chiffre before he blabs, but nevertheless, after his physical recovery, Bond 
fears that he remains psychologically damaged. Specifically, he worries that his heterosexuality 
has been lost: “And now when he could see [Vesper Lynd] again, he was afraid. Afraid that his 
senses and his body would not respond to her sensual beauty. Afraid that he would feel no stir of 
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desire and that his blood would stay cool” (155). As one can guess, Bond ultimately has no 
problems performing. He treats Vesper first as a test of his own virility but very quickly 
discovers that his fascination with her is not just as a physical sexual object—he becomes 
obsessed with and aroused by the idea that she has a secret he cannot know (which, granted, she 
does—she is a Soviet double agent). Bond’s misogynistic pleasure in penetrating Vesper’s 
privacy as well as her body allows him to experience what he calls “the sweet tang of rape” in 
each sexual encounter (156). Bond’s interactions with Le Chiffre and Vesper link his sexuality, 
brutality, masculinity, and capability as a secret agent. He resists giving Le Chiffre any of his 
secret knowledge, and he passes the “supreme test of will” by refusing homosexual desire—an 
act that would function by itself as a betrayal of the British state, regardless of any information 
he actually passes on, since simply being homosexual is treasonous enough. Bond then seeks to 
forcibly possess Vesper’s body and her secret knowledge, a secret that once known directly 
benefits MI6. Taken together, these are a double confirmation for the audience of his straightness 
and his spying prowess.  
In order to show the break that Bond instigates in the depiction of the secret agent, and to 
better illustrate how the cultural moment of the defections affects how sexuality and its relation 
to trustworthiness are depicted in the Bond books, it is useful to compare Bond to an older 
conception of the ideal intelligence agent—in this case, T.E. Lawrence. Remember that by the 
time of Casino Royale’s publication, Lawrence’s image was being very publically raked over the 
coals due to questions about his honesty, his sexuality, and the perceived conspiracy among 
some of his powerful friends to cover these things up. In short, Lawrence, at the same time of the 
defections and the Lavender Scare, had (not coincidentally) become that which Bond is 
deliberately set against: the old, outdated model, extravagant, protected by a shield of upper-class 
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status, a liar, a dandy, gay. Fleming seems well aware of this. Take, as a somewhat ghoulish 
comparison to Bond’s interrogation by Le Chiffre, this scene from Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of 
Wisdom (1922) in which he has been captured by Turkish forces as a spy and, after refusing the 
sexual advances of the prison commander, is tortured: 
I remembered the corporal kicking with his nailed boot to get me up; and this was 
true, for the next day my right side was dark and lacerated…I remembered 
smiling idly at him, for a delicious warmth, probably sexual, was swelling 
through me: and then he flung up his arm and hacked with the full length of his 
whip into my groin. (Pillars 445) 
The similarities, especially the linking of masochistic sexual pleasure to torture and the use of a 
rope/whip to attack the groin, are enough to suspect that Fleming was deliberately referencing 
Lawrence’s account while writing Casino Royale. Regardless of whether it was deliberate or not, 
that Bond adamantly and explicitly resists the formation of sexual pleasure towards his torturer 
indicates that Fleming’s idea of what was acceptable for a spy to feel under duress was quite 
different from Lawrence’s. Lawrence in 1922 had no qualms describing and publishing his 
experience, but by 1953, audiences would see such behavior as weakness, as rendering Lawrence 
unfit as an intelligence worker. Eve Sedgwick reads the passage in which Lawrence is tortured as 
an expression of “the wrenching disjunctions in his ability, as a man, to master the map of male 
homosocial desire” (Between Men 195). Sedgwick’s reading stems from the frustrations and 
confusion that Lawrence felt dealing with his homosexuality in an imperial bureaucracy that was 
intensely homosocial but also homophobic. This frustration pushed Lawrence hubristically to 
graft his sexual identity (in an unequal and Orientalizing relation) on to Arabic homosocial 
culture. His torture and rape at the Turkish garrison town of Deraa broke his fantasies of 
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mastering that Other. But by the time Fleming wrote Casino Royale, the secret agent must not be 
broken. He must be the master.  
And so James Bond helps to usher in a new era in which the older characterization of the 
spy—a gentleman steeped in a homosocial world of public schools, university clubs, bureau 
offices and map rooms—no longer functions as an adequate justification of spy work to the 
public. Bond is a cultural salve to the anxiety raised by the Cambridge Spies—namely, that the 
old guard homosociality associated with the spy world in fact overlapped too much with 
homosexuality, and homosexuality was dangerous to the state because it could be exploited, 
either through blackmail, subversion or inherent weakness. Though Bond seems, at first glance, 
to be a tuxedo-clad throwback to the gentlemanly, amateur spy—the gambling, the sporting 
adventures, the chases and thrills all echo Buchan and Hannay—his brutality, explicit 
heterosexuality, and success would make him a trustworthy government agent to a Lavender 
Scare Senate sub-committee. Both critic Alan Hepburn in his study of the spy genre, Intrigue, 
and Erin Carlston draw attention to the metaphorical connection between the national body, seen 
as male, and the penetrative, homosexual, power of the rival nation’s intelligence agency. 
Homosexuals, seen as already inhabiting a secret world of underground connections, were thus 
especially “leaky” in Hepburn’s phrasing (Hepburn 187). Bond’s detached, cruel heterosexuality 
is meant to be a safeguard against this charge; Bond is leak-proof (pun intended), even under 
extreme duress.  
Bond as a symbol reflects on the prior history of his profession, and as I argue, represents 
a significant, culturally-motivated break from previous depictions of secret agents. The figure of 
Bond has also provided an ideological template that has affected not only how spies are 
perceived, but also how they are hired and what they are asked to do. Bond’s legacy in the 
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discourse of espionage is as an early template for what I call “drone masculinity”, which is, once 
again, characterized by an objectifying mindset, aggression, and willingness to subsume personal 
agency to a hierarchic and bureaucratic structure in exchange for cultural and sexual rewards (in 
other words, in exchange for the cultural license to be seen as “real men”). Bond’s treatment of 
women throughout his 60-year history as the premier pop-culture spy amply demonstrates each 
of these. We have just seen how his hyper-heterosexuality, formed in response especially to 
anxieties raised by the Burgess and Maclean defections, functions to objectify Vesper in Casino 
Royale as an object-with-a-secret that must be penetrated.123 Sexual pleasure (for Bond) is used 
as a reward in Bond fiction; the “passionate leave” is granted by M at the end of the adventure 
(as it is in Live and Let Die) in exchange for service well done on behalf of the state (Live and 
Let Die 243). Before that final reward, Bond proves his masculinity by violence, sometimes to 
the women he later beds, and always to the many male henchmen he kills in the name of Her 
Majesty’s Secret Service. Bond popularizes the change in spy work to more military operations 
during and after World War Two, and its constant reinforcement in book after book and film 
after film, and the frequent proximity of violent set pieces and sexual reward generalizes these 
changes, removing any specific historical context. Bond has mowed down Soviet agents, Soviet 
soldiers, mercenaries, Western terrorists, Middle Eastern terrorists, thieves, ninjas, and turncoats 
with equal abandon; the only constant is that he solves his problems with violence. Bond exists 
to show the superiority of the ideology that sustains him by being rewarded for inflicting 
violence on others and taking violence himself without breaking. Fleming, who is, of course, not 
                                                 
123 Or see the even more misogynistic and heteronormative example of Pussy Galore, whose 
homosexuality is associated with her duplicity as an agent of Goldfinger, and thus homosexuality 
and villainy are set up as equivalent pathologies which Bond can cure simultaneously via a 
forced sexual encounter.  
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the greatest wordsmith, reserves his best and most urgent descriptions in the books invariably for 
descriptions of bodies in pain, and when it is Bond’s body, it is almost always coupled with the 
affirmation that pain is not enough to derail the mission. The following passage from Dr. No, in 
which Bond is being forced to crawl through a superheated passageway at the center of Dr. No’s 
“proving ground,” is indicative: 
There was no air. His lungs were bursting…He lurched and his bruised shoulder 
hit the metal. He screamed. He went on screaming, regularly, with each contact of 
hand or knee or toes. Now he was finished. Now he would fall flat and slowly fry 
to death. No! He must drive on, screaming, until his flesh was burned to the bone. 
The skin must have already gone from the knees…Go on! Go on! This isn’t where 
you’re supposed to die. (A James Bond Omnibus 703) 
Similar passages become a staple of the genre after Bond, littering the espionage thrillers of Tom 
Clancy and Robert Ludlum, and airport novels everywhere. Bond’s license to kill is the same as 
his license to act as a servant of the state. The association between the intelligence worker and 
that license to kill, which Bond’s legacy helps cement, has become a key part of a discursive 
structure that changes people into “targets,” first within intelligence work and then in the culture-
at-large. We expect our spies to be killers, a fact directly at odds with the history of the 
profession and the history of the genre of spy fiction up until James Bond. Male-centered spy 
thrillers like the Bond stories and films and their descendants like the Bourne franchise and the 
new Mission: Impossible movies exemplify the masculinist model of agency set forth by 
Bertrand de Jouvenel: “A man feels himself more of a man when he is imposing himself or 
making others the instruments of his will” (qtd. in Nelson 164). This model sounds like it could 
be a line penned by Fleming, and the prevalence of this philosophy in Bond and in the genre 
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Bond’s popularity shaped and defined has proven to have a profound effect on the future of 
espionage work: it has become more violent, more domineering, and less likely to feel 
constrained by law.  
The template that Bond provides for the secret agent, a template that will become drone 
masculinity when it crosses over from spy fiction and enters fully into the way intelligence 
agencies recruit, train, and “run” (i.e. manage, in spy parlance) covert agents, is worth exploring 
in more depth in order to uncover the cultural work it actually does. In other words, the next few 
paragraphs show how the Bond-ian model was seen as convincing as a replacement for the 
Hannay-type, homosocial, gentleman-adventurer. The work the Bond-ian model does is visible 
in each of the many Bond films and stories throughout the 50s and 60s.124 At first glance a rather 
atypical example of a Bond tale, the short story “The Property of a Lady” finds Bond not seeking 
to foil the plans of an egomaniacal madman, but rather to uncover a KGB spy in London at a 
jewel auction.125 Much more relevant than the short and simple plot, though, is how Fleming 
portrays Bond, and the secret service he represents, in terms of this new, post-Burgess 
framework of masculinity. In this respect, “The Property of a Lady” is not atypical at all. Bond 
first appears reading a manual on covert means of assassination using poison-capsule guns. 
When startled from his reverie, he immediately and instinctively reaches for his side-arm 
(Octopussy 48). Keep in mind this is a story about forcing the KGB to show their hand through 
economic entrapment (they have to bid up the titular “property,” a Faberge emerald, in order to 
mask a payment to a double agent); the plot is actually much closer to the kind of cerebral 
intelligence work associated with the profession in pop culture before Bond and after him in the 
                                                 
124 And in the films and stories of Bond’s immediate copycats, those spies on the “Bondwagon” 
as scholar Allan Burton terms it. 
125 Would you believe that this story has not yet been made into a film? 
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counter-strain of espionage fiction descending from John Le Carré. And yet even within this 
divergent (for Bond stories) plot structure, Bond is still introduced as an intentional (because he 
is studying up on assassination) and also an automatic killer. Bond is then called into a meeting 
with M and a Dr. Fanshawe, who works for customs and who has uncovered the suspicious 
provenance of the jewel. Here is how Bond sizes up Dr. Fanshawe: ““The stranger was middle-
aged, rosy, well-fed, and clothed rather foppishly in the neo-Edwardian fashion…Bond summed 
him up as something literary, a critic perhaps, a bachelor—possibly with homosexual 
tendencies” (50). Fanshawe is at once the un-masculine trifecta: academic, homosexual, and 
fop.126 He is portrayed as incapable of even looking Bond and M in the eye, always staring “at 
his boots” or “at a point above M’s left shoulder” (51). Bond and M, meanwhile, are incapable of 
withholding their feeling of masculine superiority over Fanshawe. For example, after M makes a 
comment about art being overpriced, Dr. Fanshawe nearly faints “at this bare-faced revelation of 
M’s philistinism.” M tries to placate him: “‘Forgive me, Dr. Fanshawe. I expressed myself 
clumsily. I have never had the leisure to interest myself in works of art nor, on a naval officer’s 
pay, the money to acquire any’” (55). M’s attempt at placation is to assert a vision of the Secret 
Service as, essentially, having too much probity and import to be caught up in the frivolousness 
of the concerns of the learned gentleman. M tacitly portrays himself as the protector and 
guarantor of Fanshawe’s foppishness, but does so in a way that also reasserts the boundaries 
between Fanshawe’s type and the Secret Service itself—a crucial move in making a profession 
damaged by allegations that it was composed of Fanshawes (and Communist Fanshawes to boot) 
seem more palatable. This is not to say that “Property of a Lady”, or indeed the Bond series in 
                                                 
126 And of course Fleming’s dig at literary critics is noticeable as well given the public reception 
vs critical reception of the Bond stories. 
 230 
general, seeks to overthrow the idea that “gentlemen” have the reins of government securely in 
hand. In fact, when Bond meets his actual auction-hall contact, an art dealer, the contact is at first 
quite guarded when he perceives Bond as little more than a roughneck policeman. It is only after 
Bond mentions some other art houses and fancy hotels he has stayed at that the contact trusts him 
(60). Gentlemen have buying power after all, and if that isn’t quite the same thing as taste in 
Bond’s world, it is a fairly good proxy. Bond’s character walks a fine line between old guard and 
new: he is a killer, but he stays at the Ritz; he has no time for art, yet he can make art dealers 
comfortable. This tightrope-act is precisely what has made Bond so popular, and it is also what 
allows the Bond-ian archetype to originate the concept of drone masculinity within the cultural 
discourse of espionage under the perfect cover: Bond is a fantasy of endless agency masking an 
espionage mindset that dehumanizes enemy, civilian, and agent alike.  
I understand that arguing James Bond, whose adventures seem to epitomize Michael 
Denning’s famous dictum that “The secret agent returns human agency to a world which seems 
less and less the product of human action,” is actually an integral part in a cultural discourse of 
espionage that pushed real intelligence towards drone masculinity and actual drone warfare, may 
seem like a paradox, or at least counter-intuitive (Denning 14). Especially the final component of 
drone masculinity, the willingness to self-mechanize, to cede one’s personal agency to a large 
organization (and not, in contrast, to a direct superior on the battlefield or even to a particular 
ideology) seems like it doesn’t quite fit the secret agent premiere. Bond, in the books, often 
shows outright disdain for MI6, especially in the short story “The Living Daylights” from 1962. 
In the story, Bond is asked to kill a KGB sniper from across the East/West Berlin demarcation 
line. He is less than thrilled at the mission, first forcing M to stop using euphemisms to describe 
it as anything else than a kill mission (“This was to be murder. All right. Let M bloody well say 
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so”), and then disparaging that he had been “fired off by M, like a projectile, at some distant 
target where a problem waited for his coming”—in other words, that he had been treated as a 
drone (86; 88). Bond is openly insubordinate to his boss on site in Berlin, and “sneer[s] at his 
profession” when that commanding agent uses the language of tradecraft to tell Bond what to do 
(93). Lastly, Bond refuses to ultimately kill his target, instead wounding the KGB sniper’s 
shooting arm permanently. But these elements of the Bond mythos have not been picked up in 
his cultural image. Much more essential elements to Bond’s lasting fame are also found in the 
“Living Daylights”: M’s refusal to call a murder a murder is justified in the story as a mechanism 
to diffuse the responsibility, and thus the guilt, an agent has, an act which dehumanizes the 
enemy and the agent alike; Bond’s refusal to kill the opposing sniper is not out of a recognition 
of their complementary positions and thus shared humanity, but because she turns out to be a 
she; Bond becomes infatuated with this dangerous woman while staring at her through his 
sniper-scope; Bond ultimately fights off this infatuation by describing himself as “married to the 
gun127” (100). Lastly, the superior that Bond is openly insubordinate to is the old model of 
intelligence worker, the “backbone of the Civil Service…a good second at Oxford…the ideal 
staff man,” or, in other words, the type discredited by the defections as being unfit for the new 
world of espionage (89). Little wonder Bond treats him contemptuously.  
But surely, one might object, if drone masculinity is prefigured anywhere in the Bond 
books or films, it isn’t really in Bond himself, but in his antagonists. As Patrick O’Donnell 
claims, on the surface, “The logic here seems irrefutable: Bond represents democratic freedom, 
vigorous manhood, mobility, life; the villains represent totalitarian bondage, machinic entropy, 
paralysis, death” (O’Donnell 62). Bond villains sometimes actually blur the line between man 
                                                 
127 The phallicism of the male gaze on full display in this scenario.  
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and machine, like Dr. No and his mechanical hands, and when they don’t have artificial parts 
themselves, they are often described as automatons. Red Grant in From Russia with Love128 is a 
great example; Fleming goes to great lengths to contrast Grant and Bond and, by proxy, the 
services they represent. Grant is SMERSH’s chief executioner, a killer who, unlike every other 
person to hold the post, doesn’t seem to tire of killing. Grant is immune to the “melancholy and 
drink…and a dreadful lassitude which brings a glaze to the eyes and slows up the movements 
and destroys accuracy” that Grant’s KGB superiors have seen ultimately end the usefulness of 
other state-sponsored assassins (22). He is introduced, in a sentence that only makes sense 
discussing Bond novels, as pointedly not getting an erection as an attractive girl massages him. 
Lastly, Grant is anti-intellectual, scoring poorly at spy school in ideology and theory, but 
exceptionally well in tactics and the violent skills of sabotage, close-quarters combat, and 
marksmanship. Grant enjoys killing and little else, save for the Order of Lenin medal he 
imagines he will get for killing Bond. He obeys his orders automatically and carries them out 
efficiently. If it weren’t for his monthly periods of “lunacy” on the nights of a full moon, in 
which he becomes so violent that he is uncontrollable, he would be a Soviet automaton.129  
Bond, and MI6 in general, are contrasted to Grant and SMERSH/the KGB. Fleming has a 
Soviet intelligence chief extoll that, unlike Red Grant and his external reward of the Order of 
Lenin, British secret agents: 
                                                 
128 I will be referring to the novel version, in which Soviet Intelligence Agency SMERSH decides 
to embarrass and kill James Bond to deal a moral blow to MI6 by striking at the myth of the 
upright and capable British agent. They plan to force a relationship between Bond and SMERSH 
agent Tatiana Romanova in Istanbul and on the Orient Express, before having chief executioner 
Red Grant kill the pair before they get to Paris. Naturally, the plan fails.  
129The KGB just puts him in a prison with criminals who are to be executed on this night and let 
Grant go wild. 
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serve with devotion. Yet these agents have no special privileges in 
England…Their social standing abroad is not high, and their wives have to pass as 
the wives of secretaries. They are rarely awarded a decoration until they retire. 
And yet these men and women continue to do this dangerous work…It is perhaps 
the Public School and University tradition. The love of adventure. But still it is 
odd that they play this game so well, for they are not natural conspirators…Of 
course, most of their strength lies in the myth—in the myth of Scotland Yard, of 
Sherlock Holmes, of the Secret Service…this myth is a hindrance which it would 
be good to set aside. (41-42) 
Here Fleming offers a defense of a traditional romantic view of espionage in the U.K. that, while 
acknowledged to be something of a myth (a myth that can be embodied in James Bond), is still 
behind the success of the British intelligence apparatus. Elsewhere in the novel too Fleming 
seems to be bemoaning the changes in intelligence towards violence and covert action. For 
example, when the Istanbul section-chief Kerim kills a man from a distance with a sniper-rifle, 
Bond, “who has never killed in cold blood,130” recoils in a mild disgust (179). Even more 
tellingly, a rare passage of Bond’s internal thought includes the secret agent waxing nostalgic at 
the difference between his youthful life of adventure and his cynical life as a spy:  
If that young James Bond came up to him in the street and talked to him, would 
he recognize the clean, eager youth that had been him at seventeen? And what 
would the youth think of him, the secret agent? Would he recognize himself 
beneath the surface of this man who was tarnished with years of treachery and 
                                                 
130 This is either a mistake on Fleming’s part or a very charitable reading of certain previous 
encounters in the Bond books, like in Live and Let Die in which Bond feeds henchman The 
Robber to a shark.  
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ruthlessness and fear—this man with the cold arrogant eyes and the scar down his 
cheek and the flat bulge beneath his left armpit?...What would he think of the 
dashing secret agent who was off across the world in a new and most romantic 
role—to pimp for England? (117) 
Bond here resents an agency that would force him to conflate his sexual desire with service to his 
country. Bond’s “weakness for women” as his KGB file reads should be a personal weakness, 
not a professional one. Bond, of all people, suggests earlier in the book that this separation of 
personal “vice” and professional work should extend to everyone in the Secret Service. 
Appointed to a committee to determine whether intellectuals should be recruited into MI6 
following the Burgess and Maclean defections,131 Bond is the only voice who thinks they should 
in order to match the Soviet’s facility for human intelligence and long-term mind games. His 
point of view is met by the committee chairman with resistance: ““So you [Bond] suggest we 
should staff the organization with long-haired perverts. That’s quite an original notion. I thought 
we were all agreed that homosexuals were about the worst security risk there is” (103). Though 
this logic on display in the book further reinforces the intellectual/dandy/gentleman/homosexual 
linkage we have been discussing, Bond doesn’t agree with it: “Not all intellectuals are 
homosexuals,” he retorts (103). 
  From Russia with Love reminds us that while the discourse of drone masculinity may be 
beginning to circulate in the 50s and 60s, it has not yet crystallized as a desirable force even in 
the genre of masculinist spy fiction (let alone in the other, Le Carré-an, Graham Greenian, strand 
of spy fiction). Yet, even in From Russia with Love, Fleming can’t seem to be consistent in 
describing Bond’s relation to a changing Secret Service. Each of the moments I highlighted 
                                                 
131 Which are mentioned explicitly as the context of the meetings. 
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above in which the text seems to want to resist the drone masculine discourse it nevertheless 
invokes (usually in description of Grant, the KGB, or espionage in general) is itself undercut. 
Sometimes this subversion is an immediate reattachment in the text of Bond to the proto-drone 
masculinity that he helps originate in the cultural imagination of espionage. For example, despite 
the many contrasts between the uber-violent, mechanistic Grant and Bond, and the romantic 
description of British espionage in the novel, this is how Bond is introduced in the text: 
The blubbery arms of the soft life had Bond round the neck and they were slowly 
strangling him. He was a man of war and when, for a long period, there was no 
war, his spirit went into a decline. In his particular line of business, peace had 
reigned for nearly a year. And peace was killing him. (97)  
This introduction is in some ways a familiar trope in the genre. The male protagonists of 
adventure and spy fiction are often introduced as bored with their domestic lives, thirsting for the 
adventure “out there” that will restore meaning and potency. However, the way that Bond is 
specifically described as a “man of war” in an intelligence service is very new here. Compare 
John Buchan’s take on the descriptive trope in The 39 Steps: 
Here was I [Richard Hannay], thirty-seven years old, sound in wind and limb, 
with enough money to have a good time, yawning my head off all day. I had just 
about settled to clear out and get back to the veld, for I was the best bored man in 
the United Kingdom. (Thirty-Nine Steps 1) 
Buchan’s description makes sure to signal Hannay’s class status (“enough money”) as well as his 
fitness for adventure, while keeping the emphasis on boredom. The emphasis in the Bond 
description is on violence (“strangling” “man of war” “killing him”) and Bond’s (currently 
wasted) capability for it. Nor is this the only moment at which Bond is contrasted with the old-
 236 
school gentlemanly spy à la Richard Hannay. At the climax of the novel, Red Grant imitates the 
British gentleman spy archetype (having studied under a British defector in Russia—clearly 
another shout out to Burgess and Maclean) in order to fool Bond into thinking that he (Grant) is 
backup from M. Remember, Grant is machine-like and lacks social skills, to put it lightly. Bond, 
though, is thoroughly fooled because he cannot look past his own judgments about that 
archetype. Bond reads Grant’s surface accoutrements with clear distaste: “Bond mistrusted 
anyone who tied his tie with a Windsor knot. It showed too much vanity” (230). Even though 
Bond is wrong about this particular “gentleman,” his thinking reinforces the idea that this type of 
spy is outmoded for Cold War secret service. Even when Grant slips up with an accent or an 
inappropriate usage of slang, Bond takes it as a symptom of a gentleman-spy nervous and out of 
his depth now that he is in the field. A gentleman-spy, in Bond’s universe, ends up being a great 
cover for the sociopathic Soviet agent Grant because it conceals danger under the guise of 
surface respectability and institutional naivety—exactly the charges against this type of 
espionage agent made by its critics. In this scene, Fleming gets to make both points about the 
unsuitability of the Buchan spy-type at once: gentlemanliness, if “true,” makes one unsuitable for 
violent spy work (Bond’s judgment), and if feigned, masks Soviet allegiance (Grant’s actual 
motives). This can be seen in Bond’s “Not all intellectuals are homosexuals” retort as well—
notice Bond does not say “not all homosexuals are untrustworthy,” “not all Communists are 
homosexual or intellectual,” or some other phrase that would short-circuit the Lavender Scare 
logic in the novel. Rather, Bond seems in a meta-textual move to be more interested in justifying 
the usefulness of the intellectuals the real MI6 actually still had on staff than in actively 
challenging the idea that sexuality and politics are entwined. 
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 It is this entwining of sex and political ideology that makes drone masculinity different 
from complete mechanization (such as found in the sexless Red Grant, for example). It is also 
what makes the Bond fantasy so appealing and so effective at shaping the cultural discourse of 
espionage. Bond’s contradictions in terms is his appeal—he is aggressively sexual, but automatic 
and machine-like in his efficiency, a fantasy of the romantic hero, but a “man of war” that peace 
is “killing,” a gentleman who mistrusts anyone who ties a Windsor knot, a man who resents 
being made to “pimp for England” but in the very next sentence shakes off that mutinous thought 
and re-embraces duty: “Bond put the thought of his dead youth out of his mind. Never job 
backwards” (Russia 117). Patrick O’Donnell calls Bond the “cyborg-aristocrat” due to these 
contradictions, these vacillations between drone and agent, machine and capital-M Man. 
O’Donnell elucidates this concept of cyborg-aristocrat by making reference to Tom Wolfe’s The 
Right Stuff and its depictions of astronauts:  
[astronauts] are technological marvels who have survived the tortures of being 
converted from man into machine, and yet who, at the same time, retain the 
quintessence of their humanity by possessing “the right stuff” that transforms 
them from mere mortals into the post-human elite…Portrayed as the high priests 
of the national security state, the astronauts are a contradiction in terms: at once 
robotic and the idealization of “the human,” at the same time (merely) 
technological prostheses and, yet, super-men… (O’Donnell 56) 
Bond is portrayed similarly—as the apotheosis of the state servant into machine god. As 
O’Donnell describes him, Bond “is a contradiction in terms: on the one hand, [he] instantiates a 
fully incarnate, passionate, highly intelligent, powerful heterosexual male that might be 
considered the end product of secular humanism—a recuperation of all that is threatened by 
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capitalism’s conversion of the heightened individual into mass subject; on the other hand, this 
figure is machinic and prosthetic” (57). Bond’s mechanism is more than just a reliance on 
gadgets, technology, and firearms as prosthetics for his own agency. It is present even when 
Bond is without gadget, in situations in which one might expect him to appear most fully human. 
For example, in From Russia with Love, Bond and Tatiana’s sexual encounter in Istanbul blurs 
the human form into the machine-work of the cameras filming them: “And the view finders 
gazed coldly down on the passionate arabesques the two bodies formed and broke and formed 
again, and the clockwork mechanism of the cine-cameras whirred softly on and on” (190). The 
“formed and broke and formed again” seems identical to the clockwork mechanism of the 
camera, making the whole strange incident into an unsettling mix of man, machine, and voyeur. 
Bond also seems more machine than man when under duress. In On Her Majesty’s Secret 
Service his mind whirrs “like an IBM machine” (qtd. in Hepburn 189). Mathis in Casino Royale 
tells him that it would be a shame for the service to “lose such a wonderful machine” (136). 
After Bond endures Dr. No’s death course, Fleming writes that “Inside the torn envelope of his 
skin, the machine was quietly, solidly ticking over” (A James Bond Omnibus 718). Bond has 
very little interiority, and his past seems irrelevant for understanding his character or present 
motivations. (In fact, he doesn’t really receive a past until 2012’s Skyfall.132) This “cyborg-
aristocrat” image of Bond is the one that has endured and shaped how intelligence work is 
                                                 
132 The Daniel Craig films in many respects react against the character’s history in addition to 
embracing certain aspects of it. Certainly, Craig’s Bond is not an exemplar of drone 
masculinity—despite the film’s acknowledgment of the embrace of the mindset within 
intelligence. This is shown well in the two most recent films, Skyfall and Spectre, in which the 00 
program’s affinities with drone programs are made explicit. In both films, M must fight 
government higher ups who wish to replace the 00s with a drone-warfare section and a beefed-up 
electronic surveillance section, only for Bond to prove the 00s worth over any machine 
replacement by the end of the movie.  
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represented in print and on screen precisely because it yokes together efficiency, violence, 
heterosexual pleasure, and trustworthiness.  
Even when the actual character of Bond does not act in such a way to reinforce the 
discourse of drone masculinity that he helped inaugurate (as in “The Living Daylights”), people 
seem to want him to. Bond’s status as a cultural symbol seems to trump the characterization and 
plots he actually experiences, and even the actors that play him. For example, critic Stephanie 
Jones in her paper133 on the Bond of the 80s and 90s has pointed out how the critical and 
audience response to the Timothy Dalton-led Bonds of the 1980s was both quite negative and 
also concerned about the disconnect between Dalton’s version of the super-spy and the tropes 
they were expecting. As Henry Fitzherbert put it in a review of the much bloodier and bombastic 
Pierce Brosnan films, 
In the late Eighties, before the series went into limbo, the films were fatally in 
thrall to realism and political correctness. The storylines became less fantastical - 
in Licence To Kill the villain was a pedestrian drug trafficker with no ambitions 
for world domination- and Bond became a mumsy Nineties man. I still shudder at 
the memory of Dalton cooking himself a quiche. Not only was he a dab hand in 
the kitchen, he was also caring and monogamous. And, in what was trumpeted as 
a great leap forwards into gritty realism, we even saw Bond bleed. The result? 
Awful box office and a Bond movie only in name. Where were the gags, the girls 
and the megalomaniacs? (Fitzherbert 28) 
                                                 
133 Entitled “Get Your Clothes on and I’ll Buy You an Ice Cream: The Unlikely History of James 
Bond and the New Man” and presented at the conference Spies on British Screens held at the 
University of Plymouth. 
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Fitzherbert’s complaints were noticed at the time of the Dalton Bonds as well; reviewers in the 
Daily Mail, the Independent, and the Times all concurred that “after Connery’s feral drive and 
Moore’s caddish mischief, this Bond for the safe sex era seems a bit subdued” (Usher 22). It’s 
plain to see that Fitzherbert and the others are reacting against the aspects of this iteration of 
Bond that don’t conform to what has become expected from depictions of spies and secret 
agents—they are somehow against respecting women, being less violent, and having traits 
perceived as feminine (though it’s Roger Moore that cooks the quiche—perhaps further 
highlighting the replaceable nature of the actor who plays Bond). That the original character to 
begin to shape this discourse in intelligence is himself vulnerable to revisions seems to incense 
Fitzherbert and other reviewers even more.134 The Bond archetype though (which is, as we see 
with poor Timothy Dalton, not the same as the Bond character) has become so entrenched that 
the variations witnessed within an individual Bond story, or the series of films of one Bond actor, 
are perceived within the framework of that archetype. There is a Bond-type of character, in other 
words, and it exists as an assembled set of characteristics that stick in the cultural imagination, 
regardless of what the specific Bond is doing in any specific film. In this way the trajectory of 
Bond, the cultural originator of drone masculinity in intelligence, mimics the trajectories of the 
actual intelligence workers indoctrinated into that discourse. As the next chapter argues, the 
world of intelligence has come to see the covert-action “type” as what is needed—the individual 
self of the agent, with his or her individual spins and twists and riffs are ephemera that, if not 
capable of being overwritten, are fairly safely ignored. 
                                                 
134 As Patrick O’Donnell writes in “James Bond, Cyborg-Aristocrat”: “Cinematically, [Bond] is 
both a mode of repetition and a representation of corporeality: across twenty films, the same 
character with a different body (often enough, partially unclothed, or rigged out in some kind of 
special gear) attached to the name of various actors, hence the game of who is the best Bond, the 
one who conforms to our image of who Bond should be” (63). 
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Chapter 5: The Bond Effect: James Bond, Drone Masculinity, and Spy Fiction 
Masculinities 
 
Ian Fleming died at the beginning of his creation’s ascension to the height of pop culture 
stardom. The character has by now had a 60+ year lifespan of his own. In the last chapter, I 
ended by discussing how that character has been received by the public, and how he primes the 
cultural imagination to associate intelligence work with covert action. I argued that Bond is an 
integral node in the cultural lattice of espionage, a node which incentivizes us to think of spy 
work as drone masculinity.135 This chapter examines the adoption and consequences of drone 
masculinity within the intelligence world, with a special focus on how Bond, a purely fictional 
spy, has served as a reference point both within and without intelligence for crafting espionage 
and Special Forces policy. Bond as a nexus point between pop culture and policy may seem far-
fetched initially, but I am not the first to explore the idea. Surprisingly though, the first to do so 
were not on “our” side of the Iron Curtain. Soviet critics like Yurii Zhukov and Grigor Cherney 
bemoaned the influence of Bond on what they saw to be a cheapening of human life when it 
came to warfare. Zhukov, writing in Pravda, described the Bond-ian view of espionage as a 
“world where they write laws with the butt of a pistol, where violence and outrage against female 
honor is looked on as prowess, and murder, like an amusing game,” an apt assessment of the 
effect drone masculinity has had on an espionage mindset already primed to think of human life 
                                                 
135 As a reminder, drone masculinity is characterized by a belief in objectivity (as opposed to 
subjectivity) and in objective-based approaches to intelligence and war, a belief in the value of 
violence and aggression to protect national interests, and a willingness to subsume personal 
agency to a hierarchic and bureaucratic structure in exchange for cultural and sexual rewards. 
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strategically (qtd. in Albion 209). Zhukov was also the first to connect Bond’s influence on 
public perceptions of military service: “The idolization of the killer Bond in a world where the 
use of napalm substitutes for persuasion and bombs drown out the voice of conscience is, to 
some extent, natural…A good number of [Fleming’s fans] have cursed James Bond as they 
choked in blood on the ground in South Vietnam” (210). Here, Bond is both a result and a cause 
of a military culture too willing to resort to violence and covert action over an exchange of ideas 
or a more HUMINT-focused persuasive tactic. Soviet criticism of Bond, and to a large extent 
Western policy, is inevitably self-serving and hypocritical; Soviet policy was not exactly pacifist 
in nature, as the participants in the Prague Spring, the mujahedeen fighting to overthrow Soviet 
occupation in Afghanistan, the victims of Stalin’s Great Purge, and many, many others can attest. 
Soviet media was propagandistic (a trait still present in Putin’s Russia), and “whataboutism”, in 
which politicians and media members attempt to deflect criticism by arguing that other people do 
similar or worse things, can be considered a practiced Soviet (and now Russian) tactic136 
(Kurtzleben). But even given that Zhukov’s words are perhaps disingenuously said, the 
connection he draws between Bond, Bond’s popularity, and violence as policy cannot be easily 
ignored.  
 The first section of this chapter concerns that connection. I argue that the Bond effect has 
left its mark on intelligence policy since the Kennedy administration and CIA director Alan 
Dulles agreed to expand the covert action wing of the organization. Covert action by espionage 
                                                 
136 Journalist Danielle Kurtzleben writes in an article for NPR that Trump’s recent rebuttal to Bill 
O’Reilly’s admonition to distance himself from Putin because Putin “is a killer” is an example of 
Trump’s embrace of whataboutism. Trump replied “There are a lot of killers. You got a lot of 
killers. What, you think our country is so innocent?” (Kurtzleben). That the President of the U.S. 
is willing to be so…unpatriotic…about our history of bloodshed in the world would almost be 
refreshing, if it weren’t being offered as a defense of Vladimir Putin.  
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services demands a particular kind of ideological shift within intelligence, and this shift was 
made more palatable when Bondomania took a central place in the cultural discourse of 
espionage. The particular ideological script within espionage that makes covert action more 
attractive is drone masculinity, and its rise vis-á-vis patriarchal homosociality as the dominant 
framework for the recruitment, training, and use of agents devoted to covert action has resulted 
in a more militarized and more aggressive intelligence community. I discuss what I see to be the 
consequences of drone masculinity within intelligence policy and in the actions of the CIA, MI6, 
and other intelligence organizations. I then move to what I consider to be the furthest extension 
of the cultural logic behind drone masculinity, drone warfare. This is the first of two different 
occasions I take up the subject. In the next chapter, I discuss the impact of drone warfare in the 
context of the West’s relation to the Middle East, and in relation to narratives of Self and Other 
in spy fiction and intelligence culture. Here though, I discuss drone warfare as an extension of 
drone masculinity, as the ultimate expression of an espionage mindset that embraces violent 
action yet is skeptical that the human agents it tasks with the violence are up to the job. If drone 
masculinity is in part a reaction against the betrayal of the old guard patrician class in espionage 
(figures like Burgess and Philby), drone warfare is an attempt at ensuring that the intelligence 
world cannot be placed in position that could be betrayed ever again, by stripping its covert 
agents of any kind of agency.  
 The last half of this chapter returns to spy fiction more directly in a search for alternate 
ideologies of masculinity and alternate masculinities that the genre may offer. Counter-
programming the Bond effect is necessary to changing the current culture of intelligence. But a 
counter-programming from completely outside the cultural discourse of espionage is unlikely to 
resonate within the secret world given its cloistered and elitist nature. So, attending and 
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celebrating what is already present can reveal potential points of change and inform policy 
makers, authors, movie and TV producers, fans, and spies themselves that drone masculinity is 
not an inevitability, but a choice that has proven convenient and complicit in the militarization of 
intelligence work. Alternates exist, even under the aegis of state service (let alone outside of it). I 
examine three alternates to Bond-ian drone masculinity already existing within spy fiction: Jason 
Bourne from the Bourne Identity, George Smiley from Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, and Victor 
Maskell from The Untouchable. Each of these characters responds to and challenges the Bond 
typos in different ways, but their shared challenge to the intelligence community is to abandon 
drone masculinity and its yoking of mechanized violence to sexual reward, and instead return to 
a philosophy of espionage more human and humane.  
Drone Masculinity, Covert Action, and Drone Warfare 
Bond as a cultural figure, not as the individual character in any given film or story, has 
endured as a Cold War fantasy of a safe and efficient secret agent, emerging from a historical 
context that had shown the previous fantasy was a compromised one. Bond, as a “particular 
political fantasy” as Frederic Jameson would put it, has not stayed in the realm of spectacle, 
though, and as a result Bond cannot just be set aside as a pop-culture reaction against the 
Cambridge Spies (Political Unconscious 48). Bond, and the drone masculinity he comes to 
figure throughout the Cold War, have grown beyond their original historical and cultural 
moment. As I argue, it is in part through Bond and his imitators—both fictional and, as we will 
see, actual—that drone masculinity entered into the institutional logic of intelligence and Special 
Forces agencies worldwide. Drone masculinity can be considered a politico-cultural resolution to 
the problem of individual, personal agency within the secret bureaucracy of intelligence itself, a 
problem revealed to intelligence higher-ups each time Burgess, Maclean, Philby, and all the 
 246 
other double agents who have been uncovered over the years demonstrate that when secret 
agents actually have agency, they can abuse it. Bond’s cultural influence has informed the 
practice of espionage akin to the way in which the practice of spycraft has influenced cultural 
expressions of spy work. Violence as proof of effectiveness—the license to kill as the license to 
act—has increasingly become a staple of evaluating covert actions. Bond’s early adventures 
reflect the activities of the Special Operations Executive during WWII, whose saboteur 
operations contrasted with the sister Special Intelligence Service. In the words of one SIS recruit: 
“SIS’s role…was to watch enemy troops crossing a bridge while SOE’s brief was…to blow up 
the bridge,” (Knightley 118). These operations had at the time a divisive effect in the intelligence 
community. Former SIS officer Henry Kirby actually called the split over whether intelligence 
organizations should focus on gathering intelligence or undergo violent subversive acts “the 
biggest, bitterest internal battle in the history of our intelligence services,” (118). However, after 
the Lavender Scare and the defections of the Cambridge Spy Ring, the Bond-solution to a shaky 
public reputation proved too easy. Bond gets things done, after all, and is wrapped in enough 
trappings to convince skeptics and possible detractors that he, and his type, are the right men for 
the job. With Bond came a renewed trust in and fascination with intelligence agencies, allowing 
them a kind of cultural license to pursue secret operations in line with what the public expected 
Bond’s employers to do, despite the huge caveat that Bond did not exist in real life. 
Nevertheless, the scruples about sabotage and assassinations began to disappear under the 
popularity of the Bond illusion and his imitators, both real and fictional, and soon the lyric, “I’m 
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ten percent cloak and ninety percent dagger” from the mid-century song “Boo Boo Baby I’m a 
Spy137” was standard operating procedure.  
The embrace of drone masculinity in espionage is intricately linked both temporally and 
symbolically with Bond as a cultural force, most likely helped by the fact that Fleming was well-
connected himself within intelligence on both sides of the Atlantic. Bond’s influence in US 
intelligence is a bit interesting given the character’s British roots, but, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the toxic homophobic discourse which shattered the image of gentlemen spies 
such as the Cambridge Five was very much also present in the US, and the connections between 
the fledgling CIA and the more established British services in the early years of the Cold War 
were quite strong, as the agencies shared resources and information both formally and informally 
through the social networks of Anglophiles like James Jesus Angleton. Bond’s popularity 
certainly transcended national borders, especially after President Kennedy named From Russia 
with Love as one of his favorite books (Kinzer 274). In his biography of the architect of the 
modern CIA, director Allen Dulles, Stephen Kinzer argues that both Dulles and Kennedy 
somewhat conflated real espionage with the James Bond novels, most worryingly by increasing 
their faith in covert action (274). Dulles did in fact remark that he “would be glad to hire several 
James Bonds,” given the spy’s usefulness and trustworthiness, and by all accounts he tried to do 
so, as over his tenure the CIA pivoted from Truman’s news service to a covert action entity 
supported by teams of analysts (274). Though these analysts outnumbered (and still do) the 
secret agents that enacted covert operations, under Dulles and his deputy Frank Wisner, the 
CIA’s budget for covert actions dwarfed that of intelligence gathering (Weiner 32). As former 
                                                 
137 The band of the Park Hotel in Istanbul actually played this song when one of the heads of the 
many spy organizations (Allied, Axis, and then Western, Soviet) came to eat throughout WWII 
and the 40s-50s (McIntyre 63). So much for cover identities. 
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CIA director Walter Bedell Smith prophesized when Dulles and his group came to power, “the 
operational tail will wag the intelligence dog” (53). He has been proven right, both in the US 
and, according to MI6 historian Phillip Knightley, in the U.K. agencies as well (Knightley 
118).138 Starting with Dulles, when government officials seek to convey a sense of covert action 
to the public (in fairness, sometimes to criticize it), they mention Bond. Bond has been cited by 
heads of the CIA, JSOC, MI6, and even in a U.K. High Court as a justification by the judge for 
the state’s refusal to pay child support to women that MI5 agents had impregnated while 
undercover in Northern Ireland (Grey 281).139 Royal Marines carried out Special Forces missions 
under the heading “Operation James” during the Iraq War, with their targets code-named 
“Goldfinger, Blofeld, Pussy Galore, and Connery” (Albion 214). Citing Bond and his cultural 
imitators makes covert action look far more effective than it is to a general public. This 
glamorized, though fictional, effectiveness, and the acceptance of this mythic effectiveness by 
the public, in turn makes the temptation to play Bond irresistible to covert organizations 
regardless of actual results: in the words of a former head of JSOC (Joint Special Operations 
                                                 
138 One example of the mania for covert action in the early days of the CIA, and of the 
interconnectedness of the CIA and MI6, is the sad tale of the several operations to parachute 
Albanian rebels and other would-be anti-Soviet forces behind the Iron Curtain to create a Fifth 
Column in the event of a ground war (a real worry in the early days of the Cold War). Each one 
of these missions was a catastrophic failure, ending with every paratrooper caught, captured, and 
presumably executed (they were never heard from again). The problem: the MI6 liaison to the 
operation was…Kim Philby.  
139 From Stephen Grey’s The New Spymasters: Justice Tugendhat, a High Court judge in the 
U.K., dismissed 10 women’s lawsuits against the Metropolitan police…said “James Bond is the 
most famous fictional example of a member of the intelligence services who used relationships 
with women to obtain information, or access to persons or property…[F]ictional accounts (and 
there are others) lend credence to the view that the intelligence and police services have for many 
years deployed both men and women officers to form personal relationships of an intimate 
nature…in order to obtain information or access” (281).  
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Command), “We had all these guys running around trying to be James Bond, and it didn’t work 
very well” (Mazzetti 82). 
The mythic effectiveness140 of drone masculinity propagated by Bond and his cultural 
imitators141 tempts intelligence agencies by offering a different standard of what that 
effectiveness looks like. Despite numerous failed missions and PR disasters, intelligence 
agencies have embraced drone masculinity because, unlike traditional intelligence gathering, 
violent covert operations are spectacular and quantifiable. They can be measured in terms of 
damage: enemies killed, structures destroyed, etc. In other words, they seem to demonstrate their 
own success immediately. I argue that this has had a kind of addictive effect within intelligence, 
since the immediate reward—a seemingly successful operation—is in the short term powerfully 
present, whereas any consequences or failures of violent covert operations142 only manifest in the 
long term. This addictive effect in turn reinforces the ethos that the masculinity martialed to 
train, evaluate, and control the personnel who carry out those missions is the only guarantee of 
successful results. The militarization of the secret agent is a direct result of intelligence agencies 
changing who and how they recruit, eschewing the conventional cradles of intelligence 
workers—Ivy League Universities—for former Special Forces personnel who volunteer for or 
are conscripted into CIA service.143 As John le Carré points out, the idea that espionage 
                                                 
140 Note that this is the same myth of effectiveness the Russians try to puncture in From Russia 
with Love by killing Bond. 
141 For example, the 24 Wiki reveals that Jack Bauer kills 309 people over the 9 days the show 
takes place (“On-screen”). Given that the U.S. army spent 250,000 rounds of ammunition per 
insurgent killed in Iraq in the mid-2000s, Bauer’s kill rate with his pistol and bare hands is a 
mythical feat (Buncombe). 
142 Such as further destabilization of the region or a shift in local (within the theater of 
operations), national, or international attitudes towards the intelligence agency and the nation it 
represents 
143 It should be noted that for analysts, Ivy League, Ivy League equivalent, and think tank 
recruitment is still alive and well, but not for those agents tasked with covert action. 
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recruitment no longer relies upon networks of gentlemanly connections is due to the fear of 
betrayal and double agency lingering from the Cambridge Five: “[In the old days] you had to be 
spotted. If you applied [as now you can do] you could be enemy, whereas if you were spotted, 
you couldn’t possibly be. And we all know how well that worked” (Pigeon Tunnel 165). As a 
consequence of the change in recruitment strategies, the line between soldier and spy has been 
slowly erased over the past 40 years. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, this 
line has almost entirely disappeared, and journalist Mark Mazzetti argues that “Just as a 
generation earlier Ross Newland and his training class had been told that the spy agency should 
eschew killing at all costs, many CIA officers who joined the agency since September 11, 2001, 
have experienced only man hunting and killing” (Mazzetti 318).144 One process that has further 
entrenched the idea that successful intelligence work is violent action—the (perceived) surgical 
removal of threats to the home country—is known as sheep-dipping. Sheep-dipping is a 
bureaucratic process by which Special Forces personnel can temporarily become intelligence 
workers in order to run an operation in a country with which the US is not officially at war (i.e. 
Navy Seals becoming CIA agents in the raid to kill Osama bin Laden, or Air Force pilots 
becoming CIA agents to pilot drones active in Yemen). This makes the idea that the successful 
intelligence worker is Bond-like, or, more accurately, has been conscripted by the discourse of 
                                                 
144 The passage from which this quote is taken is quite illuminating; from Mazzetti’s Way of the 
Knife: “The CIA’s closed society has fundamentally changed, and a generation of CIA officers is 
now socialized in war. Just as a generation earlier Ross Newland and his training class had been 
told that the spy agency should eschew killing at all costs, many CIA officers who joined the 
agency since September 11, 2001, have experienced only man hunting and killing. This new 
generation has felt more of the adrenaline rush of being at the front lines than the patient, 
“gentle” work of intelligence gathering and espionage. The latter can be tedious, even boring, 
and as one former top CIA officer put it, ‘How are you going to keep these people on the farm 
now that they’ve seen the bright lights of the city?’” (318). 
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drone masculinity, all the more powerful. The bureaucratic shell game of sheep-dipping 
encourages the CIA to think of its personnel as tools for particular assignments instead of human 
agents embedded in intelligence networks and dependent on the good will of locals for their 
safety. The attitude of “Navy Seals for this, drone operators for that, analysts to support the Seals 
and drones” treats the intelligence agent as disposable and replaceable, only granting them 
latitude to improvise when that improvisation also conforms to a drone masculinity cultural 
formation. While the “ours is but to do or die” mentality is not new to the military, its application 
in intelligence represents a significant evolution in institutional logic. That application has had 
severe repercussions as drone masculinity has fostered the expanded reach of covert military 
operations under the bureaucratic cover of intelligence activities and has influenced both the 
public and institutional conceptions of what intelligence work is “supposed” to be. Targeted 
assassination programs, once rejected by the intelligence community during the late years of 
World War Two as more trouble than they were worth, seem more than ever to accord with what 
the public expects its spy agencies to do (Mazzetti 45).  In fact, assassinations, despite by 
definition removing possible sources of human intelligence, have paradoxically increased the 
public’s confidence in the CIA’s ability to gather and analyze intelligence. As Mark Mazzetti 
reports, according to one public poll from the middle of Obama’s presidency, “69% of 
respondents expressed confidence that American spy agencies had accurate information about 
what was happening inside Iran and North Korea,” a number nearly 20% higher than the answer 
to the same question in the middle of the Bush years (315)145. When the public believes in the 
                                                 
145 This discrepancy possibly also reflects the heavy (and clearly warranted) skepticism about 
Bush’s CIA following the weapons-of-mass-destruction debacle in Iraq, but the improvement 
also seemingly ignores the widely-reported fact that the CIA did not know that Kim Jong Il had 
died until weeks later, after North Korean television reported it (Mazzetti 315). 
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mythic effectiveness of its spy agencies, it becomes easy for those agencies to retreat further into 
protective shadows of bureaucratic secrecy, away from public scrutiny. This retreat into the 
shadows has facilitated an intelligence world of assassination raids carried out worldwide by 
sheep-dipped military personnel. Private black-site prisons are run by contractors in which 
detainees (not official prisoners—another bureaucratic shell game meant to deny them the rights 
of prisoners of war) are tortured for inaccurate information. Meanwhile, drones hover invisibly 
over civilians, threatening them by their presence, surveillance, and, occasionally, their 
“mistaken” strikes.146 
In conclusion of this section, I’d like to begin to think about the relation between the 
inculcation of a culture of drone masculinity within intelligence and Special Forces work and the 
actual use of drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). A New York Times op-ed entitled 
“How Drones Help Al-Qaeda” highlights the dangers of embracing drone warfare for 
intelligence agencies by quoting a Yemeni lawyer, who wrote: “Dear Obama, when a U.S. drone 
missile kills a child in Yemen, the father will go to war with you, guaranteed” (Mothana). The 
Yemeni lawyer, and the thousands protesting the increased lethal use of drone strikes over the 
past decade, are reacting to a US policy which states that “in an area of known militant activity, 
all military-aged males were considered to be enemy fighters. Therefore, anyone who was killed 
in a drone strike there was categorized as a combatant, unless there was explicit intelligence that 
posthumously proved him to be innocent” (Mazzetti 291). This policy still obscures the ability of 
                                                 
146 The Obama administration claims that 116 civilians have been killed by drones outside of war 
zones since the beginning of drone strikes in 2008, but the number is disputed—independent 
investigators believe it to be significantly higher (Whitlock). An average of several non-
governmental human-rights groups figures compiled by Foreign Policy’s Micah Zenko pegs the 
number at around 474 civilians in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan (Zenko). Civilian death totals 
within Afghanistan and Iraq are much more difficult to find but are liable to be higher.  
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journalists and watchdog groups to gather reliable information on the number of civilian 
casualties caused by drones (Mazzetti 291). That drone strikes are unpopular in the regions they 
unblinkingly patrol, and that their continued use can cause the same militancy and radicalization 
they are meant to combat, are not news to the administration or the public in general; the recent 
film Eye in the Sky (2015) dramatizes just such a scenario: an innocent girl is killed in a strike 
meant to stop a group of suicide bombers. Yet the use of drones, a feature of the modern CIA, 
only seems to be increasing. The Predator drone and its more-current models, the Reaper and 
Avenger, are aptly named for their purpose: to track, target and kill quickly with the surgical 
precision, it is hoped, of a jungle cat. Drone strikes are meant to be the very point of the Obama 
and Trump administrations’ philosophy of a war of the scalpel—small, focused, effective 
operations that remove key figures in terror networks from those networks. This policy has, 
according to both administrations, been a great success. Perhaps arising in part out of the Obama 
administration’s reluctance to continue the Bush administration’s practices of capture and 
interrogation,147 drone use, along with widespread electronic surveillance, has become a go-to 
strategy for waging the War on Terror, despite the extreme unpopularity of drone use within 
America’s ostensible allies, like Pakistan, and among a large set of Obama’s constituency at 
home. Oddly enough, it might be a theoretical concept from the analysis of performance art that 
helps us to better understand the appeal of drones to political and military decision-makers in the 
face of this unpopularity and uncertain effectiveness.148 Art historian Jane Blocker in her essay 
                                                 
147 John Rizzo, a career CIA lawyer who had helped getting DOJ approval for CIA’s torture 
program: “They [Obama’s staff] never came out and said they would start killing people because 
they couldn’t interrogate them, but the implication was unmistakable. Once the interrogation was 
gone, all that was left was the killing.” (Mazzetti 219) 
148 Drones are certainly effective at killing people, but their use as a long-term strategy to end the 
War on Terror is heavily debated. Even former heads of the CIA acknowledge this point at the 
end of the Showtime documentary The Spymasters.  
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“Aestheticizing Risk in Wartime: The SLA to Iraq” uses the phrase “risk transfer” to refer to 
how an artist gets a reputation as a “fearless risk-taker by transferring the risk to those around 
him or her” (Nelson 129). Blocker’s essay goes on to argue that risk transfer “also applies to the 
West’s current method of waging war, in which bodily risk gets transferred to the populations of 
other, faraway countries; the costs, to future generations” (129). While Blocker does not directly 
consider drone warfare in the article, drones are perhaps the best representation of risk transfer as 
she is defining it. Drones are built to accomplish missions that are best described by one of the 
“3 Ds”: dangerous, dirty, or dull (Singer 63). Their entire point is to remove human actors from 
the consequences of those missions—and here I mean consequences in the sense of physical 
harm, but also in the sense of moral harm and moral hazard—while continuing the U.S.’s, and 
perhaps more specifically in-power administration’s, reputation as dangerous to its enemies. The 
ability to follow targets for days, learn their habits, and kill them when you choose, all from a 
screen thousands of miles away, is unprecedented in the history of war. The distance between 
actor(s) and action, and the displacement of that action onto a metal, disposable, replaceable 
body instead of the pilot’s human one must affect the psychological and moral decision-making 
by the pilot, the drone support staff,149 and the higher-ranked architects of drone missions. 
Drones encourage aggression because the consequences for the aggressors are only metal and the 
consequences for the targets are flesh. We would thus expect to see that drones are downed at a 
much higher rate than traditional aircraft, due to this aggressive proximity to targets and the 
pilot’s lack of sense of personal stakes in the operation—it’s not their body that suffers—and 
indeed this is the case (Whitlock). Drone warfare is asymmetrical in a way that has shifted the 
                                                 
149 Drone warfare is extremely decentralized, and it is usual for each drone to have half a dozen 
personnel responsible for different components of one mission like surveillance, research, 
weather, etc. 
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costs and consequences of war. The idea of disposable soldiers, of humans as living weapons, 
has finally reached its technological perfection. Drones allow the same precision as a 00 agent 
with a license to kill without actually endangering the agent at all.  
As we have been discussing, drone masculinity, like other masculine ideologies (and 
most ideologies in general) links desired behaviors to rewards. It is these inducements that invite 
willing participation. In drone masculinity, these inducements are heterosexual conquest, 
advancement within a bureaucratic system that values violence, and a monopoly on “real” 
manliness; contrast to the patriotic patrician-ism of pre-WWII espionage, in which the rewards 
were homosocial ties, advancement within an aristocratic system that valued traits like parentage, 
breeding, and education, and a monopoly on “real” manliness. The last term looks the same, 
though how those groups would define “manliness” differs considerably. The idea of drone 
masculinity has been tremendously effective at changing how intelligence agencies hire and train 
agents and what kind of operations are conceived of and carried out by those agents. But people 
are people, and humans are agentive, even if they are culturally conscripted to be less so. Drone 
masculinity is a cultural discourse, a powerful one, but not a totalizing one—it isn’t brain 
washing, and there needs to be some willing participation on the agent’s end for it to continue to 
function. But this participation can become far less willing when that agent faces incongruous 
situations, especially when asked to actually confront the Other he has been trained to see as the 
enemy. Combat, life overseas, working directly with local communities, and a lack of medical 
and psychological services at home all complicate the cultural messaging for military and 
intelligence personnel, and can lead to crises of conscience, stress, burnout, diminished 
performance, and other consequences—perhaps corroborated by the high incidence of PTSD 
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among Special Forces operatives and overseas intelligence workers who see combat.150 Even the 
spy genre has plenty of examples, mostly more recent, of cultural push-back against the concept; 
alternative masculinities in current spy fiction are discussed in the next (and last) section of this 
chapter. Remember though, even Bond “sneer[s] at his profession” sometimes. All told, it seems 
that Bond-as-fantasy and the drone masculinity which that fantasy crystallized into cultural 
consciousness after the Burgess and Maclean defections has proven imperfect as a mechanism of 
control over those that are required to actually enact the violence. Drone warfare, in contrast, 
might be the closest one gets to a pure distillation of the ideal that drone masculinity tries to 
approximate, a perfection of the institutional logic that led to the embrace of drone masculinity 
after Burgess and Maclean. Whereas drone masculinity tries to tie heterosexuality and violence 
with a willingness to submit to a bureaucratic organization in order to guarantee agent 
trustworthiness, drone piloting gets the same efficient results without needing to do so much 
cultural legwork resolving the Bond paradox (i.e., how to sell to human agents the idea that 
taking orders is a kind of agency). Drone operations involve dozens of people all across the 
world operating simultaneously: a pilot and co-pilot on a US military base (most likely in 
Nevada), an operations commander closer to the target zone, a base commander in the US, teams 
                                                 
150 A 2012 study published in the Journal of Special Operations Medicine found that due to their 
advanced training (correlated, as I would argue, with their advanced steeping in the culture of 
drone masculinity), Special Forces personnel are more resilient to combat-induced stress than 
non-SF service members, and yet even given this, PTSD rates among Special Forces operatives 
were twice as high as the general Army population (Hing et al). Statistics from the Department 
of Veteran Affairs suggest that since a peak level of PTSD among all service personnel in the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, the past few years have seen a decline as less troops are 
exposed to direct combat (“PTSD: A Growing Epidemic”). This fits with my argument above—
even drone masculinity can break down when confronted with a more complicated reality than 
that found in a spy novel, and part of the move to more indirect, distanced military interventions 
such as drone warfare and (relatively) small Special Forces deployments are to diminish the 
psychological risks for U.S. forces in addition to the physical risks and economic concerns. 
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of image analysts, communications specialists, etc. Thus, drone piloting represents a fusion of 
man and two separate machines: the robotic flying phallus itself and the bureaucratic machinery 
of the modern-day intelligence agency. Alan Hepburn writes that the symbolic function of 
gadgets in spy fiction is to act as technological prosthetics for masculine authority “by extending 
it through time and space” (Hepburn 210). The drone does this in a way that Ian Fleming could 
not have imagined for Q branch, but the drone pilot, the user of the “gadget”, is not the one 
having his masculine authority extended—the drone pilot is the prosthesis of the agency. The 
machine and the mission can outlast any individual pilot (shifts are 8-12 hours long but drones 
stay aloft for far longer) and, when assassination orders are issued, the pilot acts as a mere 
functionary in the chain of command. Unlike, say, a jet fighter pilot, who must physically fly the 
vehicle to the point of contact and then decide when to strike, drone operations are carried out 
over extreme distances, over multiple days (so the pilot that positions the drone might not be the 
one to launch the missile), under strict operational conditions (drone pilots do not determine 
when to strike, operations command does) and pose little risk to the U.S. No one mourns for a 
downed drone (except perhaps an accountant), and drone pilots in Nevada don’t form 
relationships with Pashtuns in Peshawar; the turn to automation and action-at-a-distance in 
intelligence work, like the turn to drone masculinity before it, seeks to further remove human 
agency from the world of secret agents. This is done in the name of increased safety (for the 
intelligence workers, the intelligence agency, and the national interest) and increased 
effectiveness, but at the cost of long-term human intelligence networks, empathy, and public 
scrutiny and oversight.151 There’s an Air Force joke, repeated by P.W. Singer in his book Wired 
                                                 
151 Perhaps the turn to true automation in terms of using algorithms for intelligence gathering, 
such as the CIA’s experimental KARNAK system or the NSA’s data collection projects, is also 
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for War, which goes “UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] are the answer, but what’s the 
question?” (224). I think the question is something like, “How can state power be even further 
removed from the humanity of its enemies, citizens, and even its enforcers?” It isn’t a very funny 
joke. 
Spy Fiction, Anti-Bonds, and Alternate Masculinities 
This chapter and the one before it have argued that twentieth century spy fiction has both 
reflected and influenced the rise of a certain cultural formation in espionage, that of drone 
masculinity. I have examined spy fiction’s role in shaping the cultural discourse of espionage in 
such a way as to trace a lineage between patriarchic homosociality, drone masculinity, and drone 
warfare. But spy fiction, an incredibly popular genre of literature, film, TV, video games, 
comics, and every other media form one can imagine, does not in its multiplicity and expanse 
have one coherent ideological message. I would be remiss if I did not end this section of my 
dissertation with a look at some of the alternate masculine ideologies that spy fiction offers 
instead of the drone masculine model. Like Bond and drone masculinity, these examples respond 
to specific historical and cultural moments in intelligence and pop culture more generally. While 
no alternate masculinity post-World War Two has so far had the impact that the Bond-ian model 
has had in defining what a spy is and does, some, like John Le Carré’s George Smiley, have had 
substantial influence in their own right, and others, like Jason Bourne or Sterling Archer,152 show 
some promise at developing into full-blown cultural figures in their own right. This section 
examines three alternate masculinities in post-World War Two spy fiction and the characters that 
embody them. I begin closest to the Bond model, with Jason Bourne, in an effort to show what a 
                                                 
at least partially explained by a belief within these organizations that humans are ultimately too 
fallible for the goals of the state.  
152A spoof of Bond from the FX television series Archer.  
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Bond type divorced from the government licensing that makes Bond a loyal agent of the state 
would look like. I then examine George Smiley for the opposite case—a devoted state servant 
without many of the pathologies of drone masculinity. Lastly, I end this section and this chapter 
with a brief discussion of Victor Maskell from John Banville’s The Untouchable, who is an 
example of a queer masculinity in modern espionage fiction. In Maskell, Banville creates a spy 
character directly at odds with the elements of the genre that have pushed seemingly relentlessly 
towards drone masculinity.153  
At first glance, the Jason Bourne series by Robert Ludlum (and a series of ghostwriters) 
and the films adapted from that series by directors Doug Liman and Paul Greengrass starring 
Matt Damon as Bourne might be declared the inheritor of the Bond mantle. Timing helps with 
this evaluation; the first three films came out in a Bond-free pop-cultural gap between the end of 
the Brosnan-era Bond film and before the Daniel Craig-led period. The Bourne films also, like 
the Bond films of the 60s, seemed to fit the zeitgeist of espionage at the time, addressing the 
changing role of intelligence agencies and agents at the beginning of the War on Terror. Bourne, 
like Bond, is heterosexual, ex-military, and supremely skilled at both ranged and melee 
combat—actually even more so than depictions of Bond through Pierce Brosnan. For while, in 
the Brosnan Bond films especially, Bond kills a lot of people, this violence is almost 
cartoonish.154 Bond either executes his foe in an ironic way, and makes a disarming quip 
                                                 
153 While I could have chosen many examples of alternate masculinities in spy fiction, I settled on 
these three for two reasons: 1) I liked being able to show that works conventionally slotted into 
“low-brow” (the Bourne franchise), “mid-brow” (Le Carré’s works), and “high-brow” (Banville) 
can each challenge and shape genre conventions and cultural discourse; and 2) each of these 
three examples also helps me to clarify some points about drone masculinity that might be 
lingering.   
154 According to the Economist, the Brosnan films average around twenty kills for Bond, whereas 
the Dalton Bonds average five. For an examination of why the Dalton Bond is so different from 
the others, see Stephanie Jones’s paper “Get Your Clothes on and I’ll Buy You an Ice Cream: 
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afterward, or mows down countless nameless henchmen with preternatural ease and automatic 
weapons or his signature Walther PPK pistol. The cartoonishness of violence in these Bond films 
ostensibly keeps audience sympathies with the British superspy; PG-13-rated violence, killing 
without carnage, death without consideration of life before it, normalizes the use and mastery of 
violence by protagonists while toning down the consequences of what could, in works with 
different ideological goals perhaps,155 be seen as sociopathy. The effect is to reinforce the idea of 
action-hero as robot, the drone man who feels no compunction over killing and is in no real 
danger from the consequences of violence.156 However, the Bourne series marks a cultural shift 
in which that old espionage genre trope, “realism”, affects the way violence itself is portrayed. 
As a reminder,157 most critics follow the lead of Michael Denning and pay little attention to the 
vetting of the realness of “realism” in spy fiction, instead exploring the reasons authors and 
filmmakers employ “realistic” levels of detail in their work. Over the course of this dissertation, I 
am arguing for a different approach; while I think this kind of interrogation of the ideological 
function of “realism” in spy fiction is crucial, it is a mistake to look past the surface details of 
what is passing for realistic at a given cultural moment. The violence in the Bourne books and 
films is a good place to show how both a depth and surface reading can be productive. Like the 
other moves towards aesthetic “realism” in spy fiction—more attention to actual tradecraft, less 
cartoonish villain motivations, etc.—more “realistic” fight scenes are employed to ground the 
                                                 
The Unlikely History of James Bond and the New Man.” The other Bonds are all around ten kills 
each. The same Economist study showed that Daniel Craig’s Bond is by far the most alcoholic, 
averaging 4x as many drinks per film as the next closest Bond. (“Booze, Bonks, and Bodies”).  
155 As in Denis Villanueve’s film Sicario, discussed in chapter 3.  
156 Or, put another way, it’s like Hollywood still wants to replicate the thrills of 80s action icons 
like Robocop and Terminator without considering that those films don’t portray losing humanity 
in exchange for efficiency in killing as a good thing.  
157 Discussed in the introduction. 
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story in the “real” world, that is, the world of late-capitalism and bureaucracy, a world in which 
spycraft has become increasingly militarized. This increases the ideological potency of Bourne’s 
combat mastery, aligning it with the arch-spy fiction fantasy of individual agency cutting through 
a depersonalizing world. This fantasy is an essential part of the conscripting discourse of drone 
masculinity, which makes self-mechanization, quantification, and aggression in the service of the 
state the necessary condition of obtaining this fantasy of agency. It remains a fantasy even in its 
obtainment, because once an individual has embraced the mindset, there is an incongruity 
between the cultural narratives surrounding them (which is the narrative of the hero) and their 
lived experience (which is as a disposable tool of the state). This disconnect is readily visible to 
the public in the difference, for example, between how veterans are revered at sporting events on 
the one hand, and the horrible state of veteran health care on the other. But drone masculinity is 
not the only possible discursive formation reinforced by fantasies of individual agency in spy 
fiction—for example, in the Hannay novels of John Buchan, it is patriarchal homosociality that 
serves as the necessary condition for the attainment of agency. So there can be alternate 
possibilities, and it is in the surface details of the violence in the Bourne films that we can start to 
see that Bourne is, actually, an anti-Bond, deliberately set against the drone masculinity in 
intelligence. In the first book, the Bourne Identity, Bourne becomes sickened by the other 
government assassins sent to stop him, though he himself was one. Bourne is quick to associate 
the violent attitudes and willingness to kill on the part of other assassins as a kind of pathological 
masculinity: in one scene, Bourne observes a CIA assassin “fondling his gun as though it were a 
sexual object, cracking the breech, unable to resist peering inside. He ran his palm over the 
inserted shells, the gesture obscene” (506). Bourne’s own mastery of combat, in contrast, is 
generally portrayed as shocking to him and to the audience, not eroticized and easy. The books 
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devote an excessive amount of time directly to Bourne mentally agonizing over his martial 
abilities.158 The films accomplish this angst visually. Action scenes in the Bourne films focus on 
close-combat or car chases, cut in a hyper-kinetic visual style with many fast-paced edits 
designed to simulate the jarring impact of blows on protagonist and combatant alike, all 
reinforced by a sound mix that lets every thud, smack and muffled grunt be audible over the 
backing score. Juxtaposed with this very technical depiction of violence, a depiction which can 
overwhelm and disorient the audience with sensory detail (and dizziness), is the after-shot of 
Matt Damon’s face: an expression of pain, disgust with the situation, and fear of himself. The 
technical editing highlights the visceral nature of violence, its effects on the bodies of the 
combatants on-screen. The after-shot emphasizes Bourne’s vulnerability and his reluctance to 
fall back into patterns of violence. The juxtaposition of the two deconstructs the robotic 
efficiency of the action hero—there is nothing easy about Bourne winning a fight. True, the 
Bourne films, as popular entertainment, have still sought to make a spectacle out of this anti-
spectacular159 violence, and since Bourne always wins it is still very much a fantasy of heroic 
agency, but it’s a non-robotic fantasy, a fantasy that regrets and bleeds.160 
The series as a whole attempts to use more “realistic” fantasies to deconstruct the 
romance of Bond-ian spy fiction and highlight the hypocrisy of intelligence agencies creating 
                                                 
158 Here’s a sample three lines from a paragraph full of the same kind of rhetorical questions: 
“What kind of past was it that produced the skills he had displayed in the past 24 hours? Where 
had he learned to maim and cripple with lunging feet, and fingers entwined in hammers? How 
did he know precisely where to deliver the blows?” (43). You’re welcome that you don’t have to 
read more. 
159 In that it is actually quite difficult to witness as an audience member due to the editing. 
160 Bond, as you may recall from Fitzherbert’s review at the end of the previous chapter, did not 
bleed on screen until the 80s, and indeed any emphasis on the suffering of Bond’s body did not 
arise until the Daniel Craig films more consciously and thematically embraced the franchise’s 
latent masochism and sadism. 
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assassination programs. In the books, the (real-life) assassin Carlos the Jackal figures into 
Bourne’s backstory. Here is how Carlos gets described:   
Whereas tales of his exploits give rise to images of a world filled with violence 
and conspiracy, high explosives and higher intrigues, fast cars and faster women, 
the facts would seem to indicate at least as much Adam Smith as Ian Fleming. 
“Carlos” is reduced to human proportions and in the compression a truly 
frightening man comes into focus. The sado-romantic myth turns into a brilliant, 
blood-soaked monster who brokers assassinations with the expertise of a market 
analyst, fully aware of wages, costs, distribution, and the divisions of underworld 
labor. (212) 
This passage is a proto-typical one for spy fiction authors who want to contrast their works to the 
Bond series—Ludlum even directly references Fleming in the description of Carlos as a 
shorthand for the world of espionage. But it is in the passage’s specific deconstruction of the 
Bond villain where we see the Bourne series’ approach to espionage. Ludlum couches his villain 
in economic terms, arguing the rationality of the other side instead of its sheer Otherness. While 
not an unexpected move for someone like Le Carré to make, to find an intentional jab at the 
romanticization of heroes and villains in a series that relies on action and violence for its 
ostensible audience pleasures (instead of Le Carréan style mind-games) does make the Bourne 
series stand out.  
As part and parcel of its de-romanticization of the Bond-ian spy story, the Bourne series 
is not shy about attacking the power structures and individuals in those structures that have 
embraced drone masculinity—and indeed, I mean literally attacking, in the sense that Bourne 
fights them as they try to stop him from unraveling and revealing to the public the covert 
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assassination program that trained him. The CIA in the Bourne universe bears a much closer 
resemblance to the CIA in ours than it does to depictions of the agency in the Bond series and its 
close imitators, especially in that the CIA is portrayed as both encouraging covert violent 
operations and trying desperately and futilely to make sure the public does not know the full 
extent of its involvement in them; or, as CIA chief Alexander Conklin puts it in the Bourne 
Identity, “The specter of such an operation [the program that produced Bourne] wouldn’t do 
much for the glory of Old Glory. We don’t train assassins, much less field them…And 
somewhere here just happens to be an assassin we trained and fielded and now can’t find” (273).  
They fear that the assassin that they can’t find has gone rogue, or sold his services to the enemy, 
to Carlos himself. But it is worse than that for the higher-ups of Treadstone—Bourne has 
abandoned the mentality of drone masculinity altogether. As he begins piecing together his past, 
he calls that past self a “reproduced illusion” (377). This shows that he has come to understand 
the power of the cultural conscription that led him to volunteer for the program in the first place, 
but that the result of that conscription was to make him a disposable piece of someone else’s 
puzzle, sold on the fantasy that he could make a difference as a tool of the CIA.161 
 Despite the “realism” of the series relative to Bond, the Bourne series is still very much 
doing some ideological fantasizing. The fantasy of Jason Bourne is the fantastic return and 
triumph of liberal subjectivity in the military-industrial complex. He is a have-your-cake-and-
eat-it-too superhero for fans of action films who have grown queasy at the right-wing 
mythologizing that suffuses the genre. Bourne achieves this precisely because the plot and 
characterization of his stories, especially the movies but in the books as well, posit him as a 
                                                 
161 Bourne is, operationally, a failure. His mission in the books is to stop Carlos, which he does 
not accomplish. In the films, he is a more generic assassin, and has a crisis of conscience when 
ordered to execute a man in front of his son.  
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reformed conscript of drone masculinity, still possessing all the skills but aimed now at the 
shadowy world that created him instead of a foreign Other. That this reformation occurs because 
of trauma-induced amnesia speaks to how difficult the conscription of drone masculinity is to 
throw off. Bourne’s bosses believe him to be a thing, a “$30 million dollar malfunctioning 
weapon” according to Conklin (portrayed by Chris Cooper) in the film of the Bourne Identity 
(Liman), a weapon that is “beyond salvage” as Conklin remarks in the book (Ludlum 366). 
Nevertheless, Bourne has forgotten the machine to regain the man—his eyes even change from 
“steel gray” to innocent blue when he is fished, amnesiac, out of the water at the beginning of the 
first book (Ludlum 11). Bourne’s overarching quest is to find a self underneath the training, 
skills, and violence of his past—a past that he realizes he need not know the totality of in order to 
make a future for himself; as he says, he only has to know “enough to make a decision…but 
maybe not everything. A part of me has to be able to walk away, disappear. I have to be able to 
say to myself, what was isn’t any longer, and there’s a possibility that it never was because I 
have no memory of it. What a person can’t remember didn’t exist…for him” (181). Bourne 
wants amnesia to be absolution in this quote from early on in the novel, but over the course of 
the book he realizes this is impossible. And as he comes to realize that he will still have to 
answer for his past, he grows more determined to set himself against the organizations—the CIA, 
Treadstone, Blackbriar—that made him what he was. Bourne’s resolution to do this is the end 
result of his quest to recover a de-mechanized, personal self. This recovery project is shown as 
intimately linked to his relationship with Marie St. Jacques, the only love-interest in the Ludlum 
Bourne books (a clear contrast with the serialization of women in Bond). Though she has more 
characterization than any single female in the Bond stories, Marie as a character still gets used to 
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make a symbolic162 point by Ludlum, but for a very different purpose than Fleming’s use of 
women as proofs of Bond’s trustworthiness as a secret agent. Marie represents the attractiveness 
for Bourne of a heteronormative masculinity rooted in staid bourgeois respectability instead of 
violence and conquest, thereby inverting the traditional “bored man finds fulfillment in action” 
narrative structure of the adventure tale and its spy fiction counterparts. Bourne wants to be 
bored, wants to be left alone in contemplation of his guilt in crimes he can’t quite remember. If 
Bourne has become a cultural symbol of espionage approaching Bond in popularity, he has done 
so by shedding the bureaucracy, sidekicks, organizational backing, gadgets, weapons, women, 
cars, luxury, food, gambling, tuxedos, and exotic locales of his British counterpart. Bourne is 
Bond on Walden Pond, an anti-Bond, an individual who in the text is both ensnared in and 
fighting the drone masculinity that at one time created him.  
The question is whether culturally Bourne is enough of an anti-Bond to shift the public 
discourse about espionage in any meaningful sense. The character is popular and recognizable, 
but has probably not reached the cultural status that Bond has, let alone what he had in the 60s, 
the peak decade of “Bondmania”163 and the height of Bond’s impact in pop culture and the 
beginning of his influence on espionage itself. Unlike Bond, whose changing actors lend to the 
logic of replace-ability essential to drone masculinity, Bourne is attached to one actor, Matt 
Damon, and Damon’s star power may fuel the film franchise’s success more than attachment to 
the character, the trappings of a Bourne story, the themes, etc. Notably, the one Bourne film, the 
                                                 
162 Use of women as symbols instead of subjects being a depressingly common trope in 
masculine-focused genres. However this is changing a little, as mentioned in chapter 4. 
163 See Allan Burton’s “Jumping on the Bondwagon: The Spy Cycle in British Cinema in the 
1960s and 1970s” and Edward Biddulph’s “Bond Girls, Bondmania and Bondsmanship: James 
Bond’s Impact on the English Language” for a good introduction on the pop cultural obsession 
with Bond in the 60s.  
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Bourne Legacy, that has been released without Damon was not nearly as successful as the four 
films with him, nor did that film even try to recast Bourne—it starred Jeremy Renner as another 
former Treadstone-trained assassin turning against the CIA. The other hesitancy I have before 
anointing Bourne as the “Bond-buster” is the question of violence. As I have argued above, I 
think the violence in the Bourne books and films is pointedly different than in Bond. The 
violence is partially decoupled from heteronormative masculinity, which is proved instead by a 
monogamous, loving relationship with Marie. Additionally, as the quote cited above detailing an 
assassin’s love of his gun indicates, any hint of sexuality in violence, not just homosexuality as 
in the Bond stories, is portrayed as pathological. The violence in the later series is also quite 
distinct from the robotic invincibility, cartoon-like violence in the Bond films pre-Daniel Craig. 
But, just the same, Bourne still solves his problems with killing. This killing may be done 
unwillingly and reluctantly, it may be in self-defense, it may be a close call each time, with each 
fight taking a little more out of an increasingly broken man, but it is still killing. I worry that the 
Bourne series does less to dismantle the cultural associations between espionage and violence 
than the protagonist of the series might like. And without dismantling the cultural associations 
first, the institutional ethos that has redefined spy work as violent covert action, carried out by 
pre-amnesiac Jason Bournes steeped in drone masculinity, will be impossible to change.      
John Le Carré’s oeuvre is an extended examination of the health and purpose of Britain’s, 
and later the West’s more broadly, intelligence community from an author who was at one point 
a part of it. As such, his Smiley trilogy (Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy; The Honourable Schoolboy; 
and Smiley’s People) written throughout the 1970s are thematically tied to the changes in 
intelligence work occurring over that period, especially the end of the era of homosocial 
“gentlemanly” masculinity and the rise of Bond’s hyper-violence and hyper-heterosexuality. 
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Tinker, Tailor is especially useful to examine as a response to the rise of Bond and the end of 
Richard Hannay because, with a characteristic ambivalence, Le Carré both mourns the direction 
in which the intelligence world is headed while plotting a novel that is frank about the dangers of 
the old boys’ club as a sacrosanct marker of worth or virtue.  
   The plot is a mole hunt: forcibly retired spy George Smiley is approached by members 
of Parliament to root out a highly-placed Soviet agent in “the Circus,” Le Carré’s term for MI6. 
The traitor, Bill Haydon, is directly compared with T.E. Lawrence, with a great helping of Philby 
and some of Burgess for good measure:      
[Bill] was of that pre-war set that seemed to have vanished for good, which 
managed to be disreputable and high-minded at the same time. His father was a 
high court judge, two of his several beautiful sisters had married into the 
aristocracy; at Oxford he favoured the unfashionable right instead of the 
fashionable left164, but never to the point of strain. From his late teens he had been 
a keen explorer and amateur painter of brave, if over-ambitious, stamp…He had 
connections in every embassy and consulate across the Middle East and he used 
them ruthlessly. He took up remote languages with ease…He was ubiquitous and 
charming; he was unorthodox and occasionally outrageous. He was probably 
heroic. The comparison with Lawrence was inevitable. (161) 
Haydon is also queer, having various lovers both male and female and strongly intimated to have 
had a relationship with an agent he “burned” (and his eventual killer) Jim Prideaux, though when 
MI5 and the CIA in the 1950s requested MI6 to interrogate Haydon and Prideaux, their public 
school connections cover up the true nature of their relationship (274). Haydon is 
                                                 
164 As Burgess was instructed to do by his Soviet handlers as a cover 
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paradigmatically the untrustworthy, “leaky” agent against which Bond is a reaction—and, unlike 
most of the intelligence workers and government employees fired or forced out in the 1950s, he 
is actually a Soviet spy hiding behind the shield of gentlemanly masculine power. If the 
uncovering and removal of Haydon were the only thematic thrust of the novel, then it would fit 
quite nicely in the post-Bond revolution. But of course, Haydon’s betrayal, while it may move 
the plot of Tinker, Tailor, is secondary to Smiley’s investigation not only of the actions of the 
betrayal, but also of the pieces that informed it, from world-systems to interpersonal relations, 
governments to public schools, and ideological ideals and personal foibles. 
 Smiley is well-positioned to reflect on the mid-century changes in intelligence work he 
experiences throughout the novel because, like Bill Haydon, his career has lasted long enough to 
see that the kind of spy he is has been demoted from the ideal to the obsolete. The new world of 
espionage that we see in Tinker, Tailor is a world in which drone masculinity is replacing 
gentlemanly homosociality, and bureaucrats like Percy Alleline, who can only speak in banter, 
have seized (C)ontrol165 from the aristocratic old guard (187). Alleline’s bureaucracy is making 
the shift to the kind of worship of efficiency that has made covert action so seductive, and while, 
in the 1970s, the intelligence world is still only in transition to this ethos, one can already see 
how the over-reliance on technology, especially satellite surveillance instead of human networks, 
and the prioritization of immediate results will lead to an intelligence apparatus that forgets to 
gather and cultivate human intelligence. This is shown in the novel in the Circus’s dismissal of 
people like Smiley (at least initially), Connie Sacks and Jerry Westerby, whose value lies in the 
characteristics they share with the talented amateur of an earlier generation of spy fiction: 
dedication, obsessiveness, and passion in the pursuit of the answer that will unravel the grand 
                                                 
165 The former head of the Circus before Alleline was codenamed Control. 
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conspiracy. Smiley, as the primary viewpoint character, offers a stark contrast to James Bond. 
Smiley shudders at the idea of the scalp-hunters, covert operations specialists who have 
increasingly focused on kidnappings, assassinations, and the other less cerebral aspects of 
espionage work. He views agents like Ricky Tarr, who revels in the Bond-like aspects of the 
job—the danger, the women, the exotic/erotic tourism—as childish and immature. Smiley is a 
man of reflection instead of covert action,166 but he isn’t like Alleline either; Smiley is aligned 
with neither violent covert action nor the bureaucratic cult of technocracy and efficiency, making 
him an outsider within the new paradigm of intelligence work unfolding around him. Smiley 
becomes a lens167 for the reader to view intelligence work and the ambivalent nature Le Carré 
assigns to it. Tinker, Tailor is not simply the complaint of someone who feels intelligence is 
moving in the wrong direction, that it was better in the old days. To Le Carré, what hasn’t 
become outright worse about intelligence work is actually exposed as never very great to begin 
with. Control, the previous head of the Circus and Smiley’s mentor, is paranoid and cruel, 
willing to sacrifice Jim Prideaux to catch the mole he is convinced is in MI6. The public school 
system, the traditional breeding ground of British intelligence workers, is where Prideaux is sent 
as a forced retirement after his near fatal injury—a spy’s graveyard instead of cradle. Smiley 
may not be a fan of the Circus’s new methods, but his old ones (reverse interrogation, building 
rapport, forming networks behind enemy lines, gathering human contacts) are revealed to be 
predicated on an ideological position—that the West is worth fighting for/deserves to “win”—
                                                 
166 The 2012 film version of Tinker, Tailor has a great scene demonstrating this to the audience, 
in which several characters are riding in a car when a fly buzzes in; other characters swat and 
miss at the fly, agitating it further, while Smiley patiently observes its flight pattern, and then 
when it is close to a window, simply rolls the window down, sucking the fly out.  
167 That Smiley’s glasses have become an iconic symbol of the character reinforces the 
“seeing/being seen” nature of his role in Le Carré’s fiction, as discussed in Ch. 1. 
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that Smiley does not even believe in, and thus these methods prove to be ineffective when 
confronted with either true believers or people equally as cynical as Smiley.  
Smiley’s ideological cracks show when he interrogates his nemesis Karla, who is either 
very much the believer or the arch-cynic (the text allows the reader to project his or her own 
answer, much like Smiley does). Smiley’s interrogation of Karla soon becomes an interrogation 
of his own blindspots and weaknesses as a spy. After he decides not to “make speeches to 
[Karla] about freedom—whatever that means—or the essential goodwill of the West” since “they 
were not favourable days for selling that story, and I was in no clear ideological state myself” 
(215), Smiley decides to take “the line of kinship,” and approach Karla as if they were the same:  
I had asked myself—lazily, no doubt—what would a man think of in such a 
situation, what would I? And my mind came up with a subjective answer: his 
woman…I exchanged my predicament for his, that is the point, and as I now 
realise I began to conduct an interrogation with myself…There were certain 
externals, it is true, to which I pinned the approach. He looked connubial; he 
looked like half a union; he looked too complete to be alone in all his life. Then 
there was his passport, describing Gerstmann [Karla] as married; and it is a habit 
in all of us to make our cover stories, our assumed personae, at least parallel with 
the reality…The more identities a man has, the more they express the person they 
conceal. The fifty-year-old who knocks five years off his age. The married man 
who calls himself a bachelor; the fatherless man who gives himself two 
children…Or the interrogator who projects himself into the life of a man who 
does not speak. Few men can resist expressing their appetites when they are 
making a fantasy about themselves. (219) 
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Smiley’s reflection is meant to be read as a micro-examination of the intelligence world itself, as 
the speech moralizes that making a fantasy about itself has been the primary job of the 
intelligence community since at least World War Two. Smiley is disturbed by the possibility that 
the differences between West and East in the Cold War are not so different, and that he and 
Karla are alike. Most of all, Smiley worries here that espionage isn’t even very political; or, 
rather, it makes the political very personal. Nor is this the only moment in the novel in which this 
concern is visible: Guillam feels “orphaned” when he finds out Haydon is a traitor (358); Smiley 
knows that Bill’s affair with Smiley’s wife Ann is the root of his distrust of him (164); Smiley’s 
resolution of the case is tied both metaphorically (through a dream) and at the conclusion of the 
plot to a reunion with Ann (276); Jim Prideaux blows the initial operation to catch the mole by 
warning Haydon out of love (374); Haydon’s final screed against the West stems, in Connie 
Sack’s opinion, from a personal sense that the British empire had betrayed him by “retreating” 
from the world stage via decolonization and the American surge (a feeling which Smiley shares) 
(367, 356). Michael Denning argues that part of the function of espionage thrillers is to make 
“the spy the link between the actions of the individual…and the world historical fate of nations 
and empires” through devices like apparent realism and unity of character in order to restore a 
sense of agency “to a world which seems less and less the product of human action,” (14). 
Tinker, Tailor plays with the nature of that link, and questions whether or not the modern (at the 
time, the 1970s) intelligence agent can have a sense of agency within the de-personalizing and 
bureaucratic world of espionage.  
At first glance, the personalization of the political in Tinker, Tailor does not leave Smiley 
with a sense of agency restored or a feeling that the work he does is useful or meaningful: 
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Like an actor, he had a sense of approaching anti-climax before the curtain went 
up, a sense of great things dwindling to a small, mean end; as death itself seemed 
small and mean to him after the struggles of his life. He had no sense of conquest 
that he knew of. His thoughts, as often when he was afraid, concerned people. He 
had no theories or judgments in particular. He simply wondered how everyone 
would be affected; and he felt responsible…He thought about treason and 
wondered if there was mindless treason in the same way, supposedly, as there was 
mindless violence. It worried him that he felt so bankrupt; that whatever 
intellectual or philosophical precepts he clung to broke down entirely now that he 
was faced with the human situation. 
Smiley is an “actor” not on the world stage but in a psychodrama, wherein even treason can be 
mindless, and motivations to act are empty and bankrupt in the face of people suffering.168 
Smiley’s final assessment of himself at the moment just before he apprehends Haydon is a 
portrait of another type of anti-Bond than Jason Bourne. Bourne was an individual turning drone 
masculinity against the state to guarantee his individuality, but Smiley is a state servant who can 
only succeed because he has not been conscripted into drone masculinity. Smiley does not share 
Bond’s athleticism, violence, sexual prowess, belief in British or Western superiority, or even 
professional status (as he has been fired from MI6). He is “a fat, barefooted spy, as Ann would 
say, deceived in love and impotent in hate, clutching a gun in one hand, a bit of string in the 
other, as he waited in the darkness,” (357). Smiley feels—and increasingly is—out of place in a 
post-Bond world. However, waiting barefoot in the dark, he has maneuvered himself to be in 
                                                 
168 Though “people” definitely only refers to people Smiley knows, i.e. individuals, rather than 
people in the abstract or even specific groups. 
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place to catch Haydon. Le Carré knows that Smiley is outdated, but can’t shake the feeling that 
he is more needed than ever. Smiley doubts everyone’s, including his own, motivations, feels 
morally and emotionally bankrupt, and moves like a piece in a deterministic machine that began 
clicking at the end of World War Two and has placed Smiley and Haydon in a dark room in a 
safe house as a matter of inevitability; but of course Smiley is good at his job, has the right 
temperament for it (as opposed to Alleline, Tarr, or Haydon), and despite, or perhaps because of, 
his deep skepticism about espionage he finds himself drawn back into the Circus as a watchdog 
in several novels until his final retirement in 1990s The Secret Pilgrim. Smiley is Le Carré’s 
perfected version of the gentleman spy, written as a reaction against the Bond type and the 
fantasization in espionage work that accompanied him, but at the same time the text responds to 
the criticisms Fleming and Bond raise for the inter-war secret agent. To Le Carré, Hannay’s 
amateurism, jingoistic enthusiasm, and plucky optimism are inappropriate in a post-war world, 
so Smiley is professional, skeptical, and dour—but, because of his surface unremarkability, is 
even more an everyman than Hannay. Lawrence’s flamboyance, success, and self-mythologizing 
are suspect, so Smiley is straightlaced (and straight), middling, and quiet—but is the only one 
who can catch Haydon. Bond’s violence, aggressive heterosexuality, and fantastic adventures are 
a strange kind of wish-fulfillment, so Smiley is cerebral and a cuckold, and is surrounded by 
petty politics and petty people—but is still a gentleman in breeding and action, one of “Us,” a 
Cold Warrior to the core. Le Carré wants espionage to be petty instead of grandly fantastical like 
the Bond books and movies, because pettiness is human, and thinking any ideological, political, 
or bureaucratic system is more important than humanity is the wrong conclusion to make in Le 
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Carré’s works—it’s Bill Haydon instead of Smiley.169 Thus, the author and his most famous 
character come to opposite conclusions; Smiley questions how much of a difference an 
individual human can make in an age of bankrupt ideologies, but through the process of that 
questioning Le Carré insists that human considerations should be at the heart of the intelligence 
community.   
Le Carré is committed to making the point that intelligence services, failing to thoroughly 
question themselves and falling into the trap of drone masculinity, are morally compromised 
institutions. But because of this ideological commitment by his author, Smiley’s world is a dour 
and cynical one, filled with deep tragedies and only half successes. The play and pleasure of the 
adventure genre has been drained out of Smiley’s Circus—for good reason, to be sure. 
Portraying MI6, or any intelligence agency, cavalierly can very easily come off as 
propagandistic, such as in the novels of Tom Clancy or in properties like The Man from 
U.N.C.L.E. Nevertheless, the austerity and coldness of the spy world in Le Carré champions a 
kind of detached, stoic, cynical masculinity, a masculinity without Bond’s swagger, and with 
considerably more individualism and contempt for bureaucracy than what Bond feigns at, but 
still a masculinity of “tough men making tough decisions.” To the extent that Le Carré is 
formulaic, he is formulaic in replicating protagonists with this mindset (or who start out naïve 
and come to this mindset); Alec Leamas from The Spy Who Came in From the Cold, Smiley, 
Gunther Bachmann from A Most Wanted Man, and Jonathan Pine from The Night Manager are 
examples I discuss throughout the dissertation, and yet they are not close to an exhaustive list. 
                                                 
169 Ironically given Le Carré’s liberalism, it’s a rather conservative conclusion—one that 
manages not to remove the need for intelligence agencies altogether because they are features of 
a corrupted system, as in Ambler, but also one that dismisses targeted movements as “just 
politics” and disconnected from the “real truth” of the world, which is found in individuals.   
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But spy fiction, often slotted into “adventure” or “realist” categories, has occasionally offered 
more choices for masculine attitudes than cavalier or cynic. John Banville’s The Untouchable 
(1997) reflects back (though from a further distance) on the same period170 as Tinker, Tailor and 
similarly critiques the turn towards drone masculinity within intelligence that arose within the 
Cold War era. But it also responds to the genre of spy fiction itself, and questions the role the 
genre has had in perpetuating toxic masculine discourses. A fictionalized account of Cambridge 
Spy Anthony Blunt, The Untouchable, in critic Alan Hepburn’s words, “offers a critique of 
joyless heterosexuality in espionage narratives,” through its main character, Victor Maskell, a 
version of “the queer pleasure-seeking spy,” (208). Maskell’s outsider status, his inability to 
“take seriously the self-deluding, school-brigade, boys-with-men’s-mustaches world of military 
intelligence” certainly acts as a foil to that institution and its obsession with heterosexual 
masculinity (Banville 73). Maskell, a double-agent like Blunt, makes sport of the relationship 
between espionage work, homosexuality, and heterosexuality by specializing in and running 
homosexual honey-trap171 operations for the Brits—thus making the disavowed relationship 
(even more) integral to the functioning of British intelligence. Maskell is plainly delighted by 
being doubly subversive (as a Communist spy and as a homosexual), drawing analogies between 
the two frequently, and even, channeling Lavender Scare rhetoric, describes how the one career 
prepared him for the other: “When I began to go in search of men it was all already familiar to 
me: the covert, speculative glance, the underhand sign, the blank exchange of passwords, the 
hurried, hot unburdening—all, all familiar” (287). Of course, that Communism comes first for 
                                                 
170 The late 30s-Philby’s defection. 
171 The honey-trap is a common blackmailing scheme (generally, though they have been used for 
assassinations and theft) in which a target is seduced by an agent or someone working for an 
agent, and the affair is then used as leverage over the target.  
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Maskell, and then homosexuality, is also a joke on how seriously government officials took the 
potential threat of gays in the State department. As Hepburn writes, “Maskell’s homosexuality 
[is] a ruse, not in the sense that he withholds it, but in the sense that it does not explain his 
personality or actions,” (224). Maskell was an aesthete first, then a Communist, then a British 
spy, then a Communist spy, then both, then a homosexual. The chronology upsets the causal link 
between the Wildean-type and treason that mid-century panic rhetoric depended on, and, as 
Sinfield, MacFarlane, and Sedgwick have outlined, has been a feature of responses to queer 
identity in mass culture for much longer.  
 Alan Hepburn reads the sensual, aesthete, homosexual Maskell as a direct commentary 
on what he terms the “masculine orthodoxy of antipleasure” that he sees as characteristic of 
espionage novels post-Bond (207). Bond is illustrative of this concept. As I have argued above, 
the emphasis on Bond’s sexuality in the novels is not about emphasizing the pleasure of sexual 
encounters.172.Bond’s sexuality serves as a cultural marker of his trustworthiness, a vouchsafe 
that the public is right to trust him and the institution he represents with the agency of the secret 
agent, that is, the agency to act in secret, outside of the public knowledge, for the good of the 
nation-state. Spy fiction, like Le Carré’s, that jettison the actual sex from their narratives keep 
the idea that sexuality itself is illustrative as a character trait, and can signal trustworthiness or 
treason (like it does with Haydon in Tinker, Tailor). Banville’s Maskell—and even more 
obviously, Boy, who was based on Guy Burgess—are characters in an espionage novel that do 
not conform to that model. Their sexuality is not a vouchsafe; it is sexuality (and thus can be 
                                                 
172 Sexual pleasure is a reward in Bond fiction: the “passionate leave” with Domino Solitaire in 
Live and Let Die, the penetration of Vesper’s secret in Casino Royale, and even the turning of 
Pussy Galore from villain/lesbian into heroine/heterosexual are all things Bond “earns” in the 
course of doing his job as a secret agent (A James Bond Omnibus 243). 
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pleasurable), and though they are not actually very trustworthy in a political sense (at least not to 
Britain) Banville takes pains to separate any causal relationship between one’s sexuality and the 
ability to act as a spy.173 In fact, the novel’s, or at least Maskell’s, take on trying to police or 
proscribe specific qualities, including agent sexuality, among espionage agents might actually 
reduce the effectiveness of spy services, which need agents who can be fluid in their identities to 
be successful. Maskell anticipates the turn from aristocratic homosociality to drone masculinity 
in hiring practices, remarking that “the Americans, who now hold power, were demanding that 
professionals be put in charge, company men like themselves, whom they could bully and 
coerce, not mavericks like Boy or…me,” (313). The word “mavericks” in the quote indicates that 
Maskell, though homosexual, still aligns himself with a kind of masculine agency. This agency, 
ironically, is proven (to Maskell) by his decision to spy for the Soviet Union; he, unlike Bond 
and other “company men”, actually have the agency to make that kind of radical choice. It isn’t 
the licensed agency that Bond possesses, but it reads as much more agential, responsive, 
individual—in short, more like the gentleman spy of spy fiction before Bond.  
Despite the attention paid to the concept, I think The Untouchable critiques more than the 
relationship between modern-day espionage novels, masculine antipleasure, and the genesis of 
the link between the two in the cultural connection between homosexuality and treason made 
visible by the Cambridge Spies. The novel goes further in its examination of identity and 
characterization then Hepburn supposes. For one, Boy, the Burgess character, does gleefully 
participate in the cultural trappings and the historical lineage of the orthodoxy of espionage 
fiction, and while his cavalier attitude is undoubtedly a partial subversion given his true 
                                                 
173 The novel also contains a Philby character as well, who is “depressingly” straight and the 
master-double agent (Banville 271).   
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allegiance, there is no reason to doubt Maskell’s assessment that Boy “adored the trappings of 
the secret world, the code names and letter-drops and the rest. Brought up on Buchan and Henty, 
he saw his life in the lurid terms of an old-fashioned thriller and himself dashing through the 
preposterous plot heedless of all perils” (116). Espionage is still for Boy, as it was for Hannay, a 
place of play, a field in which one can pick up and put down identities to advance the game. One 
characteristic of spy fiction, especially those texts that deal with cover identities, double agents, 
and the like, is the tease that both the job of being a spy and identity itself are performative 
instead of innate. Take for example, Eric Ambler’s Epitaph for a Spy, in which the protagonist 
must track down a German spy staying at a resort hotel in the south of France in order to save his 
own skin, as he has, due to a coincidence, been arrested for espionage. Every character except 
the protagonist174 is ultimately revealed to be playing a part: the high status military major and 
his wife are broke and involved in shady dealings and scams, the American brother and sister are 
eloping cousins, the most suspect guest is an escapee from Nazi-occupied territory and the shifty 
innkeeper is actually the member of the underground helping him, and the sweet elderly couple 
are Gestapo agents there to track the refugee down. The actual spy is revealed just to be doing it 
for the money (the eponymous epitaph) rather than any deep-seated ideology. Identities are roles 
these characters play, though Ambler does seem to skew closer to the “don’t judge by 
appearances/things aren’t what they seem” moral rather than making a statement that all 
identities are all performative. This is the same logic behind Haydon’s character in Tinker, 
Tailor: Haydon proves that one’s identity as a gentleman does not rule him out as a traitor. The 
principal conflict in The Untouchable though is not “will Maskell be found out?”, as it is in 
Tinker, Tailor, since the reader knows from the beginning that he already has been. Rather, it is 
                                                 
174 A missed opportunity in my opinion. 
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this very question of the possibility of an innate quality to identity. Maskell wants there to be 
such an innateness. At various times he presents sensation, guilt, Communism, and art as 
enduring qualities of the human experience, experiences that are themselves not dependent on a 
performance to have action and agency in the world. He describes himself and his fellow 
Cambridge spies as “latter-day Gnostics, keepers of a secret knowledge, for whom the world of 
appearances was only a gross manifestation of an infinitely subtler, more real reality known only 
to the chosen few, but the iron, ineluctable laws of which were everywhere at work” (45). 
However, this “more real reality” is troubled by how easily the categories that Maskell assumes 
are fixed melt into one another, are abandoned, or are revealed to be an act: sexuality gets 
analogized to playing the role of an ideological double agent and vice-versa; Nick, the Philby 
character, betrays Maskell to save his own reputation; Maskell’s prized painting the Death of 
Seneca might be a fake; the novel’s final scene has Maskell looking for shapes in the clouds, 
attempting to impose an order on a visual field that is highly subjective.  
The Untouchable suggests that the spy himself is in a state of tension between the fear of 
all identity being absolute performance, on the one hand, and the necessity of adopting a 
convincing cover identity and remaining undetected, on the other. Maskell reflects upon the dual 
attraction and terror of being a spy: “Attraction, because in the midst of such uncertainty you are 
never required to be yourself; whatever you do, there is another, alternative you standing 
invisibly to one side, observing, evaluating, remembering” but also “fear…of the possibility that 
nothing, absolutely nothing, is as it seems,” (131). This state of tension calls into question the 
very mechanism by which drone masculinity was presumed to guarantee agent trustworthiness, 
by suggesting that even these “trustworthy” traits—heterosexuality, aggression, professionalism, 
a certain set of anti-elitist attitudes—might be equally as performative as Kim Philby’s 
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aristocratic stammer. If, as The Untouchable suggests, in the spy world (and perhaps the world at 
large), no personality characteristic or specific attitude can be read as actually saying something 
meaningful about the person demonstrating it—that any trait shown cannot exclude the 
possibility that the person being evaluated is in fact a very good double agent—then there is no 
point in seeking out specific “types” of people for spy work, and no point in prioritizing for 
ideological reasons one version of masculinity over another.  
This is a crucial lesson to learn; without an ideological justification (i.e. that it guarantees 
loyalty and effectiveness) to back it, drone masculinity can be evaluated on its evidence of 
success. Intelligence officials might point to the high-profile killings of terrorist leaders, most 
notably Osama bin Laden, as proof of the usefulness of drone masculinity as an organizing 
principle for covert action agents. However, due to the spectacular nature of these successes and 
the secrecy of espionage agencies, it can be difficult for the public to focus on the numerous 
failures of modern intelligence agencies. Drone masculinity prevents the formation of human 
intelligence networks and the recruitment of human assets in sensitive positions. As a result, 
intelligence agencies have embarrassingly little knowledge of the inner workings of their 
traditional targets: terror groups, states like North Korea, Iran, and Russia, multinational 
corporations or international criminal syndicates. Critics of drone masculinity, many of which I 
have quoted throughout this chapter, point out that the covert-action, anti-intellectual but pro-
technical ethos of modern espionage has resulted in an apparatus that, in the words of an 
anonymous Naval intelligence officer, “shoot[s] a whole lot better than we aim” (qtd. in 
Diamond 322). Shooting without aiming, or, in other words, carrying out targeted intelligence 
operations without gathering enough systemic and environmental intelligence first, has further 
destabilized the globe, creating power vacuums from which new dictatorial and authoritarian 
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regimes and new terror groups like ISIS have sprung. Without human intelligence to rely on, the 
US’s intelligence apparatus has constructed the largest and most comprehensive Signals 
Intelligence in the world, a system that electronically surveilled every email, cell phone, and 
social media post, regardless of the legality of that surveillance, let alone its morality. As drone 
masculinity has gained in prominence in cultural representations of intelligence and within the 
intelligence community itself, it has spread to other areas of civil society, most notably manifest 
in the militarization of U.S. police forces. According to a leaked 120-page catalogue175 from a 
British defense firm specializing in intelligence and Special Forces gear, American police forces 
are buying technology designed to illegally intercept and record cell phone conversations, record 
numbers of automatic weapons and tactical armor, surplussed military vehicles, and millions of 
dollars more of technology designed to facilitate drone masculinity rather than community-based 
policing (Biddle). For these reasons, as well as others I have already mentioned, such as the use 
of torture by intelligence agents, the victimization of hundreds of innocents via drone strikes, the 
higher rates of PTSD among Special Forces personnel, and the Bond-ian attitude that sexually 
assaulting a woman is getting what is “owed” for service to the state, we desperately need 
another change in the cultural discourse of espionage akin to the one that excised gentlemanly 
homosociality from it. This other change needs to sever drone masculinity entirely from the 
cultural expectations of what spy work is and who intelligence agents are.  
Such a cultural untangling is a difficult task, but, as I have argued in the past two 
chapters, it has been done before, and the cultural shift can affect the institutional practice (and 
vice versa). I believe that we can create, perhaps even in spy fiction itself (as Bourne, Smiley, 
and Maskell show), both alternate masculinities and alternatives to masculinities, the adoption of 
                                                 
175 Obtained by the website The Intercept.  
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which might even be affecting Bond himself. Daniel Craig’s Bond films update much of the 
franchise, including, perhaps, some playing with the linking between Bond’s heterosexuality and 
his loyalty—the first foundation of drone masculinity. The scene in which Bond meets the 
villainous Silva from 2012’s Skyfall is one such example. Bond has been captured and tied to a 
chair in Silva’s abandoned and dilapidated island town. In one continuous take, Silva descends 
an elevator into the room and walks towards Bond, telling him a story about his grandmother’s 
efforts to eliminate the rats plaguing her by getting them to eat each other. The story is meant to 
undermine Bond’s faith in the head of MI6, M (played by Judi Dench), as Silva wishes Bond to 
see himself and Silva as rats M has set to metaphorically “eat” each other. Bond doesn’t seem 
fazed, so Silva moves closer to the captured superspy and begins to get more…intimate: 
S: Just look at you. Barely held together by your pills, your drink… 
B: Don’t forget my pathetic love of country 
S: [laughs] You are still clinging to your faith in that old woman [M] when all she 
does is lie to you. 
B: She’s never lied to me. 
S: [Reveals in detail that M has lied to Bond about his fitness for this mission—he 
did not pass the fitness tests required of him after his gunshot wound earlier in the 
film] 
S: What is this if not betrayal? She sent you off to me knowing you are not ready, 
knowing you would likely die…Mommy was very bad…hmmm? [begins 
unbuttoning Bond’s shirt, sees his bullet wound] See what she’s done to you. 
B: Well she’s never tied me to a chair. 
S: Her loss. [Plays with Bond’s chest hair] 
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B: You sure this is about M? 
S: It’s about her…and you…and me. You see we are the last two rats. We can 
either eat each other…[seductive glance, lifted eyebrow] hmm?...or eat everyone 
else. [Strokes Bond’s cheek]. How you are trying to remember your training now! 
What’s the regulation to cover this? Well first time for everything [caresses 
Bond’s legs] 
B: What makes you think this is my first time? 
S: Oh Mr. Bond. [Draws back] The physical stuff is so dull, so dull. Chasing 
spies…so old fashioned. [Silva unties Bond]. Your knees must be killing you. 
England [scoff] empire [scoff] MI6 [scoff]…you are living in a ruin as well, you 
just don’t know it yet.   
At this point, Silva actually tries to hire Bond, tempting him with the opportunity to leave MI6 
and become a rogue agent (like Silva himself had done), profiting off the chaos inherent in the 
wake of covert action. This scene is a bravura performance by Javier Bardem as Silva. 
Additionally though, I could not help but notice how this scene seems to be in conversation with 
the torture scene from Casino Royale—the movie version (which also stared Daniel Craig as 
Bond), but also Fleming’s original version, which I analyzed in the last chapter. Like Le Chiffre 
in Casino Royale, Silva here presents a kind of homosexual threat, specifically, the threat that 
homosexuality will lead to treason. Silva even directly references Bond’s training in how to 
resist this temptation—remember, Fleming has Bond reflect on this training in Casino Royale 
when he thinks to himself that it is “the supreme test of will” to avoid giving in to homoerotic 
identification induced by torture (Casino Royale 113). Silva is clear that he finds Bond’s 
“pathetic love of country” to be shallow in the face of personal wrong, in this case, the wrong 
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that M has committed by turning Silva over to the Chinese (which sparked his rebellion) and 
then sending Bond to kill Silva despite knowing Bond would most likely die in the attempt. Silva 
is, like Le Chiffre, aligned with forces that scoff at England, empire, and MI6. But there is one 
key difference in this scene that clues us in that Craig’s Bond is not Fleming’s. “What makes you 
think this is my first time?” Bond asks Silva, a line that, given its placement as Silva is actively 
caressing Bond’s legs, references both torture (it isn’t Bond’s first time being tortured) and 
homoerotic encounter. Of course, Bond may be bluffing—perhaps this is part of his training, to 
use his sardonic wit to bravura his way past desire. But we never find out. The film leaves the 
answer as unimportant. Given how crucially important that answer would have been to spy 
writers like Fleming and Buchan and heads of MI5, MI6, the FBI, the CIA, etc., that it doesn’t 
seem to matter very much in the Daniel Craig-era films is remarkable.  
Ultimately, Skyfall tells a very personal Bond story, one in which love of country is left 
aside for Bond’s love of a person, his mother figure M, and Silva’s desire to kill that same 
mother figure for her betrayal of him. Loyalty, state service, and espionage do not have their 
genesis in a kind of masculinity in Skyfall, but rather in a personal, familial relationship—at least 
at first. Notably, the movie’s final set piece action scene takes place at Bond’s family home in 
Scotland, where he was orphaned as a child. M dies there, orphaning him again (Bond tenderly 
kisses M’s forehead as she dies in his arms), and the home burns down. After this trauma, Bond 
is next seen in a scene that homages the classic films: he flirts with Moneypenny, walks through 
M’s office door, and receives a file from the new M, played by Ralph Fiennes. Fiennes as M asks 
Bond if he is ready to be a dutiful soldier and serve his country, and Bond answers “With 
pleasure.” Craig delivers the line with no real pleasure, and the audience knows that Bond, now a 
man without a family and a past, feels hollow. The homage ending of Skyfall turns the idea of 
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drone masculinity around a little bit by placing the homage in the context of the intense personal 
trauma Bond has undergone. Skyfall’s plot shows the painful birth of the automaton Bond which 
earlier films show unreflectingly. We, the audience, are not uplifted by this transformation, just 
as we are not uplifted when we hear of cases like Raymond Davis’s, whose story of drone 
masculinity gone wrong began the previous chapter. Whether or not a change in how Bond films 
or spy fiction more broadly represent masculinity will lead to better, more just, more transparent 
but not less effective intelligence agencies remains unknown. However, until we can live in a 
world without the need for intelligence services, such a reform is direly necessary.  
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Chapter 6: Drone Orientalism: A Discourse of the Other in the Culture of Intelligence 
 
The first great theme of spy fiction is identity. The first wave of what is generally 
considered spy fiction—Kim, The Riddle of the Sands, The Thirty-Nine Steps—are novels about 
identities: finding one’s own identity, uncovering the identity of an enemy, mistaken identities, 
identities as social constructs, identities as innate, or racialized or gendered.176 Spy fiction shares 
with the profession it supposedly represents this concern with knowing who is who. John 
Buchan’s The Thirty-Nine Steps is a book driven by the difficulty in proving identity, in holding 
it static and fixed in the social sphere. First, there is the slipperiness of the identity of protagonist 
Richard Hannay’s upstairs neighbor, Scudder. Scudder is a spy, and admits as much to Hannay, 
and must change his appearance and fake his death because of the information he has uncovered. 
After “faking up the corpse” he has procured to make it seem more like him, Scudder approaches 
Hannay with his story and asks for help (7). Hannay lets him put on a disguise in his apartment, a 
process which seems to change his entire being:  
In half an hour’s time a figure came out that I scarcely recognized. Only his 
gimlet hungry eyes were the same. He was shaved clean, his hair was parted in 
the middle, and he had cut his eyebrows. Further, he carried himself as if he had 
been drilled, and was the very model, even to the brown complexion, of some 
                                                 
176 I don’t mean to imply that identity has ever gone away as a key theme in spy fiction (ask 
Jason Bourne), just that it was the first concern of a genre that has grown slightly more complex 
in the century since. 
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British officer who had had a long spell in India. He had a monocle, too, which he 
stuck in his eye, and every trace of the American had gone out of his speech. 
‘My hat! Mr. Scudder—’ I stammered. 
‘Not Mr. Scudder,’ he corrected; ‘Captain Theophilus Digby, of the 40th Gurkahs, 
presently home on leave.’ (8) 
Scudder is now Digby, in appearance, habit, and past. Not that it saves him, as Hannay finds 
Scudder/Digby murdered, and himself framed. The bulk of the book has Hannay on the run, a 
case of mistaken identity. As discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, though Hannay’s social 
identity is threatened by this mistaken identity, it is his white, colonial, gentlemanly background 
that grants him the skills to survive his ordeal on the run in Scotland, from the ability to blend in 
at a political rally to his South African “veldcraft” which allows him to trek stealthily across the 
moors. Throughout the novel, Buchan plays with an identity dichotomy: on one end, identity is a 
social marker, fluid, changing, threatened; on the other, identity is innate, stable, something that 
can be disguised but will ultimately be revealed, will “out.” Hannay’s enemies are themselves 
masters of disguise. The kindly archaeologist who takes Hannay in from the moor is actually the 
nefarious “man who can hood his eyes like a hawk,” the leader of the German spy ring who has 
framed him (47). Later, the same man fools a military intelligence committee into thinking he is 
the First Sea Lord of the Navy. Only Hannay can see through the disguise, and only too late—the 
enemy spy walks out with the plans he had meant to steal. In the climax of the novel, Hannay, 
having cleared his name, thinks he has solved the mystery of the thirty-nine steps and discovered 
the German hideout. But when he surveilles the occupants, he is disheartened. He finds three 
middle-class Britons, merrily playing bridge and tennis and taking tea—they look and sound 
“horribly English”, leaving Hannay feeling like a “precious idiot” and openly wondering, “These 
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men might be acting; but if they were, where was their audience? They didn’t know I was sitting 
thirty yards off in the rhododendron. It was simply impossible to believe that these three hearty 
fellows were anything but what they seemed” (80). It is only by remembering a story about his 
friend Peter Pienar, who once sat next to a detective who was after him in church without the 
fellow noticing precisely because Peter acted so plainly like he belonged there, that Hannay can 
summon up the courage to believe that the three men are “playing a part” (81). Nevertheless, 
when Hannay confronts the men and their disguises do not crack, their attitudes do not change, 
he almost loses heart and abandons his mission. Just then, he notices a “tell”—one of the men 
taps his hand on his knee like the archaeologist had done: “[I]n a flash, the air seemed to clear. 
Some shadow lifted from my brain, and I was looking at the three men with full and absolute 
recognition” (86). Hannay notices the last shred of difference visible under this disguise, what 
might be psychoanalytically read as a symptom, a shard of the reality of hostile intention 
underneath a façade of civility. The threat, ultimately, is locatable to the expert. Hannay can 
now, and in fact does, act on his certainty, calling in the police and getting the three spies to 
crack under their eminent arrest.  
The emphasis on hidden difference we find in The Thirty-Nine Steps and early spy fiction 
as a whole broaches the fundamental philosophical tangle of espionage—that it is necessary, but 
in reality quite difficult, to tell “them” from “us.” After all, if it were a simple matter to 
determine whether or not a person or group were an enemy, and what their nefarious plans were, 
then intelligence agencies would be tremendous wastes of taxpayer money. Recall that as early 
as the turn of the 20th century, spy agencies found justification by stressing the difficulty of 
discernment: William Le Queux mobilized public anxiety, caused in large part by his own 
suggestion that German spies were everywhere, to convince James Edward Edmonds, head of 
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British Military Intelligence and the House of Commons’ Committee of Imperial Defence to set 
up a new Secret Services Bureau (Trotter 31). It’s a useful line to take for a government 
bureaucracy seeking to expand, and as we have discussed throughout this project, espionage has 
been and still is a growth industry. Spy fiction such as The Thirty-Nine Steps or Le Queux’s 
invasion literature played up the paranoia of the “secret German” hiding the impulse to barbarity 
behind a seemingly civilized face. It’s really quite difficult when analyzing the first moment of 
popular spy fiction to determine if the genre is more entertainment or propaganda, or to 
distinguish where those categories are separate. Spy fiction certainly did not trouble the notion 
that there was a good and a bad, and that the Brits and the Germans were emblematic of those 
poles, respectively. If anything, spy fiction’s emphasis on the cleverness and capability for 
disguise of the enemy increased that polarization. However, after the First World War, especially 
in the writing of Eric Ambler, the genre found what could be considered it’s saving grace: taking 
the seeming ease by which one person can play as if they are another not as paranoia-fuel, but as 
a useful conceit for interrogating the dialectic between the Self and the Other. Spy fiction learned 
to question the distance between the terms in the dialectic, the ideological determinations that 
construct it, and the necessity of it in the realm of personal interaction and world politics. Let’s 
take Ambler’s Journey into Fear (1940) as exemplary of this turn in spy fiction. The novel 
begins with the attempted assassination of an English armaments engineer named Graham 
designing a defense system for the Turkish government in Istanbul. The Turkish secret police 
determine that it is (of course) not an accident that the Nazi regime is attempting to kill Graham 
in an effort to hamper British mobilization in this, the immediate build-up to WW2. Graham is 
secretly smuggled under an assumed name onto a steamer from Istanbul to Athens. But on the 
voyage, Graham cannot help himself from thinking—perhaps one of his fellow passengers is not 
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who he or she claims. Beset by paranoia, Graham interrogates those aboard the ship. He finds a 
German anthropologist, Fritz Haller, to be a comfort. Both Graham and Haller share a (very 
Modernist) sense of moral ambiguity, and they are anti-patriotic humanists in a time of political 
fever. When a Serbian passenger, Josette, criticizes Graham’s benefactors the Turks, calling 
them “heathen animals” who have committed atrocities against the Armenians and Syrians, 
Graham equivocates: 
“Does your memory go back to nineteen twelve? I was thinking of the Serbian 
atrocities in Turkish villages. Most armies commit what are called atrocities at 
some time or other. They usually call them reprisals.” 
[Josette:] “Including the British army, perhaps?” 
[Graham:] “You would have to ask an Indian or Afrikaner about that. But every 
country has its madmen. Some countries have more than others. And when you 
give such men a license to kill they are not always particular about the way they 
kill. But I am afraid that the rest of their fellow countrymen remain human 
beings.” (Ambler 81-82) 
Graham insists upon common humanity, upon the difficulty in discerning right and wrong when 
partisanship is a first consideration. He finds his echo in a conversation with Haller a few pages 
later. Haller and Graham discuss the possible awkwardness of a German and Englishman eating 
together under the looming shadow of war. Haller reassures Graham, saying: “Perhaps it is that I 
am old, but I find it extremely difficult to identify men with their ideas. I can dislike, even hate 
an idea, but the man who has it seems to be still a man,” (85). Graham’s “the rest of their fellow 
countrymen remain human beings” and Haller’s “the man who has it seems to be still a man” 
ideologically rhyme. Which makes sense, as the two men are very similar: both academic, both 
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cautious. Over the course of the novel the two men spar over Spengel, history, and the nature of 
the soul. And then, surprise, Haller is actually a Nazi spy named Moeller, on board to kill 
Graham. The self and the other, thesis and antithesis, prove difficult to tell apart, yet nevertheless 
are irreconcilable to each other. 
 Yet, paradoxically, both spy fiction and spy work depend on the conceit that, despite a 
high degree of similarity or a clever disguise, what is hidden can be revealed, especially under 
the professional gaze. A shorthand for this belief is the representation (or assumption) that the 
enemy has a “tell,” an irrepressible symptom of their true identity, such as the hand-tapping of 
the German spy in The Thirty-Nine Steps. Another great example of this is from the Bond novel 
Diamonds Are Forever. In the climax of the novel, Bond realizes two hired killers from the 
American mob are on board the same ocean-liner he is (shades of Journey into Fear), but he 
does not know exactly what they look like because he has previously only seen them masked. 
However, one of the killers cannot resist sucking on a large red welt (or wart) on his hand, a 
gesture that clues Bond in to his real identity since he had seen the man do the same action 
before. The killers are red warts on society, at least within the logic of the novel, and so they are 
given away by this symptomatic mimesis, a physical flaw which reveals a flawed heart. From Le 
Chiffre to Blofeld to Oddjob and Jaws, it is quite a common conceit for Bond villains to be 
marked by these symbols of irreducible difference:  
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Figure 10: Christoph Waltz as Blofeld in 2015’s Spectre 
These physical marks are empty in and of themselves—it doesn’t really matter how Blofeld got 
his scar—but serve to distinguish these men (and occasionally women) as apart from the society 
that must be defended by Bond. The discourse of espionage reinforces the logic that the 
difference between the Self and Other is small (thus necessitating professional agencies with 
wide state powers) yet obvious when the expert looks. When this logic enters into the institution 
of the intelligence agency it becomes the structural belief that malfeasance does not originate 
within an unreadable heart; it instead has clear markers that can be read and interpreted only by 
professionals. But in reality, villains do not have diamonds embedded in their skin (Zao from Die 
Another Day) or a condition that causes them to weep blood (Le Chiffre in Casino Royale). 
Power’s insistence that “evil” can be seen—if one knows how to spot the “right kind” of 
difference—actually produces that difference as significant; in other words, the spy agency as an 
organization that ought to know becomes an organization that makes the knowledge worth 
knowing.  
The linkage of double-agency to homosexuality discussed in previous chapters and the 
fallout from that link provide one example of what can happen when the internal logic of 
intelligence aligns a particular marker of identity with threat. The double-agent plot, connected 
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to homosexuality or not, is an elevated form of the genre’s general concern with identity, agency, 
and ideology. From Casino Royale to The Ipcress File; Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy to the TV 
show The Americans, many of the classics of the genre depend upon not only the ambiguity and 
difficulty in determining who is who, but in the angst and moral wrangling inspired by that 
ambiguity. For example, in Tinker, Tailor, George Smiley’s inherent identification with the 
Soviet double agent Bill Haydon177 means that he cannot hate his enemy, even in the depths of 
the Cold War. Smiley even “takes the line of kinship” when talking to his KGB counterpart and 
ostensible arch-enemy, Karla, reframing the ideological conflict undergirding the confrontation 
between East and West, which one might fine exaggerated in more overtly nationalist works, as a 
personal interaction (Tinker Tailor 219). But the double agent plot does not exist in a vacuum, 
and throughout the discourse of espionage, double-agency, an ideological position, became 
mapped onto a homosocial and homosexual version of gentlemanly masculinity. Fiction, like 
Buchan’s Greenmantle and the Bond stories, and cultural figures like T.E. Lawrence, W.H. 
Auden, and the Cambridge Five operated in a discursive conjunction, feeding off each other and 
fueling Lavender Scare fears. The rifts within intelligence agencies between intelligence-
gathering and covert action became exacerbated as the CIA and MI6 attempted to shed the image 
that they were havens for gay Communist double agents. Ultimately, the pivot away from 
homosocial gentlemanly masculinity to drone masculinity has transformed how spy agents are 
                                                 
177 As discussed in Chapter 5. As a reminder, right before Smiley arrests Haydon he thinks this: 
“Haydon had betrayed. As a lover, a colleague, a friend; as a patriot; as a member of that 
inestimable body that Ann loosely called the Set: in every capacity, Haydon had overtly pursued 
one aim and secretly achieved its opposite. Smiley knew very well that even now he did not 
grasp the scope of that appalling duplicity; yet there was a part of him that rose already in 
Haydon’s defence. Was not Bill also betrayed? Connie’s lament rang in his ears: ‘Poor loves. 
Trained to Empire, trained to rule the waves…You’re the last, George, you and Bill.’ …Thus 
Smiley felt not only disgust, but, despite all that the moment meant to him, a surge of resentment 
against the institutions he was supposed to be protecting” (Tinker Tailor 356) 
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recruited and what they are expected to do. Believing homosexuality is an indicative proxy for 
double-agency is a fantasy, a fantasy that the hidden Other cannot help but betray himself by 
some kind of noticeable flaw. It is a particular fantasy, one with a long history in Western culture 
and the culture of espionage, but nonetheless it is a fantasy that takes coincidental, incidental, 
and accidental histories and makes them pregnant with hidden meaning. Homosexuality does not 
lead to Communism, but for a generation of intelligence worker, whether he personally believed 
it or not, the two terms were unavoidably linked, affecting how one behaved, who one 
befriended, and what one was expected to do as a professional agent. And this linkage is 
regrettably not the only such fantasy that conflates identity categories for symptoms of 
malevolency. Unsurprisingly, race can also serve as a symbolic marker of the irreducible 
difference between agentive self and enemy other. The trope is found throughout both the history 
of intelligence work and in its cultural shadow, spy fiction, where the reinforcement of racial 
difference as the difference between Self and Other reinforces the always-already tendency to 
conflate the two by agents of state power.  
In order to get a grasp of how the metaphoric feedback loop operates, it is helpful to 
begin with examining the interplay of race and hidden subversion through the lens of the most 
popular and influential bit of spy fiction, James Bond. Racial difference suffuses many of the 
Bond books and films, but perhaps the most directly relevant to us is 1954’s novel Live and Let 
Die.178 Live and Let Die finds Bond brought to the U.S. to investigate the ties between a Harlem 
kingpin, Mr. Big, and a drug smuggling operation out of British-controlled Jamaica. The novel is 
steeped in a racial and at times racist Othering, manifest in its pre-occupation with voodoo, 
                                                 
178 Live and Let Die demonstrates that the quality of a Bond book and the quality of its film 
version are not correlated. The novel is one of the few actually about something, the movie one 
of the bottom two or three out of 25.   
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superstition, racial difference as filtered through white experience, government involvement in 
black communities, and crime and law-enforcement. Because of this, it is tempting to think of 
Live and Let Die as a novel that gawks at the spectacle of the Other, and indeed reading 
Fleming’s interpretation of the dialect of African-American English spoken within Harlem is 
cringing: “Guess ah jist nacherlly gits tahd listenin’ at yuh. Why’nt yuh hush yo’ mouff’n let me 
‘joy mahself ‘n peace ‘n qui-yet” (53). This attempt at “verisimilitude” is nothing of the sort, as 
it is the only differently-presented speech in the novel; the British Bond and American Felix 
Leiter do not have any difference in how their speech is portrayed on the page, though there is 
little chance they would pronounce “color/colour” the same. But Bond (MI6) and Leiter (CIA) 
are both agents of the state. The portrayal of “realistic” African-American speech actually serves 
to highlight difference, to separate and remove the Other from the purview of the Self, and fix it 
as the proper recipient of the law-enforcement gaze. The voodoo angle in the book on first 
glance has a similar function: to cast black people as barely civilized, an irrational force within 
the heart of the national body threatening to burst forth, as in this quote from an FBI agent 
explaining to Bond why they haven’t previously arrested Mr. Big:  
‘Do you want a race riot?’” objected Dexter sourly. ‘There’s nothing against him 
and you know it, and we know it. If he wasn’t sprung in half an hour by that black 
mouthpiece of his, those Voodoo drums would start beating from here to the Deep 
South. When they’re full of that stuff we all know what happens.’ (43) 
Or this reflection by Domino Solitaire, a fortune-teller in the employ of Mr. Big and Bond’s 
love-interest du jour, about the inherent mysticism of the regions of the world not fully under the 
dominion of Anglo-Saxon whiteness: 
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How can one explain to someone [i.e., Bond] who hasn’t lived close to the secret 
heart of the tropics, at the mercy of their anger and stealth and poison; who hasn’t 
experienced the mystery of the drums, seen the quick workings of magic and the 
mortal dread it inspires. What can he know of catalepsy, and thought-transference 
and the sixth sense of fish, of birds, of negroes…(113) 
In Domino’s thoughts, the “negro” is a type of being akin to fish and birds rather than a kind of 
person. Likewise, in FBI agent Dexter’s analysis, black people are a kind of supernatural mob, 
liable to lose themselves to mystic frenzy. These attitudes reflect classic tropes of 
dehumanization, the comparison to nature and the fear of the horde, endemic in many pulpier 
forms of entertainment, and inherited from the adventure novels of Rider Haggard and Edgar 
Burroughs. But, and this distinguishes Live and Let Die from its pulpier cousins and even its own 
movie version, within the logic of the novel (let alone outside of it) Domino’s and Dexter’s 
attitudes are thought to be ridiculous. Spectacular difference is not the domain of spy fiction, as 
spectacular difference does not require the expert to see. Spectacular difference is not as 
threatening within the espionage mindset as hidden difference, a tenet Fleming knows well. 
Ultimately, the threat of Mr. Big is far more subtle and thus far more insidious than the voodoo 
spectacularism hints. It is not a threat of racial revenge, or culture clash; instead, like the threat of 
homosexual double-agents, it is the threat that Mr. Big might actually be able to pass undetected 
into the national body.  
 Remember, spy media, whether print or visual, found its uniqueness as a pop-culture 
genre in the question it asks about the distance between the Self or Other and the capacity of 
either one to appear, seem, and act like its ostensible opposite. Critic Erin Carlston identifies the 
fear of the Otherness of double agency as linked to the fears of the Otherness of homosexuality, 
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writing “[as] double agents, invisible Others passing as the Same, [homosexuals and Jews] could 
act like, and on behalf of, both the “us” within the nation and the “them” outside it” (5). The 
thrills in spy fiction in both Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and Live and Let Die come from 
uncovering this duplicity, revealing that passing Other within the national and cultural body that 
Carlston is terming “the Same.” But this is not to say that espionage in pop culture has been 
uniform in its handling of its central thematic concern. When the distance at first prefigured by 
the self/other dialectic is proved mutable or circumstantial, we are in the Conrad-Ambler-
Greene-Le Carré lineage of spy fiction (print or visual). When the distance is proved immutable, 
though deeply hidden, we are in the Buchan-Fleming-Ludlum lineage. The former allows for the 
humanist critiques of an amorphous and ambivalent “system” we examined in the first two 
chapters, that is, the critiques of a spy bureaucracy that threatens to grind out individual agency. 
Larger structures are to blame for the conflicts in these kinds of novels; their themes suggest that 
without such “silly ideas” as “capitalism” or “communism”, or “West” or “East”, or “CIA” or 
“KGB”, etc., then people could get along fairly well as people. In the second strain, the conflict 
is driven by the suppressed danger of the Other, difficult to discern because of its ostensible 
similarity and its positioning always already within the borders of the Same. The presence of the 
Other makes the Same dangerous or uncanny because it divorces the contiguity of the Self and 
the Same—the Same harbors the Other as well as it does the Self. We might call this the “Is your 
bathroom breeding Bolsheviks?” style of paranoia, after the infamous Scot Tissue ad that first 
appeared in the 1930s: 
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Figure 11: Bolshevik Scott Towel Ad (Wilson) 
This ad, whether with its tongue-in-cheek or not (there is some debate as to its seriousness), 
leverages the idea that the Other can appear in the heart of the Same as a kind of splinter-Self (or 
splinter-cell). It is the job of the professional secret agent to make sure that if this happens, it is 
quickly found out. I wrote about the arguments for intelligence work professionalization within 
spy fiction a bit in Chapter 1, and indeed it is that difficulty in distinguishing the carefully hidden 
enemy and alien that reinforces the Le Queux-esque mechanism in which spy fiction does the job 
of helping to justify the existence of spy professionals. However, I argue that meta-textual 
arguments for bureaucracies are not the only, nor potentially the most important, impact spy 
stories make when they obsess over the Self and Other dialectic. To be honest, by this point spy 
agencies are pretty good at drumming up their own justifications anyway, and fiction is no longer 
required as a cultural catalyst. Rather, it is what the professional secret agents of fiction find 
when they look for the difference between the Other and the Self that has had a subtle but crucial 
influence in the discourse of espionage. Within spy fiction, the Other is not similar to the Self, 
but its uncanny mimic.  
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My use of the term mimic calls to mind the work of Homi K. Bhaba, specifically his 
essay “Of Mimicry and Man.” Bhabha describes mimicry as a colonial discourse that, in an 
attempt to create a more recognizable, and thus governable, Other, inadvertently undermines 
itself:  
Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of 
difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the 
discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be 
effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. 
(86)  
The successful mimic is threatening because he or she fits in well enough to be beneath 
suspicion. From the perspective of authority, the mimic fools the national body’s immune 
response, and once in, it spreads its disease. Red Grant in From Russia, With Love is a 
murderous psychopath who can pass as a British gentleman. The eponymous Aurich Goldfinger 
is a business magnate whose ruthlessness in the boardroom and golf course camouflages a 
pathological desire to steal (or destroy, in the film) all the gold from Ft. Knox. In the recent 
Spectre (2015), the difference between Blofeld’s Spectre and MI6’s surveillance program is only 
that the former uses it for his personal profit. Bond consistently fights warped, or perhaps simply 
more honest, versions of the ideologies he represents, embodied by enemies who are jealous and 
resentful of what the Self has and they, as the Other, do not. Mr. Big’s voodoo spectacularism is 
too obvious a mark of Otherness; it does not take the personified form of the state’s expertise, the 
secret agent, to determine it and so it cannot really undermine the cohesion of the state. But Mr. 
Big’s voodoo schtick is not directed at the wider, white world in the novel—but his network of 
informants, his surveillance apparatus, is. Mr. Big threatens to be a better spy than Bond himself. 
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In Bhabha’s terms, we might say that what Mr. Big does is “[return] the look of surveillance…as 
the displacing gaze of the disciplined” (89). It is this more subtle threat, that he can simulate and 
mimic the conditions of the Self well enough that he understands how to exploit it, that makes 
him a dangerous opponent, and reveals the insidious way the discourse of espionage can 
transform difference into threat. 
Mr. Big consciously uses the voodoo trappings attributed to him to his strategic 
advantage, in order to prevent both fearful FBI agents and rival black criminals from making a 
serious attempt to discover his real business: he is a Soviet-trained agent provocateur (27). Bond 
and Felix are actually not fooled by this feint nor are they very perturbed by any overt cultural 
difference they encounter on their Harlem investigation/cruising bar trip (we will talk more about 
Bond’s missions sounding suspiciously like tourist activity in the next section). Bond’s takeaway 
from his Harlem experience is the opposite of the increasingly provincial-seeming Dexter; his 
judgment of the partying at the Harlem nightclub is total acceptance: “Got the gist of it. Seems 
they’re interested in much the same things as everyone else—sex, having fun, and keeping up 
with the Jones’s. Thank God they’re not genteel about it” (55). Lest the reader think that Fleming 
is making a point about an “enlightened” British perspective versus a backward American one, 
Leiter is quick to join in on making the observation that, gasp, the citizens of Harlem are pretty 
much like everyone else, responding to Bond’s assessment with “‘Some of them are…Harlem’s 
riddled with social distinctions, the same as any other big city’” (55). There is still an “us and 
them” separation here, as in Felix Leiter’s earlier assertion that “[he] like[s] the negroes and they 
know it somehow” (48). But the novel goes out of its way to undercut the more sensationalistic 
aspects it also presents, introducing the spectacle of the Other only to insist that the difference 
between “us and them” is not really all that large. I argue that this is crucial for establishing the 
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actual threat of Mr. Big, and by extension the actual threat of the Other in the novel and in the 
Fleming Bond books in general: the Other resents the Self because of their closeness, and thus is 
motivated to overturn it. Mr. Big threatens Anglo-Saxon dominance not with voodoo drums, but 
with the specter of a black man successfully navigating the white world on his own terms despite 
his lack of access to it. Here is how M describes him to Bond at the beginning of the novel:  
[T]he Negro races are just beginning to throw up geniuses in all the professions—
scientists, doctors, writers. It’s about time they turned out a great criminal. After 
all, there are 250,000,000 of them in the world. Nearly a third of the white 
population. They’ve got plenty of brains and ability and guts. And now Moscow’s 
taught one of them the technique. (27) 
Racial difference is very real in M’s description, but it does not seem to be biological, rather a 
matter of education. And if the West won’t educate them, then Moscow will, at least in M’s 
analysis. Mr. Big seems to agree, after a fashion: 
It is unfortunate for you, Mister Bond, and for this girl, that you have encountered 
the first of the great negro criminals. I use a vulgar word, Mister Bond, because it 
is the one you, as a form of policeman, would yourself use. But I prefer to regard 
myself as one who has the ability and the mental and nervous equipment to make 
his own laws and act according to them rather than accept the laws that suit the 
lowest common denominator of the people. (224) 
Mr. Big threatens the social order not through overthrow, but supersession. His ability to excel as 
a businessman, intelligence agent, leader, and community support is a threat because it makes the 
white, imperial order of the U.K. and the U.S. superfluous. By mastering the techniques of his 
oppressors—with their help, it might be said, as he has been professionally trained—Mr. Big 
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reveals that “[t]he menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of 
colonial discourse also disrupts its authority” (Bhabha 88). Fleming makes him into a black 
ubermensch, a much more frightening supposition for the policemen of the world like Bond than 
a voodoo horde. Within the logic of the novel, Mr. Big is the terror of proximity but not quite 
nearness, similarity without sameness—or, as Bhabha says, “almost the same but not 
quite…almost the same but not white” (89). The concept of the “uncanny valley,” a term 
originating in computer science to describe the sense of unease, revulsion, and uncanniness 
elicited when viewing a being (digital, robotic, corpse, undead, etc.) that is too-close to human 
without being exactly considered one is useful as a conceit to describe how Bond views Mr. Big. 
Upon their first face-to-face meeting, Bond notices both that “the photographs had conveyed 
nothing of this man, nothing of the power and the intellect which seemed to radiate from him” 
and that his “skin was grey-black, taut and shining like the face of a week-old corpse in the 
river” (70). Genius and corpse, Mr. Big upends Bond’s social order because he is similar enough 
to Bond and the Self he represents and defends to replace Bond’s order with an order of his own: 
a mirrored order in which the cultural Other, in this case, a racial Other, can dominate and 
impose his will upon white men (Bond) and women (Domino Solitaire). This threat of reversal 
reveals secret agent Bond for what he really is: in Mr. Big’s words, a “form of policeman.” In 
fact, it reveals all police as “forms” of police, themselves the performers of a supposed “law and 
order” that may not exist in and of itself (i.e. ontologically), but only in the very performance by 
the Bonds of the world. Though Jean Baudrillard is associated more with media studies than 
literary, I think a line from “Simulacra and Simulations” captures the anxiety behind the Other in 
spy fiction, and by extension in the cultural discourse of espionage itself. Simulation—the 
representation of the real, independent of the object being represented—is dangerous “since it 
 304 
always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves might really be 
nothing more than a simulation” (177). If the espionage agent, the “form of [a] policeman” is the 
simulation of law and order, then law and order may not exist without him. Similarly, if the 
mimic can so successfully imitate the colonial authority that oppresses him, this suggests that 
that authority itself isn’t an inviolable order. Authority is exposed as a performance of power, not 
the right to it, and a performance based on historical contingency and accident rather than 
destiny, purpose, or inherent racial, class, or national superiority.  
Exposing the truth that power is a performance of itself, and not an unquestionable, 
ontological mandate, is the true threat of the Other in the cultural history of espionage, the 
general threat behind the specific machinations of villains like Mr. Big. The mimicking Other 
presents the (very dangerous) ideas that history is contingency and not destiny, that difference 
can be arbitrary and/or based on bias instead of truth. Insistence that the opposite is the case—in 
other words, that reality exists as it does because it has to be this way, and that the Other’s very 
existence threatens “us”—is the foundational justification of state violence against those who 
dissent. The Le Carrean spy, confronted with the contingency of it all, agonizes over his place 
within what comes to seem increasingly a web of inhumane circumstance. The Fleming spy, on 
the other hand, polices the borders between “them and us” in order to stave off the uncanniness 
of being confronted with his own mimic. Thus, Bond must continually remind himself that Mr. 
Big can be put into his place, that he is “a man who walked and defecated, a mortal man with a 
diseased heart” (223). This is true (at least within the novel), but that Bond must repeat it to 
himself before confronting Mr. Big makes the statement a kind of symptom of its own. Bond is 
anxious, not at the theatricality of voodoo, but at what must to him seem an equally uncanny 
vision: a world in which a black man is better at maneuvering the secret corridors of power than 
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white men. Mr. Big is fine forgoing destruction in exchange for usurpation. Bond and Felix are 
actually aware somewhat of the injustice of race relations, and not without some sympathy. For 
example, when Bond imagines the finding of the pirate Henry Morgan’s treasure cave by a black 
Jamaican, an event which kicked off the plot of the novel, he understands why the man would 
seek out Mr. Big to help him, thinking that “a white man would cheat [the finder of the treasure]” 
(212). Regardless, Bond’s loyalty is to his country and his agency and the regimes of supremacy 
they represent and defend. In other words, Bond’s knowledge of the Other does not translate into 
empathy. The expert can be judged an expert because of the distance between him and the 
subject studied—it’s a close distance, but it is immutable. As we will see, this logic of expertise 
has a long history within both spy fiction and spy practice, in the cultural discourse and the 
institutional logic of espionage. 
 I have been making the case that the Self/Other dialectic plays a key part in structuring 
both narrative choices in spy fiction and spy media; however, the policing of the boundary 
between the self and the other and the assumption that only an expert can do so constitute key 
tenets of the institutional logics that lie behind the formation and expansion of spy agencies 
themselves. Furthermore, I think these phenomena are linked, that the popularity and purported 
representationalism of fictional espionage has exacerbated the tendency of agencies and agents 
of state power to think dualistically in terms of Us and Them, good guys and bad. In other words, 
anxieties within the cultural discourse of anxiety become written into intelligence practices. 
Intelligence work draws moral authority from positing that there is a threatening Other, but that 
this Other cannot be uncovered without the close scrutiny of the expert. When racial, cultural, 
gender, national, sexuality and other less plastic and less individualized criteria become the 
distinguishing marks of a disguised enemy, then discrimination becomes intelligence policy. The 
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oldest illustration of this concept within the actual history of intelligence work is the relationship 
between espionage and Orientalism. The next section of this chapter is concerned with that 
relationship and a disturbing new development within it, the advent of a set of procedures, 
beliefs, structures, and technologies I call “drone Orientalism.” In analyzing the origin and 
functioning of drone Orientalism, I show how the particular role of the Self and Other dialectic 
within the discourse of intelligence has had consequences in the lives of thousands (if not more), 
and how a concern with expertise as a scholastic category, instead of an expertise that arises 
from human relationships and an empathic lived experience, can lead to abuse of state power on 
the one hand, and failures of intelligence-gathering work on the other.  
Drone Orientalism 
The bulk of the rest of this chapter reconfigures drone warfare as a particular way of 
viewing the Other that has its origin in the cultural discourse and history of espionage. Prominent 
within this analysis is the history of Orientalism as a shifting set of cultural beliefs and political 
policies. Orientalism suffuses much of early spy fiction and its ancestral DNA in adventure 
fiction and was also integral to the discursive structure of the modern spy agency. I have termed 
the specific discursive logic I am investigating here “drone Orientalism,” a term which addresses 
how the cultural, technological, political, and bureaucratic components of drone warfare have 
combined to form a particularly pernicious way of shaping and policing a Self and Other dyad 
between the (imagined) “West” and the (imagined) “Orient.” Before I analyze drone Orientalism 
in earnest, I would like to introduce the topic with an example that intuits drone warfare as a kind 
of (flawed) seeing of the Other.  
Born in Istanbul to Iranian parents, poet Solmaz Sharif directly addresses the human costs 
of the “War on Terror” and the U.S.’s history of intervention in the Middle East in her collection 
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of poems, Look. The poems within Look are short, fragmented at times, emphasizing the 
fragmented reality created by war and violence. The titular poem, “Look”, addresses drone 
warfare by positioning two kinds of incongruent languages, the legalistic and the personal, into a 
tension that cannot be resolved through recourse to either language alone. In the stanzas I excerpt 
here, the poem directly addresses drone warfare, and, in doing so, places into tension three 
possible ways of viewing the Other: as a dog, as a thermal shadow, and as the “exquisite face”: 
Whereas it could take as long as 16 seconds between  
   The trigger pulled in Las Vegas and the Hellfire missile 
   Landing in Mazar-e-Sharif, after which they will ask 
   Did we hit a child? No. A dog. they will answer themselves;[…] 
  Whereas this lover would pronounce my name and call me 
   Exquisite and LAY the floor lamp across the floor, 
   Softening even the light; 
  Whereas the lover made my heat rise so that if heat  
   Sensors were trained on me, they could read 
   My THERMAL SHADOW through the roof and through 
   The wardrobe; […] 
  Whereas ye know not what shall be on the morrow. For what is 
   Your life? It is even a THERMAL SHADOW; it appears 
   So little, and then vanishes from the screen; 
  Whereas I cannot control my own heat and it can take  
   As long as 16 seconds between the trigger, the Hellfire 
   Missile, and A dog, they will answer themselves; 
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  Whereas A dog, they will say: Now, therefore, 
  Let it matter what we call a thing. 
  Let it be the exquisite face for at least 16 seconds. 
  Let me LOOK at you. 
The poem is predominantly a series of quasi-legalistic sounding clauses; the first several stanzas 
begin with the conjunction “whereas”, and the last few begin with the command “let.” This 
structure alone primes the reader to recognize and indict the legal, instead of ethical and moral, 
framework through which the U.S. government views its interactions with Muslims in the U.S. 
and in the Middle East. Contrasted to the legalistic mimicry of the stanzas’ form is the speaker’s 
fear of being reduced to a “thermal shadow” in the eyes of the West—a reduction made even 
more painful and poignant by the speaker’s remembrance of a lover.179 Sharif imagines drone 
operators reassuring themselves that they “only” killed a dog instead of a child. Unfortunately, 
this imagined scenario is not a far-fetched one. Scholar Hugh Gusterson in his study of drone 
warfare, Drone, relates a particularly horrendous case of post-hoc reassurances connected to a 
particular drone operation. During this mission, all levels of oversight, from the drone pilots to 
their image spotters to the commanding officer, mistook a convoy heading to market, including 
several children, as a terrorist column and destroyed it. Despite the certainty at all levels before 
the strike that the convoy was a threat, after the strike, when the image analysts began 
questioning the pilots whether or not children had been present, one pilot, in charge of operating 
millions of dollars of surveillance equipment, is quoted as saying that there was “[n]o way to 
tell” that the market convoy was harmless (Gusterson 69). Major General James O. Poss oversaw 
                                                 
179 This lover, the poem reveals in a section not excerpted here, may have been captured and sent 
to a detention center. 
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an Air Force investigation of the incident and concluded that “technology can occasionally give 
you a false sense of security that you can see everything, that you can hear everything, that you 
know everything” (69). This is a convenient kind of excuse—the same kind offered by the drone 
operators in “Look” who claim they see a dog—that ignores the way technology, culture, and 
bureaucracy intersect. Major General Timothy McHale was also on that Air Force investigation, 
but he concluded that the Predator crew “were out to employ weapons no matter what” (70). This 
is the danger in seeing people as thermal shadows, as targets first and foremost that have to be 
proven not to be a threat.180 This dehumanization process is not remedied by adding more 
surveillance; drone operators track and record individuals for 8-12 hour shifts at a time and yet 
give the excuse “no way to tell, man” after firing upon a shopping convoy. Letting the powerful 
see more does not transform a thermal shadow into an “exquisite face.”  
The phrasing “exquisite face” in the poem calls to mind the work of philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas, who throughout his work uses the confrontation between the ego and the 
face of the o/Other as the basis for ethical relation. For Levinas, to come into contact with the 
face of the other is to confront both “that which cannot be found in the self through any 
introspection” as well as the “very mortality of the other person” (19; 107). Levinas argues that 
this conflict “puts into question the ego’s natural position as subject,” a destabilization that is not 
solved by gaining more knowledge of the other, a tactic which will ultimately fail to reassert the 
primacy of the ego due to the “irreducible” nature of difference itself (108). Rather, Levinas 
                                                 
180 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the official Obama administration statistics for people killed in 
drone strikes counts all military aged males as combatants, not civilians, unless proven to be 
innocent after the strike—a nearly impossible task. This policy drastically undercounts the true 
number of civilian deaths due to drone strikes. 
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argues, it is only love that can answer the demand that responsibility for others places on the ego, 
only love that can transform the Other into the “exquisite face”: 
Responsibility for the Other—the face signifying to me ‘ego’s natural position,’ 
and consequently also ‘you are responsible for the life of this absolutely other 
other’—is responsibility for the unique one. The ‘unique one’ means the loved 
one, love being the condition of the very possibility of uniqueness. (108) 
“Look” places this love/uniqueness recognition in contrast to observation: observation by a legal 
system that sees Muslims as potential terrorists, and observation by a drone operation that sees 
them as thermal shadows. Its ending co-opts the legalistic language of the observer into a plea 
for the transformative power of love to change observation into an authentic encounter with the 
other: “Let it be the exquisite face for at least 16 seconds.” But the “16 seconds” in this line, the 
same 16 seconds as the time after a Hellfire missile launch and before its impact, already hints at 
the structural difficulties that the attitudes and the technical mechanisms of the “War on Terror” 
have placed upon this kind of encounter. Drone warfare, as the poem suggests, creates too much 
distance between actor and acted-upon, confuses observation for understanding, and relies on 
stereotypical assumptions of the people at the other end of the drone’s camera. The result in 
Sharif’s poem is a Levinasian transformation in reverse; instead of love transforming an 
unknowable other into a “unique one,” the love between the speaker and her lover inadvertently 
facilitates the transformation into the thermal shadow of state observation: “Whereas the lover 
made my heat rise so that if heat / Sensors were trained on me, they could read / My THERMAL 
SHADOW through the roof…” Within state observation, even love can be misread, can lead to 
Othering. 
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An analysis of how drone warfare has changed how our intelligence agencies view the 
world must have at least two separate domains: political and cultural. From the policy 
perspective, drone use is clearly the most technologically advanced form of covert action and 
one of the two most technologically advanced forms of surveillance (along with data collection). 
Drones are being used to track, record, and kill specific individuals (called a “personal drone 
strike”) and also to strike and kill large groups exhibiting suspicious behavior as a deterrent to 
possible insurgent or terroristic groups in the region (called a “signature strike”). As I argued in 
the last chapter, covert action, precisely due to its spectacular and quantifiable nature (i.e. it 
allows intelligence agencies to count kills, captures, and damage), has encouraged a mentality 
that turns people into targets.  Drone warfare threatens to take this mentality to its extreme, 
transforming people into thermal signatures, red when living, blue when not. The continuing 
violence of these transformations calls our attention to the cultural ramifications of drone 
warfare. I addressed some of those ramifications—specifically those for drone operators and 
intelligence workers—in an earlier chapter (Chapter 4). Here, I mean to take a different track, 
focusing on how drone use structures and re-structures encounters between Western powers, 
specifically intelligence agencies and the military, and the people who live under the threat of 
drone surveillance and drone warfare, that is, the people of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and everywhere else drones have been used (officially or 
unofficially). I cannot claim to speak for such a diverse and varied group; rather, I hope through 
my analysis to spur discussion about how discursive structures can cause real violence, pain, and 
fear.       
Drone use is a practice enmeshed in discourse, a discourse that sets binaries of Self and 
Other, West and Orient, here and there, distance and immediacy. Though drone use only became 
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a prominent surveillance and killing tool in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the discourse 
that has encouraged its expansion as a tool of intelligence policy is reminiscent and in some ways 
a descendant of 19th century imperialism. It is the “War on Terror,” an amorphous, poorly-
defined concept that seemingly justifies military action across wide swaths of Africa and Central 
Asia, in which drone warfare has found its niche. As critic Adam Kirsch reminds us, the porous 
boundaries and ill-defined goals of the War on Terror mean that an inherent end to conflict, or 
even the achievable goals that would herald that end, can not immediately be seen: “Compared to 
Vietnam or World War II, wars that involved or convulsed all of American society, our “forever 
war” seems like an anomaly. But it would have been quite familiar to a nineteenth-century 
Briton: For these are the border wars of empire, which can never be won because no empire is 
ever free from threats” (qtd. in Gusterson 117). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine in future 
conflicts the U.S. using drone warfare in Russia or Germany or China to the extent it uses it in 
the Middle East and horn of Africa, as a tool for targeted killings and signature strikes. Social 
anthropologist Hugh Gusterson concludes his work Drone with a scathing analysis of the role 
drone warfare plays in creating political inequality and instability among nations: 
Drones are an imperial border-control technology for the age of late capitalism. 
They can be used only against countries that lack the technological sophistication 
to shoot down the slow-moving planes and whose internal affairs, conforming to 
Western stereotypes of ‘failed states,’ provide a pretext for incursion that is as 
persuasive to liberal interventionists today as the white man’s burden was to their 
Victorian ancestors…Enacted on the basis that countries such as Yemen and 
Somalia are in some sense lawless, the drone strike further establishes through its 
performance the abject status of countries that do not have the legal right to 
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territorial integrity employed by more mature nations…it simultaneously 
bifurcates the world, establishing a moveable master seam between one side 
where drones can be used and another side where they cannot. (148-149)   
Gusterson’s criticism of where and how drone warfare is implemented directly touches on a 
continuing problem with the way the Middle East and Middle Easterners are narrativized in 
Western thought—in other words, with Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism. These problems 
with narrativization begin with the fact that the power-relations inherent in narrativization 
prevent it from being a way to experience the other as the “exquisite face” in the first place. This 
is a difficulty in representation itself, discussed by scholars like Saidiya Hartman in her work 
Scenes of Subjugation, and outside of the scope of my current project. However, the particular 
ways drone warfare is influenced by and influences the way the people of the Middle East 
become narrativized as a particular kind of “Muslim other” are inseparable from the discourse of 
espionage itself, and its long history of blurring depictions of the “real,” or at least a pretense to 
the real, with outright fantasies of heroism.  
The fantasy structure that fuels the expansion of drone use is only one of several different 
manifestations that results when state power becomes enmeshed in the fantasy of knowing an 
Other while still keeping them Other—the general form of the fantasy that Edward Said 
examines with reference to Central Asia in his seminal work, Orientalism. Edward Said claimed 
in 1978 (the year Orientalism was published) that “the Orientalist reality is both antihuman and 
persistent. Its scope, much as its institutions and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present” 
(44). Criticisms of Said, especially that of Robert J.C. Young in White Mythologies, question the 
monolithic nature of Orientalism, and its ability to totalize academic or cultural thought in one, 
non-contradictory way. Young particularly decries Said’s inability to get outside of dualistic 
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thinking, writing: “As soon as Said has set up the traditional opposition of particular versus 
universal, individual agency as opposed to the determinations of culture or system, the problem 
remains by definition insoluble. To the totalizing culture the individual opposes a consciousness 
derived from experience: but how has that consciousness or experience been produced outside 
that culture if it is indeed totalizing?” (174). One way that I think Young’s criticisms can be 
answered is by reframing Orientalism as Orientalisms, non-monolithic discursive structures that 
nevertheless achieve hegemonic (though not absolute) status within particular institutions and at 
particular times due to various incentivizing structures. The specific Orientalist discourse that I 
wish to examine here, which I term (perhaps unsurprisingly) “drone Orientalism,” is by no 
means the only discourse, or even the only Orientalism, in operation in the CIA, the state 
department, or Western culture. But it is an active discourse, a discourse that does in the real 
world, and in order to accurately evaluate, analyze, and modify (or extinguish) the use of drones 
by our intelligence and military services, we must understand it. There exists a non-equal relation 
between the “real life” that the drone pilot claims to understand through observation and the lives 
that they see and sometimes end on their screens. This discordant relation is the result of a 
discursive structure, a cultural lattice. As mentioned in the introduction, a cultural lattice is a 
conceptual frame of easy references, mental heuristics, and material design, in which individual 
meaning-making occurs. Cultural lattices assume their rigidity by institutional repetition, as 
individual decisions influence future decisions which become bureaucratic policies. Drone 
Orientalism is a node of the cultural lattice of espionage, and has assumed its rigidity due to 
several factors: the mental heuristic of the “PlayStation mentality” of war at a distance, the 
material design of the drone cockpit, a Western cultural emphasis on individual moral choice 
theory, and, perhaps most perniciously, the easy references describing the Muslim subjects of the 
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drone gaze as a particular and peculiar Other, references reinforced in their place as nodes by the 
history and evolution(s) of Orientalism in espionage and international policy. It is with this last 
phenomenon that I begin my analysis of drone Orientalism and its effects, because this inherited 
history bears the most responsibility for the presence of  drone Orientalism within the cultural 
lattice of espionage today.  
When adventurer and proto-intelligence agent Richard Burton claimed that in the middle 
of the 19th century that “Egypt is a treasure to be won,” he began a decades-long push that would 
move Orientalist thought from description to evaluation and bring it from the scholastic to the 
military domain (Orientalism 197). From the strain of academic Orientalism practiced by Burton 
and other scholars of the 19th century, drone Orientalism has inherited an undue emphasis on the 
power of discovery, especially on the (fallacious) analogy that seeing is knowledge. Said writes 
that for those Orientalists responsible for making Orientalism into imperial policy, the accrual of 
“[k]nowledge was essentially the making visible of material….Scholarly discipline was therefore 
a specific technology of power: it gained for its user tools and knowledge which had hitherto 
been lost” (127). Scholarship within the framework of Orientalism is a tool of Orientalism, 
constrained by its governing discourse. Scholarship under Orientalism produces not objective 
facts or neutral analysis, nor does it traffic in a free exchange of ideas. Rather, it produces 
governing power via producing knowledge; geographic knowledge for army deployments and 
resource exploitation, cultural knowledge to better subjugate the multiple ethnic groups 
inhabiting the imagined spaces of Empire; historical knowledge to entrench fundamental 
difference between a European “us” and an Oriental “them.” The use of surveillance drones in 
the modern War on Terror is, as scholarship was for Burton, another such “specific technology 
of power,” one that literalizes and mechanizes the impulse to make visible the Other. Orientalist 
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scholars such as Richard Burton or David Hogarth made pretense to objectivity and dispassion, 
but as Said reminds us, “to be a European in the Orient, and to be one knowledgeably, one must 
see and know the Orient as a domain ruled over by Europe” (197). Likewise, the temptation to 
view drone surveillance data as objective truth in order to advance mission goals belies the 
Othering gaze that peers through the Predator’s camera—that is, the gaze of the pilot and data 
analyst steeped in an Orientalist mindset. In the following passage, Said is describing the 
panoramic quality of the 19th and early 20th century Orientalist scholarship:  
The Orientalist surveys the Orient from above, with the aim of getting hold of the 
whole sprawling panorama before him—culture, religion, mind, history, society. 
To do this he must see every detail through the device of a set of reductive 
categories (the Semites, the Muslim mind, the Orient, and so forth). Since these 
categories are primarily schematic and efficient ones, and since it is more or less 
assumed that no Oriental can know himself the way an Orientalist can, any vision 
of the Orient ultimately comes to rely for its coherence and force on the person, 
institution, or discourse whose property it is. (239) 
This passage characterizes Orientalism as totalizing in its sweep as well as reductive in its 
categorization. The totalization inherent in Orientalism prevents it from being wrong in any 
meaningful sense to those caught up in its discursive trap. Because Orientalist scholarship was 
conversant about a wide range of phenomena, it begat the illusion of perfect understanding to the 
imperial powers that relied on it. As a reminder that discourses do, colonial and imperial powers 
acted upon this fantasy of perfect knowledge, designing and implementing policy, including 
violence, based on generalizing and totalizing knowledge that only relates to its purported object 
of study by creating it as a pseudo-fiction. The use of drones adds the only missing component in 
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the imagining of the “Orient”: the ability to “know” what “they” are doing in real time. The goal 
that state power put Orientalist scholarship to during the 19th century was, in reality, an 
impossible task: to ascertain via extrapolation from essentialist categories the threat-level the 
Empire faced in a given region. Drones induce the confidence that we no longer need to 
extrapolate, that certainty is as close as a digital video feed. The claim drone surveillance makes 
to objectivity is powered by one of the oldest and most potent metaphors in human thought and 
language: vision as knowledge. As incidents such as the convoy bombing described above (in 
relation to Sharif’s poem) illustrate, vision is not certainty when devoid of understanding. 
Remember, one pilot was quoted as saying there was “no way to tell” that the attacked convoy 
was a group of villagers heading to market rather than a terrorist column (Gusterson 69). This is 
patently false; one human agent placed in the region could have informed central command of 
the regular practice of driving to market. What the pilot meant, though unawares, is that there 
was no way to tell given the constraints of his vision. Though he could see what was going on, 
his vision was hampered by being steeped in a discourse. This discourse is one that reinforces the 
mental script that “strange behavior”—behavior that intelligence, assumed to be total within the 
bureaucratic structure of Military Intelligence, does not mark as safe—is tantamount to terrorist 
behavior. The pilot presumed his own values as the values of those he was watching, and then 
“trusted his own eyes.” In other words, since he would not rise pre-dawn and drive en masse to 
market, armed, he assumed no one else would either, careless of the difference between life in 
Las Vegas and in rural Afghanistan. This is a mental error, but one structured by a fantasy of 
knowing the Other, a fantasy of mastery through (assumed) understanding and prediction.  
The technologies at work in drone warfare shape a particular manifestation of this 
fantasy. The interior of the drone “cockpit” is designed to look and feel like the interior of a jet 
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aircraft, yet the lack of embodied feedback is one of the most common reasons given when pilots 
crash drones (for example, pilots often don’t realize they are flying the drone upside down). The 
lack of clear boundaries extends to the time of drone operations as well as their space. Drone 
pilots, like many military personnel who have seen combat duty, have difficulties re-assimilating 
to civilian life—but unlike a Navy Seal, a drone operator must re-assimilate at the end of every 
shift.181 Gusterson argues that the lack of clear boundaries between combat and non-combat that 
is a particular feature of drone warfare disconnects the pilot from traditional narratives of war, 
specifically morally-simplistic narratives about risk, courage, and danger. These narratives are 
crucial, as Elaine Scarry argues in her book The Body in Pain, for buying into the master-trope of 
“war as a contest” between two competing, and relatively equal, relatively vulnerable, powers 
(145). Drone warfare is not a contest between equal powers; as I wrote in the last chapter, drone 
pilots face no physical dangers, their fleshy bodies thousands of miles away from the metal shell 
armed with Hellfire missiles and the capacity to surveil the “enemy” for 48-hour flight times. 
The unilateral nature of danger in drone warfare does not resemble traditional narratives of 
conflict and battle. I would argue instead that drone warfare, especially in conjunction with 
increased electronic surveillance and small Special Forces team strikes, transforms both war and 
espionage into police action. The corollary to this is a transformation in representation of the 
people on the other end of the drone’s cameras: when war or espionage are contests, the enemy 
are rivals (for example, the U.S.S.R. in the Cold War), but when they are police actions, the 
enemy become criminals. Gusterson points out that for the drone pilot, one piece in the 
                                                 
181 Stars and Stripes quotes a drone operator: “You’ve just been on a combat mission and half an 
hour later your spouse is mad at you because you’re late to soccer practice” (Gusterson 50). This 
kind of whiplash is built into the structures of drone warfare, and its effects on the psychology of 
drone pilots is not yet fully known.  
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responsibility-diffusing machinery of bureaucracy, unaware of the whos, whats, and whys behind 
a particular mission on a given day, it is tempting to view the figures on the screen as always-
already guilty:  
Judgments are made about people simply on the basis of their observed actions or 
their placement on an intelligence agency’s target list for reasons that the drone 
operator often does not know…Drone operators are confronted with a local social 
logic that they often do not understand and which they then recode through the 
cultural logic of American moral individualism. (78) 
American moral individualism is a particularly poor logic from which to draw conclusions about 
the many people surveilled by drones each day. Especially because, as I have argued in Chapters 
2 and 4 already, drone surveillance and covert action do not take the place of Human 
Intelligence, and so the cultural understanding gap can be extreme despite the massive amount of 
visual and audio data gathered. Seeing more does not translate into more knowledge when the 
framework to interpret that data is inadequate or biased, yet the discourse of drone Orientalism 
assumes that it does. The logic of American moral individualism and the transformation of war 
into a police action without physical risk for one power combine to place undue emphasis on 
“good guys” and “bad guys,” casting all behavior as a clear moral choice performed in a vacuum 
without social pressures. This idea is reinforced by much of spy fiction, but do not correspond 
well to reality. Gusterson writes about the membership of groups like the Taliban:  
Far from populations consisting of clear ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys, some of their 
members often move in and out of insurgency depending on the economic 
opportunities available to them, shifting alliances in local tribal politics, 
ethnoreligious antagonisms, and the stimulus of atrocity, invasion, and 
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subjugation. People may be part-time insurgents…some young men have no 
choice [and are forcibly conscripted by organizations like the Taliban or 
ISIS]…Journalist Steve Coll observes, ‘In such a landscape, the binary categories 
recognized by international law—combatant or noncombatant—can seem 
inadequate…A young man of military age holding a gun outside a hujra might be 
a motivated Taliban volunteer, a reluctant conscript, or a victim of a violent 
coercion.’ (107-108) 
On an institutional level, observations like this one contrast with the psychological assessments 
of the professionals consulted by the CIA after 9/11. For example, psychologist Eric Shaw 
argues that terrorist psychologies are “symptomatic of an incomplete or fragmented psychosocial 
identity” (Puar 56). Attitudes like this posit that joining organizations such as al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, or ISIS can never be a rational choice, but always a symptom of an irreducible distance 
between the reasonable, rational West and the incompletely developed East. These attitudes are 
easily reinforced by stereotypical depictions of “the terrorist” in Western media as fanatics, 
lunatics, or zealots, such as the “Crimson Jihad” group in the Arnold Schwarzenegger spy film 
True Lies (1994) or Abu Nazir (who believes Osama bin Laden didn’t go far enough) from the 
TV spy show Homeland. The number of civilian casualties182 drone warfare has produced 
indicate that the structural mechanisms, media narratives, and bureaucratic policies of drone 
Orientalism encourage pilots to see any person visible in the Predator’s eye as a terrorist or 
                                                 
182 As mentioned last chapter: The Obama administration claimed in 2016 that 116 civilians have 
been killed by drones outside of war zones since the beginning of official drone strikes in 2008, 
but the number is disputed; independent investigators believe it to be significantly higher 
(Whitlock). An average of several non-governmental human-rights groups figures compiled by 
Foreign Policy’s Micah Zenko pegs the number at around 474 civilians in Yemen, Somalia, and 
Pakistan (Zenko). However, the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that 
civilian deaths range from 2,438 to 3,942 in Pakistan alone (Gusterson 88). 
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potential terrorists, regardless of the reality on the ground.183 The consequences of this policy 
have been the creation of militancy and anger among the people under threat from drone 
strikes,184 perpetuating conflict by perpetuating anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.  
Drone Orientalism, like other forms of Orientalism and other totalizing discourses, does 
not arrive via magic; it is incentivized by a hierarchic, bureaucratic apparatus that rewards instant 
results and over-values sound-bite news over deeper dives. Incentivization flattens contradiction 
and dissent, and this was true for the 19th century as well as the 21st. Richard Burton and T.E. 
Lawrence were rewarded—with fame, promotion, money—for advancing a vision of the people 
and territories of the Middle East that lent itself to British material gains. The common thread 
between scholastic Orientalism of the 19th century and drone Orientalism is the flattening of 
human life into a puzzle that can be solved, and in recognizing that there is strategic value in 
doing so. The “Orient” as described by the imperial agent of any century is a place that can be 
mastered for the good of the home nation. However, the specifics of how that mastery is possible 
will vary and have varied based on differing scholastic, economic, technological, and any other 
                                                 
183 Several scholars have remarked on the similarities between the kind of profiling drone 
operators engage in and that which U.S. police enact in African American communities here. 
Micah Zenko of the Council of Foreign Relations, for example, points out the dark irony in 
President Obama’s response to shootings of unarmed black men in the U.S. to the logic of drone 
signature strikes, which his administration embraced (especially in his first term): “It is striking 
to compare Obama’s deliberate and thoughtful commentary about the tragic killing of Trayvon 
Martin with the military tactic that will forever characterize his presidency: killing people with 
drones. The president posits that it is wrong to profile individuals based upon their appearance, 
associations, or statistical propensity to violence. By extension, he believes that, just because 
those characteristics may seem threatening to some, the use of lethal force cannot be justified as 
self-defense unless there are reasonable grounds to fear imminent bodily harm. But that very 
kind of profiling and a broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat are the foundational 
principles of U.S. ‘signature strikes’—the targeted killings of unidentified military-age males…” 
(Gusterson 95).  
184 See Ibrahim Mothana’s 2012 op-ed in the 2012 op-ed in the New York Times entitled “How 
Drones Help al Qaeda” for a discussion of how the organizations that we now know as ISIS and 
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula use anger at drone warfare as a recruitment tool.   
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incentivizing structure. The fantasy of knowing at a distance, propped up by a rich tradition of 
scholastic Orientalism as well as modern-day media depictions, combines with the physical and 
digital technologies in the drone apparatus itself and the bureaucratic and design technologies of 
remote war. As a result, drone Orientalism traffics in a fantasy that the “Oriental Other” becomes 
mastered when “it” comes into view; showing up on the screen as a thermal shadow, as Solmaz 
Sharif suggests in “Look”, is always-already enough to be understood as a potential target.  
The scholastic Orientalism of the 19th century has had a profound influence over drone 
Orientalism, but by no means is it the sole progenitor of the modern-day discourse. Throughout 
the almost two centuries between Richard Burton and drone warfare, the way the culture of 
espionage has interacted with, has influenced, and has been influenced by different strands of 
Orientalism has undergone various permutations, each leaving some mark on how drone 
Orientalism operates today. Burton may stand as the forebear to the Orientalist secret agent, but 
even in the half-century span between Burton and his descendants who composed the ranks of 
the first intelligence divisions and organizations, we can see changes in how the fledgling 
intelligence world interacted with and sought to understand the peoples and cultures that area 
studies have trained us to call the “Middle East” and “Central Asia.” Burton’s gift as an 
Orientalist is, according to Said, his ability to evaluate his conception of the Orient without 
subsuming his identity to the fantasy (197). By the age of T.E. Lawrence, fantasy, and the 
appropriations that sustained those fantasies of the imperial imagination, was the order of the 
day. Lawrence especially could not resist inserting himself into the picture; he was in his own 
estimation “a hero rescuing the Orient from the obscurity, alienation, and strangeness which he 
himself had properly distinguished,” (121). Lawrence admits in Seven Pillars of Wisdom that his 
Arabian campaign was motivated by his desire for “the power of self-expression in some 
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imaginative form,” (549). Lawrence’s adoption of Arab dress and desire to “[quit his] English 
self and [look] at the West and its conventions with new eyes” reveals his commitment to a 
dialectic of West and Orient that only he himself can exist in the middle of, critical of both sides 
(31). Lawrence describes himself as an infidel that cannot be converted to another faith, 
indicating his ambivalence to both the monoliths he had fashioned out of his conceptions of 
“East” and “West” (32). But we must keep in mind Lawrence was incentivized to his Orientalism 
by two tremendous pressures: his mission to induce the Arabs to revolt against the Turks and the 
alienation he felt due to his sexuality from his fellow soldiers (which Lawrence details in his 
memoir The Mint and I address in an earlier chapter). When he admits that male-male love was 
common among his Arab guerilla band, he justifies it by claiming that “friends quivering 
together in the yielding sand with intimate hot limbs in supreme embrace” found “a sensual co-
efficient of the mental passion which was welding our souls and spirits in one flaming effort,” 
(30). The “flaming effort” Lawrence is alluding to is the Arab revolt itself, a political ideal that 
he has been tasked with fomenting and which directly benefits British interests. Critic Joseph A. 
Boone points to this yoking of the sensual and the political, as well as other instances throughout 
Seven Pillars185, as evidence that in Lawrence’s writings “[a]n erotic ideal thus finds its 
reflection in a political ideal that, under the sign of male-male love, tenuously combines British 
colonial interests and the movement toward Arab sovereignty” (Boone 472). In Boone’s analysis, 
the discursive tropes which characterize the “Orient” as a place inherently sexual and 
                                                 
185 For example, Lawrence’s contrast of the dirtiness of his sexual contact with the enemy, the 
Turks at Deraa, with the “cleanliness” of Arab male-male sex, and the dedication of the work to 
S.A. (commonly considered to be Dahoum, one of Lawrence’s attendants and a possible lover) in 
which Lawrence writes essentially that he fomented the Arab revolt out of love (Boone 472-
473). I agree with Boone’s analysis in general, though if Lawrence were actually raped at Deraa, 
this might have had an influence Boone does not attend to on Lawrence’s depiction of the 
difference between Turkish and Arab homosexuality. 
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dangerously homosexual are the same tropes which allow for Lawrence’s self-expression, though 
this self-expression problematically allows Lawrence to advance British military interests. In 
other words, an Orientalist understanding of Arab homoeroticism is the foundation on which he 
can craft a heroic fantasy capable of reconciling his roles as imperial agent and queer subject. 
Ultimately, the fantasy will break for Lawrence, as the realities of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a 
pact between Britain and France dividing up the Ottoman Empire signed in secret in 1916, 
shatters Lawrence’s hubristic vision of “delivering Arabia to the Arabs.” Said reminds us that 
Lawrence’s own ego is the paramount fantasy he seeks to preserve, a motivation which spurs 
Lawrence to make imperialism itself a reflection of his own personal failures, thus ignoring the 
consequences for the various Arabic people, peoples, and factions that he interacted with during 
the Arabian campaign: “And when, for whatever reason, the movement failed…it is Lawrence’s 
disappointment that counts” (Orientalism 243). Lawrence abandoned his role as diplomat and 
intelligence officer in disappointment after his efforts to negotiate between British interests and 
those of King Hussein in the early 1920s were met with broken promises on the British side and 
stubborn refusal to acknowledge a growing Wahhabist threat from the ibn-Saud family on the 
other (Anderson 493). Later in his life, Lawrence re-enlisted in the military under an assumed 
name, desperate for the rituals and routines of enlisted life but loath to resume his failed fantasy 
of “Lawrence of Arabia.” The life of T.E. Lawrence provides us with a vision of what happens 
when two strains of Orientalist discourse overlap. On the one hand, we see Lawrence’s embrace 
of a psycho-sexually tinged Orientalism for the purpose of personal myth-making, which Boone 
and Said go into great detail explicating.186 On the other, Lawrence’s enmeshment in an imperial 
                                                 
186 In Boone’s article “Vacation Cruises; Or, the Homoerotics of Orientalism” and, among other 
places, in Ch. 4 of Part 2 of Said’s Orientalism, “Pilgrims and Pilgrimages, British and French.” 
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Orientalism, the strain that views the Middle East foremost as a materially wealthy region to 
exploit, ultimately disgusts him, despite his own responsibility for increasing its scope and 
influence in the West. For Lawrence, the psychological and political aspects of the Orientalist 
discourse that surrounded him (and that he participated in) were at odds. It is a conflict that 
seems more and more idiosyncratic as the 20th century would continue. In fact, I argue that spy 
fiction, and its close cousin imperial adventure fiction, help to facilitate a link between 
psychological, especially psycho-sexual, Orientalist self-fashioning narratives and the political 
exploitation and domination of the people of the Middle East and Central Asia. 
The cultural discourse of espionage has shaped drone Orientalism, or, more broadly, in 
affecting how the various strains of Orientalism have impacted spy work and intelligence policy 
throughout the long 20th century. Spy stories, whether on the page or on the screen, based in 
history or invented whole-cloth, have served as reference points for attitudes within intelligence 
work toward the people and countries of the Middle East and Central/South Asia. This is 
especially true when it comes to considering how Orientalist discourse can both admire (certain 
aspects of) the presumed187 culture of the Oriental Other and seek to dominate it. The 
contradiction inherent in these positions must have been smoothed over before drone Orientalism 
arose. If it hadn’t been, drone Orientalism would have run into one of two structural barriers:  
1) Too much emphasis on identification: Drone pilots, after surveilling their “targets” 
for hours, would identify with them too closely and be unable to pull the trigger. 
Drone pilots begin to see themselves as a part of an invading army (and thus evil) 
rather than a global peacekeeping force (and thus heroic).  
                                                 
187 By which I mean always filtered through the experiences of the observer, i.e. not objective knowledge, but a 
subjective experience of knowledge.  
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2) Too much emphasis on domination: Unable to see the peoples of the “Orient” as 
human, the military and covert action intelligence organizations abandon drone use 
for indiscriminate bombing campaigns.   
Drone Orientalism operates somewhere in between these two poles, though, as no discourse is 
omnipotent, individuals may drift more towards one or the other depending on their own 
particular backgrounds and circumstances. Nevertheless, drone Orientalism as a discourse has a 
cultural script that balances identification and domination, a cultural script in part written by 
authors like Rudyard Kipling and Ian Fleming. Edward Said, in his Introduction to the 1987 
Penguin Edition of Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, begins to analyze how narrative serves to balance the 
impulses toward both identification and domination within Orientalism. Kim is Kipling’s most 
complex and elusive work, yet is fundamentally a story in which British imperialism is 
reaffirmed and celebrated. Said spends much of his introduction teasing out the inconsistencies 
in a work that vacillates between propaganda and (in Said’s words) “a work of great aesthetic 
merit [that] cannot be dismissed simply as the racist imagining of one fairly disturbed and ultra-
reactionary imperialist” (Introduction 315). Part of the difficulty in reading Kim lies in figuring 
out Kipling’s own position in regard to his subject matter. At times, the book itself seems to echo 
the identity crisis of its main character, torn between whether it is a bildungsroman or a spy 
story, or an adventure tale or a philosophical treatise on spirituality. Kipling treats the 
relationship between Kim and the Tibetan lama he guides throughout India with great tenderness, 
such as when the lama admits that he relies on Kim “as an old tree lives on the lime of a new 
wall” (Kipling 273). Likewise, Kim’s other father figures in the story—the Muslim horse 
trader/spy Mahbub Ali, scholastic Spencerian/spy Hurree Babu, and anthropologist/spy master 
Colonel Creighton—are all, despite their diverse ethnic and racial identities, portrayed as clever, 
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intelligent, heroic, kind, and, most importantly, enough like Kim to offer him role models at how 
to navigate dual and conflicting identities. On the other hand, the book also reproduces 
Orientalist essentialism in lines like “Kim could lie like an Oriental” or “the huckster instinct of 
the East” (313). One scene, in which a soldier glosses over the Great Mutiny of 1857 by casting 
it as a temporary “madness” in some soldiers, falls squarely within the propagandistic (310). Said 
resolves the conflict between the sympathy, emotion and artistry behind much of Kipling’s text 
and its moments of totalization, Empire-championing, and Oriental essentializing by declaring 
there is no conflict, that Kipling’s vision of India in Kim posits an imagined world in which there 
is no contradiction or inconsistency between British values, goals, and actions in India on the one 
hand and the health, happiness, and livelihoods of the diverse peoples of the Indian subcontinent 
on the other.  
At the climax of the novel, Kim and Hurree Babu succeed in thwarting two foreign (one 
is French, the other Russian) spies’ mission to foment revolution in the Himalayan foothills by 
causing their baggage-handlers to revolt and run off with key documents via a series of accidents 
and lucky coincidences. Kim and Hurree separately remark on the effortlessness and humor of 
the situation; Hurree thinks back on the beneficent chaos and thinks to himself “How I shall 
laugh with the Colonel!” about the foreign agents’ carelessness and unsuitability to operating in 
India (251). The two spies’ failure at the end of Kim is ironic given their earlier claim that only it 
is only France and Russia, not the British, “who can deal with Orientals” (240). Their inability to 
be “colonial” by keeping control of their baggage servants convinces Kim and Hurree (and 
perhaps the reader in 1900) how funny that claim is (250). The picaresque resolution to the spy 
plot in the novel suggests that in the immutable world of British imperial order, espionage is 
nothing more than a prank, a game, the Great Game, a plot device that makes boys into men. 
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And this is the insidious influence the first generation of spy fiction (roughly 1880-WWI) had on 
intelligence policy: spy fiction gave Orientalism a hero fantasy by reducing geopolitics to the 
white imperial agent’s self-actualization. This process is a subset of a phenomenon that we have 
examined throughout this dissertation; namely, we have seen how heroic fantasy weds individual 
agency to the reproduction of state power through government Agencies. For example, the Bond-
ian masculine myth incentivizes violent covert action in service to the state by tying that 
behavior to a specific, consumerist-based masculinity and hetero-sexual reward. At the outset of 
spy fiction, the particular form of the fantastic synthesis that could turn self-fulfillment into a 
tool of the British Empire was suffused throughout with Orientalism, no doubt owing to the large 
personnel overlap between Orientalist scholars, proto-spies and intelligence officers, and nascent 
spy-fiction authors. In short, these were mostly the same people. Said explicitly compares the 
fantasy-making of Kim with the Arab identity co-option of T.E. Lawrence, drawing a parallel 
between Kim’s capacity to disguise himself and his service to Creighton with Lawrence’s 
imperial agent in Arab dress:  
This is the confluence between Creighton’s Great Game and Kim’s inexhaustibly 
renewed capacity for disguises and adventure. Kipling keeps the two things 
tightly connected in the novel. The first is the device of political surveillance and 
control; the second, at a much deeper and more interesting level, is the wish-
fantasy of someone who would like to think that everything is possible, that one 
can go anywhere and be anything. T.E. Lawrence in The Seven Pillars of Wisdom 
expresses this fantasy over and over, as he reminds us how he—a blond and blue-
eyed Englishman—moved among the desert Arabs as if he were one of them. 
(Introduction 329) 
 329 
In this passage, Said identifies the work Kim does in tying together fantasies of individual 
identity, Orientalist appropriations of cultures not their own, and imperial surveillance and 
control through a comparison to Lawrence. But as discussed above, Lawrence is not the only 
example of an imperialist agent expressing this particular fantast that Said could have chosen, 
nor even the example par excellence. Lawrence’s barely contained self-loathing and depression, 
and his alienation from both poles (English and Arab) of his imagined binary,188 incessantly bite 
back and deflate his fantasies. As discussed in chapter 3, Lawrence’s fictional counter-part is not 
Colonel Creighton, but John Buchan’s Sandy from Greenmantle, the friend of protagonist 
Richard Hannay. Sandy can blend in anywhere in the Ottoman Empire, yet faces a crisis of 
identity related to his sexuality—though Sandy pointedly faces heterosexual temptation, a re-
working of Lawrence’s queer identity to be more palatable to audiences at the time. Sandy is an 
Orientalist-turned-spy, and the huge popularity of Buchan’s spy novels helps to reinforce the 
connection between the careers as much as actual figures like Lawrence, Dave Hogarth, Gertrude 
Bell, or St. John Philby. Philby makes a great contrast to Lawrence, as he embraced the 
opportunity to aggrandize his own stature by participation in an appropriating Orientalist 
discourse. St. John Philby is often described as larger-than-life, but it was a deliberate attempt to 
embrace the heroic fantasy that combined imperial action and becoming an Orientalized vision 
of an Arabic cultural other. As an advisor to the house of Saud, Philby once remarked that “[m]y 
ambition is fame, whatever that may mean” (A Spy Among Friends 36). He attempted to make 
                                                 
188 Lawrence is not of course the only one to take his or her conceptions of what constitutes 
“Englishness” and “Arabness” and make them into polar opposites—much of Orientalist 
discourse depends on doing the same thing. However, I feel confident in saying that what 
Lawrence eventually coalesced (and/or what eventually coalesced for Lawrence) from his 
cultural environment, training, and life experience into those poles was unique. In fact, I think all 
encounters with discursive forces are ultimately unique, despite shared similarities that make 
discourses analyzable and active in the material world.   
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good on his ambition by inserting himself in the post-WWI carving up of the former Ottoman 
empire much more successfully than Lawrence did, despite his at times cantankerous and 
arrogant personality.  
 
Figure 12: St. John Philby, as photographed in his book The Heart of Arabia 
St. John is the first post-Kim Orientalist-cum-imperial agent-cum-spy to acknowledge the effect 
of the book on his and subsequent generations. St. John nicknamed his son “Kim” in a nod to 
Kipling’s boy hero (35). History would prove the choice of nicknames an ironic one—Kim 
Philby ends up using his capacity to play many roles in service of the USSR, not Britain.  
Imperialist adventure fiction and the fledgling genre of spy fiction help to solidify the 
marriage of Orientalist description and heroic self-fashioning, even beyond the historical 
moment of the late-19th or early-20th century. Ben Macintyre relates that as a young man 
covering the Afghan revolt against the USSR in the 1980s, Kipling’s “The Man Who Would Be 
King” was required reading for the foreign press, spies, and mercenaries hanging out in 
Peshawar (The Man Who Would Be King 4). Kipling’s story is based on a real person, Josiah 
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Harlan, who, inspired by his own dreams of adventure and conquest, became the first American 
to enter Afghanistan. A century and a half later, in the 1980s, military and intelligence personnel 
were still imbibing Kipling’s version of Harlan’s story and the Orientalist narrative within. 
Intelligence still depends on these self-fashioning Orientalist narratives in the 21st century; while 
Kipling is no longer on the required reading lists189, intelligence personnel attached to U.S. Joint 
Forces Command in Afghanistan are still asked to read Macintyre’s biography of Josiah Harlan, 
as well as Charles Allen’s book Soldier Sahibs: The Daring Adventurers Who Tamed India’s 
Northwest Frontier, a book that lauds imperialist agents like Harlan, Philby, Lawrence, and 
Kipling’s Colonel Creighton (“Pre-Deployment”). Khaled Hosseini’s The Kite Runner also 
makes modern intelligence reading lists (“Pre-Deployment”). The Kite Runner is not a spy novel, 
but it’s inclusion is still insightful into how deeply our military and intelligence services depend 
upon fiction (or mythologized history like Charles Allen’s Soldier Sahibs) for an understanding 
of the geographic and cultural regions within which they operate. In and of itself, that people can 
learn from fiction is a neutral phenomenon—after all, much of cultural criticism depends on 
analyzing and explicating fictional or quasi-fictional “texts” (here in the widest possible sense) in 
order to learn something about the world that informs their creation and/or that they shape in 
some sense. But, as I have insisted throughout this project, exactly what those texts are matter. 
                                                 
189 Military and Intelligence recommended and required reading lists are fascinating artifacts, 
reflecting the administrations currently in power, the current conflict, anticipated future conflicts, 
etc. Current lists have the classic Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, and Thucydides is back after quite an 
absence. All lists look back on previous conflicts, but the Bush-era lists reflected on WWII while 
Obama-era lists were Vietnam-heavy. Pop social-science books, especially those concerning 
psychology and decision-making (think Malcolm Gladwell, Nate Silver, and Steven Pinker) are 
also common on modern-day lists. Chinese history books appear in force in the last few years, as 
do books on cyber-warfare and drone warfare. Many of my sources appear on various lists, such 
as P.W. Singer’s Wired for War, Ben Macintyre’s The Man Who Would Be King, and Mark 
Mazzetti’s The Way of the Knife. The website www.militaryreadinglists.com does an excellent job of 
collating as many lists as possible from the U.S.’s multiple Armed Services branches. 
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Specifically, when those texts are narratives of white men using the cultural tropes and scripts of 
Orientalism to prop up the very same imperial mechanisms of knowledge production and 
political domination that create Orientalism a discursive practice, the possibility of continuing 
into the present day the flattening and totalizing errors of the generation of the Orientalist-cum-
imperial agent intelligence worker of the pre-WWII era remains as a potential pitfall to 
intelligence and military work today.  
Finding that the intelligence and military personnel of today are still being steeped in the 
“adventure” of Orientalist self-fashioning narratives like Kim, “The Man Who Would Be King” 
or Soldier Sahibs may help explain the sheer bravado of some U.S. and U.K. military operations 
in Central Asia. Certainly, the idea that the Peshawar exists as a place for white men to make 
themselves into heroes by serving empires on the other side of the world complements the CIA’s 
“way of the knife” approach to covert action. Described in detail in previous chapters, the “way 
of the knife” (the term comes from journalist Mark Mazzetti’s book of the same name) is an 
intelligence strategy that emphasizes violent covert action—such as targeted killings, sabotage/ 
disruption of supply lines, and kidnapping suspected leaders of groups either deemed or proven 
hostile to the U.S. This strategy, I argue, is made possible by a system of cultural pressures, 
bureaucratic advancement, and psycho-sexual reward I have termed “drone masculinity.” Hero 
narratives that posit using one’s individual initiative to serve the state faithfully as a core 
component of the definition of the hero are a key part of drone masculinity. This is why Bond 
grumbles, but always gets the job done; the grumbling shows he possesses a particular masculine 
individualism, the service shows that he willfully subordinates that masculine individualistic 
agency to the state (as “you” should too, potential soldier/spy/male media consumer). Orientalist 
self-fashioning is another way to play the hero, another set of incentives to encourage individuals 
 333 
to accomplish the goals of the state. Whereas drone masculinity often depends upon the 
existence of the totalized category “women” so it can cast the members of that category as 
symbols or sexual objects, Orientalism in intelligence turns distinct and varied cultures, peoples, 
groups and individuals into an Other. But, and this is key, not an inscrutable Other—the 
ostensible expertise of the Orientalist intelligence agent means that the “Oriental Other” is 
considered knowable and predictable to the specialist. Nevertheless, the inhabiting Orientalist 
adventure narrative, whether presented in Greenmantle or Kim, the lives of men like Lawrence, 
Harlan, or St. John Philby, or modern-day biographers and historians who tell the history of the 
region through the lens of the “Soldier Sahibs”, does not intuitively lead us to drone Orientalism. 
The illusion of close, personal knowledge provided by the “regional expert” who has travelled in 
the country seems at first glance an opposite kind of knowledge than the surveillance at a 
distance characteristic of drone use. However, the two forms of Orientalism share a similar 
knowledge-assumption model. Knowledge of the “regional expert” takes the place of 
institutional practice, allowing policy to be decided upon at a distance under the illusion of 
closeness; drone surveillance functions similarly—video and audio are assumed to be complete 
forms of knowledge, rendering on-the-ground experience as a part of general intelligence 
practice less prioritized.190 Complement is not explanation though, and there is still a “how we 
got here” gap between an Orientalism that combines political conquest with appropriation of the 
“Other” for the purposes of heroic self-fashioning and the particular strain, drone Orientalism, 
that I wish to explore here. Part of filling in that gap involves returning more closely to spy 
fiction and its relation to another genre of writing: the travelogue.  
                                                 
190 Of course this is not to say that the CIA or the international intelligence community has or 
ever will abandon HUMINT entirely—only that the increase in SIGINT creates a sense of total 
knowledge and understanding that has proven misplaced.   
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Michael Denning in his seminal work on spy fiction Cover Stories argues that Ian 
Fleming’s Bond books re-orients the post-WWII world into a tourist’s playground, dividing the 
world not into the West and the Communist East, but into the center/periphery of the seat of 
declining imperial power and the “pleasure periphery” in which imperialism is giving way to 
neo-colonialist economies of service and tourism (105). The pleasure periphery is the zone in 
which adventurous self-fashioning is possible, and Denning ignores the connection between 
Bond’s touristic voyeurism—his “license to look” at exotic locales, women, and spectacles—and 
the pleasures of Kim’s ability to assume multiple identities, or the homoerotic “vacation cruises” 
(European male vacations to “exotic” locales with the intent of engaging in homosexual activity) 
that critic Joseph Boone explores as essential components to Orientalist discourse around the 
turn of the 20th century.191 Likewise, Denning glosses over the use of international locales, 
especially Turkey or the Ottoman Empire and other “Oriental” destinations, in British spy fiction 
as liminal spaces between the “civilization” of Western Europe and the forces of chaos and 
barbarity of a monolithic and inscrutable “East,” which sometimes (depending on the proximity 
to a world war) includes Germany. One of the patriarchs of “serious” spy fiction, Eric Ambler, 
invokes Istanbul twice in this fashion, in Journey into Fear and The Mask of Dimitrios, the latter 
of which Bond reads while he himself travels in Istanbul in From Russia, With Love (From 
Russia 115).  I assert the relevance of this lineage to bring further context to Denning’s 
discussion of Bond’s tourist impulses, because I think Denning’s point may have further 
relevance than he could have known when Cover Stories was written in the 1980s. Denning 
points to the moment in Live and Let Die in which Fleming quotes a tour book for several pages, 
or the tedious selections of straightforward travelogue in You Only Live Twice, as evidence for 
                                                 
191 In his article “Vacation Cruises; or, the Homoerotics of Orientalism.” 
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how easily the similarities between the desire of the tourist to know and the desire of the spy to 
know can disrupt the generic boundaries between the two kinds of writing (103). The 
comparison is a stealth insult; likening espionage to tourism undercuts the professed expertise of 
the former, imagining the intelligence worker as a dilettante interested in seeing what he already 
expects to find. Even when, as Denning points out, Bond gets to glimpse the  
“secret worlds” of Mr. Big’s Harlem (in Live and Let Die) or Kerim’s Istanbul (in From Russia, 
With Love), he does so as a voyeur and an outsider, as someone who does not belong and indeed, 
can’t belong: Kerim reminds him he is a gajo when they go to a gipsy camp; Felix Leiter warns 
him that “Harlem doesn’t like being stared at any more” when they go to visit Mr. Big’s 
nightclub (Live and Let Die 48). Bond’s involvement in these secret worlds is thus always 
temporary and conditional—he needs to go there for his work, he goes, he has a good time, he 
succeeds in his mission. When one places the Bondian tourist ethos in the context of the history 
of spy fiction and spy work before it, one can see that it introduces further distance between the 
“expert” and his purported subject by tweaking appropriation. A discourse in which the white 
imperial agent believes themselves an expert by attempting to inhabit and/or hybridize salient (or 
over-salient) cultural signifiers of a “target” population is replaced by an interested 
commodification of the readily apparent. By this latter term, I mean the reduction of supposed 
knowledge of the Other to only that which is immediately obtainable and necessary for the 
completion of the mission. For Bond, the foreign locale is something to be consumed: it is food, 
picturesque views (like of “the dancing waves of the unsheltered Bosphorus”), women, and 
mission-critical information (From Russia 124). For the tourist secret agent, “out there” still, as it 
had for the imperial Orientalist, only exists in so far as it matters to the (neo)imperial center. But 
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what constitutes “out there” no longer requires the veneer of academic expertise to understand—
a tourist visa serves the same purpose.  
Espionage as an aggressive form of tourism may have originated with Bond, but it has 
endured as a feature of spy stories, films, and TV that cater to an audience’s desire for escapism. 
The latest Mission Impossible film takes its audience to Minsk, London, Washington DC, 
Havana, Vienna, and Casablanca within the first hour. The genre contains a dizzying array of 
exotica, displayed on page and screen for the titillation of secret agent and consumer alike. I 
argue that this has impacted assumptions about intelligence work, including assumptions held by 
intelligence workers themselves. The first danger that a tourist discourse carries is a lowered 
research bar for decision-making. Journalist Tim Weiner relates an anecdote in which after 
getting denied a briefing with the CIA before going to report on the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 
and going anyway, he was invited upon his return to CIA HQ in Langley (Gladwell). Weiner 
assumed he would be intimidated, bullied, or otherwise treated heavy-handedly (as he was before 
his trip) for heading to Afghanistan on his own initiative. Instead, the CIA officers and analysts 
assembled for his meeting asked him to lecture on the situation in the country, as none of them 
had ever been there. Relying on a stable of Orientalists (or Russia hands, or China hands, or any 
other area studies grouping) to craft policy has its own drawbacks, several of which were 
discussed above. However, replacing Hogarth and Lawrence’s Arab Bureau with some eager 
CIA agents in Langley asking Tim Weiner to talk to them about a place none of them have spent 
any significant time has about the same effectiveness as classifying a Frommer’s travel guide.192 
                                                 
192 No offense to Tim Weiner. He too was shocked at the lack of first-hand knowledge in the 
CIA, so much so that he was inspired to write his history of the agency Legacy of Ashes after 
getting this first-hand glimpse of the at times stunning lack of expertise in Langley. No offense 
to Frommer’s either. 
 337 
One can see how a travelogue understanding of a place may make it seem less real, less 
immediate in consequence or even proximity. Tourism emphasizes and advertises frictionless 
contact between the Self and the Other; when that discourse begins to infiltrate militarized 
policy, then killing becomes better as it becomes less visceral and embodied. The use of drones 
to advertise a location’s natural beauty relies on the same conceptual framework as their more 
tactical uses: being there and seeing there should be as pleasurable for the tourist as possible. The 
more sense-data a drone provides, the less the difficult knowledge, the experiential and 
interpersonal knowledge that is forged and formed at great risk to all, is deemed necessary.  
The tourist ethos has externalized libidinal pleasure in intelligence work, by which I 
mean that the pleasure of identity-assumption and appropriation have been replaced by an erotics 
of distance. Bond’s “license to look,” when translated to the work of espionage, is actually the 
desire to look, reframed as a national-security mandate to know the enemy. A tourist ethos 
insulates from too much identification with the Other by attaching the pleasure to seeing and 
categorizing rather than identifying and embodying. According to Danny Kaplan, in his book 
Brothers and Others in Arms: The Making of Love and War in Israeli Combat Units, once 
eroticization enters the picture, objectification is not far behind; in fact, “[the] eroticization of 
enemy targets…triggers the objectification process,” (qtd. in Puar 86). Even though opposition to 
the objectification inherent in the tourist ethos in intelligence work is an opposition to the central 
power imbalance that makes that ethos possible and pleasurable, it often finds itself cast as an 
opposition to the tourist himself, and thus as a further mechanism of objectification. Critic Jasbir 
Puar argues that tourism becomes overly-virtuous when placed dialectically against terrorism: 
“terrorism has long been articulated as the foe of tourism, the former breeding intolerance and 
hatred, while the latter is constituted as a democratizing and liberalizing venture that embraces 
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pluralism” (Puar 64). Placing terrorism as the ressentiment of tourism undermines the political 
and social realities that inform any individual’s decision to join a terroristic group, flattening 
coercion, political passion, economic incentivization, revolutionary ardor, etc. into irrationality 
or “backwardness”.  De-agentifying the Other in this way furthers the objectification already 
present in an erotics of distance.  
Drone Orientalism inherits the erotics of distance from the tourist strand within the 
discourse of espionage. In fact, drone Orientalism exacerbates the problem, allowing the agent to 
indulge in objectification without even the tourist’s proximity, already itself a considerable 
distance. This objectification is, as we would expect, dependent on erotic pleasure, visual 
pleasure, and violent pleasure. “Predator porn” is a genre of video passed around by drone 
operators and other military and intelligence personnel that capitalize on the drone’s constant 
recordings. The videos feature everything from nudity and sex recorded by surveillance drones, 
to sweeping natural vistas filmed in a panoptical fashion, to particularly graphic and visceral acts 
of violence, both drone strikes and violence committed by people on the ground (Gusterson 64). 
The objectification of Predator porn undoubtedly serves a dark purpose: allowing for the drone 
operators to see the people in the camera’s eye as less than the same kind of human as the pilots, 
as a kind of human-thing, silly and awkward in its desire to fuck, kill, or escape death.   Predator 
porn presents the regions of the world in which drones operate as places of spectacle, places 
peripheral to the global world order and free to have their people, geography, and to some extent 
their cultural difference mined for libidinal and voyeuristic pleasure. In other words, as tourist 
zones too dangerous for embodied Western tourism.  
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The PlayStation Mentality and War at a Distance 
I am suggesting that a particular discursive structure, drone Orientalism, is influencing 
intelligence and military policy, and that drone Orientalism cannot be analyzed without attending 
to the legacy of other strands of Orientalism it has inherited, such as the metaphorical 
slipperiness between witnessing and understanding from scholastic Orientalism or the 
voyeuristic libidinal pleasure of tourist Orientalism. However, this position is not the only 
critical one to take. For example, critics like the Guardian newspaper’s Philip Alston and Hina 
Shamsi or journalist Pratap Chatterjee, argue that a kind of “PlayStation mentality193” is 
responsible for the sometime callous disregard of other human beings that we see in drone 
warfare at large (71). In an International Red Cross report critical of civilian casualties by drone 
operators, “PlayStation mentality” is made into a biological argument: “‘advanced technologies 
which permit killing at a distance or on the computer screen prevent the activation of neuro-
psychological mechanisms which render the act of killing difficult” (qtd. in Gusterson 71). The 
PlayStation mentality argues that it is the distance in the killing at a distance of drone warfare 
that matters. Art historian Jane Blocker in her essay “Aestheticizing Risk in Wartime: The SLA 
to Iraq” comes to a similar conclusion. Blocker uses the phrase “risk transfer” to refer to how an 
artist gets a reputation as a “fearless risk-taker by transferring the risk to those around him or 
her” (Nelson 129). Blocker’s essay goes on to argue that risk transfer “also applies to the West’s 
current method of waging war, in which bodily risk gets transferred to the populations of other, 
faraway countries; the costs, to future generations” (129). While Blocker does not directly 
consider drone warfare or the PlayStation mentality in the article, drones are perhaps the best 
                                                 
193 The wording is Philip Alston’s and Hina Shamsi’s from The Guardian; Chatterjee calls it 
“desktop killing” but seems to mean the same thing. 
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representation of risk transfer as she is defining it in relation to military policy. Drones are built 
to accomplish missions that are best described by one of the “3 Ds”: dangerous, dirty, or dull 
(Singer 63). Their entire point is to remove human actors from the consequences of those 
missions—and here I mean consequences in the sense of physical harm, but also in the sense of 
moral harm and moral hazard—while continuing the U.S.’s reputation as dangerous to its 
enemies. The ability to follow targets for days, learn their habits, and kill them when you choose, 
all from a screen thousands of miles away, is unprecedented in the history of war. The distance 
between actor(s) and action, and the displacement of that action onto a metal, disposable, 
replaceable body instead of the pilot’s human one must affect the psychological and moral 
decision-making by the pilot, the drone support staff,194 and the higher-ranked architects of drone 
missions. Drones encourage aggression because the consequences for the aggressors are only 
metal and the consequences for the targets are flesh. We would thus expect to see that drones are 
downed at a much higher rate than traditional aircraft, due to this aggressive proximity to targets 
and the pilot’s lack of sense of personal stakes in the operation—it’s not their body that suffers—
and this is in fact the case (Whitlock). 
But the phrasing “PlayStation mentality” implies a relation between simulation and actual 
killings—that drone pilots see their control of the drone as if it were a video game. This might 
make us wonder about the contributions of video games themselves to this mindset. Indeed, 
video games like the Call of Duty series have been implicated in the desensitization of the 
American public to the military interventions it sanctions. These games are first-person shooters, 
in which the player sees through the eyes of an American soldier, and the enemies are a near-
                                                 
194 Drone warfare is extremely decentralized, and it is usual for each drone to have half a dozen 
personnel responsible for different components of one mission like surveillance, research, 
weather, etc. 
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infinite pool of brown (and sometimes Eastern European or Russian) faces that the player kills 
with super-heroic skill and moral abandon. No actual soldier has anywhere close to the kill-count 
of the fictional protagonists of the modern military first person shooter. It is a powerful fantasy 
of agency that relies on chauvinistic “us vs them” tropes and rhetoric to bolster a pencil-thin 
narrative of a world in crisis, only solvable by you, the player. One could imagine that the 
dehumanization inherent in tying plot advancement and/or a high score to killing stereotyped 
enemies conditions players to expect professional advancement and/or pay raises for doing 
likewise, even without the games themselves directly involving drones. But as war has changed 
in the 21st century, war video games have changed with it, and so drone use and drone warfare 
are now explicitly represented in digital form. After the game Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare 
introduced drone warfare to the first-person shooter genre, it has now become common to find 
copycat scenarios in which the player’s virtual avatar pilots a drone, and the perspective shifts 
from the human, ground-level display to the drone’s sky-high view. Enemies appear as blobs of 
heat, and the player must use the drone’s offensive capabilities to extinguish these “blobs” so 
that they can advance in the story. If one buys the “PlayStation mentality” argument, these 
sections are the key piece of evidence. As anthropologist Antonius Robben claims, there exists 
an “ambivalence of enemies as both human and virtual” in drone warfare that prevents 
something like empathy from forming, and this implies exposure to virtual enemies in order to 
feel the ambivalence (qtd. in Gusterson 75). I would frame a strong version of the PlayStation 
argument like this: just as the players of Call of Duty during these drone sections of the game 
feel a sense of completion at progressing through the section, so drone pilots each time they pull 
the trigger feel nothing at best, or, at worst, joy and fulfillment at accomplishing an objective. 
Not for nothing, the latest Call of Duty game is subtitled “Infinite Warfare.” That feels to me to 
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be darkly prophetic, and I agree that there are some aspects of this argument that demand further 
research. But I do not believe that it is distance alone or a combination of distance and the 
technologically-facilitated ambivalence between real and virtual targets that fully captures the 
complicated relation between drone pilots, support staff, machine, and the people of Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen and Libya above whom drones circle. I argue that this relation is better 
captured by drone Orientalism, to which the PlayStation mentality contributes and is itself 
shaped by. 
Ultimately, a strong, causal, assertion that the distancing and dehumanization of video 
games can be seen as analogous, and not merely contributory, to the distancing and 
dehumanization of drone warfare proves makes a stronger claim than reality bears out. Evidence 
like the existence of Predator porn clearly points to a dehumanization of those in front of the 
robotic camera by those behind it. However, we also find several cases in which drone pilots 
refuse to fire despite being given the order, a difficult decision if they were biologically or 
behaviorally conditioned to an almost Pavlovian degree, but more understandable if instead they 
were navigating a cultural discourse (79). Additionally, there is substantial evidence of the 
incidence of trauma-related stress disorders among drone pilots caused by the mental incongruity 
of war at a distance: a 2011 Pentagon study of 840 drone operators “found that 46-48% 
experienced high levels of ‘operational stress,’ with 17% ‘clinically distressed,’ and 4% 
experiencing full-blown PTSD” (79). 195 Additionally, interviews with drone pilots indicate that 
many are keenly aware that they are not playing a game; one explicitly commented that “we feel 
                                                 
195 As Hugh Gusterson points out, this is less incidence than ground troop levels, however there is 
a prevalent belief among Armed Forces personnel that drone pilots can’t experience PTSD 
(because they aren’t “real” combatants) that may skew reported numbers and disincentives drone 
pilots from seeking a diagnosis. 
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it [the strike], maybe not to the same degree [as] if we were actually there, but it affects 
us…When you let a missile go, you know that’s real life—there’s no reset button” (75). This 
data suggests that the guilt-reduction mechanisms of the PlayStation mentality, or Blocker’s risk 
transfer, or the erotics of distance I describe above, are not biological commandments, but 
cultural incentives, ways to feel less guilt about one’s actions that are more or less convincing 
relative to an individual’s experience with them. It is their simultaneous presence rooted within 
the institution of drone warfare that collectively makes drone use so seductive a tool—a many-
faceted discourse is much harder to avoid and counter. 
The last point against the idea that the “PlayStation mentality” alone is not responsible 
for the dehumanization we find in the drone bombing campaigns of the War on Terror is a point 
about the source of the phrase itself. Video games are not a monolith and laying the blame for 
warfare at a distance on the brain’s relation to digital representation in video games in toto 
undersells the form. Some video games, even some war games, seek to increase empathy and 
recognition of the incongruity between the digital representation and the reality represented. For 
example, the 2012 game Spec Ops: The Line attempts to deconstruct first person shooters like 
Call of Duty, including the use of drones and remote warfare. One scene in the game begins very 
similarly to what one would see in a more traditional modern military action game—the 
protagonist (controlled by the player) and his squad are behind enemy lines, beset on all sides by 
hostiles in a fictionalized and war-torn Dubai. Finding their way forward blocked, the player and 
the protagonist must mutually decide to use white phosphorous in order to progress; it’s an 
illusory choice though, as refusing to use the chemical weapon is tantamount to turning the game 
off and giving it away, since there is actually no way to proceed without it. The player’s display 
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transforms to the drone view that the protagonist is using it to aim the white phosphorous mortar 
rounds: 
 
Figure 13: The Drone-View from Spec Ops: The Line 
Here you see the thermal blobs of people and vehicles, and the player/protagonist—for by 
changing the screen to this view, the difference between the two becomes very small—must 
extinguish those blobs. In a Call of Duty game, that would be that. But Spec Ops does something 
different; the way forward is after all through the area that was just bombed, and so the squad 
must progress through the carnage they just caused. The results are gruesome, and as they 
progress, the protagonist and the player (again, intentionally conflated by the mechanics of the 
game) come to a haunting realization: the white blobs they extinguished were not all, or even 
mostly, military targets; they were civilians seeking shelter.  
 
Figure 14: Civilians burned by white phosphorous in Spec Ops 
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Spec Ops attempts to reattach a humanity to the white blobs of drone surveillance and a human 
cost to the dehumanization of war at a distance. It does so by shock factor, and this means that, 
unfortunately, the people of the Middle East are still being used as a prop, as dead and burned 
bodies meant to evoke moral guilt and a sense that war is horrible in the player. Nevertheless, 
games like Spec Ops demonstrate that particular aspects of a video game matter; since video 
games are themselves cultural products, this suggests that something beyond biological 
mechanism is at work—the PlayStation mentality does not explain drone Orientalism fully in its 
application or its contradictions (like the high level of combat stress among drone pilots). The 
PlayStation mentality, as a fusion of cultural bias and biological response, is undoubtedly a part 
of the discourse (possibly even a particularly salient and conscripting aspect of it) but it is not 
drone Orientalism’s totality nor does it totalize the men and women presumably under its thrall. 
Drone Orientalism has arisen out of a particular history of Orientalism within military and 
intelligence work and out of particular technological circumstances. Both are necessary 
components, neither sufficient on their own. The technological and bureaucratic design in drone 
surveillance and drone warfare are the material and logistical structures that facilitate the 
enacting of a specific ideological structure. But the reverse is also true—the ideology and erotics 
of distance influence the design of drone technology and policy. For drone Orientalism to have 
entered into policy in the way that it has—i.e. as a hegemonic (though not omnipotent) 
discursive force—the biological, behavioral, technological, bureaucratic, cultural and ideological 
components must find resonances and points of contact with each other, pushing and pulling at 
each other until they together form an incentivizing discourse, one that has seemingly captured 
the imaginations of those responsible for crafting policy in the “War on Terror.”  
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Over the last few pages, I have traced how different strands of Orientalist thought and 
philosophy within the culture of espionage have found new expression in the technological 
possibilities of drone warfare, a phenomenon I call drone Orientalism. Not incidentally, this has 
also led me to making the claim that Orientalism itself, despite the totalizing impulse within it, 
has not been a monolithic, eternal discourse. Rather, what scholars call “Orientalism” at a given 
time is a snapshot of a multi-headed and fluid discourse, one that has proven stubbornly difficult 
to remove due to its adaptability to changing social and cultural situations. The particular tropes 
and heuristics emphasized by a specific Orientalist strain invariably fit the needs and wants of 
the institutions and individuals powerful enough to control that strain of discourse. Given that 
Orientalism as Said defined it is not based on some kind of discoverable, objective reality, but 
rather the subjective judgments, stereotypes, and knowledges of its interpreters in the West, that 
what is determined Orientalism itself has multiple branches, offshoots, and permutations tied to 
shifting priorities and incentives should not be too surprising. Nor, though it may seem counter-
intuitive, do I take Orientalism’s fluid history as a sign of its invincibility. Quite the opposite in 
fact; I hope that the malleable nature of Orientalism is a sign that cultural discourses are 
somewhat less than eternal. If cultural discourses can be influenced and changed even as it itself 
influences and changes, then perhaps we can change them for the better or dismiss them entirely. 
Regrettably, when it comes to the discursive structures categorized under the umbrella of 
“Orientalism”, we still find stereotype, hasty judgments, appropriation, and exploitation. As I 
argue here, the consequences of this discourse are urgent to address. We must find a way to 
counter the dehumanizing discourse of drone Orientalism within our military and intelligence 
organizations. Drone warfare as it is currently practiced fails to recognize and protect civilian 
life, creates more resentment of the U.S. abroad, further reinforces the imperialist boundaries 
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between nations in which drone warfare is allowable and those it is not, affronts a human right to 
privacy, and has poorly understood psychological consequences for the drone pilots themselves. 
Drones hold out the promise of more precise and less risky warfare, ostensibly for both sides—
the aggressor does not risk human life, while the precision of drone surveillance ensures that 
only the “guilty” are punished. However, as long as drone use is enmeshed in the Othering 
discourse of drone Orientalism, it cannot be anything more than a technology of trauma, 
incapable of the objectivity and precision it promises. 
 
 
 348 
Coda 
 
Perhaps there is time for one last spy story. In 1985, Nick Deak, a CIA agent and 
financier known as the “James Bond of money,” was killed ostensibly at random by a 44 year-
old homeless woman (Ames and Zaitchik). Deak had founded a Wall Street investment firm in 
1947 with the express purpose of laundering money and investing on behalf of the fledgling 
American intelligence community. His fingerprints can be found over many covert operations 
throughout the second half of the 20th century, from funding South American dictatorships and 
drug cartels to bribing the Japanese government to buy Lockheed fighter jets via the yakuza 
(Ames and Zaitchik). Very few believe that Deak’s killing was accidental. Conspiracy theories 
abound. The woman who killed him, Lois Lang, seemed to be staking out the offices all 
morning. At one point committed to a mental institution in Washington state, Lang was under the 
care of a psychiatrist implicated in the CIA’s brain-washing program MK-Ultra (Ames and 
Zaitchik). After shooting Deak in his office hallway, she reportedly said “Now you’ve got 
yours,” (Ames and Zaitchik). Lang was arrested and maintained that she was instructed to kill 
Deak, but could not clearly say by who, when, or how. She was forcibly institutionalized, where 
she remains today (Ames and Zaitchik). I bring up this story because it touches upon so much of 
what I have tried to outline over the past 360 or so pages. Deak and people like him were the 
architects of the transition of the CIA from Truman’s news service to the massive bureaucracy 
focused on covert action it is today. The money he handled fueled the expansion of drone 
masculinity, and his own nickname—the “James Bond of money”—demonstrates how 
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influential of a reference point Bond was during the Cold War. Keep in mind that Deak was 
called this by his intelligence worker colleagues; spies are themselves steeped in the cultural 
discourse of espionage. And, of course, the conspiracy theories surrounding Deak’s death make 
the event itself into a kind of spy fiction, blurring the boundary between real and fake, classified 
and unclassifiable.  
 But this story is also quite sad. Lois Lang is potentially a woman with profound mental 
delusions, a woman who was brainwashed by the CIA or one of Deak’s many enemies, or both. 
She is a victim herself, certainly of the broken-down mental health social safety net of the 1980s 
and potentially of her own country’s intelligence service or foreign actors wanting to eliminate 
Deak. Deak was 84-years-old when he was killed. Perhaps, one might argue, these are the violent 
acts he helped fund coming home to roost, either directly (because it was a political 
assassination) or karmically (if it was coincidental). But striking down an 84-year-old in his 
office doesn’t sound approximate killing Bond in his prime. It certainly isn’t as dramatic as the 
death traps Bond has had prepared for his demise over the years. Reality, strange as it can be, 
rarely ever forces us through super-heated corridors only to force us to fight a giant squid at the 
end.196  
 I point out both the summative aspects of this incident and the tragic ones in order to 
discuss the limits, subversions, and alternatives to the espionage mindset that I have spent the 
rest of the dissertation describing. Deak was an integral part in the planning and financing of 
covert action. He contributed directly to an intelligence community that valorized spectacular 
results over the quiet work of intelligence-gathering. His death, whether assassination or random 
act of violence, did not slow or stall that culture in the least. This is because the espionage 
                                                 
196 This happens to Bond at the climax of Dr. No. 
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mindset is not an individual psychology, but an institutional culture. It adheres as a common 
frame of reference for decision-making across the boundaries of an individual mind. This makes 
it influential, but it also means that it isn’t totalizing. No one figure—not Deak, not Raymond 
Davis, not even James Bond—embodies the totality of a cultural discourse. One can read every 
Bond novel in the search for a perfect expression of drone masculinity and be disappointed; 
nevertheless, as I hope I have shown, the character is integral to the formation of this 
instrumentalist attitude within the culture of espionage. The myth of Bond, like the myth of T.E. 
Lawrence or the myth of Kim Philby (and those are all quite different myths), seems to matter 
much more than the details. The complexities of the figures, texts, and events that become the 
common references for explaining espionage, even to intelligence workers themselves, get lost in 
the referencing. This is what I described as the “cultural lattice,” that network of the most 
common reference points within a cultural discourse that have had an outsized impact on the 
actions and justifications of actors within it. When intelligence agents “play James Bond,” they 
are using the cultural symbolic power of Bond as a reference point, not because they are 
brainwashed or automatons, but because they are influenced by the salient components of Bond’s 
mythic example—his effectiveness, his swagger, his loyalty, his initiative (Mazzeti 82). When 
intelligence workers reference Bond, as the British SIS did in Iraq, they hope to borrow his 
cultural idea as a kind of messaging, a signaling to their superiors and the public that they are 
mythic as well (Albion 214). The cultural lattice is a part of a conversation; specifically, it is the 
part of the conversation that everyone keeps coming back to. The conversation is much larger 
than the nodes of the lattice, but the terms in the cultural discourse that become important 
enough to shape both public and institutional ideas of espionage work have gotten that way 
because they do some kind of work for the “havers”—the interlocutors—of the conversation.    
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In other words, if a term has become a part of the cultural lattice, it is because it is useful, 
not because the lattice itself is deterministic. There is nothing inevitable about drone masculinity, 
but I hope I have shown how its history—or the history of conspiracy, or of drone orientalism, 
etc.—has been tied to cultural forces just as much as political ones. Lois Lang may have been 
brainwashed, but I don’t think any one cultural script can completely overwrite the will of an 
unwilling participant. But the nodes of the cultural lattice that the public understanding of 
espionage rests upon have proven useful as incentivizers and influencers. Espionage is hardly the 
only profession one might be attracted to because of a cultural representation. But while cultural 
representations of lawyers such as the TV show Suits may inspire people to become lawyers, 
they don’t affect the practice of law itself—if Suits did, the legal profession would be the most 
melodramatic affair imaginable. Espionage is a special case because of its intensely secret nature 
and the wide latitude provided to intelligence agencies under a national security aegis. The 
former ensures that 1) future intelligence agents have primarily cultural representations of the 
profession as their reference pools before starting; and 2) bureaucratic compartmentalization 
within intelligence work prevents easy lesson-learning, as the proverbial left hand not knowing 
what the right hand does means mistakes are repeated. Thus, the culture of “bright, highly graded 
young men who must be doing something all the time to justify their reason for being” (Weiner 
135). The latter point—the excuse of national security—ensures that what the “something” is 
that intelligence workers do can be nearly anything they can imagine. Spies are inherently spy 
fiction authors; some complete the process and publish a novel (or start a TV show as The 
Americans’ Joe Weisberg did), others enact their plots on the world stage.  
This concerns me, and has driven my interest in studying spy fiction and its relation to 
espionage practice. Spy fiction seems uniquely poised among genre fictions because the “there” 
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it purports to represent is actually a thing, a political reality and process, while at the same time a 
secret, intentionally obscured from the public--a public that includes the members of intelligence 
agencies themselves. No one knows the full picture, and so many segments of that picture get 
filled in by culture. But again, this in and of itself is not so unique. The “secret” Orient drew T.E. 
Lawrence and Richard Burton and countless others to it, and their desire “to be in the know” 
became a performance of knowing, a self-narrative of surety. Or, looking at a domestic issue, the 
“unknown” of racial relations has informed cultural depictions of African American culture 
throughout Hollywood’s history. If a secret is considered worth knowing—and many secrets in 
espionage are considered so, for example, there is considerable strategic advantage that knowing 
how a nation’s intelligence agencies operate, or in knowing how the “Other” acts or behaves in 
general—is it any wonder that in the absence of experiential revelation we create apparati of 
imagination? As I have studied the cultural discourse of espionage, I have come to question 
whether or not these apparati, these attempts to understand a secret world, are mystifications or 
indicators that the secrecy of espionage is hiding an emptiness, a performativity of rules and 
structures when really there is only gamesmanship. As an example of what I mean by this, let us 
briefly consider sheep-dipping, discussed in Chapter 2 and more in-depth in Chapter 4. Sheep-
dipping is a bureaucratic solution to a bureaucratic problem—it is the deputation of Special 
Forces personnel as CIA agents so that they can legally operate in a country with which the U.S. 
is not currently at war. Plainly, this is sleight of hand. If the law preventing Army personnel from 
operating in non-combatant zones cannot stop sheep-dipping, what good is it? Whose legal 
system does this practice make a mockery of? The CIA and the Army engage in sheep-deeping 
because they want to enact a certain mission—the pro forma legality of the paperwork filled out 
in order to deputize soldiers is a performance of legal ethics, nothing more. I quoted in Chapter 2 
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former intelligence officials Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, who said of espionage that 
“[t]here is no need to wrestle with technical legalisms or judgments as to whether something is 
right or wrong. The determining factors in secret operations are purely pragmatic” (qtd. in 
Cawelti and Rosenberg 15). In such an environment, we can’t expect intelligence agencies to 
hold themselves accountable. At least, we have not been able to so far. So what can we do in 
order to build a more just, more humane, and yes, more effective197 intelligence agency?     
Perhaps the special power of cultural representation as it relates to espionage must also be 
a part of any solutions. After all, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, culture bears some 
responsibility for an incentivization and facilitation of abuses of ethics within intelligence work. 
It is only fitting that the makers and consumers of that culture take some role in changing the 
nature of that influence. Remember, espionage and its attendant discourse have not been static. 
Cultural representation led the way in conditioning the public to expect spies like Bond instead 
of Hannay. In Chapter 5, I examined a few alternate masculinities that might help us to move on 
from drone masculinity. These alternates—Jason Bourne, George Smiley, Victor Maskell, and 
the specific Bond as Daniel Craig portrays him—have a cultural presence, but are far cries from 
the mythical figure that Bond has been over most of the 20th century. More work needs to be 
done in understanding how fictional characters become mythic, or, relatedly, how individual 
aspects of culture coalesce into a node in the cultural lattice. This work has not been the 
                                                 
197 I do not believe that a more just intelligence agency is inherently less effective, nor am I alone 
in this opinion. Alasteir Crooke, a former MI6 officer whose nickname is “the peacemaker spy,” 
argues that the manhunting and killing characteristic of modern intelligence makes intelligence 
agencies less effective, as potential assets are eliminated instead of converted (Grey 242). A 
more just intelligence agency will also lead to better mental health for intelligence agents. CIA 
agent John Stockwell remarks: “You can’t spend your life bribing people, seducing people into 
committing treason, betraying their own movements, sometimes betraying their own families—
and that’s the nice-guy stuff—and come away a healthy, whole person whatever your rationales 
are” (Knightley 388) 
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traditional aim of literary scholars, but I think there are advantages to expanding our concept of 
literary criticism away from the narrow close-readings and to do more cultural analysis. Literary 
critique as a tool is itself under review, and one of the loudest criticisms of it is a perceived lack 
of relevance. As scholar Mark Wollaeger writes in a recent letter in PMLA: 
Many of us would like to believe that our critiques of contemporary structures of power, 
particularly in the age of Trump, can gain traction beyond the university. The sad fact is 
that few do, and it is not pleasant to be reminded of the possibility that our efforts to 
intervene in society through literary criticism may amount to little more than well-
intentioned yet routinized gestures. (222) 
 Engaging with culture more broadly defined may help extend the academic’s reach outside of 
the ivory tower. It has been a while since literature departments used critique to advocate for 
some works over others, as we instead seek to better contextualize and understand works on their 
own terms. I don’t think this has done much but sequester us within our academic audiences. I 
think we can use the tools of literary criticism to make arguments to and for the public at large. 
For one, we can argue that aspects of cultural representation are not harmless, and 
demonstrate why, as this dissertation seeks to have done. For example, exploring how different 
kinds of masculinities are shaped by cultural representations can help us interrogate the cultural 
origins and influences of gender roles more broadly. Both the homosocial masculinity of Richard 
Hannay and the drone masculinity of Mark Mazzetti’s “way of the knife” reveal a kind of thread 
in masculinity itself that prizes being useful. Culture helps shape the way that thread is 
expressed—it sets the available possibilities of “usefulness.” This means that the culture of 
masculinity can and has been shaped differently than it is now. This holds for espionage itself. 
Perhaps figures that question drone masculine narratives, whether fictional (Victor Maskell) or 
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actual (Chelsea Manning) can push the cultural discourse of espionage away from Bond and his 
imitators. Or perhaps the record number of women who have joined the CIA since the agency 
was sued for sex discrimination in the mid-1990s can ultimately oust the remnants of the old 
boys’ network (Shapira). Or, then again, maybe locating the potential for political agency within 
any gender role is misguided or doomed to fail. Any of these possibilities require cultural back-
up to be successful; in order to change spycraft, the public has to consider different possibilities 
for spycraft. As scholars and critics, we can leverage our expertise for the uncovering and 
advocating for new arrangements of genres, forms, and tropes to disrupt the institutional rigidity 
of a cultural lattice. Any cultural discourse is larger and more fluid than the piece of it that 
becomes routinized and rigid through constant reference. We can and should use cultural 
analysis to position disruptions to easy frames of reference—garden gnomes that unsettle the 
cultural latticework. 24 needs not to be the “go-to” understanding of enhanced interrogation and 
torture for the public at large. Critics need to be involved in that disentangling. Of course, 
academia is not a monolith, nor is there a vast and empty “public” out there waiting to be filled 
with “the right kind of ideas” about culture. Encouraging individual scholars to make arguments 
that include proscriptions or prescriptions invites vigorous disagreement and debate. To this, I 
say good—at least let’s make it a more public debate, a more inclusive and more meaningful 
one. 
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